<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/Documentation/admin-guide, branch v4.20</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v4.20</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v4.20'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2018-12-01T20:35:48Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2018-12-01T20:35:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-01T20:35:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=4b78317679c4f3782a3cff0ddb269c1fcfde7621'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4b78317679c4f3782a3cff0ddb269c1fcfde7621</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull STIBP fallout fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "The performance destruction department finally got it's act together
  and came up with a cure for the STIPB regression:

   - Provide a command line option to control the spectre v2 user space
     mitigations. Default is either seccomp or prctl (if seccomp is
     disabled in Kconfig). prctl allows mitigation opt-in, seccomp
     enables the migitation for sandboxed processes.

   - Rework the code to handle the conditional STIBP/IBPB control and
     remove the now unused ptrace_may_access_sched() optimization
     attempt

   - Disable STIBP automatically when SMT is disabled

   - Optimize the switch_to() logic to avoid MSR writes and invocations
     of __switch_to_xtra().

   - Make the asynchronous speculation TIF updates synchronous to
     prevent stale mitigation state.

  As a general cleanup this also makes retpoline directly depend on
  compiler support and removes the 'minimal retpoline' option which just
  pretended to provide some form of security while providing none"

* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (31 commits)
  x86/speculation: Provide IBPB always command line options
  x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 user space protection mode
  x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user
  x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation
  x86/speculation: Prepare arch_smt_update() for PRCTL mode
  x86/speculation: Prevent stale SPEC_CTRL msr content
  x86/speculation: Split out TIF update
  ptrace: Remove unused ptrace_may_access_sched() and MODE_IBRS
  x86/speculation: Prepare for conditional IBPB in switch_mm()
  x86/speculation: Avoid __switch_to_xtra() calls
  x86/process: Consolidate and simplify switch_to_xtra() code
  x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control
  x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation
  x86/speculation: Unify conditional spectre v2 print functions
  x86/speculataion: Mark command line parser data __initdata
  x86/speculation: Mark string arrays const correctly
  x86/speculation: Reorder the spec_v2 code
  x86/l1tf: Show actual SMT state
  x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change
  sched/smt: Expose sched_smt_present static key
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>psi: make disabling/enabling easier for vendor kernels</title>
<updated>2018-11-30T22:56:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Weiner</name>
<email>hannes@cmpxchg.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-30T22:09:58Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=e0c274472d5d27f277af722e017525e0b33784cd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e0c274472d5d27f277af722e017525e0b33784cd</id>
<content type='text'>
Mel Gorman reports a hackbench regression with psi that would prohibit
shipping the suse kernel with it default-enabled, but he'd still like
users to be able to opt in at little to no cost to others.

With the current combination of CONFIG_PSI and the psi_disabled bool set
from the commandline, this is a challenge.  Do the following things to
make it easier:

1. Add a config option CONFIG_PSI_DEFAULT_DISABLED that allows distros
   to enable CONFIG_PSI in their kernel but leave the feature disabled
   unless a user requests it at boot-time.

   To avoid double negatives, rename psi_disabled= to psi=.

2. Make psi_disabled a static branch to eliminate any branch costs
   when the feature is disabled.

In terms of numbers before and after this patch, Mel says:

: The following is a comparision using CONFIG_PSI=n as a baseline against
: your patch and a vanilla kernel
:
:                          4.20.0-rc4             4.20.0-rc4             4.20.0-rc4
:                 kconfigdisable-v1r1                vanilla        psidisable-v1r1
: Amean     1       1.3100 (   0.00%)      1.3923 (  -6.28%)      1.3427 (  -2.49%)
: Amean     3       3.8860 (   0.00%)      4.1230 *  -6.10%*      3.8860 (  -0.00%)
: Amean     5       6.8847 (   0.00%)      8.0390 * -16.77%*      6.7727 (   1.63%)
: Amean     7       9.9310 (   0.00%)     10.8367 *  -9.12%*      9.9910 (  -0.60%)
: Amean     12     16.6577 (   0.00%)     18.2363 *  -9.48%*     17.1083 (  -2.71%)
: Amean     18     26.5133 (   0.00%)     27.8833 *  -5.17%*     25.7663 (   2.82%)
: Amean     24     34.3003 (   0.00%)     34.6830 (  -1.12%)     32.0450 (   6.58%)
: Amean     30     40.0063 (   0.00%)     40.5800 (  -1.43%)     41.5087 (  -3.76%)
: Amean     32     40.1407 (   0.00%)     41.2273 (  -2.71%)     39.9417 (   0.50%)
:
: It's showing that the vanilla kernel takes a hit (as the bisection
: indicated it would) and that disabling PSI by default is reasonably
: close in terms of performance for this particular workload on this
: particular machine so;

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181127165329.GA29728@cmpxchg.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Tested-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Reported-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2018-11-30T19:31:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-30T19:31:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=a1b3cf6d943800059adc262c4d839524c529db2d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a1b3cf6d943800059adc262c4d839524c529db2d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Misc fixes:

   - counter freezing related regression fix

   - uprobes race fix

   - Intel PMU unusual event combination fix

   - .. and diverse tooling fixes"

* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  uprobes: Fix handle_swbp() vs. unregister() + register() race once more
  perf/x86/intel: Disallow precise_ip on BTS events
  perf/x86/intel: Add generic branch tracing check to intel_pmu_has_bts()
  perf/x86/intel: Move branch tracing setup to the Intel-specific source file
  perf/x86/intel: Fix regression by default disabling perfmon v4 interrupt handling
  perf tools beauty ioctl: Support new ISO7816 commands
  tools uapi asm-generic: Synchronize ioctls.h
  tools arch x86: Update tools's copy of cpufeatures.h
  tools headers uapi: Synchronize i915_drm.h
  perf tools: Restore proper cwd on return from mnt namespace
  tools build feature: Check if get_current_dir_name() is available
  perf tools: Fix crash on synthesizing the unit
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Provide IBPB always command line options</title>
<updated>2018-11-28T10:57:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-25T18:33:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=55a974021ec952ee460dc31ca08722158639de72'/>
<id>urn:sha1:55a974021ec952ee460dc31ca08722158639de72</id>
<content type='text'>
Provide the possibility to enable IBPB always in combination with 'prctl'
and 'seccomp'.

Add the extra command line options and rework the IBPB selection to
evaluate the command instead of the mode selected by the STIPB switch case.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey.schaufler@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Asit Mallick &lt;asit.k.mallick@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Jon Masters &lt;jcm@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;longman9394@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Dave Stewart &lt;david.c.stewart@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.144047038@linutronix.de

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 user space protection mode</title>
<updated>2018-11-28T10:57:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-25T18:33:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=6b3e64c237c072797a9ec918654a60e3a46488e2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6b3e64c237c072797a9ec918654a60e3a46488e2</id>
<content type='text'>
If 'prctl' mode of user space protection from spectre v2 is selected
on the kernel command-line, STIBP and IBPB are applied on tasks which
restrict their indirect branch speculation via prctl.

SECCOMP enables the SSBD mitigation for sandboxed tasks already, so it
makes sense to prevent spectre v2 user space to user space attacks as
well.

The Intel mitigation guide documents how STIPB works:
    
   Setting bit 1 (STIBP) of the IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR on a logical processor
   prevents the predicted targets of indirect branches on any logical
   processor of that core from being controlled by software that executes
   (or executed previously) on another logical processor of the same core.

Ergo setting STIBP protects the task itself from being attacked from a task
running on a different hyper-thread and protects the tasks running on
different hyper-threads from being attacked.

While the document suggests that the branch predictors are shielded between
the logical processors, the observed performance regressions suggest that
STIBP simply disables the branch predictor more or less completely. Of
course the document wording is vague, but the fact that there is also no
requirement for issuing IBPB when STIBP is used points clearly in that
direction. The kernel still issues IBPB even when STIBP is used until Intel
clarifies the whole mechanism.

IBPB is issued when the task switches out, so malicious sandbox code cannot
mistrain the branch predictor for the next user space task on the same
logical processor.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey.schaufler@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Asit Mallick &lt;asit.k.mallick@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Jon Masters &lt;jcm@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;longman9394@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Dave Stewart &lt;david.c.stewart@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.051663132@linutronix.de


</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user</title>
<updated>2018-11-28T10:57:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-25T18:33:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=7cc765a67d8e04ef7d772425ca5a2a1e2b894c15'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7cc765a67d8e04ef7d772425ca5a2a1e2b894c15</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that all prerequisites are in place:

 - Add the prctl command line option

 - Default the 'auto' mode to 'prctl'

 - When SMT state changes, update the static key which controls the
   conditional STIBP evaluation on context switch.

 - At init update the static key which controls the conditional IBPB
   evaluation on context switch.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey.schaufler@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Asit Mallick &lt;asit.k.mallick@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Jon Masters &lt;jcm@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;longman9394@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Dave Stewart &lt;david.c.stewart@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.958421388@linutronix.de


</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation</title>
<updated>2018-11-28T10:57:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-25T18:33:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=fa1202ef224391b6f5b26cdd44cc50495e8fab54'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fa1202ef224391b6f5b26cdd44cc50495e8fab54</id>
<content type='text'>
Add command line control for user space indirect branch speculation
mitigations. The new option is: spectre_v2_user=

The initial options are:

    -  on:   Unconditionally enabled
    - off:   Unconditionally disabled
    -auto:   Kernel selects mitigation (default off for now)

When the spectre_v2= command line argument is either 'on' or 'off' this
implies that the application to application control follows that state even
if a contradicting spectre_v2_user= argument is supplied.

Originally-by: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey.schaufler@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Asit Mallick &lt;asit.k.mallick@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Jon Masters &lt;jcm@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;longman9394@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Dave Stewart &lt;david.c.stewart@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.082720373@linutronix.de

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'char-misc-4.20-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc</title>
<updated>2018-11-22T16:43:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-22T16:43:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=52465bce85a2d28bcec5cba5a645bb610367ab1b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:52465bce85a2d28bcec5cba5a645bb610367ab1b</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull char/misc driver fixes from Greg KH:
 "Here are some small char/misc driver fixes for issues that have been
  reported.

  Nothing major, highlights include:

   - gnss sync write fixes

   - uio oops fix

   - nvmem fixes

   - other minor fixes and some documentation/maintainers updates

  Full details are in the shortlog.

  All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
  issues"

* tag 'char-misc-4.20-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc:
  Documentation/security-bugs: Postpone fix publication in exceptional cases
  MAINTAINERS: Add Sasha as a stable branch maintainer
  gnss: sirf: fix synchronous write timeout
  gnss: serial: fix synchronous write timeout
  uio: Fix an Oops on load
  test_firmware: fix error return getting clobbered
  nvmem: core: fix regression in of_nvmem_cell_get()
  misc: atmel-ssc: Fix section annotation on atmel_ssc_get_driver_data
  drivers/misc/sgi-gru: fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
  Drivers: hv: kvp: Fix the recent regression caused by incorrect clean-up
  slimbus: ngd: remove unnecessary check
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'usb-4.20-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb</title>
<updated>2018-11-22T16:39:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-22T16:39:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=4cd731953d620b7e4e999a90d13db58b88c5e95b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4cd731953d620b7e4e999a90d13db58b88c5e95b</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull USB fixes from Greg KH:
 "Here are a number of small USB fixes for 4.20-rc4.

  There's the usual xhci and dwc2/3 fixes as well as a few minor other
  issues resolved for problems that have been reported. Full details are
  in the shortlog.

  All have been in linux-next for a while with no reported issues"

* tag 'usb-4.20-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb:
  usb: cdc-acm: add entry for Hiro (Conexant) modem
  usb: xhci: Prevent bus suspend if a port connect change or polling state is detected
  usb: core: Fix hub port connection events lost
  usb: dwc3: gadget: fix ISOC TRB type on unaligned transfers
  Revert "usb: gadget: ffs: Fix BUG when userland exits with submitted AIO transfers"
  usb: dwc2: pci: Fix an error code in probe
  usb: dwc3: Fix NULL pointer exception in dwc3_pci_remove()
  xhci: Add quirk to workaround the errata seen on Cavium Thunder-X2 Soc
  usb: xhci: fix timeout for transition from RExit to U0
  usb: xhci: fix uninitialized completion when USB3 port got wrong status
  xhci: Add check for invalid byte size error when UAS devices are connected.
  xhci: handle port status events for removed USB3 hcd
  xhci: Fix leaking USB3 shared_hcd at xhci removal
  USB: misc: appledisplay: add 20" Apple Cinema Display
  USB: quirks: Add no-lpm quirk for Raydium touchscreens
  usb: quirks: Add delay-init quirk for Corsair K70 LUX RGB
  USB: Wait for extra delay time after USB_PORT_FEAT_RESET for quirky hub
  usb: dwc3: gadget: Properly check last unaligned/zero chain TRB
  usb: dwc3: core: Clean up ULPI device
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/x86/intel: Fix regression by default disabling perfmon v4 interrupt handling</title>
<updated>2018-11-20T17:57:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-20T17:08:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=2a5bf23d5b795d5df33dc284e8f5cf8b6a5b4042'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2a5bf23d5b795d5df33dc284e8f5cf8b6a5b4042</id>
<content type='text'>
Kyle Huey reported that 'rr', a replay debugger, broke due to the following commit:

  af3bdb991a5c ("perf/x86/intel: Add a separate Arch Perfmon v4 PMI handler")

Rework the 'disable_counter_freezing' __setup() parameter such that we
can explicitly enable/disable it and switch to default disabled.

To this purpose, rename the parameter to "perf_v4_pmi=" which is a much
better description and allows requiring a bool argument.

[ mingo: Improved the changelog some more. ]

Reported-by: Kyle Huey &lt;me@kylehuey.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Kan Liang &lt;kan.liang@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Robert O'Callahan &lt;robert@ocallahan.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Cc: acme@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181120170842.GZ2131@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
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