<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/fs/proc, branch v4.1</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v4.1</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v4.1'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2015-04-27T00:22:07Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2015-04-27T00:22:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-26T22:48:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=9ec3a646fe09970f801ab15e0f1694060b9f19af'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9ec3a646fe09970f801ab15e0f1694060b9f19af</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull fourth vfs update from Al Viro:
 "d_inode() annotations from David Howells (sat in for-next since before
  the beginning of merge window) + four assorted fixes"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  RCU pathwalk breakage when running into a symlink overmounting something
  fix I_DIO_WAKEUP definition
  direct-io: only inc/dec inode-&gt;i_dio_count for file systems
  fs/9p: fix readdir()
  VFS: assorted d_backing_inode() annotations
  VFS: fs/inode.c helpers: d_inode() annotations
  VFS: fs/cachefiles: d_backing_inode() annotations
  VFS: fs library helpers: d_inode() annotations
  VFS: assorted weird filesystems: d_inode() annotations
  VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations
  VFS: security/: d_inode() annotations
  VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations
  VFS: net/: d_inode() annotations
  VFS: net/unix: d_backing_inode() annotations
  VFS: kernel/: d_inode() annotations
  VFS: audit: d_backing_inode() annotations
  VFS: Fix up some -&gt;d_inode accesses in the chelsio driver
  VFS: Cachefiles should perform fs modifications on the top layer only
  VFS: AF_UNIX sockets should call mknod on the top layer only
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: show locks in /proc/pid/fdinfo/X</title>
<updated>2015-04-17T13:04:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Vagin</name>
<email>avagin@openvz.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-16T19:49:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=6c8c90319c0bb1c9e0b68e721359b89ae4f28465'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6c8c90319c0bb1c9e0b68e721359b89ae4f28465</id>
<content type='text'>
Let's show locks which are associated with a file descriptor in
its fdinfo file.

Currently we don't have a reliable way to determine who holds a lock.  We
can find some information in /proc/locks, but PID which is reported there
can be wrong.  For example, a process takes a lock, then forks a child and
dies.  In this case /proc/locks contains the parent pid, which can be
reused by another process.

$ cat /proc/locks
...
6: FLOCK  ADVISORY  WRITE 324 00:13:13431 0 EOF
...

$ ps -C rpcbind
  PID TTY          TIME CMD
  332 ?        00:00:00 rpcbind

$ cat /proc/332/fdinfo/4
pos:	0
flags:	0100000
mnt_id:	22
lock:	1: FLOCK  ADVISORY  WRITE 324 00:13:13431 0 EOF

$ ls -l /proc/332/fd/4
lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Mar  5 14:43 /proc/332/fd/4 -&gt; /run/rpcbind.lock

$ ls -l /proc/324/fd/
total 0
lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:50 0 -&gt; /dev/pts/0
lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:50 1 -&gt; /dev/pts/0
lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:49 2 -&gt; /dev/pts/0

You can see that the process with the 324 pid doesn't hold the lock.

This information is required for proper dumping and restoring file
locks.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@poochiereds.net&gt;
Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" &lt;bfields@fieldses.org&gt;
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: remove use of seq_printf return value</title>
<updated>2015-04-15T23:35:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Joe Perches</name>
<email>joe@perches.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-15T23:18:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=25ce319167b517a913a2ba9fc80da8330dbc3249'/>
<id>urn:sha1:25ce319167b517a913a2ba9fc80da8330dbc3249</id>
<content type='text'>
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused,
will eventually be converted to void.

See: commit 1f33c41c03da ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to
     seq_has_overflowed() and make public")

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/string_helpers.c: change semantics of string_escape_mem</title>
<updated>2015-04-15T23:35:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Rasmus Villemoes</name>
<email>linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-15T23:17:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=41416f2330112d29f2cfa337bfc7e672bf0c2768'/>
<id>urn:sha1:41416f2330112d29f2cfa337bfc7e672bf0c2768</id>
<content type='text'>
The current semantics of string_escape_mem are inadequate for one of its
current users, vsnprintf().  If that is to honour its contract, it must
know how much space would be needed for the entire escaped buffer, and
string_escape_mem provides no way of obtaining that (short of allocating a
large enough buffer (~4 times input string) to let it play with, and
that's definitely a big no-no inside vsnprintf).

So change the semantics for string_escape_mem to be more snprintf-like:
Return the size of the output that would be generated if the destination
buffer was big enough, but of course still only write to the part of dst
it is allowed to, and (contrary to snprintf) don't do '\0'-termination.
It is then up to the caller to detect whether output was truncated and to
append a '\0' if desired.  Also, we must output partial escape sequences,
otherwise a call such as snprintf(buf, 3, "%1pE", "\123") would cause
printf to write a \0 to buf[2] but leaving buf[0] and buf[1] with whatever
they previously contained.

This also fixes a bug in the escaped_string() helper function, which used
to unconditionally pass a length of "end-buf" to string_escape_mem();
since the latter doesn't check osz for being insanely large, it would
happily write to dst.  For example, kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "something and
then %pE", ...); is an easy way to trigger an oops.

In test-string_helpers.c, the -ENOMEM test is replaced with testing for
getting the expected return value even if the buffer is too small.  We
also ensure that nothing is written (by relying on a NULL pointer deref)
if the output size is 0 by passing NULL - this has to work for
kasprintf("%pE") to work.

In net/sunrpc/cache.c, I think qword_add still has the same semantics.
Someone should definitely double-check this.

In fs/proc/array.c, I made the minimum possible change, but longer-term it
should stop poking around in seq_file internals.

[andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com: simplify qword_add]
[andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com: add missed curly braces]
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>/proc/PID/status: show all sets of pid according to ns</title>
<updated>2015-04-15T23:35:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Chen Hanxiao</name>
<email>chenhanxiao@cn.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-15T23:16:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=e4bc33245124db69b74a6d853ac76c2976f472d5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e4bc33245124db69b74a6d853ac76c2976f472d5</id>
<content type='text'>
If some issues occurred inside a container guest, host user could not know
which process is in trouble just by guest pid: the users of container
guest only knew the pid inside containers.  This will bring obstacle for
trouble shooting.

This patch adds four fields: NStgid, NSpid, NSpgid and NSsid:

a) In init_pid_ns, nothing changed;

b) In one pidns, will tell the pid inside containers:
  NStgid: 21776   5       1
  NSpid:  21776   5       1
  NSpgid: 21776   5       1
  NSsid:  21729   1       0
  ** Process id is 21776 in level 0, 5 in level 1, 1 in level 2.

c) If pidns is nested, it depends on which pidns are you in.
  NStgid: 5       1
  NSpid:  5       1
  NSpgid: 5       1
  NSsid:  1       0
  ** Views from level 1

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add CONFIG_PID_NS ifdef]
Signed-off-by: Chen Hanxiao &lt;chenhanxiao@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Tested-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Tested-by: Nathan Scott &lt;nathans@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations</title>
<updated>2015-04-15T19:06:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-17T22:25:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=2b0143b5c986be1ce8408b3aadc4709e0a94429d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2b0143b5c986be1ce8408b3aadc4709e0a94429d</id>
<content type='text'>
that's the bulk of filesystem drivers dealing with inodes of their own

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace</title>
<updated>2015-03-17T16:31:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill A. Shutemov</name>
<email>kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-09T21:11:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce</id>
<content type='text'>
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.

This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.

[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html

[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
  this is the simple model.   - Linus ]

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@openvz.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Seaborn &lt;mseaborn@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>procfs: fix race between symlink removals and traversals</title>
<updated>2015-02-22T16:43:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-22T03:16:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=7e0e953bb0cf649f93277ac8fb67ecbb7f7b04a9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7e0e953bb0cf649f93277ac8fb67ecbb7f7b04a9</id>
<content type='text'>
use_pde()/unuse_pde() in -&gt;follow_link()/-&gt;put_link() resp.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2015-02-17T22:56:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-17T22:56:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=50652963eae6afe13678dc84d789a174306a4df7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:50652963eae6afe13678dc84d789a174306a4df7</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull misc VFS updates from Al Viro:
 "This cycle a lot of stuff sits on topical branches, so I'll be sending
  more or less one pull request per branch.

  This is the first pile; more to follow in a few.  In this one are
  several misc commits from early in the cycle (before I went for
  separate branches), plus the rework of mntput/dput ordering on umount,
  switching to use of fs_pin instead of convoluted games in
  namespace_unlock()"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  switch the IO-triggering parts of umount to fs_pin
  new fs_pin killing logics
  allow attaching fs_pin to a group not associated with some superblock
  get rid of the second argument of acct_kill()
  take count and rcu_head out of fs_pin
  dcache: let the dentry count go down to zero without taking d_lock
  pull bumping refcount into -&gt;kill()
  kill pin_put()
  mode_t whack-a-mole: chelsio
  file-&gt;f_path.dentry is pinned down for as long as the file is open...
  get rid of lustre_dump_dentry()
  gut proc_register() a bit
  kill d_validate()
  ncpfs: get rid of d_validate() nonsense
  selinuxfs: don't open-code d_genocide()
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vmcore: fix PT_NOTE n_namesz, n_descsz overflow issue</title>
<updated>2015-02-17T22:34:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>WANG Chao</name>
<email>chaowang@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-17T21:46:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=34b47764297130b21aaeb4cc6119bb811814b8e3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:34b47764297130b21aaeb4cc6119bb811814b8e3</id>
<content type='text'>
When updating PT_NOTE header size (ie.  p_memsz), an overflow issue
happens with the following bogus note entry:

  n_namesz = 0xFFFFFFFF
  n_descsz = 0x0
  n_type   = 0x0

This kind of note entry should be dropped during updating p_memsz.  But
because n_namesz is 32bit, after (n_namesz + 3) &amp; (~3), it's overflow to
0x0, the note entry size looks sane and reserved.

When userspace (eg.  crash utility) is trying to access such bogus note,
it could lead to an unexpected behavior (eg.  crash utility segment fault
because it's reading bogus address).

The source of bogus note hasn't been identified yet.  At least we could
drop the bogus note so user space wouldn't be surprised.

Signed-off-by: WANG Chao &lt;chaowang@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Anderson &lt;anderson@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Baoquan He &lt;bhe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Randy Wright &lt;rwright@hp.com&gt;
Cc: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Fabian Frederick &lt;fabf@skynet.be&gt;
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov &lt;vkuznets@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Rashika Kheria &lt;rashika.kheria@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Pearson &lt;greg.pearson@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
