<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/include/keys, branch v5.2</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.2</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.2'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2019-06-05T15:37:17Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441</title>
<updated>2019-06-05T15:37:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-01T08:08:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=b886d83c5b621abc84ff9616f14c529be3f6b147'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b886d83c5b621abc84ff9616f14c529be3f6b147</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation version 2 of the license

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel &lt;armijn@tjaldur.nl&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152</title>
<updated>2019-05-30T18:26:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-27T06:55:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=2874c5fd284268364ece81a7bd936f3c8168e567'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2874c5fd284268364ece81a7bd936f3c8168e567</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
  your option any later version

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 36</title>
<updated>2019-05-24T15:27:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-20T17:08:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=b4d0d230ccfb5d1a9ea85da64aa584df7c148ee9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b4d0d230ccfb5d1a9ea85da64aa584df7c148ee9</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at
  your option any later version

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: fix -Wvarags warning</title>
<updated>2019-04-08T22:58:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>ndesaulniers@google.com</name>
<email>ndesaulniers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-22T23:43:57Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=be24b37e22c20cbaa891971616784dd0f35211e8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:be24b37e22c20cbaa891971616784dd0f35211e8</id>
<content type='text'>
Fixes the warning reported by Clang:
security/keys/trusted.c:146:17: warning: passing an object that
undergoes default
      argument promotion to 'va_start' has undefined behavior [-Wvarargs]
        va_start(argp, h3);
                       ^
security/keys/trusted.c:126:37: note: parameter of type 'unsigned
char' is declared here
unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...)
                               ^
Specifically, it seems that both the C90 (4.8.1.1) and C11 (7.16.1.4)
standards explicitly call this out as undefined behavior:

The parameter parmN is the identifier of the rightmost parameter in
the variable parameter list in the function definition (the one just
before the ...). If the parameter parmN is declared with ... or with a
type that is not compatible with the type that results after
application of the default argument promotions, the behavior is
undefined.

Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/41
Link: https://www.eskimo.com/~scs/cclass/int/sx11c.html
Suggested-by: David Laight &lt;David.Laight@aculab.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Denis Kenzior &lt;denkenz@gmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: James Bottomley &lt;jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;natechancellor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;natechancellor@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;natechancellor@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2019-03-11T00:32:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-11T00:32:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=c3665a6be5de16cf6670a00003642114c44d8a70'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c3665a6be5de16cf6670a00003642114c44d8a70</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
 "Mimi Zohar says:

   'Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA
    kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull
    request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for
    verifying the PE kernel image signature.

    Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp
    files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated.
    The remaining patches are cleanup'"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  evm: Use defined constant for UUID representation
  ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call
  evm: remove set but not used variable 'xattr'
  encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1
  kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
  integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: user: Align the payload buffer</title>
<updated>2019-02-22T18:11:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-20T13:32:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=cc1780fc42c76c705dd07ea123f1143dc5057630'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cc1780fc42c76c705dd07ea123f1143dc5057630</id>
<content type='text'>
Align the payload of "user" and "logon" keys so that users of the
keyrings service can access it as a struct that requires more than
2-byte alignment.  fscrypt currently does this which results in the read
of fscrypt_key::size being misaligned as it needs 4-byte alignment.

Align to __alignof__(u64) rather than __alignof__(long) since in the
future it's conceivable that people would use structs beginning with
u64, which on some platforms would require more than 'long' alignment.

Reported-by: Aaro Koskinen &lt;aaro.koskinen@iki.fi&gt;
Fixes: 2aa349f6e37c ("[PATCH] Keys: Export user-defined keyring operations")
Fixes: 88bd6ccdcdd6 ("ext4 crypto: add encryption key management facilities")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Aaro Koskinen &lt;aaro.koskinen@iki.fi&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key</title>
<updated>2019-02-15T22:12:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-14T16:20:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=822ad64d7e46a8e2c8b8a796738d7b657cbb146d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:822ad64d7e46a8e2c8b8a796738d7b657cbb146d</id>
<content type='text'>
In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if
a key type driver overrides the -&gt;request_key hook and the userspace side
manages to lose the authorisation key, the auth key and the internal
construction record (struct key_construction) can keep each other pinned.

Fix this by the following changes:

 (1) Killing off the construction record and using the auth key instead.

 (2) Including the operation name in the auth key payload and making the
     payload available outside of security/keys/.

 (3) The -&gt;request_key hook is given the authkey instead of the cons
     record and operation name.

Changes (2) and (3) allow the auth key to naturally be cleaned up if the
keyring it is in is destroyed or cleared or the auth key is unlinked.

Fixes: 7ee02a316600 ("keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key")
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring</title>
<updated>2019-02-04T22:29:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kairui Song</name>
<email>kasong@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-21T09:59:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=219a3e8676f3132d27b530c7d2d6bcab89536b57'/>
<id>urn:sha1:219a3e8676f3132d27b530c7d2d6bcab89536b57</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9dc92c45177a ("integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring")
introduced a .platform keyring for storing preboot keys, used for
verifying kernel image signatures. Currently only IMA-appraisal is able
to use the keyring to verify kernel images that have their signature
stored in xattr.

This patch exposes the .platform keyring, making it accessible for
verifying PE signed kernel images as well.

Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song &lt;kasong@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: fixed checkpatch errors, squashed with patch fix]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Move trusted.h to include/keys [ver #2]</title>
<updated>2018-10-26T08:30:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Denis Kenzior</name>
<email>denkenz@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-09T16:48:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=22447981fc050b5f1bdd0e7cbee89b4152a2b2d8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:22447981fc050b5f1bdd0e7cbee89b4152a2b2d8</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior &lt;denkenz@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Provide missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops [ver #2]</title>
<updated>2018-10-26T08:30:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-09T16:47:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=5a30771832aab228e0863e414f9182f86797429e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5a30771832aab228e0863e414f9182f86797429e</id>
<content type='text'>
Provide the missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops.  This
include query, encrypt, decrypt and create signature.  Verify signature
already exists.  Also provided are accessor functions for this:

	int query_asymmetric_key(const struct key *key,
				 struct kernel_pkey_query *info);

	int encrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
			 const void *data, void *enc);
	int decrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
			 const void *enc, void *data);
	int create_signature(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
			     const void *data, void *enc);

The public_key_signature struct gains an encoding field to carry the
encoding for verify_signature().

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior &lt;denkenz@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior &lt;denkenz@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
