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authorGlen Choo <chooglen@google.com>2022-07-14 21:28:01 +0000
committerJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>2022-07-14 15:08:29 -0700
commit8d1a7448206e11cdea657c35b04cc49db39be933 (patch)
treeadb883132f48ef4f809f7ed2fd4b633850998ee9
parentsafe.directory: use git_protected_config() (diff)
downloadgit-8d1a7448206e11cdea657c35b04cc49db39be933.tar.gz
git-8d1a7448206e11cdea657c35b04cc49db39be933.zip
setup.c: create `safe.bareRepository`
There is a known social engineering attack that takes advantage of the fact that a working tree can include an entire bare repository, including a config file. A user could run a Git command inside the bare repository thinking that the config file of the 'outer' repository would be used, but in reality, the bare repository's config file (which is attacker-controlled) is used, which may result in arbitrary code execution. See [1] for a fuller description and deeper discussion. A simple mitigation is to forbid bare repositories unless specified via `--git-dir` or `GIT_DIR`. In environments that don't use bare repositories, this would be minimally disruptive. Create a config variable, `safe.bareRepository`, that tells Git whether or not to die() when working with a bare repository. This config is an enum of: - "all": allow all bare repositories (this is the default) - "explicit": only allow bare repositories specified via --git-dir or GIT_DIR. If we want to protect users from such attacks by default, neither value will suffice - "all" provides no protection, but "explicit" is impractical for bare repository users. A more usable default would be to allow only non-embedded bare repositories ([2] contains one such proposal), but detecting if a repository is embedded is potentially non-trivial, so this work is not implemented in this series. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/git/kl6lsfqpygsj.fsf@chooglen-macbookpro.roam.corp.google.com [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/git/5b969c5e-e802-c447-ad25-6acc0b784582@github.com Signed-off-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
-rw-r--r--Documentation/config/safe.txt19
-rw-r--r--setup.c57
-rwxr-xr-xt/t0035-safe-bare-repository.sh54
3 files changed, 129 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/config/safe.txt b/Documentation/config/safe.txt
index f72b440879..bde7f31459 100644
--- a/Documentation/config/safe.txt
+++ b/Documentation/config/safe.txt
@@ -1,3 +1,22 @@
+safe.bareRepository::
+ Specifies which bare repositories Git will work with. The currently
+ supported values are:
++
+* `all`: Git works with all bare repositories. This is the default.
+* `explicit`: Git only works with bare repositories specified via
+ the top-level `--git-dir` command-line option, or the `GIT_DIR`
+ environment variable (see linkgit:git[1]).
++
+If you do not use bare repositories in your workflow, then it may be
+beneficial to set `safe.bareRepository` to `explicit` in your global
+config. This will protect you from attacks that involve cloning a
+repository that contains a bare repository and running a Git command
+within that directory.
++
+This config setting is only respected in protected configuration (see
+<<SCOPES>>). This prevents the untrusted repository from tampering with
+this value.
+
safe.directory::
These config entries specify Git-tracked directories that are
considered safe even if they are owned by someone other than the
diff --git a/setup.c b/setup.c
index ec5b9139e3..8c683e92b6 100644
--- a/setup.c
+++ b/setup.c
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
static int inside_git_dir = -1;
static int inside_work_tree = -1;
static int work_tree_config_is_bogus;
+enum allowed_bare_repo {
+ ALLOWED_BARE_REPO_EXPLICIT = 0,
+ ALLOWED_BARE_REPO_ALL,
+};
static struct startup_info the_startup_info;
struct startup_info *startup_info = &the_startup_info;
@@ -1160,6 +1164,46 @@ static int ensure_valid_ownership(const char *gitfile,
return data.is_safe;
}
+static int allowed_bare_repo_cb(const char *key, const char *value, void *d)
+{
+ enum allowed_bare_repo *allowed_bare_repo = d;
+
+ if (strcasecmp(key, "safe.bareRepository"))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(value, "explicit")) {
+ *allowed_bare_repo = ALLOWED_BARE_REPO_EXPLICIT;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(value, "all")) {
+ *allowed_bare_repo = ALLOWED_BARE_REPO_ALL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static enum allowed_bare_repo get_allowed_bare_repo(void)
+{
+ enum allowed_bare_repo result = ALLOWED_BARE_REPO_ALL;
+ git_protected_config(allowed_bare_repo_cb, &result);
+ return result;
+}
+
+static const char *allowed_bare_repo_to_string(
+ enum allowed_bare_repo allowed_bare_repo)
+{
+ switch (allowed_bare_repo) {
+ case ALLOWED_BARE_REPO_EXPLICIT:
+ return "explicit";
+ case ALLOWED_BARE_REPO_ALL:
+ return "all";
+ default:
+ BUG("invalid allowed_bare_repo %d",
+ allowed_bare_repo);
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
enum discovery_result {
GIT_DIR_NONE = 0,
GIT_DIR_EXPLICIT,
@@ -1169,7 +1213,8 @@ enum discovery_result {
GIT_DIR_HIT_CEILING = -1,
GIT_DIR_HIT_MOUNT_POINT = -2,
GIT_DIR_INVALID_GITFILE = -3,
- GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP = -4
+ GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP = -4,
+ GIT_DIR_DISALLOWED_BARE = -5,
};
/*
@@ -1297,6 +1342,8 @@ static enum discovery_result setup_git_directory_gently_1(struct strbuf *dir,
}
if (is_git_directory(dir->buf)) {
+ if (get_allowed_bare_repo() == ALLOWED_BARE_REPO_EXPLICIT)
+ return GIT_DIR_DISALLOWED_BARE;
if (!ensure_valid_ownership(NULL, NULL, dir->buf))
return GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP;
strbuf_addstr(gitdir, ".");
@@ -1443,6 +1490,14 @@ const char *setup_git_directory_gently(int *nongit_ok)
}
*nongit_ok = 1;
break;
+ case GIT_DIR_DISALLOWED_BARE:
+ if (!nongit_ok) {
+ die(_("cannot use bare repository '%s' (safe.bareRepository is '%s')"),
+ dir.buf,
+ allowed_bare_repo_to_string(get_allowed_bare_repo()));
+ }
+ *nongit_ok = 1;
+ break;
case GIT_DIR_NONE:
/*
* As a safeguard against setup_git_directory_gently_1 returning
diff --git a/t/t0035-safe-bare-repository.sh b/t/t0035-safe-bare-repository.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000..ecbdc8238d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/t/t0035-safe-bare-repository.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+test_description='verify safe.bareRepository checks'
+
+TEST_PASSES_SANITIZE_LEAK=true
+. ./test-lib.sh
+
+pwd="$(pwd)"
+
+expect_accepted () {
+ git "$@" rev-parse --git-dir
+}
+
+expect_rejected () {
+ test_must_fail git "$@" rev-parse --git-dir 2>err &&
+ grep -F "cannot use bare repository" err
+}
+
+test_expect_success 'setup bare repo in worktree' '
+ git init outer-repo &&
+ git init --bare outer-repo/bare-repo
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'safe.bareRepository unset' '
+ expect_accepted -C outer-repo/bare-repo
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'safe.bareRepository=all' '
+ test_config_global safe.bareRepository all &&
+ expect_accepted -C outer-repo/bare-repo
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'safe.bareRepository=explicit' '
+ test_config_global safe.bareRepository explicit &&
+ expect_rejected -C outer-repo/bare-repo
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'safe.bareRepository in the repository' '
+ # safe.bareRepository must not be "explicit", otherwise
+ # git config fails with "fatal: not in a git directory" (like
+ # safe.directory)
+ test_config -C outer-repo/bare-repo safe.bareRepository \
+ all &&
+ test_config_global safe.bareRepository explicit &&
+ expect_rejected -C outer-repo/bare-repo
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'safe.bareRepository on the command line' '
+ test_config_global safe.bareRepository explicit &&
+ expect_accepted -C outer-repo/bare-repo \
+ -c safe.bareRepository=all
+'
+
+test_done