linux/drivers/firmware, branch v4.0

Merge tag 'efi-urgent' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mfleming/efi into x86/urgent

2015-03-31T08:45:47Z

Pull EFI fix from Matt Fleming: - Fix integer overflow issue in the DMI SMBIOS 3.0 code when calculating the number of DMI table entries. (Jean Delvare) Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

firmware: dmi_scan: Prevent dmi_num integer overflow

2015-03-27T10:53:46Z

dmi_num is a u16, dmi_len is a u32, so this construct: dmi_num = dmi_len / 4; would result in an integer overflow for a DMI table larger than 256 kB. I've never see such a large table so far, but SMBIOS 3.0 makes it possible so maybe we'll see such tables in the future. So instead of faking a structure count when the entry point does not provide it, adjust the loop condition in dmi_table() to properly deal with the case where dmi_num is not set. This bug was introduced with the initial SMBIOS 3.0 support in commit fc43026278b2 ("dmi: add support for SMBIOS 3.0 64-bit entry point"). Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare Cc: Matt Fleming Cc: Ivan Khoronzhuk Cc: Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming

Merge tag 'efi-urgent' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mfleming/efi into x86/urgent

2015-03-02T13:18:57Z

Pull EFI fixes from Matt Fleming: " - Fix regression in DMI sysfs code for handling "End of Table" entry and a type bug that could lead to integer overflow. (Ivan Khoronzhuk) - Fix boundary checking in efi_high_alloc() which can lead to memory corruption in the EFI boot stubs. (Yinghai Lu)" Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

firmware: dmi_scan: Fix dmi_len type

2015-02-24T18:54:17Z

According to SMBIOSv3 specification the length of DMI table can be up to 32bits wide. So use appropriate type to avoid overflow. It's obvious that dmi_num theoretically can be more than u16 also, so it's can be changed to u32 or at least it's better to use int instead of u16, but on that moment I cannot imagine dmi structure count more than 65535 and it can require changing type of vars that work with it. So I didn't correct it. Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Ivan Khoronzhuk Cc: Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming

efi/libstub: Fix boundary checking in efi_high_alloc()

2015-02-24T18:46:03Z

While adding support loading kernel and initrd above 4G to grub2 in legacy mode, I was referring to efi_high_alloc(). That will allocate buffer for kernel and then initrd, and initrd will use kernel buffer start as limit. During testing found two buffers will be overlapped when initrd size is very big like 400M. It turns out efi_high_alloc() boundary checking is not right. end - size will be the new start, and should not compare new start with max, we need to make sure end is smaller than max. [ Basically, with the current efi_high_alloc() code it's possible to allocate memory above 'max', because efi_high_alloc() doesn't check that the tail of the allocation is below 'max'. If you have an EFI memory map with a single entry that looks like so, [0xc0000000-0xc0004000] And want to allocate 0x3000 bytes below 0xc0003000 the current code will allocate [0xc0001000-0xc0004000], not [0xc0000000-0xc0003000] like you would expect. - Matt ] Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland Tested-by: Mark Rutland Cc: Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming

Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2015-02-21T18:41:29Z

Pull misc x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar: "This contains: - EFI fixes - a boot printout fix - ASLR/kASLR fixes - intel microcode driver fixes - other misc fixes Most of the linecount comes from an EFI revert" * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mm/ASLR: Avoid PAGE_SIZE redefinition for UML subarch x86/microcode/intel: Handle truncated microcode images more robustly x86/microcode/intel: Guard against stack overflow in the loader x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems x86/mm/init: Fix incorrect page size in init_memory_mapping() printks x86/mm/ASLR: Propagate base load address calculation Documentation/x86: Fix path in zero-page.txt x86/apic: Fix the devicetree build in certain configs Revert "efi/libstub: Call get_memory_map() to obtain map and desc sizes" x86/efi: Avoid triple faults during EFI mixed mode calls

firmware: dmi_scan: Fix dmi scan to handle "End of Table" structure

2015-02-18T14:47:30Z

The dmi-sysfs should create "End of Table" entry, that is type 127. But after adding initial SMBIOS v3 support fc43026278b2 ("dmi: add support for SMBIOS 3.0 64-bit entry point") the 127-0 entry is not handled any more, as result it's not created in dmi sysfs for instance. This is important because the size of whole DMI table must correspond to sum of all DMI entry sizes. So move the end-of-table check after it's handled by dmi_table. Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Ivan Khoronzhuk Cc: # v3.19 Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming

Revert "efi/libstub: Call get_memory_map() to obtain map and desc sizes"

2015-02-18T11:38:13Z

This reverts commit d1a8d66b9177105e898e73716f97eb61842c457a. Ard reported a boot failure when running UEFI under Qemu and Xen and experimenting with various Tianocore build options, "As it turns out, when allocating room for the UEFI memory map using UEFI's AllocatePool (), it may result in two new memory map entries being created, for instance, when using Tianocore's preallocated region feature. For example, the following region 0x00005ead5000-0x00005ebfffff [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] may be split like this 0x00005ead5000-0x00005eae2fff [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] 0x00005eae3000-0x00005eae4fff [Loader Data | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] 0x00005eae5000-0x00005ebfffff [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] if the preallocated Loader Data region was chosen to be right in the middle of the original free space. After patch d1a8d66b9177 ("efi/libstub: Call get_memory_map() to obtain map and desc sizes"), this is not being dealt with correctly anymore, as the existing logic to allocate room for a single additional entry has become insufficient." Mark requested to reinstate the old loop we had before commit d1a8d66b9177, which grows the memory map buffer until it's big enough to hold the EFI memory map. Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Acked-by: Mark Rutland Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming

x86_64: kasan: add interceptors for memset/memmove/memcpy functions

2015-02-14T05:21:41Z

Recently instrumentation of builtin functions calls was removed from GCC 5.0. To check the memory accessed by such functions, userspace asan always uses interceptors for them. So now we should do this as well. This patch declares memset/memmove/memcpy as weak symbols. In mm/kasan/kasan.c we have our own implementation of those functions which checks memory before accessing it. Default memset/memmove/memcpy now now always have aliases with '__' prefix. For files that built without kasan instrumentation (e.g. mm/slub.c) original mem* replaced (via #define) with prefixed variants, cause we don't want to check memory accesses there. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Konstantin Serebryany Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Yuri Gribov Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov Cc: Sasha Levin Cc: Christoph Lameter Cc: Joonsoo Kim Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Christoph Lameter Cc: Pekka Enberg Cc: David Rientjes Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure

2015-02-14T05:21:40Z

Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and out-of-bounds bugs. KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access, therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan instrumentation of globals. This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1]. Basic idea: The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to check the shadow memory on each memory access. Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a memory address to its corresponding shadow address. Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address: unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr) { return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET; } where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3. So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory. The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7) means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see mm/kasan/kasan.h). To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler. Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16. These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error printed. Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov: "We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan), ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing, running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000 scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and lots of others): [2] [3] [4]. The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers. We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer (it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs. Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5]. We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also people from Samsung and Oracle have found some. [...] As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we finish all tuning). I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads. Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are relatively easy to port." Comparison with other debugging features: ======================================== KMEMCHECK: - KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of uninitialized memory reads. Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck: $ netperf -l 30 MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET Recv Send Send Socket Socket Message Elapsed Size Size Size Time Throughput bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72 kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54 kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39 kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23 - Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation. DEBUG_PAGEALLOC: - KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page granularity level, so it able to find more bugs. SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones): - SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan. - SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads, KASan able to detect both reads and writes. - In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact place of first bad read/write. [1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel [2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies Based on work by Andrey Konovalov. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin Acked-by: Michal Marek Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Konstantin Serebryany Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov Cc: Yuri Gribov Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov Cc: Sasha Levin Cc: Christoph Lameter Cc: Joonsoo Kim Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Christoph Lameter Cc: Pekka Enberg Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Stephen Rothwell Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds