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<title>linux/fs/proc/root.c, branch v3.9</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v3.9</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v3.9'/>
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<updated>2013-03-27T14:50:08Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mounted</title>
<updated>2013-03-27T14:50:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-24T21:28:27Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:87a8ebd637dafc255070f503909a053cf0d98d3f</id>
<content type='text'>
Only allow unprivileged mounts of proc and sysfs if they are already
mounted when the user namespace is created.

proc and sysfs are interesting because they have content that is
per namespace, and so fresh mounts are needed when new namespaces
are created while at the same time proc and sysfs have content that
is shared between every instance.

Respect the policy of who may see the shared content of proc and sysfs
by only allowing new mounts if there was an existing mount at the time
the user namespace was created.

In practice there are only two interesting cases: proc and sysfs are
mounted at their usual places, proc and sysfs are not mounted at all
(some form of mount namespace jail).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Allow unprivilged mounts of proc and sysfs</title>
<updated>2012-11-20T12:19:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-27T12:56:48Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4f326c0064b20b78b8041f4d2f6fe188a1129f18</id>
<content type='text'>
- The context in which proc and sysfs are mounted have no
  effect on the the uid/gid of their files so no conversion is
  needed except allowing the mount.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pidns: Make the pidns proc mount/umount logic obvious.</title>
<updated>2012-11-19T13:59:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-08-01T17:33:47Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0a01f2cc390e10633a54f72c608cc3fe19a50c3d</id>
<content type='text'>
Track the number of pids in the proc hash table.  When the number of
pids goes to 0 schedule work to unmount the kernel mount of proc.

Move the mount of proc into alloc_pid when we allocate the pid for
init.

Remove the surprising calls of pid_ns_release proc in fork and
proc_flush_task.  Those code paths really shouldn't know about proc
namespace implementation details and people have demonstrated several
times that finding and understanding those code paths is difficult and
non-obvious.

Because of the call path detach pid is alwasy called with the
rtnl_lock held free_pid is not allowed to sleep, so the work to
unmounting proc is moved to a work queue.  This has the side benefit
of not blocking the entire world waiting for the unnecessary
rcu_barrier in deactivate_locked_super.

In the process of making the code clear and obvious this fixes a bug
reported by Gao feng &lt;gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com&gt; where we would leak a
mount of proc during clone(CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWNET) if copy_pid_ns
succeeded and copy_net_ns failed.

Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pidns: Use task_active_pid_ns where appropriate</title>
<updated>2012-11-19T13:59:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-03-02T22:51:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:17cf22c33e1f1b5e435469c84e43872579497653</id>
<content type='text'>
The expressions tsk-&gt;nsproxy-&gt;pid_ns and task_active_pid_ns
aka ns_of_pid(task_pid(tsk)) should have the same number of
cache line misses with the practical difference that
ns_of_pid(task_pid(tsk)) is released later in a processes life.

Furthermore by using task_active_pid_ns it becomes trivial
to write an unshare implementation for the the pid namespace.

So I have used task_active_pid_ns everywhere I can.

In fork since the pid has not yet been attached to the
process I use ns_of_pid, to achieve the same effect.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>procfs: Don't cache a pid in the root inode.</title>
<updated>2012-11-19T11:09:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-07-10T22:23:34Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ae06c7c83fc6e97ba247a261921c101960f3d28f</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that we have s_fs_info pointing to our pid namespace
the original reason for the proc root inode having a struct
pid is gone.

Caching a pid in the root inode has led to some complicated
code.  Now that we don't need the struct pid, just remove it.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>procfs: Use the proc generic infrastructure for proc/self.</title>
<updated>2012-11-19T11:09:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-07-10T21:52:49Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e656d8a6f7fdf7612d2f5771f0ddfca9487f59d9</id>
<content type='text'>
I had visions at one point of splitting proc into two filesystems.  If
that had happened proc/self being the the part of proc that actually deals
with pids would have been a nice cleanup.  As it is proc/self requires
a lot of unnecessary infrastructure for a single file.

The only user visible change is that a mounted /proc for a pid namespace
that is dead now shows a broken proc symlink, instead of being completely
invisible.  I don't think anyone will notice or care.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/proc/root.c: use NULL instead of 0 for pointer</title>
<updated>2012-10-05T18:05:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sachin Kamat</name>
<email>sachin.kamat@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-05T00:15:46Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9fb88442105f5fce96ea343927500d6307c8c550</id>
<content type='text'>
This cleanup also fixes the following sparse warning:

  fs/proc/root.c:64:45: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer

Signed-off-by: Sachin Kamat &lt;sachin.kamat@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>VFS: Pass mount flags to sget()</title>
<updated>2012-07-14T12:38:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-06-25T11:55:37Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9249e17fe094d853d1ef7475dd559a2cc7e23d42</id>
<content type='text'>
Pass mount flags to sget() so that it can use them in initialising a new
superblock before the set function is called.  They could also be passed to the
compare function.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>stop passing nameidata to -&gt;lookup()</title>
<updated>2012-07-14T12:34:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-06-10T21:13:09Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:00cd8dd3bf95f2cc8435b4cac01d9995635c6d0b</id>
<content type='text'>
Just the flags; only NFS cares even about that, but there are
legitimate uses for such argument.  And getting rid of that
completely would require splitting -&gt;lookup() into a couple
of methods (at least), so let's leave that alone for now...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2012-05-24T00:42:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-24T00:42:39Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:644473e9c60c1ff4f6351fed637a6e5551e3dce7</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman:
 "This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can
  reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete
  implementation.

  Highlights:
   - Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and
     code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe.

   - Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the
     config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable
     user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission
     checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe.

   - All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial
     user namespace before they are processed.  Removing the need to add
     an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared
     uids remains the same.

   - With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or
     better than it is today.

   - For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or
     operationally with the user namespace enabled.

   - The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1
     billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code
     enabled.  This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to
     164ns per stat operation).

   - (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value.
     Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially
     anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause
     entertaining failures in userspace.

   - If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails.
     I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I
     could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and
     handle the case where setuid fails.

   - If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which
     we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid.  The LFS
     experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be
     better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I
     can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we
     can't map.

   - Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it
     safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities.

  My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core
  kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1."

Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits)
  userns:  Silence silly gcc warning.
  cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock
  userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq
  userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq
  userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate
  userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids.
  userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate.
  userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe
  userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns
  userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces.
  userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.
  userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids
  userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid
  userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs
  ...
</content>
</entry>
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