<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/ipc/ipc_sysctl.c, branch v5.17</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.17</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.17'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2021-11-09T18:02:53Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ipc/ipc_sysctl.c: remove fallback for !CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL</title>
<updated>2021-11-09T18:02:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Manfred Spraul</name>
<email>manfred@colorfullife.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-09T02:36:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=0e9beb8a96f21a6df1579cb3a679e150e3269d80'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0e9beb8a96f21a6df1579cb3a679e150e3269d80</id>
<content type='text'>
Compilation of ipc/ipc_sysctl.c is controlled by
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSVIPC_SYSCTL)
[see ipc/Makefile]

And CONFIG_SYSVIPC_SYSCTL depends on SYSCTL
[see init/Kconfig]

An SYSCTL is selected by PROC_SYSCTL.
[see fs/proc/Kconfig]

Thus: #ifndef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL in ipc/ipc_sysctl.c is impossible, the
fallback can be removed.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210918145337.3369-1-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc: check checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() to modify C/R proc files</title>
<updated>2021-11-09T18:02:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Michal Clapinski</name>
<email>mclapinski@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-09T02:35:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=5563cabdde7ee53c34ec7e5e0283bfcc9a1bc893'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5563cabdde7ee53c34ec7e5e0283bfcc9a1bc893</id>
<content type='text'>
This commit removes the requirement to be root to modify sem_next_id,
msg_next_id and shm_next_id and checks checkpoint_restore_ns_capable
instead.

Since those files are specific to the IPC namespace, there is no reason
they should require root privileges.  This is similar to ns_last_pid,
which also only checks checkpoint_restore_ns_capable.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: ipc/ipc_sysctl.c needs capability.h for checkpoint_restore_ns_capable()]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210916163717.3179496-1-mclapinski@google.com
Signed-off-by: Michal Clapinski &lt;mclapinski@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc: adjust proc_ipc_sem_dointvec definition to match prototype</title>
<updated>2020-09-05T19:14:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tobias Klauser</name>
<email>tklauser@distanz.ch</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-04T23:35:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=fff1662cc423be00c5a7dffc6cf2332161c882d6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fff1662cc423be00c5a7dffc6cf2332161c882d6</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 32927393dc1c ("sysctl: pass kernel pointers to -&gt;proc_handler")
changed ctl_table.proc_handler to take a kernel pointer.  Adjust the
signature of proc_ipc_sem_dointvec to match ctl_table.proc_handler which
fixes the following sparse error/warning:

  ipc/ipc_sysctl.c:94:47: warning: incorrect type in argument 3 (different address spaces)
  ipc/ipc_sysctl.c:94:47:    expected void *buffer
  ipc/ipc_sysctl.c:94:47:    got void [noderef] __user *buffer
  ipc/ipc_sysctl.c:194:35: warning: incorrect type in initializer (incompatible argument 3 (different address spaces))
  ipc/ipc_sysctl.c:194:35:    expected int ( [usertype] *proc_handler )( ... )
  ipc/ipc_sysctl.c:194:35:    got int ( * )( ... )

Fixes: 32927393dc1c ("sysctl: pass kernel pointers to -&gt;proc_handler")
Signed-off-by: Tobias Klauser &lt;tklauser@distanz.ch&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200825105846.5193-1-tklauser@distanz.ch
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sysctl: pass kernel pointers to -&gt;proc_handler</title>
<updated>2020-04-27T06:07:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-24T06:43:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=32927393dc1ccd60fb2bdc05b9e8e88753761469'/>
<id>urn:sha1:32927393dc1ccd60fb2bdc05b9e8e88753761469</id>
<content type='text'>
Instead of having all the sysctl handlers deal with user pointers, which
is rather hairy in terms of the BPF interaction, copy the input to and
from  userspace in common code.  This also means that the strings are
always NUL-terminated by the common code, making the API a little bit
safer.

As most handler just pass through the data to one of the common handlers
a lot of the changes are mechnical.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov &lt;rdna@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check</title>
<updated>2019-07-19T00:08:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matteo Croce</name>
<email>mcroce@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-18T22:58:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=eec4844fae7c033a0c1fc1eb3b8517aeb8b6cc49'/>
<id>urn:sha1:eec4844fae7c033a0c1fc1eb3b8517aeb8b6cc49</id>
<content type='text'>
In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to
validate the user supplied value between an allowed range.  This
function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as
minimum and maximum allowed value.

On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some
readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned
to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced.

The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range
boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1,
int_max=INT_MAX in different source files:

    $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&amp;(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l
    248

Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some
macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them
instead of creating a local one for every object file.

This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary
compiled with the default Fedora config:

    # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o
    add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164)
    Data                                         old     new   delta
    sysctl_vals                                    -      12     +12
    __kstrtab_sysctl_vals                          -      12     +12
    max                                           14      10      -4
    int_max                                       16       -     -16
    one                                           68       -     -68
    zero                                         128      28    -100
    Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00%

[mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c]
[arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce &lt;mcroce@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin &lt;atomlin@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441</title>
<updated>2019-06-05T15:37:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-01T08:08:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=b886d83c5b621abc84ff9616f14c529be3f6b147'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b886d83c5b621abc84ff9616f14c529be3f6b147</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation version 2 of the license

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel &lt;armijn@tjaldur.nl&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc: do cyclic id allocation for the ipc object.</title>
<updated>2019-05-15T02:52:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Manfred Spraul</name>
<email>manfred@colorfullife.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-14T22:46:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=99db46ea292780cd978d56932d9445b1e8bdafe8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:99db46ea292780cd978d56932d9445b1e8bdafe8</id>
<content type='text'>
For ipcmni_extend mode, the sequence number space is only 7 bits.  So
the chance of id reuse is relatively high compared with the non-extended
mode.

To alleviate this id reuse problem, this patch enables cyclic allocation
for the index to the radix tree (idx).  The disadvantage is that this
can cause a slight slow-down of the fast path, as the radix tree could
be higher than necessary.

To limit the radix tree height, I have chosen the following limits:
 1) The cycling is done over in_use*1.5.
 2) At least, the cycling is done over
   "normal" ipcnmi mode: RADIX_TREE_MAP_SIZE elements
   "ipcmni_extended": 4096 elements

Result:
- for normal mode:
	No change for &lt;= 42 active ipc elements. With more than 42
	active ipc elements, a 2nd level would be added to the radix
	tree.
	Without cyclic allocation, a 2nd level would be added only with
	more than 63 active elements.

- for extended mode:
	Cycling creates always at least a 2-level radix tree.
	With more than 2730 active objects, a 3rd level would be
	added, instead of &gt; 4095 active objects until the 3rd level
	is added without cyclic allocation.

For a 2-level radix tree compared to a 1-level radix tree, I have
observed &lt; 1% performance impact.

Notes:
1) Normal "x=semget();y=semget();" is unaffected: Then the idx
  is e.g. a and a+1, regardless if idr_alloc() or idr_alloc_cyclic()
  is used.

2) The -1% happens in a microbenchmark after this situation:
	x=semget();
	for(i=0;i&lt;4000;i++) {t=semget();semctl(t,0,IPC_RMID);}
	y=semget();
	Now perform semget calls on x and y that do not sleep.

3) The worst-case reuse cycle time is unfortunately unaffected:
   If you have 2^24-1 ipc objects allocated, and get/remove the last
   possible element in a loop, then the id is reused after 128
   get/remove pairs.

Performance check:
A microbenchmark that performes no-op semop() randomly on two IDs,
with only these two IDs allocated.
The IDs were set using /proc/sys/kernel/sem_next_id.
The test was run 5 times, averages are shown.

1 &amp; 2: Base (6.22 seconds for 10.000.000 semops)
1 &amp; 40: -0.2%
1 &amp; 3348: - 0.8%
1 &amp; 27348: - 1.6%
1 &amp; 15777204: - 3.2%

Or: ~12.6 cpu cycles per additional radix tree level.
The cpu is an Intel I3-5010U. ~1300 cpu cycles/syscall is slower
than what I remember (spectre impact?).

V2 of the patch:
- use "min" and "max"
- use RADIX_TREE_MAP_SIZE * RADIX_TREE_MAP_SIZE instead of
	(2&lt;&lt;12).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix max() warning]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190329204930.21620-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Acked-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc: allow boot time extension of IPCMNI from 32k to 16M</title>
<updated>2019-05-15T02:52:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Waiman Long</name>
<email>longman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-14T22:46:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=5ac893b8cb10fe2a47a77780d37f9bf5b142854b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5ac893b8cb10fe2a47a77780d37f9bf5b142854b</id>
<content type='text'>
The maximum number of unique System V IPC identifiers was limited to
32k.  That limit should be big enough for most use cases.

However, there are some users out there requesting for more, especially
those that are migrating from Solaris which uses 24 bits for unique
identifiers.  To satisfy the need of those users, a new boot time kernel
option "ipcmni_extend" is added to extend the IPCMNI value to 16M.  This
is a 512X increase which should be big enough for users out there that
need a large number of unique IPC identifier.

The use of this new option will change the pattern of the IPC
identifiers returned by functions like shmget(2).  An application that
depends on such pattern may not work properly.  So it should only be
used if the users really need more than 32k of unique IPC numbers.

This new option does have the side effect of reducing the maximum number
of unique sequence numbers from 64k down to 128.  So it is a trade-off.

The computation of a new IPC id is not done in the performance critical
path.  So a little bit of additional overhead shouldn't have any real
performance impact.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190329204930.21620-1-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc: IPCMNI limit check for semmni</title>
<updated>2018-10-31T15:54:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Waiman Long</name>
<email>longman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-30T22:07:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=8c81ddd2acd2c10979f5a64f6784ce7c6717495e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8c81ddd2acd2c10979f5a64f6784ce7c6717495e</id>
<content type='text'>
For SysV semaphores, the semmni value is the last part of the 4-element
sem number array.  To make semmni behave in a similar way to msgmni and
shmmni, we can't directly use the _minmax handler.  Instead, a special sem
specific handler is added to check the last argument to make sure that it
is limited to the [0, IPCMNI] range.  An error will be returned if this is
not the case.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536352137-12003-3-git-send-email-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc: IPCMNI limit check for msgmni and shmmni</title>
<updated>2018-10-31T15:54:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Waiman Long</name>
<email>longman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-30T22:07:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=6730e6580177d13f4612767873cb5a533ad63c61'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6730e6580177d13f4612767873cb5a533ad63c61</id>
<content type='text'>
Patch series "ipc: IPCMNI limit check for *mni &amp; increase that limit", v9.

The sysctl parameters msgmni, shmmni and semmni have an inherent limit of
IPC_MNI (32k).  However, users may not be aware of that because they can
write a value much higher than that without getting any error or
notification.  Reading the parameters back will show the newly written
values which are not real.

The real IPCMNI limit is now enforced to make sure that users won't put in
an unrealistic value.  The first 2 patches enforce the limits.

There are also users out there requesting increase in the IPCMNI value.
The last 2 patches attempt to do that by using a boot kernel parameter
"ipcmni_extend" to increase the IPCMNI limit from 32k to 8M if the users
really want the extended value.

This patch (of 4):

A user can write arbitrary integer values to msgmni and shmmni sysctl
parameters without getting error, but the actual limit is really IPCMNI
(32k).  This can mislead users as they think they can get a value that is
not real.

The right limits are now set for msgmni and shmmni so that the users will
become aware if they set a value outside of the acceptable range.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536352137-12003-2-git-send-email-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
