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<title>linux/crypto, branch v5.4</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.4</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.4'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2019-09-28T15:14:15Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2019-09-28T15:14:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-28T15:14:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=aefcf2f4b58155d27340ba5f9ddbe9513da8286d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:aefcf2f4b58155d27340ba5f9ddbe9513da8286d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
 "This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
  Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.

  From the original description:

    This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
    intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
    When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
    Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
    kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
    enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.

    The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
    of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
    doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
    to not requiring external patches.

  There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:

   - Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
     covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/

   -  Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
      module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
      rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.

  The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
  policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
  tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
  permitted.

  The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
  policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
  level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:

    lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}

  Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
  that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
  confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
  confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.

  This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
  overriden by kernel configuration.

  New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
  lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
  include/linux/security.h for details.

  The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
  across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
  weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.

  Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf
  when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
  Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
  this under category (c) of the DCO"

* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
  kexec: Fix file verification on S390
  security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
  lockdown: Print current-&gt;comm in restriction messages
  efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
  tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
  debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
  kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
  lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
  bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
  lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
  lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
  x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
  lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
  lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
  lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
  acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
  acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
  x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity</title>
<updated>2019-09-28T02:37:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-28T02:37:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=f1f2f614d535564992f32e720739cb53cf03489f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f1f2f614d535564992f32e720739cb53cf03489f</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "The major feature in this time is IMA support for measuring and
  appraising appended file signatures. In addition are a couple of bug
  fixes and code cleanup to use struct_size().

  In addition to the PE/COFF and IMA xattr signatures, the kexec kernel
  image may be signed with an appended signature, using the same
  scripts/sign-file tool that is used to sign kernel modules.

  Similarly, the initramfs may contain an appended signature.

  This contained a lot of refactoring of the existing appended signature
  verification code, so that IMA could retain the existing framework of
  calculating the file hash once, storing it in the IMA measurement list
  and extending the TPM, verifying the file's integrity based on a file
  hash or signature (eg. xattrs), and adding an audit record containing
  the file hash, all based on policy. (The IMA support for appended
  signatures patch set was posted and reviewed 11 times.)

  The support for appended signature paves the way for adding other
  signature verification methods, such as fs-verity, based on a single
  system-wide policy. The file hash used for verifying the signature and
  the signature, itself, can be included in the IMA measurement list"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: ima_api: Use struct_size() in kzalloc()
  ima: use struct_size() in kzalloc()
  sefltest/ima: support appended signatures (modsig)
  ima: Fix use after free in ima_read_modsig()
  MODSIGN: make new include file self contained
  ima: fix freeing ongoing ahash_request
  ima: always return negative code for error
  ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
  ima: Define ima-modsig template
  ima: Collect modsig
  ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
  ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()
  ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures
  integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
  PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
  PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
  MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
  ima: initialize the "template" field with the default template
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-5.4/dm-changes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm</title>
<updated>2019-09-21T17:40:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-21T17:40:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=3e414b5bd28f965fb39b9e9419d877df0cf3111a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3e414b5bd28f965fb39b9e9419d877df0cf3111a</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull device mapper updates from Mike Snitzer:

 - crypto and DM crypt advances that allow the crypto API to reclaim
   implementation details that do not belong in DM crypt. The wrapper
   template for ESSIV generation that was factored out will also be used
   by fscrypt in the future.

 - Add root hash pkcs#7 signature verification to the DM verity target.

 - Add a new "clone" DM target that allows for efficient remote
   replication of a device.

 - Enhance DM bufio's cache to be tailored to each client based on use.
   Clients that make heavy use of the cache get more of it, and those
   that use less have reduced cache usage.

 - Add a new DM_GET_TARGET_VERSION ioctl to allow userspace to query the
   version number of a DM target (even if the associated module isn't
   yet loaded).

 - Fix invalid memory access in DM zoned target.

 - Fix the max_discard_sectors limit advertised by the DM raid target;
   it was mistakenly storing the limit in bytes rather than sectors.

 - Small optimizations and cleanups in DM writecache target.

 - Various fixes and cleanups in DM core, DM raid1 and space map portion
   of DM persistent data library.

* tag 'for-5.4/dm-changes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm: (22 commits)
  dm: introduce DM_GET_TARGET_VERSION
  dm bufio: introduce a global cache replacement
  dm bufio: remove old-style buffer cleanup
  dm bufio: introduce a global queue
  dm bufio: refactor adjust_total_allocated
  dm bufio: call adjust_total_allocated from __link_buffer and __unlink_buffer
  dm: add clone target
  dm raid: fix updating of max_discard_sectors limit
  dm writecache: skip writecache_wait for pmem mode
  dm stats: use struct_size() helper
  dm crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher
  dm crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
  crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
  dm space map common: remove check for impossible sm_find_free() return value
  dm raid1: use struct_size() with kzalloc()
  dm writecache: optimize performance by sorting the blocks for writeback_all
  dm writecache: add unlikely for getting two block with same LBA
  dm writecache: remove unused member pointer in writeback_struct
  dm zoned: fix invalid memory access
  dm verity: add root hash pkcs#7 signature verification
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>padata, pcrypt: take CPU hotplug lock internally in padata_alloc_possible</title>
<updated>2019-09-13T11:15:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Jordan</name>
<email>daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-06T01:40:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=cc491d8e6486c56e07e60d9992cd56f63dc9fd6c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cc491d8e6486c56e07e60d9992cd56f63dc9fd6c</id>
<content type='text'>
With pcrypt's cpumask no longer used, take the CPU hotplug lock inside
padata_alloc_possible.

Useful later in the series for avoiding nested acquisition of the CPU
hotplug lock in padata when padata_alloc_possible is allocating an
unbound workqueue.

Without this patch, this nested acquisition would happen later in the
series:

      pcrypt_init_padata
        get_online_cpus
        alloc_padata_possible
          alloc_padata
            alloc_workqueue(WQ_UNBOUND)   // later in the series
              alloc_and_link_pwqs
                apply_wqattrs_lock
                  get_online_cpus         // recursive rwsem acquisition

Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan &lt;daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Lai Jiangshan &lt;jiangshanlai@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: pcrypt - remove padata cpumask notifier</title>
<updated>2019-09-13T11:15:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Jordan</name>
<email>daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-06T01:40:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=63d3578892dc00d165623184b793045257e01083'/>
<id>urn:sha1:63d3578892dc00d165623184b793045257e01083</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that padata_do_parallel takes care of finding an alternate callback
CPU, there's no need for pcrypt's callback cpumask, so remove it and the
notifier callback that keeps it in sync.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan &lt;daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Lai Jiangshan &lt;jiangshanlai@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>padata: make padata_do_parallel find alternate callback CPU</title>
<updated>2019-09-13T11:15:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Jordan</name>
<email>daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-06T01:40:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=e6ce0e0807e90d38a2cefa524ac253d7a85c3f2f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e6ce0e0807e90d38a2cefa524ac253d7a85c3f2f</id>
<content type='text'>
padata_do_parallel currently returns -EINVAL if the callback CPU isn't
in the callback cpumask.

pcrypt tries to prevent this situation by keeping its own callback
cpumask in sync with padata's and checks that the callback CPU it passes
to padata is valid.  Make padata handle this instead.

padata_do_parallel now takes a pointer to the callback CPU and updates
it for the caller if an alternate CPU is used.  Overall behavior in
terms of which callback CPUs are chosen stays the same.

Prepares for removal of the padata cpumask notifier in pcrypt, which
will fix a lockdep complaint about nested acquisition of the CPU hotplug
lock later in the series.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan &lt;daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Lai Jiangshan &lt;jiangshanlai@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>padata: allocate workqueue internally</title>
<updated>2019-09-13T11:15:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Jordan</name>
<email>daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-06T01:40:21Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=b128a30409356df65f1a51cff3eb986cac8cfedc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b128a30409356df65f1a51cff3eb986cac8cfedc</id>
<content type='text'>
Move workqueue allocation inside of padata to prepare for further
changes to how padata uses workqueues.

Guarantees the workqueue is created with max_active=1, which padata
relies on to work correctly.  No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan &lt;daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Lai Jiangshan &lt;jiangshanlai@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: skcipher - Unmap pages after an external error</title>
<updated>2019-09-09T07:35:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-06T03:13:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=0ba3c026e685573bd3534c17e27da7c505ac99c4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0ba3c026e685573bd3534c17e27da7c505ac99c4</id>
<content type='text'>
skcipher_walk_done may be called with an error by internal or
external callers.  For those internal callers we shouldn't unmap
pages but for external callers we must unmap any pages that are
in use.

This patch distinguishes between the two cases by checking whether
walk-&gt;nbytes is zero or not.  For internal callers, we now set
walk-&gt;nbytes to zero prior to the call.  For external callers,
walk-&gt;nbytes has always been non-zero (as zero is used to indicate
the termination of a walk).

Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Fixes: 5cde0af2a982 ("[CRYPTO] cipher: Added block cipher type")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: sha256 - Merge crypto/sha256.h into crypto/sha.h</title>
<updated>2019-09-05T04:54:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hans de Goede</name>
<email>hdegoede@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-01T20:35:31Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=34d6245fbc81e764806a65fceaeb3ab3274a1e63'/>
<id>urn:sha1:34d6245fbc81e764806a65fceaeb3ab3274a1e63</id>
<content type='text'>
The generic sha256 implementation from lib/crypto/sha256.c uses data
structs defined in crypto/sha.h, so lets move the function prototypes
there too.

Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede &lt;hdegoede@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation</title>
<updated>2019-09-03T20:44:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-19T14:17:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=be1eb7f78aa8fbe34779c56c266ccd0364604e71'/>
<id>urn:sha1:be1eb7f78aa8fbe34779c56c266ccd0364604e71</id>
<content type='text'>
Implement a template that wraps a (skcipher,shash) or (aead,shash) tuple
so that we can consolidate the ESSIV handling in fscrypt and dm-crypt and
move it into the crypto API. This will result in better test coverage, and
will allow future changes to make the bare cipher interface internal to the
crypto subsystem, in order to increase robustness of the API against misuse.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Tested-by: Milan Broz &lt;gmazyland@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
