<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst, branch v6.3</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v6.3</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v6.3'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2023-02-03T06:50:05Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>kexec: introduce sysctl parameters kexec_load_limit_*</title>
<updated>2023-02-03T06:50:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ricardo Ribalda</name>
<email>ribalda@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-04T14:38:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=a42aaad2e47b23d63037bfc0130e33fc0f74cd71'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a42aaad2e47b23d63037bfc0130e33fc0f74cd71</id>
<content type='text'>
kexec allows replacing the current kernel with a different one.  This is
usually a source of concerns for sysadmins that want to harden a system.

Linux already provides a way to disable loading new kexec kernel via
kexec_load_disabled, but that control is very coard, it is all or nothing
and does not make distinction between a panic kexec and a normal kexec.

This patch introduces new sysctl parameters, with finer tuning to specify
how many times a kexec kernel can be loaded.  The sysadmin can set
different limits for kexec panic and kexec reboot kernels.  The value can
be modified at runtime via sysctl, but only with a stricter value.

With these new parameters on place, a system with loadpin and verity
enabled, using the following kernel parameters:
sysctl.kexec_load_limit_reboot=0 sysct.kexec_load_limit_panic=1 can have a
good warranty that if initrd tries to load a panic kernel, a malitious
user will have small chances to replace that kernel with a different one,
even if they can trigger timeouts on the disk where the panic kernel
lives.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221114-disable-kexec-reset-v6-3-6a8531a09b9a@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda &lt;ribalda@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Acked-by: Baoquan He &lt;bhe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Bagas Sanjaya &lt;bagasdotme@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Guilherme G. Piccoli &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt; # Steam Deck
Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) &lt;joel@joelfernandes.org&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Philipp Rudo &lt;prudo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ross Zwisler &lt;zwisler@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;senozhatsky@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation: sysctl: correct kexec_load_disabled</title>
<updated>2023-02-03T06:50:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ricardo Ribalda</name>
<email>ribalda@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-04T14:38:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=06dcb0138f5f815f50142234b2e06f5540471715'/>
<id>urn:sha1:06dcb0138f5f815f50142234b2e06f5540471715</id>
<content type='text'>
Patch series "kexec: Add new parameter to limit the access to kexec", v6.

Add two parameter to specify how many times a kexec kernel can be loaded.

These parameter allow hardening the system.

While we are at it, fix a documentation issue and refactor some code.


This patch (of 3):

kexec_load_disabled affects both ``kexec_load`` and ``kexec_file_load``
syscalls. Make it explicit.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221114-disable-kexec-reset-v6-0-6a8531a09b9a@chromium.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221114-disable-kexec-reset-v6-1-6a8531a09b9a@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda &lt;ribalda@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Acked-by: Baoquan He &lt;bhe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Bagas Sanjaya &lt;bagasdotme@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Guilherme G. Piccoli &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) &lt;joel@joelfernandes.org&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Philipp Rudo &lt;prudo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ross Zwisler &lt;zwisler@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;senozhatsky@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'loongarch-6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chenhuacai/linux-loongson</title>
<updated>2022-12-19T14:23:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-19T14:23:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=2f26e424552efd50722f4cf61f7f080373adbb1e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2f26e424552efd50722f4cf61f7f080373adbb1e</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull LoongArch updates from Huacai Chen:

 - Switch to relative exception tables

 - Add unaligned access support

 - Add alternative runtime patching mechanism

 - Add FDT booting support from efi system table

 - Add suspend/hibernation (ACPI S3/S4) support

 - Add basic STACKPROTECTOR support

 - Add ftrace (function tracer) support

 - Update the default config file

* tag 'loongarch-6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chenhuacai/linux-loongson: (24 commits)
  LoongArch: Update Loongson-3 default config file
  LoongArch: modules/ftrace: Initialize PLT at load time
  LoongArch/ftrace: Add HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_RET_ADDR_PTR support
  LoongArch/ftrace: Add HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_ARGS support
  LoongArch/ftrace: Add HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS support
  LoongArch/ftrace: Add dynamic function graph tracer support
  LoongArch/ftrace: Add dynamic function tracer support
  LoongArch/ftrace: Add recordmcount support
  LoongArch/ftrace: Add basic support
  LoongArch: module: Use got/plt section indices for relocations
  LoongArch: Add basic STACKPROTECTOR support
  LoongArch: Add hibernation (ACPI S4) support
  LoongArch: Add suspend (ACPI S3) support
  LoongArch: Add processing ISA Node in DeviceTree
  LoongArch: Add FDT booting support from efi system table
  LoongArch: Use alternative to optimize libraries
  LoongArch: Add alternative runtime patching mechanism
  LoongArch: Add unaligned access support
  LoongArch: BPF: Add BPF exception tables
  LoongArch: Remove the .fixup section usage
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'hardening-v6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux</title>
<updated>2022-12-14T20:20:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-14T20:20:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=48ea09cddae0b794cde2070f106ef676703dbcd3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:48ea09cddae0b794cde2070f106ef676703dbcd3</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull kernel hardening updates from Kees Cook:

 - Convert flexible array members, fix -Wstringop-overflow warnings, and
   fix KCFI function type mismatches that went ignored by maintainers
   (Gustavo A. R. Silva, Nathan Chancellor, Kees Cook)

 - Remove the remaining side-effect users of ksize() by converting
   dma-buf, btrfs, and coredump to using kmalloc_size_roundup(), add
   more __alloc_size attributes, and introduce full testing of all
   allocator functions. Finally remove the ksize() side-effect so that
   each allocation-aware checker can finally behave without exceptions

 - Introduce oops_limit (default 10,000) and warn_limit (default off) to
   provide greater granularity of control for panic_on_oops and
   panic_on_warn (Jann Horn, Kees Cook)

 - Introduce overflows_type() and castable_to_type() helpers for cleaner
   overflow checking

 - Improve code generation for strscpy() and update str*() kern-doc

 - Convert strscpy and sigphash tests to KUnit, and expand memcpy tests

 - Always use a non-NULL argument for prepare_kernel_cred()

 - Disable structleak plugin in FORTIFY KUnit test (Anders Roxell)

 - Adjust orphan linker section checking to respect CONFIG_WERROR (Xin
   Li)

 - Make sure siginfo is cleared for forced SIGKILL (haifeng.xu)

 - Fix um vs FORTIFY warnings for always-NULL arguments

* tag 'hardening-v6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (31 commits)
  ksmbd: replace one-element arrays with flexible-array members
  hpet: Replace one-element array with flexible-array member
  um: virt-pci: Avoid GCC non-NULL warning
  signal: Initialize the info in ksignal
  lib: fortify_kunit: build without structleak plugin
  panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs
  panic: Introduce warn_limit
  panic: Consolidate open-coded panic_on_warn checks
  exit: Allow oops_limit to be disabled
  exit: Expose "oops_count" to sysfs
  exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops
  panic: Separate sysctl logic from CONFIG_SMP
  mm/pgtable: Fix multiple -Wstringop-overflow warnings
  mm: Make ksize() a reporting-only function
  kunit/fortify: Validate __alloc_size attribute results
  drm/sti: Fix return type of sti_{dvo,hda,hdmi}_connector_mode_valid()
  drm/fsl-dcu: Fix return type of fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid()
  driver core: Add __alloc_size hint to devm allocators
  overflow: Introduce overflows_type() and castable_to_type()
  coredump: Proactively round up to kmalloc bucket size
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LoongArch: Add unaligned access support</title>
<updated>2022-12-14T00:36:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Huacai Chen</name>
<email>chenhuacai@loongson.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-10T14:39:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=61a6fccc0bd2e8030b2672a52ef3f6706b2b2ee4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:61a6fccc0bd2e8030b2672a52ef3f6706b2b2ee4</id>
<content type='text'>
Loongson-2 series (Loongson-2K500, Loongson-2K1000) don't support
unaligned access in hardware, while Loongson-3 series (Loongson-3A5000,
Loongson-3C5000) are configurable whether support unaligned access in
hardware. This patch add unaligned access emulation for those LoongArch
processors without hardware support.

Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen &lt;chenhuacai@loongson.cn&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2022-12-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm</title>
<updated>2022-12-13T01:28:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-13T01:28:58Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=8702f2c611bf124c48b21b5c57bfc156cd11f4ca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8702f2c611bf124c48b21b5c57bfc156cd11f4ca</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:

 - A ptrace API cleanup series from Sergey Shtylyov

 - Fixes and cleanups for kexec from ye xingchen

 - nilfs2 updates from Ryusuke Konishi

 - squashfs feature work from Xiaoming Ni: permit configuration of the
   filesystem's compression concurrency from the mount command line

 - A series from Akinobu Mita which addresses bound checking errors when
   writing to debugfs files

 - A series from Yang Yingliang to address rapidio memory leaks

 - A series from Zheng Yejian to address possible overflow errors in
   encode_comp_t()

 - And a whole shower of singleton patches all over the place

* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2022-12-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (79 commits)
  ipc: fix memory leak in init_mqueue_fs()
  hfsplus: fix bug causing custom uid and gid being unable to be assigned with mount
  rapidio: devices: fix missing put_device in mport_cdev_open
  kcov: fix spelling typos in comments
  hfs: Fix OOB Write in hfs_asc2mac
  hfs: fix OOB Read in __hfs_brec_find
  relay: fix type mismatch when allocating memory in relay_create_buf()
  ocfs2: always read both high and low parts of dinode link count
  io-mapping: move some code within the include guarded section
  kernel: kcsan: kcsan_test: build without structleak plugin
  mailmap: update email for Iskren Chernev
  eventfd: change int to __u64 in eventfd_signal() ifndef CONFIG_EVENTFD
  rapidio: fix possible UAF when kfifo_alloc() fails
  relay: use strscpy() is more robust and safer
  cpumask: limit visibility of FORCE_NR_CPUS
  acct: fix potential integer overflow in encode_comp_t()
  acct: fix accuracy loss for input value of encode_comp_t()
  linux/init.h: include &lt;linux/build_bug.h&gt; and &lt;linux/stringify.h&gt;
  rapidio: rio: fix possible name leak in rio_register_mport()
  rapidio: fix possible name leaks when rio_add_device() fails
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'docs-6.2' of git://git.lwn.net/linux</title>
<updated>2022-12-13T01:18:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-13T01:18:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=a7cacfb0688e3988660e90fad7017cc9a18ab390'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a7cacfb0688e3988660e90fad7017cc9a18ab390</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
 "This was a not-too-busy cycle for documentation; highlights include:

   - The beginnings of a set of translations into Spanish, headed up by
     Carlos Bilbao

   - More Chinese translations

   - A change to the Sphinx "alabaster" theme by default for HTML
     generation.

     Unlike the previous default (Read the Docs), alabaster is shipped
     with Sphinx by default, reducing the number of other dependencies
     that need to be installed. It also (IMO) produces a cleaner and
     more readable result.

   - The ability to render the documentation into the texinfo format
     (something Sphinx could always do, we just never wired it up until
     now)

  Plus the usual collection of typo fixes, build-warning fixes, and
  minor updates"

* tag 'docs-6.2' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (67 commits)
  Documentation/features: Use loongarch instead of loong
  Documentation/features-refresh.sh: Only sed the beginning "arch" of ARCH_DIR
  docs/zh_CN: Fix '.. only::' directive's expression
  docs/sp_SP: Add memory-barriers.txt Spanish translation
  docs/zh_CN/LoongArch: Update links of LoongArch ISA Vol1 and ELF psABI
  docs/LoongArch: Update links of LoongArch ISA Vol1 and ELF psABI
  Documentation/features: Update feature lists for 6.1
  Documentation: Fixed a typo in bootconfig.rst
  docs/sp_SP: Add process coding-style translation
  docs/sp_SP: Add kernel-docs.rst Spanish translation
  docs: Create translations/sp_SP/process/, move submitting-patches.rst
  docs: Add book to process/kernel-docs.rst
  docs: Retire old resources from kernel-docs.rst
  docs: Update maintainer of kernel-docs.rst
  Documentation: riscv: Document the sv57 VM layout
  Documentation: USB: correct possessive "its" usage
  math64: fix kernel-doc return value warnings
  math64: add kernel-doc for DIV64_U64_ROUND_UP
  math64: favor kernel-doc from header files
  doc: add texinfodocs and infodocs targets
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>panic: Introduce warn_limit</title>
<updated>2022-12-02T21:04:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-17T23:43:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=9fc9e278a5c0b708eeffaf47d6eb0c82aa74ed78'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9fc9e278a5c0b708eeffaf47d6eb0c82aa74ed78</id>
<content type='text'>
Like oops_limit, add warn_limit for limiting the number of warnings when
panic_on_warn is not set.

Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Baolin Wang &lt;baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Huang Ying &lt;ying.huang@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: tangmeng &lt;tangmeng@uniontech.com&gt;
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt;
Cc: Tiezhu Yang &lt;yangtiezhu@loongson.cn&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-5-keescook@chromium.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exit: Allow oops_limit to be disabled</title>
<updated>2022-12-02T21:04:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-02T20:59:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=de92f65719cd672f4b48397540b9f9eff67eca40'/>
<id>urn:sha1:de92f65719cd672f4b48397540b9f9eff67eca40</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for keeping oops_limit logic in sync with warn_limit,
have oops_limit == 0 disable checking the Oops counter.

Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Baolin Wang &lt;baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Huang Ying &lt;ying.huang@intel.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops</title>
<updated>2022-12-01T16:50:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-17T23:43:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=d4ccd54d28d3c8598e2354acc13e28c060961dbb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d4ccd54d28d3c8598e2354acc13e28c060961dbb</id>
<content type='text'>
Many Linux systems are configured to not panic on oops; but allowing an
attacker to oops the system **really** often can make even bugs that look
completely unexploitable exploitable (like NULL dereferences and such) if
each crash elevates a refcount by one or a lock is taken in read mode, and
this causes a counter to eventually overflow.

The most interesting counters for this are 32 bits wide (like open-coded
refcounts that don't use refcount_t). (The ldsem reader count on 32-bit
platforms is just 16 bits, but probably nobody cares about 32-bit platforms
that much nowadays.)

So let's panic the system if the kernel is constantly oopsing.

The speed of oopsing 2^32 times probably depends on several factors, like
how long the stack trace is and which unwinder you're using; an empirically
important one is whether your console is showing a graphical environment or
a text console that oopses will be printed to.
In a quick single-threaded benchmark, it looks like oopsing in a vfork()
child with a very short stack trace only takes ~510 microseconds per run
when a graphical console is active; but switching to a text console that
oopses are printed to slows it down around 87x, to ~45 milliseconds per
run.
(Adding more threads makes this faster, but the actual oops printing
happens under &amp;die_lock on x86, so you can maybe speed this up by a factor
of around 2 and then any further improvement gets eaten up by lock
contention.)

It looks like it would take around 8-12 days to overflow a 32-bit counter
with repeated oopsing on a multi-core X86 system running a graphical
environment; both me (in an X86 VM) and Seth (with a distro kernel on
normal hardware in a standard configuration) got numbers in that ballpark.

12 days aren't *that* short on a desktop system, and you'd likely need much
longer on a typical server system (assuming that people don't run graphical
desktop environments on their servers), and this is a *very* noisy and
violent approach to exploiting the kernel; and it also seems to take orders
of magnitude longer on some machines, probably because stuff like EFI
pstore will slow it down a ton if that's active.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221107201317.324457-1-jannh@google.com
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-2-keescook@chromium.org
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
