linux/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h, branch v4.19

mm: provide a fallback for PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC for architectures

2018-08-17T23:20:29Z

Some architectures just don't have PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC. The mm/nommu.c and mm/vmalloc.c code have been using PAGE_KERNEL as a fallback for years. Move this fallback to asm-generic. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180510185507.2439-3-mcgrof@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: provide a fallback for PAGE_KERNEL_RO for architectures

2018-08-17T23:20:29Z

Some architectures do not define certain PAGE_KERNEL_* flags, this is either because: a) The way to implement some of these flags is *not yet ported*, or b) The architecture *has no way* to describe them Over time we have accumulated a few PAGE_KERNEL_* fallback workarounds for architectures in the kernel which do not define them using *relatively safe* equivalents. Move these scattered fallback hacks into asm-generic. We start off with PAGE_KERNEL_RO using PAGE_KERNEL as a fallback. This has been in place on the firmware loader for years. Move the fallback into the respective asm-generic header. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180510185507.2439-2-mcgrof@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2018-08-14T16:46:06Z

Merge L1 Terminal Fault fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "L1TF, aka L1 Terminal Fault, is yet another speculative hardware engineering trainwreck. It's a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache when the page table entry controlling the virtual address, which is used for the access, has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set. If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant page table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set, then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads the referenced data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if the page referenced by the address bits in the PTE was still present and accessible. While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will raise a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of loading the data and making it available to other speculative instructions opens up the opportunity for side channel attacks to unprivileged malicious code, similar to the Meltdown attack. While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the attack works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX and also works from inside virtual machines because the speculation bypasses the extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism. The assoicated CVEs are: CVE-2018-3615, CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646 The mitigations provided by this pull request include: - Host side protection by inverting the upper address bits of a non present page table entry so the entry points to uncacheable memory. - Hypervisor protection by flushing L1 Data Cache on VMENTER. - SMT (HyperThreading) control knobs, which allow to 'turn off' SMT by offlining the sibling CPU threads. The knobs are available on the kernel command line and at runtime via sysfs - Control knobs for the hypervisor mitigation, related to L1D flush and SMT control. The knobs are available on the kernel command line and at runtime via sysfs - Extensive documentation about L1TF including various degrees of mitigations. Thanks to all people who have contributed to this in various ways - patches, review, testing, backporting - and the fruitful, sometimes heated, but at the end constructive discussions. There is work in progress to provide other forms of mitigations, which might be less horrible performance wise for a particular kind of workloads, but this is not yet ready for consumption due to their complexity and limitations" * 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (75 commits) x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr() x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16 x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush() x86/KVM/VMX: Replace 'vmx_l1d_flush_always' with 'vmx_l1d_flush_cond' x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush() cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS ...

x86/speculation/l1tf: Unbreak !__HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED architectures

2018-07-15T09:29:26Z

pfn_modify_allowed() and arch_has_pfn_modify_check() are outside of the !__ASSEMBLY__ section in include/asm-generic/pgtable.h, which confuses assembler on archs that don't have __HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED (e.g. ia64) and breaks build: include/asm-generic/pgtable.h: Assembler messages: include/asm-generic/pgtable.h:538: Error: Unknown opcode `static inline bool pfn_modify_allowed(unsigned long pfn,pgprot_t prot)' include/asm-generic/pgtable.h:540: Error: Unknown opcode `return true' include/asm-generic/pgtable.h:543: Error: Unknown opcode `static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)' include/asm-generic/pgtable.h:545: Error: Unknown opcode `return false' arch/ia64/kernel/entry.S:69: Error: `mov' does not fit into bundle Move those two static inlines into the !__ASSEMBLY__ section so that they don't confuse the asm build pass. Fixes: 42e4089c7890 ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings") Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner

ioremap: Update pgtable free interfaces with addr

2018-07-04T19:37:08Z

The following kernel panic was observed on ARM64 platform due to a stale TLB entry. 1. ioremap with 4K size, a valid pte page table is set. 2. iounmap it, its pte entry is set to 0. 3. ioremap the same address with 2M size, update its pmd entry with a new value. 4. CPU may hit an exception because the old pmd entry is still in TLB, which leads to a kernel panic. Commit b6bdb7517c3d ("mm/vmalloc: add interfaces to free unmapped page table") has addressed this panic by falling to pte mappings in the above case on ARM64. To support pmd mappings in all cases, TLB purge needs to be performed in this case on ARM64. Add a new arg, 'addr', to pud_free_pmd_page() and pmd_free_pte_page() so that TLB purge can be added later in seprate patches. [toshi.kani@hpe.com: merge changes, rewrite patch description] Fixes: 28ee90fe6048 ("x86/mm: implement free pmd/pte page interfaces") Signed-off-by: Chintan Pandya Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: mhocko@suse.com Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Will Deacon Cc: Joerg Roedel Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180627141348.21777-3-toshi.kani@hpe.com

x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings

2018-06-20T17:10:01Z

For L1TF PROT_NONE mappings are protected by inverting the PFN in the page table entry. This sets the high bits in the CPU's address space, thus making sure to point to not point an unmapped entry to valid cached memory. Some server system BIOSes put the MMIO mappings high up in the physical address space. If such an high mapping was mapped to unprivileged users they could attack low memory by setting such a mapping to PROT_NONE. This could happen through a special device driver which is not access protected. Normal /dev/mem is of course access protected. To avoid this forbid PROT_NONE mappings or mprotect for high MMIO mappings. Valid page mappings are allowed because the system is then unsafe anyways. It's not expected that users commonly use PROT_NONE on MMIO. But to minimize any impact this is only enforced if the mapping actually refers to a high MMIO address (defined as the MAX_PA-1 bit being set), and also skip the check for root. For mmaps this is straight forward and can be handled in vm_insert_pfn and in remap_pfn_range(). For mprotect it's a bit trickier. At the point where the actual PTEs are accessed a lot of state has been changed and it would be difficult to undo on an error. Since this is a uncommon case use a separate early page talk walk pass for MMIO PROT_NONE mappings that checks for this condition early. For non MMIO and non PROT_NONE there are no changes. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Acked-by: Dave Hansen

Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/sparc-next

2018-04-03T21:08:58Z

Pull sparc updates from David Miller: 1) Add support for ADI (Application Data Integrity) found in more recent sparc64 cpus. Essentially this is keyed based access to virtual memory, and if the key encoded in the virual address is wrong you get a trap. The mm changes were reviewed by Andrew Morton and others. Work by Khalid Aziz. 2) Validate DAX completion index range properly, from Rob Gardner. 3) Add proper Kconfig deps for DAX driver. From Guenter Roeck. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/sparc-next: sparc64: Make atomic_xchg() an inline function rather than a macro. sparc64: Properly range check DAX completion index sparc: Make auxiliary vectors for ADI available on 32-bit as well sparc64: Oracle DAX driver depends on SPARC64 sparc64: Update signal delivery to use new helper functions sparc64: Add support for ADI (Application Data Integrity) mm: Allow arch code to override copy_highpage() mm: Clear arch specific VM flags on protection change mm: Add address parameter to arch_validate_prot() sparc64: Add auxiliary vectors to report platform ADI properties sparc64: Add handler for "Memory Corruption Detected" trap sparc64: Add HV fault type handlers for ADI related faults sparc64: Add support for ADI register fields, ASIs and traps mm, swap: Add infrastructure for saving page metadata on swap signals, sparc: Add signal codes for ADI violations

mm/vmalloc: add interfaces to free unmapped page table

2018-03-23T00:07:01Z

On architectures with CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP set, ioremap() may create pud/pmd mappings. A kernel panic was observed on arm64 systems with Cortex-A75 in the following steps as described by Hanjun Guo. 1. ioremap a 4K size, valid page table will build, 2. iounmap it, pte0 will set to 0; 3. ioremap the same address with 2M size, pgd/pmd is unchanged, then set the a new value for pmd; 4. pte0 is leaked; 5. CPU may meet exception because the old pmd is still in TLB, which will lead to kernel panic. This panic is not reproducible on x86. INVLPG, called from iounmap, purges all levels of entries associated with purged address on x86. x86 still has memory leak. The patch changes the ioremap path to free unmapped page table(s) since doing so in the unmap path has the following issues: - The iounmap() path is shared with vunmap(). Since vmap() only supports pte mappings, making vunmap() to free a pte page is an overhead for regular vmap users as they do not need a pte page freed up. - Checking if all entries in a pte page are cleared in the unmap path is racy, and serializing this check is expensive. - The unmap path calls free_vmap_area_noflush() to do lazy TLB purges. Clearing a pud/pmd entry before the lazy TLB purges needs extra TLB purge. Add two interfaces, pud_free_pmd_page() and pmd_free_pte_page(), which clear a given pud/pmd entry and free up a page for the lower level entries. This patch implements their stub functions on x86 and arm64, which work as workaround. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix typo in pmd_free_pte_page() stub] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180314180155.19492-2-toshi.kani@hpe.com Fixes: e61ce6ade404e ("mm: change ioremap to set up huge I/O mappings") Reported-by: Lei Li Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Wang Xuefeng Cc: Will Deacon Cc: Hanjun Guo Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Chintan Pandya Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm, swap: Add infrastructure for saving page metadata on swap

2018-03-18T14:38:45Z

If a processor supports special metadata for a page, for example ADI version tags on SPARC M7, this metadata must be saved when the page is swapped out. The same metadata must be restored when the page is swapped back in. This patch adds two new architecture specific functions - arch_do_swap_page() to be called when a page is swapped in, and arch_unmap_one() to be called when a page is being unmapped for swap out. These architecture hooks allow page metadata to be saved if the architecture supports it. Signed-off-by: Khalid Aziz Cc: Khalid Aziz Acked-by: Jerome Marchand Reviewed-by: Anthony Yznaga Acked-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

mm/thp: remove pmd_huge_split_prepare()

2018-02-01T01:18:38Z

Instead of marking the pmd ready for split, invalidate the pmd. This should take care of powerpc requirement. Only side effect is that we mark the pmd invalid early. This can result in us blocking access to the page a bit longer if we race against a thp split. [kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com: rebased, dirty THP once] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171213105756.69879-13-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: David Daney Cc: David Miller Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Hugh Dickins Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Martin Schwidefsky Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Nitin Gupta Cc: Ralf Baechle Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Vineet Gupta Cc: Vlastimil Babka Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds