git/Documentation, branch v2.30.4Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/git/git.git/
https://git.shady.money/git/atom?h=v2.30.42022-04-13T20:31:29ZGit 2.30.42022-04-13T20:31:29ZJunio C Hamanogitster@pobox.com2022-04-13T20:31:29Zurn:sha1:17083c79ae842b51d82518e2efe5281346acea0e
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
setup: opt-out of check with safe.directory=*2022-04-13T19:42:51ZDerrick Stoleederrickstolee@github.com2022-04-13T15:32:31Zurn:sha1:0f85c4a30b072a26d74af8bbf63cc8f6a5dfc1b8
With the addition of the safe.directory in 8959555ce
(setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory,
2022-03-02) released in v2.35.2, we are receiving feedback from a
variety of users about the feature.
Some users have a very large list of shared repositories and find it
cumbersome to add this config for every one of them.
In a more difficult case, certain workflows involve running Git commands
within containers. The container boundary prevents any global or system
config from communicating `safe.directory` values from the host into the
container. Further, the container almost always runs as a different user
than the owner of the directory in the host.
To simplify the reactions necessary for these users, extend the
definition of the safe.directory config value to include a possible '*'
value. This value implies that all directories are safe, providing a
single setting to opt-out of this protection.
Note that an empty assignment of safe.directory clears all previous
values, and this is already the case with the "if (!value || !*value)"
condition.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Git 2.30.32022-03-23T23:22:17ZJohannes Schindelinjohannes.schindelin@gmx.de2022-03-17T09:15:15Zurn:sha1:cb95038137e9e66fc6a6b4a0e8db62bcc521b709
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory2022-03-21T12:16:26ZJohannes Schindelinjohannes.schindelin@gmx.de2022-03-02T11:23:04Zurn:sha1:8959555cee7ec045958f9b6dd62e541affb7e7d9
It poses a security risk to search for a git directory outside of the
directories owned by the current user.
For example, it is common e.g. in computer pools of educational
institutes to have a "scratch" space: a mounted disk with plenty of
space that is regularly swiped where any authenticated user can create
a directory to do their work. Merely navigating to such a space with a
Git-enabled `PS1` when there is a maliciously-crafted `/scratch/.git/`
can lead to a compromised account.
The same holds true in multi-user setups running Windows, as `C:\` is
writable to every authenticated user by default.
To plug this vulnerability, we stop Git from accepting top-level
directories owned by someone other than the current user. We avoid
looking at the ownership of each and every directories between the
current and the top-level one (if there are any between) to avoid
introducing a performance bottleneck.
This new default behavior is obviously incompatible with the concept of
shared repositories, where we expect the top-level directory to be owned
by only one of its legitimate users. To re-enable that use case, we add
support for adding exceptions from the new default behavior via the
config setting `safe.directory`.
The `safe.directory` config setting is only respected in the system and
global configs, not from repository configs or via the command-line, and
can have multiple values to allow for multiple shared repositories.
We are particularly careful to provide a helpful message to any user
trying to use a shared repository.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Git 2.30.22021-02-12T14:51:13ZJohannes Schindelinjohannes.schindelin@gmx.de2021-02-12T14:51:13Zurn:sha1:94f6e3e283f2adfc518b39cfc39291f1c2832ad0
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Sync with 2.29.32021-02-12T14:51:12ZJohannes Schindelinjohannes.schindelin@gmx.de2021-02-12T14:51:12Zurn:sha1:e4e68081bb811672b069eb1d6c97e57dd0764d51
* maint-2.29:
Git 2.29.3
Git 2.28.1
Git 2.27.1
Git 2.26.3
Git 2.25.5
Git 2.24.4
Git 2.23.4
Git 2.22.5
Git 2.21.4
Git 2.20.5
Git 2.19.6
Git 2.18.5
Git 2.17.6
unpack_trees(): start with a fresh lstat cache
run-command: invalidate lstat cache after a command finished
checkout: fix bug that makes checkout follow symlinks in leading path
Git 2.29.32021-02-12T14:50:15ZJohannes Schindelinjohannes.schindelin@gmx.de2021-02-12T14:50:15Zurn:sha1:0628636d0c21324ae0f11be591611c6b1e55705f
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Sync with 2.28.12021-02-12T14:50:14ZJohannes Schindelinjohannes.schindelin@gmx.de2021-02-12T14:50:14Zurn:sha1:d7bdabe52fbbde2ec1cbabdc8bdc737a8ead26aa
* maint-2.28:
Git 2.28.1
Git 2.27.1
Git 2.26.3
Git 2.25.5
Git 2.24.4
Git 2.23.4
Git 2.22.5
Git 2.21.4
Git 2.20.5
Git 2.19.6
Git 2.18.5
Git 2.17.6
unpack_trees(): start with a fresh lstat cache
run-command: invalidate lstat cache after a command finished
checkout: fix bug that makes checkout follow symlinks in leading path
Git 2.28.12021-02-12T14:50:10ZJohannes Schindelinjohannes.schindelin@gmx.de2021-02-12T14:50:10Zurn:sha1:e4f4299859610638e45ec1a36266973b9a4eb47a
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Sync with 2.27.12021-02-12T14:50:09ZJohannes Schindelinjohannes.schindelin@gmx.de2021-02-12T14:50:09Zurn:sha1:3f01e56686b2fd08d919306717764391409ac81e
* maint-2.27:
Git 2.27.1
Git 2.26.3
Git 2.25.5
Git 2.24.4
Git 2.23.4
Git 2.22.5
Git 2.21.4
Git 2.20.5
Git 2.19.6
Git 2.18.5
Git 2.17.6
unpack_trees(): start with a fresh lstat cache
run-command: invalidate lstat cache after a command finished
checkout: fix bug that makes checkout follow symlinks in leading path