<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/Documentation/admin-guide, branch v6.15</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v6.15</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v6.15'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2025-05-09T20:22:05Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>x86/its: Add support for RSB stuffing mitigation</title>
<updated>2025-05-09T20:22:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-02T20:07:08Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=facd226f7e0c8ca936ac114aba43cb3e8b94e41e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:facd226f7e0c8ca936ac114aba43cb3e8b94e41e</id>
<content type='text'>
When retpoline mitigation is enabled for spectre-v2, enabling
call-depth-tracking and RSB stuffing also mitigates ITS. Add cmdline option
indirect_target_selection=stuff to allow enabling RSB stuffing mitigation.

When retpoline mitigation is not enabled, =stuff option is ignored, and
default mitigation for ITS is deployed.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre &lt;alexandre.chartre@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/its: Add "vmexit" option to skip mitigation on some CPUs</title>
<updated>2025-05-09T20:22:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-18T17:53:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=2665281a07e19550944e8354a2024635a7b2714a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2665281a07e19550944e8354a2024635a7b2714a</id>
<content type='text'>
Ice Lake generation CPUs are not affected by guest/host isolation part of
ITS. If a user is only concerned about KVM guests, they can now choose a
new cmdline option "vmexit" that will not deploy the ITS mitigation when
CPU is not affected by guest/host isolation. This saves the performance
overhead of ITS mitigation on Ice Lake gen CPUs.

When "vmexit" option selected, if the CPU is affected by ITS guest/host
isolation, the default ITS mitigation is deployed.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre &lt;alexandre.chartre@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/its: Enable Indirect Target Selection mitigation</title>
<updated>2025-05-09T20:22:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-22T03:23:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=f4818881c47fd91fcb6d62373c57c7844e3de1c0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f4818881c47fd91fcb6d62373c57c7844e3de1c0</id>
<content type='text'>
Indirect Target Selection (ITS) is a bug in some pre-ADL Intel CPUs with
eIBRS. It affects prediction of indirect branch and RETs in the
lower half of cacheline. Due to ITS such branches may get wrongly predicted
to a target of (direct or indirect) branch that is located in the upper
half of the cacheline.

Scope of impact
===============

Guest/host isolation
--------------------
When eIBRS is used for guest/host isolation, the indirect branches in the
VMM may still be predicted with targets corresponding to branches in the
guest.

Intra-mode
----------
cBPF or other native gadgets can be used for intra-mode training and
disclosure using ITS.

User/kernel isolation
---------------------
When eIBRS is enabled user/kernel isolation is not impacted.

Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)
-----------------------------------------
After an IBPB, indirect branches may be predicted with targets
corresponding to direct branches which were executed prior to IBPB. This is
mitigated by a microcode update.

Add cmdline parameter indirect_target_selection=off|on|force to control the
mitigation to relocate the affected branches to an ITS-safe thunk i.e.
located in the upper half of cacheline. Also add the sysfs reporting.

When retpoline mitigation is deployed, ITS safe-thunks are not needed,
because retpoline sequence is already ITS-safe. Similarly, when call depth
tracking (CDT) mitigation is deployed (retbleed=stuff), ITS safe return
thunk is not used, as CDT prevents RSB-underflow.

To not overcomplicate things, ITS mitigation is not supported with
spectre-v2 lfence;jmp mitigation. Moreover, it is less practical to deploy
lfence;jmp mitigation on ITS affected parts anyways.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre &lt;alexandre.chartre@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation: x86/bugs/its: Add ITS documentation</title>
<updated>2025-05-09T20:22:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-11T22:36:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=1ac116ce6468670eeda39345a5585df308243dca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1ac116ce6468670eeda39345a5585df308243dca</id>
<content type='text'>
Add the admin-guide for Indirect Target Selection (ITS).

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre &lt;alexandre.chartre@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfs: remove duplicate Zoned Filesystems sections in admin-guide</title>
<updated>2025-04-22T14:05:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hans Holmberg</name>
<email>Hans.Holmberg@wdc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-22T11:50:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=f0447f80aec83f1699d599c94618bb5c323963e6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f0447f80aec83f1699d599c94618bb5c323963e6</id>
<content type='text'>
Remove the duplicated section and while at it, turn spaces into tabs.

Signed-off-by: Hans Holmberg &lt;hans.holmberg@wdc.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino &lt;cmaiolino@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: c7b67ddc3c99 ("xfs: document zoned rt specifics in admin-guide")
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino &lt;cem@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfs: document zoned rt specifics in admin-guide</title>
<updated>2025-04-17T06:16:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hans Holmberg</name>
<email>Hans.Holmberg@wdc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-09T12:39:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=c7b67ddc3c999aa2f8d77be7ef1913298fe78f0e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c7b67ddc3c999aa2f8d77be7ef1913298fe78f0e</id>
<content type='text'>
Document the lifetime, nolifetime and max_open_zones mount options
added for zoned rt file systems.

Also add documentation describing the max_open_zones sysfs attribute
exposed in /sys/fs/xfs/&lt;dev&gt;/zoned/

Fixes: 4e4d52075577 ("xfs: add the zoned space allocator")
Signed-off-by: Hans Holmberg &lt;hans.holmberg@wdc.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino &lt;cem@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfs: add tunable threshold parameter for triggering zone GC</title>
<updated>2025-04-14T08:41:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hans Holmberg</name>
<email>Hans.Holmberg@wdc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-25T09:10:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=845abeb1f06a8a44e21314460eeb14cddfca52cc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:845abeb1f06a8a44e21314460eeb14cddfca52cc</id>
<content type='text'>
Presently we start garbage collection late - when we start running
out of free zones to backfill max_open_zones. This is a reasonable
default as it minimizes write amplification. The longer we wait,
the more blocks are invalidated and reclaim cost less in terms
of blocks to relocate.

Starting this late however introduces a risk of GC being outcompeted
by user writes. If GC can't keep up, user writes will be forced to
wait for free zones with high tail latencies as a result.

This is not a problem under normal circumstances, but if fragmentation
is bad and user write pressure is high (multiple full-throttle
writers) we will "bottom out" of free zones.

To mitigate this, introduce a zonegc_low_space tunable that lets the
user specify a percentage of how much of the unused space that GC
should keep available for writing. A high value will reclaim more of
the space occupied by unused blocks, creating a larger buffer against
write bursts.

This comes at a cost as write amplification is increased. To
illustrate this using a sample workload, setting zonegc_low_space to
60% avoids high (500ms) max latencies while increasing write
amplification by 15%.

Signed-off-by: Hans Holmberg &lt;hans.holmberg@wdc.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino &lt;cem@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Add RSB mitigation document</title>
<updated>2025-04-09T10:42:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-08T21:47:35Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=83f6665a49c3d44ad0c08f837d352dd290f5d10b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:83f6665a49c3d44ad0c08f837d352dd290f5d10b</id>
<content type='text'>
Create a document to summarize hard-earned knowledge about RSB-related
mitigations, with references, and replace the overly verbose yet
incomplete comments with a reference to the document.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ab73f4659ba697a974759f07befd41ae605e33dd.1744148254.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/early_printk: Use 'mmio32' for consistency, fix comments</title>
<updated>2025-04-09T10:27:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Shevchenko</name>
<email>andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-07T17:22:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=996457176bb7c64b3d30996592c754205ec4d3ea'/>
<id>urn:sha1:996457176bb7c64b3d30996592c754205ec4d3ea</id>
<content type='text'>
First of all, using 'mmio' prevents proper implementation of 8-bit accessors.
Second, it's simply inconsistent with uart8250 set of options. Rename it to
'mmio32'. While at it, remove rather misleading comment in the documentation.
From now on mmio32 is self-explanatory and pciserial supports not only 32-bit
MMIO accessors.

Also, while at it, fix the comment for the "pciserial" case. The comment
seems to be a copy'n'paste error when mentioning "serial" instead of
"pciserial" (with double quotes). Fix this.

With that, move it upper, so we don't calculate 'buf' twice.

Fixes: 3181424aeac2 ("x86/early_printk: Add support for MMIO-based UARTs")
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Denis Mukhin &lt;dmukhin@ford.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250407172214.792745-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 's390-6.15-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux</title>
<updated>2025-04-04T23:58:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-04T23:58:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=dd9db3bff8ec419ab0e5f18092f89a8fddc37f15'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dd9db3bff8ec419ab0e5f18092f89a8fddc37f15</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull more s390 updates from Vasily Gorbik:

 - Fix machine check handler _CIF_MCCK_GUEST bit setting by adding the
   missing base register for relocated lowcore address

 - Fix build failure on older linkers by conditionally adding the
   -no-pie linker option only when it is supported

 - Fix inaccurate kernel messages in vfio-ap by providing descriptive
   error notifications for AP queue sharing violations

 - Fix PCI isolation logic by ensuring non-VF devices correctly return
   false in zpci_bus_is_isolated_vf()

 - Fix PCI DMA range map setup by using dma_direct_set_offset() to add a
   proper sentinel element, preventing potential overruns and
   translation errors

 - Cleanup header dependency problems with asm-offsets.c

 - Add fault info for unexpected low-address protection faults in user
   mode

 - Add support for HOTPLUG_SMT, replacing the arch-specific "nosmt"
   handling with common code handling

 - Use bitop functions to implement CPU flag helper functions to ensure
   that bits cannot get lost if modified in different contexts on a CPU

 - Remove unused machine_flags for the lowcore

* tag 's390-6.15-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux:
  s390/vfio-ap: Fix no AP queue sharing allowed message written to kernel log
  s390/pci: Fix dev.dma_range_map missing sentinel element
  s390/mm: Dump fault info in case of low address protection fault
  s390/smp: Add support for HOTPLUG_SMT
  s390: Fix linker error when -no-pie option is unavailable
  s390/processor: Use bitop functions for cpu flag helper functions
  s390/asm-offsets: Remove ASM_OFFSETS_C
  s390/asm-offsets: Include ftrace_regs.h instead of ftrace.h
  s390/kvm: Split kvm_host header file
  s390/pci: Fix zpci_bus_is_isolated_vf() for non-VFs
  s390/lowcore: Remove unused machine_flags
  s390/entry: Fix setting _CIF_MCCK_GUEST with lowcore relocation
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
