git/gpg-interface.h, branch v2.50.0

gpg-interface: fix misdesigned signing key interfaces

2024-09-05T15:49:11Z

The interfaces to retrieve signing keys and their IDs are misdesigned as they return string constants even though they indeed allocate memory, which leads to memory leaks. Refactor the code to instead always return allocated strings and let the callers free them accordingly. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano

tag: fix sign_buffer() call to create a signed tag

2024-02-07T18:47:25Z

The command "git tag -s" internally calls sign_buffer() to make a cryptographic signature using the chosen backend like GPG and SSH. The internal helper functions used by "git tag" implementation seem to use a "negative return values are errors, zero or positive return values are not" convention, and there are places (e.g., verify_tag() that calls gpg_verify_tag()) that these internal helper functions translate return values that signal errors to conform to this convention, but do_sign() that calls sign_buffer() forgets to do so. Fix it, so that a failed call to sign_buffer() that can return the exit status from pipe_command() will not be overlooked. Reported-by: Sergey Kosukhin Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano

gpg-interface: lazily initialize and read the configuration

2023-02-10T01:01:27Z

Instead of forcing the porcelain commands to always read the configuration variables related to the signing and verifying signatures, lazily initialize the necessary subsystem on demand upon the first use. This hopefully would make it more future-proof as we do not have to think and decide whether we should call git_gpg_config() in the git_config() callback for each command. A few git_config() callback functions that used to be custom callbacks are now just a thin wrapper around git_default_config(). We could further remove, git_FOO_config and replace calls to git_config(git_FOO_config) with git_config(git_default_config), but to make it clear which ones are affected and the effect is only the removal of git_gpg_config(), it is vastly preferred not to do such a change in this step (they can be done on top once the dust settled). Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano

gpg-interface: add function for converting trust level to string

2022-07-11T05:10:23Z

Add new helper function `gpg_trust_level_to_str()` which will convert a given member of `enum signature_trust_level` to its corresponding string (in lowercase). For example, `TRUST_ULTIMATE` will yield the string "ultimate". This will abstract out some code in `pretty.c` relating to gpg signature trust levels. Mentored-by: Christian Couder Mentored-by: Hariom Verma Signed-off-by: Jaydeep Das Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano

ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime

2021-12-09T21:38:04Z

If valid-before/after dates are configured for this signatures key in the allowedSigners file then the verification should check if the key was valid at the time the commit was made. This allows for graceful key rollover and revoking keys without invalidating all previous commits. This feature needs openssh > 8.8. Older ssh-keygen versions will simply ignore this flag and use the current time. Strictly speaking this feature is available in 8.7, but since 8.7 has a bug that makes it unusable in another needed call we require 8.8. Timestamp information is present on most invocations of check_signature. However signer ident is not. We will need the signer email / name to be able to implement "Trust on first use" functionality later. Since the payload contains all necessary information we can parse it from there. The caller only needs to provide us some info about the payload by setting payload_type in the signature_check struct. - Add payload_type field & enum and payload_timestamp to struct signature_check - Populate the timestamp when not already set if we know about the payload type - Pass -Overify-time={payload_timestamp} in the users timezone to all ssh-keygen verification calls - Set the payload type when verifying commits - Add tests for expired, not yet valid and keys having a commit date outside of key validity as well as within Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano

ssh signing: use sigc struct to pass payload

2021-12-09T21:38:04Z

To be able to extend the payload metadata with things like its creation timestamp or the creators ident we remove the payload parameters to check_signature() and use the already existing sigc->payload field instead, only adding the length field to the struct. This also allows us to get rid of the xmemdupz() calls in the verify functions. Since sigc is now used to input data as well as output the result move it to the front of the function list. - Add payload_length to struct signature_check - Populate sigc.payload/payload_len on all call sites - Remove payload parameters to check_signature() - Remove payload parameters to internal verify_* functions and use sigc instead - Remove xmemdupz() used for verbose output since payload is now already populated. Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano

ssh signing: provide a textual signing_key_id

2021-09-10T21:15:52Z

For ssh the user.signingkey can be a filename/path or even a literal ssh pubkey. In push certs and textual output we prefer the ssh fingerprint instead. Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano

ssh signing: preliminary refactoring and clean-up

2021-09-10T21:15:51Z

Openssh v8.2p1 added some new options to ssh-keygen for signature creation and verification. These allow us to use ssh keys for git signatures easily. In our corporate environment we use PIV x509 Certs on Yubikeys for email signing/encryption and ssh keys which I think is quite common (at least for the email part). This way we can establish the correct trust for the SSH Keys without setting up a separate GPG Infrastructure (which is still quite painful for users) or implementing x509 signing support for git (which lacks good forwarding mechanisms). Using ssh agent forwarding makes this feature easily usable in todays development environments where code is often checked out in remote VMs / containers. In such a setup the keyring & revocationKeyring can be centrally generated from the x509 CA information and distributed to the users. To be able to implement new signing formats this commit: - makes the sigc structure more generic by renaming "gpg_output" to "output" - introduces function pointers in the gpg_format structure to call format specific signing and verification functions - moves format detection from verify_signed_buffer into the check_signature api function and calls the format specific verify - renames and wraps sign_buffer to handle format specific signing logic as well Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano

gpg-interface: improve interface for parsing tags

2021-02-11T07:35:42Z

We have a function which parses a buffer with a signature at the end, parse_signature, and this function is used for signed tags. However, we'll need to store values for multiple algorithms, and we'll do this by using a header for the non-default algorithm. Adjust the parse_signature interface to store the parsed data in two strbufs and turn the existing function into parse_signed_buffer. The latter is still used in places where we know we always have a signed buffer, such as push certs. Adjust all the callers to deal with this new interface. Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano

gpg-interface: prefer check_signature() for GPG verification

2020-03-15T16:46:28Z

This commit refactors the use of verify_signed_buffer() outside of gpg-interface.c to use check_signature() instead. It also turns verify_signed_buffer() into a file-local function since it's now only invoked internally by check_signature(). There were previously two globally scoped functions used in different parts of Git to perform GPG signature verification: verify_signed_buffer() and check_signature(). Now only check_signature() is used. The verify_signed_buffer() function doesn't guard against duplicate signatures as described by Michał Górny [1]. Instead it only ensures a non-erroneous exit code from GPG and the presence of at least one GOODSIG status field. This stands in contrast with check_signature() that returns an error if more than one signature is encountered. The lower degree of verification makes the use of verify_signed_buffer() problematic if callers don't parse and validate the various parts of the GPG status message themselves. And processing these messages seems like a task that should be reserved to gpg-interface.c with the function check_signature(). Furthermore, the use of verify_signed_buffer() makes it difficult to introduce new functionality that relies on the content of the GPG status lines. Now all operations that does signature verification share a single entry point to gpg-interface.c. This makes it easier to propagate changed or additional functionality in GPG signature verification to all parts of Git, without having odd edge-cases that don't perform the same degree of verification. [1] https://dev.gentoo.org/~mgorny/articles/attack-on-git-signature-verification.html Signed-off-by: Hans Jerry Illikainen Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano