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<title>linux/ipc/mqueue.c, branch v3.13</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v3.13</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v3.13'/>
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<updated>2013-11-09T05:16:42Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>locks: break delegations on unlink</title>
<updated>2013-11-09T05:16:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>J. Bruce Fields</name>
<email>bfields@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-09-20T13:14:34Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b21996e36c8e3b92a84e972378bde80b43acd890</id>
<content type='text'>
We need to break delegations on any operation that changes the set of
links pointing to an inode.  Start with unlink.

Such operations also hold the i_mutex on a parent directory.  Breaking a
delegation may require waiting for a timeout (by default 90 seconds) in
the case of a unresponsive NFS client.  To avoid blocking all directory
operations, we therefore drop locks before waiting for the delegation.
The logic then looks like:

	acquire locks
	...
	test for delegation; if found:
		take reference on inode
		release locks
		wait for delegation break
		drop reference on inode
		retry

It is possible this could never terminate.  (Even if we take precautions
to prevent another delegation being acquired on the same inode, we could
get a different inode on each retry.)  But this seems very unlikely.

The initial test for a delegation happens after the lock on the target
inode is acquired, but the directory inode may have been acquired
further up the call stack.  We therefore add a "struct inode **"
argument to any intervening functions, which we use to pass the inode
back up to the caller in the case it needs a delegation synchronously
broken.

Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Dustin Kirkland &lt;dustin.kirkland@gazzang.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: fix mq_open and mq_unlink to add the MQ root as a hidden parent audit_names record</title>
<updated>2013-07-09T17:33:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-07-08T22:59:36Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:79f6530cb59e2a0af6953742a33cc29e98ca631c</id>
<content type='text'>
The old audit PATH records for mq_open looked like this:

  type=PATH msg=audit(1366282323.982:869): item=1 name=(null) inode=6777
  dev=00:0c mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
  obj=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023
  type=PATH msg=audit(1366282323.982:869): item=0 name="test_mq" inode=26732
  dev=00:0c mode=0100700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
  obj=staff_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023

...with the audit related changes that went into 3.7, they now look like this:

  type=PATH msg=audit(1366282236.776:3606): item=2 name=(null) inode=66655
  dev=00:0c mode=0100700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
  obj=staff_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023
  type=PATH msg=audit(1366282236.776:3606): item=1 name=(null) inode=6926
  dev=00:0c mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
  obj=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023
  type=PATH msg=audit(1366282236.776:3606): item=0 name="test_mq"

Both of these look wrong to me.  As Steve Grubb pointed out:

 "What we need is 1 PATH record that identifies the MQ.  The other PATH
  records probably should not be there."

Fix it to record the mq root as a parent, and flag it such that it
should be hidden from view when the names are logged, since the root of
the mq filesystem isn't terribly interesting.  With this change, we get
a single PATH record that looks more like this:

  type=PATH msg=audit(1368021604.836:484): item=0 name="test_mq" inode=16914
  dev=00:0c mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
  obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s0

In order to do this, a new audit_inode_parent_hidden() function is
added.  If we do it this way, then we avoid having the existing callers
of audit_inode needing to do any sort of flag conversion if auditing is
inactive.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jiri Jaburek &lt;jjaburek@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2013-03-28T20:43:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-28T20:43:46Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2c3de1c2d7d68c6ba4c1ecd82c68285f34d9609e</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull userns fixes from Eric W Biederman:
 "The bulk of the changes are fixing the worst consequences of the user
  namespace design oversight in not considering what happens when one
  namespace starts off as a clone of another namespace, as happens with
  the mount namespace.

  The rest of the changes are just plain bug fixes.

  Many thanks to Andy Lutomirski for pointing out many of these issues."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mounted
  ipc: Restrict mounting the mqueue filesystem
  vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
  vfs: Add a mount flag to lock read only bind mounts
  userns:  Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted
  yama:  Better permission check for ptraceme
  pid: Handle the exit of a multi-threaded init.
  scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc: Restrict mounting the mqueue filesystem</title>
<updated>2013-03-27T14:50:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-22T01:13:15Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a636b702ed1805e988ad3d8ff8b52c060f8b341c</id>
<content type='text'>
Only allow mounting the mqueue filesystem if the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN
rights over the ipc namespace.   The principle here is if you create
or have capabilities over it you can mount it, otherwise you get to live
with what other people have mounted.

This information is not particularly sensitive and mqueue essentially
only reports which posix messages queues exist.  Still when creating a
restricted environment for an application to live any extra
information may be of use to someone with sufficient creativity.  The
historical if imperfect way this information has been restricted has
been not to allow mounts and restricting this to ipc namespace
creators maintains the spirit of the historical restriction.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mqueue: sys_mq_open: do not call mnt_drop_write() if read-only</title>
<updated>2013-03-22T23:41:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Vladimir Davydov</name>
<email>vdavydov@parallels.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-22T22:04:51Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:38d78e587d4960d0db94add518d27ee74bad2301</id>
<content type='text'>
mnt_drop_write() must be called only if mnt_want_write() succeeded,
otherwise the mnt_writers counter will diverge.

mnt_writers counters are used to check if remounting FS as read-only is
OK, so after an extra mnt_drop_write() call, it would be impossible to
remount mqueue FS as read-only.  Besides, on umount a warning would be
printed like this one:

  =====================================
  [ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
  3.9.0-rc3 #5 Not tainted
  -------------------------------------
  a.out/12486 is trying to release lock (sb_writers) at:
  mnt_drop_write+0x1f/0x30
  but there are no more locks to release!

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov &lt;vdavydov@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro &lt;kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2013-02-27T04:16:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-02-27T04:16:07Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d895cb1af15c04c522a25c79cc429076987c089b</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull vfs pile (part one) from Al Viro:
 "Assorted stuff - cleaning namei.c up a bit, fixing -&gt;d_name/-&gt;d_parent
  locking violations, etc.

  The most visible changes here are death of FS_REVAL_DOT (replaced with
  "has -&gt;d_weak_revalidate()") and a new helper getting from struct file
  to inode.  Some bits of preparation to xattr method interface changes.

  Misc patches by various people sent this cycle *and* ocfs2 fixes from
  several cycles ago that should've been upstream right then.

  PS: the next vfs pile will be xattr stuff."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (46 commits)
  saner proc_get_inode() calling conventions
  proc: avoid extra pde_put() in proc_fill_super()
  fs: change return values from -EACCES to -EPERM
  fs/exec.c: make bprm_mm_init() static
  ocfs2/dlm: use GFP_ATOMIC inside a spin_lock
  ocfs2: fix possible use-after-free with AIO
  ocfs2: Fix oops in ocfs2_fast_symlink_readpage() code path
  get_empty_filp()/alloc_file() leave both -&gt;f_pos and -&gt;f_version zero
  target: writev() on single-element vector is pointless
  export kernel_write(), convert open-coded instances
  fs: encode_fh: return FILEID_INVALID if invalid fid_type
  kill f_vfsmnt
  vfs: kill FS_REVAL_DOT by adding a d_weak_revalidate dentry op
  nfsd: handle vfs_getattr errors in acl protocol
  switch vfs_getattr() to struct path
  default SET_PERSONALITY() in linux/elf.h
  ceph: prepopulate inodes only when request is aborted
  d_hash_and_lookup(): export, switch open-coded instances
  9p: switch v9fs_set_create_acl() to inode+fid, do it before d_instantiate()
  9p: split dropping the acls from v9fs_set_create_acl()
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>new helper: file_inode(file)</title>
<updated>2013-02-23T04:31:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2013-01-23T22:07:38Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:496ad9aa8ef448058e36ca7a787c61f2e63f0f54</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Allow the unprivileged users to mount mqueue fs</title>
<updated>2013-01-28T03:25:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Gao feng</name>
<email>gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-01-28T03:09:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=bc1b69ed22a704fb1cc83d75b2eb46508a06c820'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bc1b69ed22a704fb1cc83d75b2eb46508a06c820</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch allow the unprivileged user to mount mqueuefs in
user ns.

If two userns share the same ipcns,the files in mqueue fs
should be seen in both these two userns.

If the userns has its own ipcns,it has its own mqueue fs too.
ipcns has already done this job well.

Signed-off-by: Gao feng &lt;gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: make audit_inode take struct filename</title>
<updated>2012-10-13T00:15:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-10T20:43:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:adb5c2473d3f91526c79db972aafb20a56d3fbb3</id>
<content type='text'>
Keep a pointer to the audit_names "slot" in struct filename.

Have all of the audit_inode callers pass a struct filename ponter to
audit_inode instead of a string pointer. If the aname field is already
populated, then we can skip walking the list altogether and just use it
directly.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: define struct filename and have getname() return it</title>
<updated>2012-10-13T00:14:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-10T19:25:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:91a27b2a756784714e924e5e854b919273082d26</id>
<content type='text'>
getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a
kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would
however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to
the string.

For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the
amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled,
we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not
need to recopy it from userspace.

This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return
a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the
string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it.

Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes
convenient.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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