<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/Documentation/sysctl, branch v4.20</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v4.20</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v4.20'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2018-11-01T18:46:27Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux</title>
<updated>2018-11-01T18:46:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-01T18:46:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=2d6bb6adb714b133db92ccd4bfc9c20f75f71f3f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2d6bb6adb714b133db92ccd4bfc9c20f75f71f3f</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull stackleak gcc plugin from Kees Cook:
 "Please pull this new GCC plugin, stackleak, for v4.20-rc1. This plugin
  was ported from grsecurity by Alexander Popov. It provides efficient
  stack content poisoning at syscall exit. This creates a defense
  against at least two classes of flaws:

   - Uninitialized stack usage. (We continue to work on improving the
     compiler to do this in other ways: e.g. unconditional zero init was
     proposed to GCC and Clang, and more plugin work has started too).

   - Stack content exposure. By greatly reducing the lifetime of valid
     stack contents, exposures via either direct read bugs or unknown
     cache side-channels become much more difficult to exploit. This
     complements the existing buddy and heap poisoning options, but
     provides the coverage for stacks.

  The x86 hooks are included in this series (which have been reviewed by
  Ingo, Dave Hansen, and Thomas Gleixner). The arm64 hooks have already
  been merged through the arm64 tree (written by Laura Abbott and
  reviewed by Mark Rutland and Will Deacon).

  With VLAs having been removed this release, there is no need for
  alloca() protection, so it has been removed from the plugin"

* tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  arm64: Drop unneeded stackleak_check_alloca()
  stackleak: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing
  doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature
  fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system
  lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK
  gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack
  x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations</title>
<updated>2018-10-26T00:11:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-22T23:11:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=ede95a63b5e84ddeea6b0c473b36ab8bfd8c6ce3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ede95a63b5e84ddeea6b0c473b36ab8bfd8c6ce3</id>
<content type='text'>
Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module
space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later
attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for
example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then
before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case
where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort
with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out.

Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case
of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached
or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter
was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can
be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit
is reached.

Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64")
Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe &lt;rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: LKML &lt;linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Drop all 00-INDEX files from Documentation/</title>
<updated>2018-09-09T21:08:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Henrik Austad</name>
<email>henrik@austad.us</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-03T22:15:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=a7ddcea58ae22d85d94eabfdd3de75c3742e376b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a7ddcea58ae22d85d94eabfdd3de75c3742e376b</id>
<content type='text'>
This is a respin with a wider audience (all that get_maintainer returned)
and I know this spams a *lot* of people. Not sure what would be the correct
way, so my apologies for ruining your inbox.

The 00-INDEX files are supposed to give a summary of all files present
in a directory, but these files are horribly out of date and their
usefulness is brought into question. Often a simple "ls" would reveal
the same information as the filenames are generally quite descriptive as
a short introduction to what the file covers (it should not surprise
anyone what Documentation/sched/sched-design-CFS.txt covers)

A few years back it was mentioned that these files were no longer really
needed, and they have since then grown further out of date, so perhaps
it is time to just throw them out.

A short status yields the following _outdated_ 00-INDEX files, first
counter is files listed in 00-INDEX but missing in the directory, last
is files present but not listed in 00-INDEX.

List of outdated 00-INDEX:
Documentation: (4/10)
Documentation/sysctl: (0/1)
Documentation/timers: (1/0)
Documentation/blockdev: (3/1)
Documentation/w1/slaves: (0/1)
Documentation/locking: (0/1)
Documentation/devicetree: (0/5)
Documentation/power: (1/1)
Documentation/powerpc: (0/5)
Documentation/arm: (1/0)
Documentation/x86: (0/9)
Documentation/x86/x86_64: (1/1)
Documentation/scsi: (4/4)
Documentation/filesystems: (2/9)
Documentation/filesystems/nfs: (0/2)
Documentation/cgroup-v1: (0/2)
Documentation/kbuild: (0/4)
Documentation/spi: (1/0)
Documentation/virtual/kvm: (1/0)
Documentation/scheduler: (0/2)
Documentation/fb: (0/1)
Documentation/block: (0/1)
Documentation/networking: (6/37)
Documentation/vm: (1/3)

Then there are 364 subdirectories in Documentation/ with several files that
are missing 00-INDEX alltogether (and another 120 with a single file and no
00-INDEX).

I don't really have an opinion to whether or not we /should/ have 00-INDEX,
but the above 00-INDEX should either be removed or be kept up to date. If
we should keep the files, I can try to keep them updated, but I rather not
if we just want to delete them anyway.

As a starting point, remove all index-files and references to 00-INDEX and
see where the discussion is going.

Signed-off-by: Henrik Austad &lt;henrik@austad.us&gt;
Acked-by: "Paul E. McKenney" &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Just-do-it-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: [Almost everybody else]
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>stackleak: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing</title>
<updated>2018-09-04T17:35:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Popov</name>
<email>alex.popov@linux.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-16T22:17:03Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=964c9dff0091893a9a74a88edf984c6da0b779f7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:964c9dff0091893a9a74a88edf984c6da0b779f7</id>
<content type='text'>
Introduce CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE option, which provides
'stack_erasing' sysctl. It can be used in runtime to control kernel
stack erasing for kernels built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.

Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Tested-by: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files</title>
<updated>2018-08-24T01:48:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Salvatore Mesoraca</name>
<email>s.mesoraca16@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-24T00:00:35Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5</id>
<content type='text'>
Disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
writable sticky directories, unless the owner is the same as that of the
directory or the file is opened without the O_CREAT flag.  The purpose
is to make data spoofing attacks harder.  This protection can be turned
on and off separately for FIFOs and regular files via sysctl, just like
the symlinks/hardlinks protection.  This patch is based on Openwall's
"HARDEN_FIFO" feature by Solar Designer.

This is a brief list of old vulnerabilities that could have been prevented
by this feature, some of them even allow for privilege escalation:

CVE-2000-1134
CVE-2007-3852
CVE-2008-0525
CVE-2009-0416
CVE-2011-4834
CVE-2015-1838
CVE-2015-7442
CVE-2016-7489

This list is not meant to be complete.  It's difficult to track down all
vulnerabilities of this kind because they were often reported without any
mention of this particular attack vector.  In fact, before
hardlinks/symlinks restrictions, fifos/regular files weren't the favorite
vehicle to exploit them.

[s.mesoraca16@gmail.com: fix bug reported by Dan Carpenter]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180426081456.GA7060@mwanda
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524829819-11275-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com
[keescook@chromium.org: drop pr_warn_ratelimited() in favor of audit changes in the future]
[keescook@chromium.org: adjust commit subjet]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180416175918.GA13494@beast
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca &lt;s.mesoraca16@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Solar Designer &lt;solar@openwall.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc: reorganize initialization of kern_ipc_perm.seq</title>
<updated>2018-08-22T17:52:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Manfred Spraul</name>
<email>manfred@colorfullife.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-22T05:01:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=e2652ae6bd7492cdc0436817cbcd09282eb0bb03'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e2652ae6bd7492cdc0436817cbcd09282eb0bb03</id>
<content type='text'>
ipc_addid() initializes kern_ipc_perm.seq after having called idr_alloc()
(within ipc_idr_alloc()).

Thus a parallel semop() or msgrcv() that uses ipc_obtain_object_check()
may see an uninitialized value.

The patch moves the initialization of kern_ipc_perm.seq before the calls
of idr_alloc().

Notes:
1) This patch has a user space visible side effect:
If /proc/sys/kernel/*_next_id is used (i.e.: checkpoint/restore) and
if semget()/msgget()/shmget() fails in the final step of adding the id
to the rhash tree, then .._next_id is cleared. Before the patch, is
remained unmodified.

There is no change of the behavior after a successful ..get() call: It
always clears .._next_id, there is no impact to non checkpoint/restore
code as that code does not use .._next_id.

2) The patch correctly documents that after a call to ipc_idr_alloc(),
the full tear-down sequence must be used. The callers of ipc_addid()
do not fullfill that, i.e. more bugfixes are required.

The patch is a squash of a patch from Dmitry and my own changes.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180712185241.4017-3-manfred@colorfullife.com
Reported-by: syzbot+2827ef6b3385deb07eaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernel/hung_task.c: allow to set checking interval separately from timeout</title>
<updated>2018-08-22T17:52:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Vyukov</name>
<email>dvyukov@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-22T04:55:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=a2e514453861dd39b53b7a50b6771bd3f9852078'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a2e514453861dd39b53b7a50b6771bd3f9852078</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently task hung checking interval is equal to timeout, as the result
hung is detected anywhere between timeout and 2*timeout.  This is fine for
most interactive environments, but this hurts automated testing setups
(syzbot).  In an automated setup we need to strictly order CPU lockup &lt;
RCU stall &lt; workqueue lockup &lt; task hung &lt; silent loss, so that RCU stall
is not detected as task hung and task hung is not detected as silent
machine loss.  The large variance in task hung detection timeout requires
setting silent machine loss timeout to a very large value (e.g.  if task
hung is 3 mins, then silent loss need to be set to ~7 mins).  The
additional 3 minutes significantly reduce testing efficiency because
usually we crash kernel within a minute, and this can add hours to bug
localization process as it needs to do dozens of tests.

Allow setting checking interval separately from timeout.  This allows to
set timeout to, say, 3 minutes, but checking interval to 10 secs.

The interval is controlled via a new hung_task_check_interval_secs sysctl,
similar to the existing hung_task_timeout_secs sysctl.  The default value
of 0 results in the current behavior: checking interval is equal to
timeout.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: update hung_task_timeout_max's comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180611111004.203513-1-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt: update __vm_enough_memory()'s path</title>
<updated>2018-08-22T17:52:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>juviliu</name>
<email>juviliu@tencent.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-22T04:53:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=85f237a57f143c0c895dcb7cc53fa0174522ce07'/>
<id>urn:sha1:85f237a57f143c0c895dcb7cc53fa0174522ce07</id>
<content type='text'>
__vm_enough_memory has moved to mm/util.c.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/E18EDF4A4FA4A04BBFA824B6D7699E532A7E5913@EXMBX-SZMAIL013.tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Juvi Liu &lt;juviliu@tencent.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'char-misc-4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc</title>
<updated>2018-08-18T18:04:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-18T18:04:51Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=d5acba26bfa097a618be425522b1ec4269d3edaf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d5acba26bfa097a618be425522b1ec4269d3edaf</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull char/misc driver updates from Greg KH:
 "Here is the bit set of char/misc drivers for 4.19-rc1

  There is a lot here, much more than normal, seems like everyone is
  writing new driver subsystems these days... Anyway, major things here
  are:

   - new FSI driver subsystem, yet-another-powerpc low-level hardware
     bus

   - gnss, finally an in-kernel GPS subsystem to try to tame all of the
     crazy out-of-tree drivers that have been floating around for years,
     combined with some really hacky userspace implementations. This is
     only for GNSS receivers, but you have to start somewhere, and this
     is great to see.

  Other than that, there are new slimbus drivers, new coresight drivers,
  new fpga drivers, and loads of DT bindings for all of these and
  existing drivers.

  All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
  issues"

* tag 'char-misc-4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (255 commits)
  android: binder: Rate-limit debug and userspace triggered err msgs
  fsi: sbefifo: Bump max command length
  fsi: scom: Fix NULL dereference
  misc: mic: SCIF Fix scif_get_new_port() error handling
  misc: cxl: changed asterisk position
  genwqe: card_base: Use true and false for boolean values
  misc: eeprom: assignment outside the if statement
  uio: potential double frees if __uio_register_device() fails
  eeprom: idt_89hpesx: clean up an error pointer vs NULL inconsistency
  misc: ti-st: Fix memory leak in the error path of probe()
  android: binder: Show extra_buffers_size in trace
  firmware: vpd: Fix section enabled flag on vpd_section_destroy
  platform: goldfish: Retire pdev_bus
  goldfish: Use dedicated macros instead of manual bit shifting
  goldfish: Add missing includes to goldfish.h
  mux: adgs1408: new driver for Analog Devices ADGS1408/1409 mux
  dt-bindings: mux: add adi,adgs1408
  Drivers: hv: vmbus: Cleanup synic memory free path
  Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove use of slow_virt_to_phys()
  Drivers: hv: vmbus: Reset the channel callback in vmbus_onoffer_rescind()
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation: vm.txt: Adding 'nr_hugepages_mempolicy' parameter description.</title>
<updated>2018-07-26T22:24:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Prashant Dhamdhere</name>
<email>pdhamdhe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-20T13:35:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=d1634e1aedbc7c30fbba819f8f4fb37df076f49c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d1634e1aedbc7c30fbba819f8f4fb37df076f49c</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch adds 'nr_hugepages_mempolicy' parameter which is currently missing
in 'vm.txt' file. It also contains a short description of 'nr_hugepages_mempolicy'
parameter.

Signed-off-by: Prashant Dhamdhere &lt;pdhamdhe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
