linux/Documentation/security/keys, branch v5.0

Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

2019-01-02T17:43:14Z

Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall. Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the kexec'ed kernel image. This adds additional support in IMA to prevent loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall, independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included. In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named ".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring. (David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different use case scenario, are included here)" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: integrity: Remove references to module keyring ima: Use inode_is_open_for_write ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser efi: Add EFI signature data types integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring selftests/ima: kexec_load syscall test ima: don't measure/appraise files on efivarfs x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0 x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86 ima: add support for arch specific policies ima: refactor ima_init_policy() ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag x86/ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding field

Merge tag 'docs-5.0' of git://git.lwn.net/linux

2018-12-29T19:21:49Z

Pull documentation update from Jonathan Corbet: "A fairly normal cycle for documentation stuff. We have a new document on perf security, more Italian translations, more improvements to the memory-management docs, improvements to the pathname lookup documentation, and the usual array of smaller fixes. As is often the case, there are a few reaches outside of Documentation/ to adjust kerneldoc comments" * tag 'docs-5.0' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (38 commits) docs: improve pathname-lookup document structure configfs: fix wrong name of struct in documentation docs/mm-api: link slab_common.c to "The Slab Cache" section slab: make kmem_cache_create{_usercopy} description proper kernel-doc doc:process: add links where missing docs/core-api: make mm-api.rst more structured x86, boot: documentation whitespace fixup Documentation: devres: note checking needs when converting doc:it: add some process/* translations doc:it: fixes in process/1.Intro Documentation: convert path-lookup from markdown to resturctured text Documentation/admin-guide: update admin-guide index.rst Documentation/admin-guide: introduce perf-security.rst file scripts/kernel-doc: Fix struct and struct field attribute processing Documentation: dev-tools: Fix typos in index.rst Correct gen_init_cpio tool's documentation Document /proc/pid PID reuse behavior Documentation: update path-lookup.md for parallel lookups Documentation: Use "while" instead of "whilst" dmaengine: Add mailing list address to the documentation ...

keys-encrypted: add nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys

2018-12-14T01:54:13Z

Adding nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys in order to limit the size of the key to 32bytes. Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang Acked-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Dan Williams

docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0

2018-12-11T12:13:42Z

Extend the documentation for trusted keys with documentation for how to set up a key for a TPM 2.0 so it can be used with a TPM 2.0 as well. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang Acked-by: Dan Williams Acked-by: Jerry Snitselaar Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

Documentation: Use "while" instead of "whilst"

2018-11-20T16:30:43Z

Whilst making an unrelated change to some Documentation, Linus sayeth: | Afaik, even in Britain, "whilst" is unusual and considered more | formal, and "while" is the common word. | | [...] | | Can we just admit that we work with computers, and we don't need to | use þe eald Englisc spelling of words that most of the world never | uses? dictionary.com refers to the word as "Chiefly British", which is probably an undesirable attribute for technical documentation. Replace all occurrences under Documentation/ with "while". Cc: David Howells Cc: Liam Girdwood Cc: Chris Wilson Cc: Michael Halcrow Cc: Jonathan Corbet Reported-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet

KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]

2018-10-26T08:30:46Z

Provide five keyctl functions that permit userspace to make use of the new key type ops for accessing and driving asymmetric keys. (*) Query an asymmetric key. long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY, key_serial_t key, unsigned long reserved, struct keyctl_pkey_query *info); Get information about an asymmetric key. The information is returned in the keyctl_pkey_query struct: __u32 supported_ops; A bit mask of flags indicating which ops are supported. This is constructed from a bitwise-OR of: KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_{ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY} __u32 key_size; The size in bits of the key. __u16 max_data_size; __u16 max_sig_size; __u16 max_enc_size; __u16 max_dec_size; The maximum sizes in bytes of a blob of data to be signed, a signature blob, a blob to be encrypted and a blob to be decrypted. reserved must be set to 0. This is intended for future use to hand over one or more passphrases needed unlock a key. If successful, 0 is returned. If the key is not an asymmetric key, EOPNOTSUPP is returned. (*) Encrypt, decrypt, sign or verify a blob using an asymmetric key. long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, void *out); long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, void *out); long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, void *out); long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, const void *in2); Use an asymmetric key to perform a public-key cryptographic operation a blob of data. The parameter block pointed to by params contains a number of integer values: __s32 key_id; __u32 in_len; __u32 out_len; __u32 in2_len; For a given operation, the in and out buffers are used as follows: Operation ID in,in_len out,out_len in2,in2_len ======================= =============== =============== =========== KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT Raw data Encrypted data - KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT Encrypted data Raw data - KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN Raw data Signature - KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Raw data - Signature info is a string of key=value pairs that supply supplementary information. The __spare space in the parameter block must be set to 0. This is intended, amongst other things, to allow the passing of passphrases required to unlock a key. If successful, encrypt, decrypt and sign all return the amount of data written into the output buffer. Verification returns 0 on success. Signed-off-by: David Howells Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior Tested-by: Denis Kenzior Signed-off-by: James Morris

KEYS: Provide key type operations for asymmetric key ops [ver #2]

2018-10-26T08:30:46Z

Provide five new operations in the key_type struct that can be used to provide access to asymmetric key operations. These will be implemented for the asymmetric key type in a later patch and may refer to a key retained in RAM by the kernel or a key retained in crypto hardware. int (*asym_query)(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params, struct kernel_pkey_query *info); int (*asym_eds_op)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *in, void *out); int (*asym_verify_signature)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *in, const void *in2); Since encrypt, decrypt and sign are identical in their interfaces, they're rolled together in the asym_eds_op() operation and there's an operation ID in the params argument to distinguish them. Verify is different in that we supply the data and the signature instead and get an error value (or 0) as the only result on the expectation that this may well be how a hardware crypto device may work. Signed-off-by: David Howells Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior Tested-by: Denis Kenzior Signed-off-by: James Morris

doc: Fix acronym "FEKEK" in ecryptfs

2018-09-20T17:11:48Z

"FEFEK" was incorrectly used as acronym for "File Encryption Key Encryption Key". This replaces all occurences with "FEKEK". Signed-off-by: Felix Eckhofer Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet

KEYS: fix in-kernel documentation for keyctl_read()

2017-11-15T16:38:44Z

When keyctl_read() is passed a buffer that is too small, the behavior is inconsistent. Some key types will fill as much of the buffer as possible, while others won't copy anything. Moreover, the in-kernel documentation contradicted the man page on this point. Update the in-kernel documentation to say that this point is unspecified. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: David Howells

Documentation: fix security related doc refs

2017-10-12T17:14:40Z

Make security document refs valid. Signed-off-by: Tom Saeger Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet