<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/fs/debugfs/file.c, branch v5.4</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.4</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.4'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2019-09-28T15:14:15Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2019-09-28T15:14:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-28T15:14:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=aefcf2f4b58155d27340ba5f9ddbe9513da8286d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:aefcf2f4b58155d27340ba5f9ddbe9513da8286d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
 "This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
  Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.

  From the original description:

    This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
    intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
    When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
    Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
    kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
    enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.

    The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
    of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
    doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
    to not requiring external patches.

  There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:

   - Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
     covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/

   -  Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
      module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
      rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.

  The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
  policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
  tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
  permitted.

  The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
  policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
  level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:

    lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}

  Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
  that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
  confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
  confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.

  This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
  overriden by kernel configuration.

  New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
  lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
  include/linux/security.h for details.

  The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
  across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
  weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.

  Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf
  when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
  Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
  this under category (c) of the DCO"

* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
  kexec: Fix file verification on S390
  security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
  lockdown: Print current-&gt;comm in restriction messages
  efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
  tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
  debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
  kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
  lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
  bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
  lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
  lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
  x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
  lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
  lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
  lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
  acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
  acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
  x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down</title>
<updated>2019-08-20T04:54:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-20T00:18:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=5496197f9b084f086cb410dd566648b0896fcc74'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5496197f9b084f086cb410dd566648b0896fcc74</id>
<content type='text'>
Disallow opening of debugfs files that might be used to muck around when
the kernel is locked down as various drivers give raw access to hardware
through debugfs.  Given the effort of auditing all 2000 or so files and
manually fixing each one as necessary, I've chosen to apply a heuristic
instead.  The following changes are made:

 (1) chmod and chown are disallowed on debugfs objects (though the root dir
     can be modified by mount and remount, but I'm not worried about that).

 (2) When the kernel is locked down, only files with the following criteria
     are permitted to be opened:

	- The file must have mode 00444
	- The file must not have ioctl methods
	- The file must not have mmap

 (3) When the kernel is locked down, files may only be opened for reading.

Normal device interaction should be done through configfs, sysfs or a
miscdev, not debugfs.

Note that this makes it unnecessary to specifically lock down show_dsts(),
show_devs() and show_call() in the asus-wmi driver.

I would actually prefer to lock down all files by default and have the
the files unlocked by the creator.  This is tricky to manage correctly,
though, as there are 19 creation functions and ~1600 call sites (some of
them in loops scanning tables).

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andy.shevchenko@gmail.com&gt;
cc: acpi4asus-user@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
cc: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@srcf.ucam.org&gt;
cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;greg@kroah.com&gt;
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;matthewgarrett@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>debugfs: make debugfs_create_u32_array() return void</title>
<updated>2019-06-03T14:34:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-16T13:46:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=c9c2c27d7ceca8c2856c5008f2002bddb384f518'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c9c2c27d7ceca8c2856c5008f2002bddb384f518</id>
<content type='text'>
The single user of debugfs_create_u32_array() does not care about the
return value of it, so make it return void as there is no need to do
anything with the return value.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>debugfs: update documented return values of debugfs helpers</title>
<updated>2019-04-25T09:56:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ronald Tschalär</name>
<email>ronald@innovation.ch</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-15T08:25:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=9abb24990a2bfa3d9dd35a6b3b93ff54d9cc7908'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9abb24990a2bfa3d9dd35a6b3b93ff54d9cc7908</id>
<content type='text'>
Since commit ff9fb72bc077 ("debugfs: return error values, not NULL")
these helper functions do not return NULL anymore (with the exception
of debugfs_create_u32_array()).

Fixes: ff9fb72bc077 ("debugfs: return error values, not NULL")
Signed-off-by: Ronald Tschalär &lt;ronald@innovation.ch&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>debugfs: Re-use kstrtobool_from_user()</title>
<updated>2018-05-14T14:48:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Shevchenko</name>
<email>andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-03T16:17:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=964f8363a1aba6cb4198bfaaac538b08f1c538f1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:964f8363a1aba6cb4198bfaaac538b08f1c538f1</id>
<content type='text'>
Re-use kstrtobool_from_user() instead of open coded variant.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: do bulk POLL* -&gt; EPOLL* replacement</title>
<updated>2018-02-11T22:34:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-11T22:34:03Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=a9a08845e9acbd224e4ee466f5c1275ed50054e8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a9a08845e9acbd224e4ee466f5c1275ed50054e8</id>
<content type='text'>
This is the mindless scripted replacement of kernel use of POLL*
variables as described by Al, done by this script:

    for V in IN OUT PRI ERR RDNORM RDBAND WRNORM WRBAND HUP RDHUP NVAL MSG; do
        L=`git grep -l -w POLL$V | grep -v '^t' | grep -v /um/ | grep -v '^sa' | grep -v '/poll.h$'|grep -v '^D'`
        for f in $L; do sed -i "-es/^\([^\"]*\)\(\&lt;POLL$V\&gt;\)/\\1E\\2/" $f; done
    done

with de-mangling cleanups yet to come.

NOTE! On almost all architectures, the EPOLL* constants have the same
values as the POLL* constants do.  But they keyword here is "almost".
For various bad reasons they aren't the same, and epoll() doesn't
actually work quite correctly in some cases due to this on Sparc et al.

The next patch from Al will sort out the final differences, and we
should be all done.

Scripted-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>use linux/poll.h instead of asm/poll.h</title>
<updated>2018-02-01T21:23:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-01T17:14:57Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=cfe39442ab8ce9670b4ddd04291b8cddb9cb1129'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cfe39442ab8ce9670b4ddd04291b8cddb9cb1129</id>
<content type='text'>
The only place that has any business including asm/poll.h
is linux/poll.h.  Fortunately, asm/poll.h had only been
included in 3 places beyond that one, and all of them
are trivial to switch to using linux/poll.h.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: annotate -&gt;poll() instances</title>
<updated>2017-11-27T21:20:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-03T05:02:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=076ccb76e1a6cf0aa5371132efdd502a11e806f1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:076ccb76e1a6cf0aa5371132efdd502a11e806f1</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>anntotate the places where -&gt;poll() return values go</title>
<updated>2017-11-27T21:19:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-04T02:25:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=e6c8adca20ba459dd88057ca74232bf9f1045075'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e6c8adca20ba459dd88057ca74232bf9f1045075</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>debugfs: Remove redundant license text</title>
<updated>2017-11-07T19:25:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-07T16:01:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=2b2d8788dd565cbe1ab22da6a1bc63d0934a80eb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2b2d8788dd565cbe1ab22da6a1bc63d0934a80eb</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that the SPDX tag is in all debugfs files, that identifies the
license in a specific and legally-defined manner.  So the extra GPL text
wording can be removed as it is no longer needed at all.

This is done on a quest to remove the 700+ different ways that files in
the kernel describe the GPL license text.  And there's unneeded stuff
like the address (sometimes incorrect) for the FSF which is never
needed.

No copyright headers or other non-license-description text was removed.

Cc: Nicolai Stange &lt;nicstange@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
