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<title>git/wrapper.c, branch v2.37.2</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/git/git.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/git/atom?h=v2.37.2</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/git/atom?h=v2.37.2'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/'/>
<updated>2022-05-20T22:26:59Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'ep/maint-equals-null-cocci'</title>
<updated>2022-05-20T22:26:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Junio C Hamano</name>
<email>gitster@pobox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-20T22:26:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=538dc459a0331c48b893c9f6ca0be5917860bb99'/>
<id>urn:sha1:538dc459a0331c48b893c9f6ca0be5917860bb99</id>
<content type='text'>
Introduce and apply coccinelle rule to discourage an explicit
comparison between a pointer and NULL, and applies the clean-up to
the maintenance track.

* ep/maint-equals-null-cocci:
  tree-wide: apply equals-null.cocci
  tree-wide: apply equals-null.cocci
  contrib/coccinnelle: add equals-null.cocci
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tree-wide: apply equals-null.cocci</title>
<updated>2022-05-02T16:50:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Junio C Hamano</name>
<email>gitster@pobox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-02T16:50:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=afe8a9070bc62db9cfde1e30147178c40d391d93'/>
<id>urn:sha1:afe8a9070bc62db9cfde1e30147178c40d391d93</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano &lt;gitster@pobox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>trace2: add stats for fsync operations</title>
<updated>2022-03-30T18:15:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Neeraj Singh</name>
<email>neerajsi@microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-30T05:06:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=9a4987677d3f65e8cd93b9e77216f0f1026cd9b2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9a4987677d3f65e8cd93b9e77216f0f1026cd9b2</id>
<content type='text'>
Add some global trace2 statistics for the number of fsyncs performed
during the lifetime of a Git process.

These stats are printed as part of trace2_cmd_exit_fl, which is
presumably where we might want to print any other cross-cutting
statistics.

Signed-off-by: Neeraj Singh &lt;neerajsi@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano &lt;gitster@pobox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>core.fsyncmethod: add writeout-only mode</title>
<updated>2022-03-10T23:10:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Neeraj Singh</name>
<email>neerajsi@microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-10T22:43:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=abf38abec201cded6094801766d69e11a6c112b6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:abf38abec201cded6094801766d69e11a6c112b6</id>
<content type='text'>
This commit introduces the `core.fsyncMethod` configuration
knob, which can currently be set to `fsync` or `writeout-only`.

The new writeout-only mode attempts to tell the operating system to
flush its in-memory page cache to the storage hardware without issuing a
CACHE_FLUSH command to the storage controller.

Writeout-only fsync is significantly faster than a vanilla fsync on
common hardware, since data is written to a disk-side cache rather than
all the way to a durable medium. Later changes in this patch series will
take advantage of this primitive to implement batching of hardware
flushes.

When git_fsync is called with FSYNC_WRITEOUT_ONLY, it may fail and the
caller is expected to do an ordinary fsync as needed.

On Apple platforms, the fsync system call does not issue a CACHE_FLUSH
directive to the storage controller. This change updates fsync to do
fcntl(F_FULLFSYNC) to make fsync actually durable. We maintain parity
with existing behavior on Apple platforms by setting the default value
of the new core.fsyncMethod option.

Signed-off-by: Neeraj Singh &lt;neerajsi@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano &lt;gitster@pobox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wrapper: make inclusion of Windows csprng header tightly scoped</title>
<updated>2022-03-10T23:10:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Neeraj Singh</name>
<email>neerajsi@microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-10T22:43:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=19d3f228c8df7e946278c96fb52acf1cea0f6a7a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:19d3f228c8df7e946278c96fb52acf1cea0f6a7a</id>
<content type='text'>
Including NTSecAPI.h in git-compat-util.h causes build errors in any
other file that includes winternl.h. NTSecAPI.h was included in order to
get access to the RtlGenRandom cryptographically secure PRNG. This
change scopes the inclusion of ntsecapi.h to wrapper.c, which is the only
place that it's actually needed.

The build breakage is due to the definition of UNICODE_STRING in
NtSecApi.h:
    #ifndef _NTDEF_
    typedef LSA_UNICODE_STRING UNICODE_STRING, *PUNICODE_STRING;
    typedef LSA_STRING STRING, *PSTRING ;
    #endif

LsaLookup.h:
    typedef struct _LSA_UNICODE_STRING {
        USHORT Length;
        USHORT MaximumLength;
    #ifdef MIDL_PASS
        [size_is(MaximumLength/2), length_is(Length/2)]
    #endif // MIDL_PASS
        PWSTR  Buffer;
    } LSA_UNICODE_STRING, *PLSA_UNICODE_STRING;

winternl.h also defines UNICODE_STRING:
    typedef struct _UNICODE_STRING {
        USHORT Length;
        USHORT MaximumLength;
        PWSTR  Buffer;
    } UNICODE_STRING;
    typedef UNICODE_STRING *PUNICODE_STRING;

Both definitions have equivalent layouts. Apparently these internal
Windows headers aren't designed to be included together. This is
an oversight in the headers and does not represent an incompatibility
between the APIs.

Signed-off-by: Neeraj Singh &lt;neerajsi@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano &lt;gitster@pobox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wrapper: use a CSPRNG to generate random file names</title>
<updated>2022-01-17T22:17:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>brian m. carlson</name>
<email>sandals@crustytoothpaste.net</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-17T21:56:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=47efda967cfd4ef9d39de149e1e3654b051e5d19'/>
<id>urn:sha1:47efda967cfd4ef9d39de149e1e3654b051e5d19</id>
<content type='text'>
The current way we generate random file names is by taking the seconds
and microseconds, plus the PID, and mixing them together, then encoding
them.  If this fails, we increment the value by 7777, and try again up
to TMP_MAX times.

Unfortunately, this is not the best idea from a security perspective.
If we're writing into TMPDIR, an attacker can guess these values easily
and prevent us from creating any temporary files at all by creating them
all first.  Even though we set TMP_MAX to 16384, this may be achievable
in some contexts, even if unlikely to occur in practice.

Fortunately, we can simply solve this by using the system
cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG) to
generate a random 64-bit value, and use that as before.  Note that there
is still a small bias here, but because a six-character sequence chosen
out of 62 characters provides about 36 bits of entropy, the bias here is
less than 2^-28, which is acceptable, especially considering we'll retry
several times.

Note that the use of a CSPRNG in generating temporary file names is also
used in many libcs.  glibc recently changed from an approach similar to
ours to using a CSPRNG, and FreeBSD and OpenBSD also use a CSPRNG in
this case.  Even if the likelihood of an attack is low, we should still
be at least as responsible in creating temporary files as libc is.

Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson &lt;sandals@crustytoothpaste.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano &lt;gitster@pobox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wrapper: add a helper to generate numbers from a CSPRNG</title>
<updated>2022-01-17T22:17:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>brian m. carlson</name>
<email>sandals@crustytoothpaste.net</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-17T21:56:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=05cd988dce58ba4cd46d4b3e79deacd86b34dc52'/>
<id>urn:sha1:05cd988dce58ba4cd46d4b3e79deacd86b34dc52</id>
<content type='text'>
There are many situations in which having access to a cryptographically
secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG) is helpful.  In the
future, we'll encounter one of these when dealing with temporary files.
To make this possible, let's add a function which reads from a system
CSPRNG and returns some bytes.

We know that all systems will have such an interface.  A CSPRNG is
required for a secure TLS or SSH implementation and a Git implementation
which provided neither would be of little practical use.  In addition,
POSIX is set to standardize getentropy(2) in the next version, so in the
(potentially distant) future we can rely on that.

For systems which lack one of the other interfaces, we provide the
ability to use OpenSSL's CSPRNG.  OpenSSL is highly portable and
functions on practically every known OS, and we know it will have access
to some source of cryptographically secure randomness.  We also provide
support for the arc4random in libbsd for folks who would prefer to use
that.

Because this is a security sensitive interface, we take some
precautions.  We either succeed by filling the buffer completely as we
requested, or we fail.  We don't return partial data because the caller
will almost never find that to be a useful behavior.

Specify a makefile knob which users can use to specify one or more
suitable CSPRNGs, and turn the multiple string options into a set of
defines, since we cannot match on strings in the preprocessor.  We allow
multiple options to make the job of handling this in autoconf easier.

The order of options is important here.  On systems with arc4random,
which is most of the BSDs, we use that, since, except on MirBSD and
macOS, it uses ChaCha20, which is extremely fast, and sits entirely in
userspace, avoiding a system call.  We then prefer getrandom over
getentropy, because the former has been available longer on Linux, and
then OpenSSL. Finally, if none of those are available, we use
/dev/urandom, because most Unix-like operating systems provide that API.
We prefer options that don't involve device files when possible because
those work in some restricted environments where device files may not be
available.

Set the configuration variables appropriately for Linux and the BSDs,
including macOS, as well as Windows and NonStop.  We specifically only
consider versions which receive publicly available security support
here.  For the same reason, we don't specify getrandom(2) on Linux,
because CentOS 7 doesn't support it in glibc (although its kernel does)
and we don't want to resort to making syscalls.

Finally, add a test helper to allow this to be tested by hand and in
tests.  We don't add any tests, since invoking the CSPRNG is not likely
to produce interesting, reproducible results.

Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson &lt;sandals@crustytoothpaste.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano &lt;gitster@pobox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wrapper: remove xunsetenv()</title>
<updated>2021-10-29T21:59:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón</name>
<email>carenas@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-29T21:27:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=6fc527a8d05141335799f27bfbaab28c8625c31b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6fc527a8d05141335799f27bfbaab28c8625c31b</id>
<content type='text'>
Remove the unused wrapper function.

Reported-by: Randall S. Becker &lt;rsbecker@nexbridge.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón &lt;carenas@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano &lt;gitster@pobox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wrapper.c: add x{un,}setenv(), and use xsetenv() in environment.c</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T20:15:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason</name>
<email>avarab@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-21T13:12:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=3540c71ea5ddffff6e473249866cbc7abb8ce509'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3540c71ea5ddffff6e473249866cbc7abb8ce509</id>
<content type='text'>
Add fatal wrappers for setenv() and unsetenv(). In d7ac12b25d3 (Add
set_git_dir() function, 2007-08-01) we started checking its return
value, and since 48988c4d0c3 (set_git_dir: die when setenv() fails,
2018-03-30) we've had set_git_dir_1() die if we couldn't set it.

Let's provide a wrapper for both, this will be useful in many other
places, a subsequent patch will make another use of xsetenv().

The checking of the return value here is over-eager according to
setenv(3) and POSIX. It's documented as returning just -1 or 0, so
perhaps we should be checking -1 explicitly.

Let's just instead die on any non-zero, if our C library is so broken
as to return something else than -1 on error (and perhaps not set
errno?) the worst we'll do is die with a nonsensical errno value, but
we'll want to die in either case.

Let's make these return "void" instead of "int". As far as I can tell
there's no other x*() wrappers that needed to make the decision of
deviating from the signature in the C library, but since their return
value is only used to indicate errors (so we'd die here), we can catch
unreachable code such as

    if (xsetenv(...) &lt; 0)
        [...];

I think it would be OK skip the NULL check of the "name" here for the
calls to die_errno(). Almost all of our setenv() callers are taking a
constant string hardcoded in the source as the first argument, and for
the rest we can probably assume they've done the NULL check
themselves. Even if they didn't, modern C libraries are forgiving
about it (e.g. glibc formatting it as "(null)"), on those that aren't,
well, we were about to die anyway. But let's include the check anyway
for good measure.

1. https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/009604499/functions/setenv.html

Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason &lt;avarab@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano &lt;gitster@pobox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xopen: explicitly report creation failures</title>
<updated>2021-08-25T21:39:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>René Scharfe</name>
<email>l.s.r@web.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-08-25T20:14:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/git/commit/?id=a7439d0f9dd291e7cc9e6c2dda19cbfdf09b62ee'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a7439d0f9dd291e7cc9e6c2dda19cbfdf09b62ee</id>
<content type='text'>
If the flags O_CREAT and O_EXCL are both given then open(2) is supposed
to create the file and error out if it already exists.  The error
message in that case looks like this:

	fatal: could not open 'foo' for writing: File exists

Without further context this is confusing: Why should the existence of
the file pose a problem?  Isn't that a requirement for writing to it?

Add a more specific error message for that case to tell the user that we
actually don't expect the file to preexist, so the example becomes:

	fatal: unable to create 'foo': File exists

Signed-off-by: René Scharfe &lt;l.s.r@web.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano &lt;gitster@pobox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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