git/config.c, branch v2.41.2

Merge branch 'fixes/2.45.1/2.40' into fixes/2.45.1/2.41

2024-05-24T23:57:02Z

* fixes/2.45.1/2.40: Revert "fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir" Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents" clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning" init: use the correct path of the templates directory again hook: plug a new memory leak ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object send-email: drop FakeTerm hack

Merge branch 'jc/fix-2.45.1-and-friends-for-2.39' into fixes/2.45.1/2.40

2024-05-24T19:29:36Z

Revert overly aggressive "layered defence" that went into 2.45.1 and friends, which broke "git-lfs", "git-annex", and other use cases, so that we can rebuild necessary counterparts in the open. * jc/fix-2.45.1-and-friends-for-2.39: Revert "fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir" Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents" clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning" init: use the correct path of the templates directory again hook: plug a new memory leak ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object send-email: drop FakeTerm hack

Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning"

2024-05-21T19:33:08Z

This defense-in-depth was intended to protect the clone operation against future escalations where bugs in `git clone` would allow attackers to write arbitrary files in the `.git/` directory would allow for Remote Code Execution attacks via maliciously-placed hooks. However, it turns out that the `core.hooksPath` protection has unintentional side effects so severe that they do not justify the benefit of the protections. For example, it has been reported in https://lore.kernel.org/git/FAFA34CB-9732-4A0A-87FB-BDB272E6AEE8@alchemists.io/ that the following invocation, which is intended to make `git clone` safer, is itself broken by that protective measure: git clone --config core.hooksPath=/dev/null Since it turns out that the benefit does not justify the cost, let's revert 20f3588efc6 (core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning, 2024-03-30). Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano

Sync with 2.40.2

2024-04-19T10:38:42Z

* maint-2.40: (39 commits) Git 2.40.2 Git 2.39.4 fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone Add a helper function to compare file contents init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter entry: report more colliding paths t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/' docs: document security issues around untrusted .git dirs upload-pack: disable lazy-fetching by default ...

Sync with 2.39.4

2024-04-19T10:38:37Z

* maint-2.39: (38 commits) Git 2.39.4 fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone Add a helper function to compare file contents init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter entry: report more colliding paths t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/' docs: document security issues around untrusted .git dirs upload-pack: disable lazy-fetching by default fetch/clone: detect dubious ownership of local repositories ...

core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning

2024-04-19T10:38:24Z

Quite frequently, when vulnerabilities were found in Git's (quite complex) clone machinery, a relatively common way to escalate the severity was to trick Git into running a hook which is actually a script that has just been laid on disk as part of that clone. This constitutes a Remote Code Execution vulnerability, the highest severity observed in Git's vulnerabilities so far. Some previously-fixed vulnerabilities allowed malicious repositories to be crafted such that Git would check out files not in the worktree, but in, say, a submodule's `/hooks/` directory. A vulnerability that "merely" allows to modify the Git config would allow a related attack vector, to manipulate Git into looking in the worktree for hooks, e.g. redirecting the location where Git looks for hooks, via setting `core.hooksPath` (which would be classified as CWE-427: Uncontrolled Search Path Element and CWE-114: Process Control, for more details see https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/427.html and https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/114.html). To prevent that attack vector, let's error out and complain loudly if an active `core.hooksPath` configuration is seen in the repository-local Git config during a `git clone`. There is one caveat: This changes Git's behavior in a slightly backwards-incompatible manner. While it is probably a rare scenario (if it exists at all) to configure `core.hooksPath` via a config in the Git templates, it _is_ conceivable that some valid setup requires this to work. In the hopefully very unlikely case that a user runs into this, there is an escape hatch: set the `GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE=false` environment variable. Obviously, this should be done only with utmost caution. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin

Merge branch 'en/header-split-cache-h-part-2'

2023-05-09T23:45:46Z

More header clean-up. * en/header-split-cache-h-part-2: (22 commits) reftable: ensure git-compat-util.h is the first (indirect) include diff.h: reduce unnecessary includes object-store.h: reduce unnecessary includes commit.h: reduce unnecessary includes fsmonitor: reduce includes of cache.h cache.h: remove unnecessary headers treewide: remove cache.h inclusion due to previous changes cache,tree: move basic name compare functions from read-cache to tree cache,tree: move cmp_cache_name_compare from tree.[ch] to read-cache.c hash-ll.h: split out of hash.h to remove dependency on repository.h tree-diff.c: move S_DIFFTREE_IFXMIN_NEQ define from cache.h dir.h: move DTYPE defines from cache.h versioncmp.h: move declarations for versioncmp.c functions from cache.h ws.h: move declarations for ws.c functions from cache.h match-trees.h: move declarations for match-trees.c functions from cache.h pkt-line.h: move declarations for pkt-line.c functions from cache.h base85.h: move declarations for base85.c functions from cache.h copy.h: move declarations for copy.c functions from cache.h server-info.h: move declarations for server-info.c functions from cache.h packfile.h: move pack_window and pack_entry from cache.h ...

Merge branch 'en/header-split-cache-h'

2023-04-25T20:56:20Z

Header clean-up. * en/header-split-cache-h: (24 commits) protocol.h: move definition of DEFAULT_GIT_PORT from cache.h mailmap, quote: move declarations of global vars to correct unit treewide: reduce includes of cache.h in other headers treewide: remove double forward declaration of read_in_full cache.h: remove unnecessary includes treewide: remove cache.h inclusion due to pager.h changes pager.h: move declarations for pager.c functions from cache.h treewide: remove cache.h inclusion due to editor.h changes editor: move editor-related functions and declarations into common file treewide: remove cache.h inclusion due to object.h changes object.h: move some inline functions and defines from cache.h treewide: remove cache.h inclusion due to object-file.h changes object-file.h: move declarations for object-file.c functions from cache.h treewide: remove cache.h inclusion due to git-zlib changes git-zlib: move declarations for git-zlib functions from cache.h treewide: remove cache.h inclusion due to object-name.h changes object-name.h: move declarations for object-name.c functions from cache.h treewide: remove unnecessary cache.h inclusion treewide: be explicit about dependence on mem-pool.h treewide: be explicit about dependence on oid-array.h ...

Sync with Git 2.40.1

2023-04-25T05:31:32Z

treewide: remove cache.h inclusion due to previous changes

2023-04-24T19:47:33Z

Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano