linux/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM, branch v5.8

Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: documentation

2020-06-08T15:30:19Z

Rationale: Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate. Deterministic algorithm: For each file: For each line: If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`: For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`: If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions return 200 OK and serve the same content: Replace HTTP with HTTPS. Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200526060544.25127-1-grandmaster@al2klimov.de Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet

docs: SafeSetID.rst: Remove spurious '???' characters

2019-10-11T15:58:38Z

It appears that some smart quotes were changed to "???" by even smarter software; change them to the dumb but legible variety. Signed-off-by: Christian Kujau Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet

security/loadpin: Allow to exclude specific file types

2019-05-31T20:57:40Z

Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This patch adds a kernel command line option "loadpin.exclude" which allows to exclude specific file types from LoadPin. This is useful when people want to use different mechanisms to verify module and kernel image while still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of other files kernel loads. Signed-off-by: Ke Wu Reviewed-by: James Morris [kees: fix array size issue reported by Coverity via Colin Ian King] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook

LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls

2019-01-25T19:22:45Z

SafeSetID gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit the given UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated with CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace UID mappings. For now, only gating the set*uid family of syscalls is supported, with support for set*gid coming in a future patch set. Signed-off-by: Micah Morton Acked-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: James Morris

procfs: add smack subdir to attrs

2019-01-08T21:18:44Z

Back in 2007 I made what turned out to be a rather serious mistake in the implementation of the Smack security module. The SELinux module used an interface in /proc to manipulate the security context on processes. Rather than use a similar interface, I used the same interface. The AppArmor team did likewise. Now /proc/.../attr/current will tell you the security "context" of the process, but it will be different depending on the security module you're using. This patch provides a subdirectory in /proc/.../attr for Smack. Smack user space can use the "current" file in this subdirectory and never have to worry about getting SELinux attributes by mistake. Programs that use the old interface will continue to work (or fail, as the case may be) as before. The proposed S.A.R.A security module is dependent on the mechanism to create its own attr subdirectory. The original implementation is by Kees Cook. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Kees Cook

Merge branch 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

2019-01-02T18:56:09Z

Pull smack updates from James Morris: "Two Smack patches for 4.21. Jose's patch adds missing documentation and Zoran's fleshes out the access checks on keyrings" * 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: Smack: Improve Documentation smack: fix access permissions for keyring

Smack: Improve Documentation

2018-12-13T21:31:01Z

Add some words about the mount option "smackfstransmute=label". Signed-off-by: José Bollo Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler

Documentation: Update SELinux reference policy URL

2018-11-19T17:40:48Z

Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

yama: clarify ptrace_scope=2 in Yama documentation

2018-10-07T15:16:38Z

Current phrasing is ambiguous since it's unclear if attaching to a children through PTRACE_TRACEME requires CAP_SYS_PTRACE. Rephrase the sentence to make that clear. Signed-off-by: Yves-Alexis Perez Acked-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet

apparmor: update git and wiki locations in AppArmor docs

2018-06-07T08:50:47Z

The apparmor information in the apparmor.rst file is out of date. Update it to the correct git reference for the master apparmor tree. Update the wiki location to use apparmor.net which forwards to the current wiki location on gitlab.com. Update user space tools address to gitlab.com. Signed-off-by: Jordan Glover Signed-off-by: John Johansen