<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>git/fsck.c, branch v2.21.3</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/git/git.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/git/atom?h=v2.21.3</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/git/atom?h=v2.21.3'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/'/>
<updated>2020-04-19T23:30:08Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Git 2.21.3</title>
<updated>2020-04-19T23:30:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jonathan Nieder</name>
<email>jrnieder@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-19T23:30:08Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=9206d27eb5e76bbb3a4e59e3c53f92eaa0caa97b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9206d27eb5e76bbb3a4e59e3c53f92eaa0caa97b</id>
<content type='text'>
This merges up the security fix from v2.17.5.

Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder &lt;jrnieder@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Git 2.20.4</title>
<updated>2020-04-19T23:28:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jonathan Nieder</name>
<email>jrnieder@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-19T23:28:57Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=041bc65923e13313ca1b77681c3b2950b5e0a163'/>
<id>urn:sha1:041bc65923e13313ca1b77681c3b2950b5e0a163</id>
<content type='text'>
This merges up the security fix from v2.17.5.

Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder &lt;jrnieder@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Git 2.19.5</title>
<updated>2020-04-19T23:26:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jonathan Nieder</name>
<email>jrnieder@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-19T23:26:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=76b54ee9b9944ee70422ac24884f78769cf264f1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:76b54ee9b9944ee70422ac24884f78769cf264f1</id>
<content type='text'>
This merges up the security fix from v2.17.5.

Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder &lt;jrnieder@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Git 2.18.4</title>
<updated>2020-04-19T23:24:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jonathan Nieder</name>
<email>jrnieder@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-19T23:24:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=ba6f0905fdb9e65c1ac5fbc79c9a4ef0b59b3e68'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ba6f0905fdb9e65c1ac5fbc79c9a4ef0b59b3e68</id>
<content type='text'>
This merges up the security fix from v2.17.5.

Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder &lt;jrnieder@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fsck: reject URL with empty host in .gitmodules</title>
<updated>2020-04-19T23:10:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jonathan Nieder</name>
<email>jrnieder@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-19T03:57:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=1a3609e402a062ef7b11f197fe96c28cabca132c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1a3609e402a062ef7b11f197fe96c28cabca132c</id>
<content type='text'>
Git's URL parser interprets

	https:///example.com/repo.git

to have no host and a path of "example.com/repo.git".  Curl, on the
other hand, internally redirects it to https://example.com/repo.git.  As
a result, until "credential: parse URL without host as empty host, not
unset", tricking a user into fetching from such a URL would cause Git to
send credentials for another host to example.com.

Teach fsck to block and detect .gitmodules files using such a URL to
prevent sharing them with Git versions that are not yet protected.

A relative URL in a .gitmodules file could also be used to trigger this.
The relative URL resolver used for .gitmodules does not normalize
sequences of slashes and can follow ".." components out of the path part
and to the host part of a URL, meaning that such a relative URL can be
used to traverse from a https://foo.example.com/innocent superproject to
a https:///attacker.example.com/exploit submodule. Fortunately,
redundant extra slashes in .gitmodules are rare, so we can catch this by
detecting one after a leading sequence of "./" and "../" components.

Helped-by: Jeff King &lt;peff@peff.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder &lt;jrnieder@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff King &lt;peff@peff.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>credential: treat URL without scheme as invalid</title>
<updated>2020-04-19T23:10:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jonathan Nieder</name>
<email>jrnieder@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-19T03:54:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=c44088ecc4b0722636e0a305f9608d3047197282'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c44088ecc4b0722636e0a305f9608d3047197282</id>
<content type='text'>
libcurl permits making requests without a URL scheme specified.  In
this case, it guesses the URL from the hostname, so I can run

	git ls-remote http::ftp.example.com/path/to/repo

and it would make an FTP request.

Any user intentionally using such a URL is likely to have made a typo.
Unfortunately, credential_from_url is not able to determine the host and
protocol in order to determine appropriate credentials to send, and
until "credential: refuse to operate when missing host or protocol",
this resulted in another host's credentials being leaked to the named
host.

Teach credential_from_url_gently to consider such a URL to be invalid
so that fsck can detect and block gitmodules files with such URLs,
allowing server operators to avoid serving them to downstream users
running older versions of Git.

This also means that when such URLs are passed on the command line, Git
will print a clearer error so affected users can switch to the simpler
URL that explicitly specifies the host and protocol they intend.

One subtlety: .gitmodules files can contain relative URLs, representing
a URL relative to the URL they were cloned from.  The relative URL
resolver used for .gitmodules can follow ".." components out of the path
part and past the host part of a URL, meaning that such a relative URL
can be used to traverse from a https://foo.example.com/innocent
superproject to a https::attacker.example.com/exploit submodule.
Fortunately a leading ':' in the first path component after a series of
leading './' and '../' components is unlikely to show up in other
contexts, so we can catch this by detecting that pattern.

Reported-by: Jeff King &lt;peff@peff.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder &lt;jrnieder@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff King &lt;peff@peff.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fsck: convert gitmodules url to URL passed to curl</title>
<updated>2020-04-19T23:10:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jonathan Nieder</name>
<email>jrnieder@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-19T03:52:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=a2b26ffb1a81aa23dd14453f4db05d8fe24ee7cc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a2b26ffb1a81aa23dd14453f4db05d8fe24ee7cc</id>
<content type='text'>
In 07259e74ec1 (fsck: detect gitmodules URLs with embedded newlines,
2020-03-11), git fsck learned to check whether URLs in .gitmodules could
be understood by the credential machinery when they are handled by
git-remote-curl.

However, the check is overbroad: it checks all URLs instead of only
URLs that would be passed to git-remote-curl. In principle a git:// or
file:/// URL does not need to follow the same conventions as an http://
URL; in particular, git:// and file:// protocols are not succeptible to
issues in the credential API because they do not support attaching
credentials.

In the HTTP case, the URL in .gitmodules does not always match the URL
that would be passed to git-remote-curl and the credential machinery:
Git's URL syntax allows specifying a remote helper followed by a "::"
delimiter and a URL to be passed to it, so that

	git ls-remote http::https://example.com/repo.git

invokes git-remote-http with https://example.com/repo.git as its URL
argument. With today's checks, that distinction does not make a
difference, but for a check we are about to introduce (for empty URL
schemes) it will matter.

.gitmodules files also support relative URLs. To ensure coverage for the
https based embedded-newline attack, urldecode and check them directly
for embedded newlines.

Helped-by: Jeff King &lt;peff@peff.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder &lt;jrnieder@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff King &lt;peff@peff.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Git 2.21.2</title>
<updated>2020-03-17T21:16:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Junio C Hamano</name>
<email>gitster@pobox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-17T21:16:08Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=fe2268649423eba889e942293e9c98c781277bf2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fe2268649423eba889e942293e9c98c781277bf2</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano &lt;gitster@pobox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Git 2.20.3</title>
<updated>2020-03-17T20:46:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Junio C Hamano</name>
<email>gitster@pobox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-17T20:42:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=d1259ce117d0714f1441956805612fb36d7ce7f8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d1259ce117d0714f1441956805612fb36d7ce7f8</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano &lt;gitster@pobox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Git 2.19.4</title>
<updated>2020-03-17T20:43:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Junio C Hamano</name>
<email>gitster@pobox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-17T20:37:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=a5979d7009017c79b0100b7b66e8567b3ad7b022'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a5979d7009017c79b0100b7b66e8567b3ad7b022</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano &lt;gitster@pobox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
