<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/kernel/bpf/verifier.c, branch v5.3</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.3</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.3'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2019-09-05T12:06:58Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix precision tracking of stack slots</title>
<updated>2019-09-05T12:06:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-03T22:16:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=2339cd6cd0b5401fa3fe886bf1c0cb8822041957'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2339cd6cd0b5401fa3fe886bf1c0cb8822041957</id>
<content type='text'>
The problem can be seen in the following two tests:
0: (bf) r3 = r10
1: (55) if r3 != 0x7b goto pc+0
2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r3 -8) = 0
3: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)
..
0: (85) call bpf_get_prandom_u32#7
1: (bf) r3 = r10
2: (55) if r3 != 0x7b goto pc+0
3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r3 -8) = r0
4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)

When backtracking need to mark R4 it will mark slot fp-8.
But ST or STX into fp-8 could belong to the same block of instructions.
When backtracing is done the parent state may have fp-8 slot
as "unallocated stack". Which will cause verifier to warn
and incorrectly reject such programs.

Writes into stack via non-R10 register are rare. llvm always
generates canonical stack spill/fill.
For such pathological case fall back to conservative precision
tracking instead of rejecting.

Reported-by: syzbot+c8d66267fd2b5955287e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: b5dc0163d8fd ("bpf: precise scalar_value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix precision tracking in presence of bpf2bpf calls</title>
<updated>2019-08-23T23:17:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-21T21:07:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=6754172c208d9d3dae208c6494611ac167d56688'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6754172c208d9d3dae208c6494611ac167d56688</id>
<content type='text'>
While adding extra tests for precision tracking and extra infra
to adjust verifier heuristics the existing test
"calls: cross frame pruning - liveness propagation" started to fail.
The root cause is the same as described in verifer.c comment:

 * Also if parent's curframe &gt; frame where backtracking started,
 * the verifier need to mark registers in both frames, otherwise callees
 * may incorrectly prune callers. This is similar to
 * commit 7640ead93924 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences")
 * For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking.

Turned out though that returning -ENOTSUPP from backtrack_insn() and
doing mark_all_scalars_precise() in the current parentage chain is not enough.
Depending on how is_state_visited() heuristic is creating parentage chain
it's possible that callee will incorrectly prune caller.
Fix the issue by setting precise=true earlier and more aggressively.
Before this fix the precision tracking _within_ functions that don't do
bpf2bpf calls would still work. Whereas now precision tracking is completely
disabled when bpf2bpf calls are present anywhere in the program.

No difference in cilium tests (they don't have bpf2bpf calls).
No difference in test_progs though some of them have bpf2bpf calls,
but precision tracking wasn't effective there.

Fixes: b5dc0163d8fd ("bpf: precise scalar_value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix narrower loads on s390</title>
<updated>2019-07-23T20:59:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ilya Leoshkevich</name>
<email>iii@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-19T09:18:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=d9b8aadaffa65809d146cf0f8632a22a946367d7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d9b8aadaffa65809d146cf0f8632a22a946367d7</id>
<content type='text'>
The very first check in test_pkt_md_access is failing on s390, which
happens because loading a part of a struct __sk_buff field produces
an incorrect result.

The preprocessed code of the check is:

{
	__u8 tmp = *((volatile __u8 *)&amp;skb-&gt;len +
		((sizeof(skb-&gt;len) - sizeof(__u8)) / sizeof(__u8)));
	if (tmp != ((*(volatile __u32 *)&amp;skb-&gt;len) &amp; 0xFF)) return 2;
};

clang generates the following code for it:

      0:	71 21 00 03 00 00 00 00	r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 3)
      1:	61 31 00 00 00 00 00 00	r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 0)
      2:	57 30 00 00 00 00 00 ff	r3 &amp;= 255
      3:	5d 23 00 1d 00 00 00 00	if r2 != r3 goto +29 &lt;LBB0_10&gt;

Finally, verifier transforms it to:

  0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +104)
  1: (bc) w2 = w2
  2: (74) w2 &gt;&gt;= 24
  3: (bc) w2 = w2
  4: (54) w2 &amp;= 255
  5: (bc) w2 = w2

The problem is that when verifier emits the code to replace a partial
load of a struct __sk_buff field (*(u8 *)(r1 + 3)) with a full load of
struct sk_buff field (*(u32 *)(r1 + 104)), an optional shift and a
bitwise AND, it assumes that the machine is little endian and
incorrectly decides to use a shift.

Adjust shift count calculation to account for endianness.

Fixes: 31fd85816dbe ("bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich &lt;iii@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: verifier: avoid fall-through warnings</title>
<updated>2019-07-12T13:13:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavo@embeddedor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-11T16:22:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=ed4ed4043a127c5ca9a35339bb614693be9037a3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ed4ed4043a127c5ca9a35339bb614693be9037a3</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, this patch silences
the following warning:

kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘check_return_code’:
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:6106:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
   if (env-&gt;prog-&gt;expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG ||
      ^
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:6109:2: note: here
  case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
  ^~~~

Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3

Notice that is much clearer to explicitly add breaks in each case
statement (that actually contains some code), rather than letting
the code to fall through.

This patch is part of the ongoing efforts to enable
-Wimplicit-fallthrough.

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andriin@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix precision bit propagation for BPF_ST instructions</title>
<updated>2019-07-12T12:48:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrii Nakryiko</name>
<email>andriin@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-09T03:32:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=b3b50f05dc501cc2cd90349a7bbfd932af0ceb31'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b3b50f05dc501cc2cd90349a7bbfd932af0ceb31</id>
<content type='text'>
When backtracking instructions to propagate precision bit for registers
and stack slots, one class of instructions (BPF_ST) weren't handled
causing extra stack slots to be propagated into parent state. Parent
state might not have that much stack allocated, though, which causes
warning on invalid stack slot usage.

This patch adds handling of BPF_ST instructions:

BPF_MEM | &lt;size&gt; | BPF_ST:   *(size *) (dst_reg + off) = imm32

Reported-by: syzbot+4da3ff23081bafe74fc2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: b5dc0163d8fd ("bpf: precise scalar_value tracking")
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andriin@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix precision tracking</title>
<updated>2019-07-03T09:12:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-28T16:24:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=a3ce685dd01a786fa5bc388e47d0066a4f842591'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a3ce685dd01a786fa5bc388e47d0066a4f842591</id>
<content type='text'>
When equivalent state is found the current state needs to propagate precision marks.
Otherwise the verifier will prune the search incorrectly.

There is a price for correctness:
                      before      before    broken    fixed
                      cnst spill  precise   precise
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o       1923        8128      1863      1898
bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o       3077        6707      2468      2666
bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o     1062        1062      544       544
bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o   166729      380712    22629     36823
bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o    174607      440652    28805     45325
bpf_netdev.o          8407        31904     6801      7002
bpf_overlay.o         5420        23569     4754      4858
bpf_lxc_jit.o         39389       359445    50925     69631
Overall precision tracking is still very effective.

Fixes: b5dc0163d8fd ("bpf: precise scalar_value tracking")
Reported-by: Lawrence Brakmo &lt;brakmo@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andriin@fb.com&gt;
Tested-by: Lawrence Brakmo &lt;brakmo@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>devmap: Allow map lookups from eBPF</title>
<updated>2019-06-28T23:31:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Toke Høiland-Jørgensen</name>
<email>toke@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-28T09:12:35Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=0cdbb4b09a0658b72c563638d476113aadd91afb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0cdbb4b09a0658b72c563638d476113aadd91afb</id>
<content type='text'>
We don't currently allow lookups into a devmap from eBPF, because the map
lookup returns a pointer directly to the dev-&gt;ifindex, which shouldn't be
modifiable from eBPF.

However, being able to do lookups in devmaps is useful to know (e.g.)
whether forwarding to a specific interface is enabled. Currently, programs
work around this by keeping a shadow map of another type which indicates
whether a map index is valid.

Since we now have a flag to make maps read-only from the eBPF side, we can
simply lift the lookup restriction if we make sure this flag is always set.

Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen &lt;toke@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jonathan Lemon &lt;jonathan.lemon@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andriin@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: implement getsockopt and setsockopt hooks</title>
<updated>2019-06-27T22:25:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stanislav Fomichev</name>
<email>sdf@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-27T20:38:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=0d01da6afc5402f60325c5da31b22f7d56689b49'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0d01da6afc5402f60325c5da31b22f7d56689b49</id>
<content type='text'>
Implement new BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT program type and
BPF_CGROUP_{G,S}ETSOCKOPT cgroup hooks.

BPF_CGROUP_SETSOCKOPT can modify user setsockopt arguments before
passing them down to the kernel or bypass kernel completely.
BPF_CGROUP_GETSOCKOPT can can inspect/modify getsockopt arguments that
kernel returns.
Both hooks reuse existing PTR_TO_PACKET{,_END} infrastructure.

The buffer memory is pre-allocated (because I don't think there is
a precedent for working with __user memory from bpf). This might be
slow to do for each {s,g}etsockopt call, that's why I've added
__cgroup_bpf_prog_array_is_empty that exits early if there is nothing
attached to a cgroup. Note, however, that there is a race between
__cgroup_bpf_prog_array_is_empty and BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY where cgroup
program layout might have changed; this should not be a problem
because in general there is a race between multiple calls to
{s,g}etsocktop and user adding/removing bpf progs from a cgroup.

The return code of the BPF program is handled as follows:
* 0: EPERM
* 1: success, continue with next BPF program in the cgroup chain

v9:
* allow overwriting setsockopt arguments (Alexei Starovoitov):
  * use set_fs (same as kernel_setsockopt)
  * buffer is always kzalloc'd (no small on-stack buffer)

v8:
* use s32 for optlen (Andrii Nakryiko)

v7:
* return only 0 or 1 (Alexei Starovoitov)
* always run all progs (Alexei Starovoitov)
* use optval=0 as kernel bypass in setsockopt (Alexei Starovoitov)
  (decided to use optval=-1 instead, optval=0 might be a valid input)
* call getsockopt hook after kernel handlers (Alexei Starovoitov)

v6:
* rework cgroup chaining; stop as soon as bpf program returns
  0 or 2; see patch with the documentation for the details
* drop Andrii's and Martin's Acked-by (not sure they are comfortable
  with the new state of things)

v5:
* skip copy_to_user() and put_user() when ret == 0 (Martin Lau)

v4:
* don't export bpf_sk_fullsock helper (Martin Lau)
* size != sizeof(__u64) for uapi pointers (Martin Lau)
* offsetof instead of bpf_ctx_range when checking ctx access (Martin Lau)

v3:
* typos in BPF_PROG_CGROUP_SOCKOPT_RUN_ARRAY comments (Andrii Nakryiko)
* reverse christmas tree in BPF_PROG_CGROUP_SOCKOPT_RUN_ARRAY (Andrii
  Nakryiko)
* use __bpf_md_ptr instead of __u32 for optval{,_end} (Martin Lau)
* use BPF_FIELD_SIZEOF() for consistency (Martin Lau)
* new CG_SOCKOPT_ACCESS macro to wrap repeated parts

v2:
* moved bpf_sockopt_kern fields around to remove a hole (Martin Lau)
* aligned bpf_sockopt_kern-&gt;buf to 8 bytes (Martin Lau)
* bpf_prog_array_is_empty instead of bpf_prog_array_length (Martin Lau)
* added [0,2] return code check to verifier (Martin Lau)
* dropped unused buf[64] from the stack (Martin Lau)
* use PTR_TO_SOCKET for bpf_sockopt-&gt;sk (Martin Lau)
* dropped bpf_target_off from ctx rewrites (Martin Lau)
* use return code for kernel bypass (Martin Lau &amp; Andrii Nakryiko)

Cc: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andriin@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Martin Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next</title>
<updated>2019-06-20T04:06:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-20T04:06:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=dca73a65a68329ee386d3ff473152bac66eaab39'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dca73a65a68329ee386d3ff473152bac66eaab39</id>
<content type='text'>
Alexei Starovoitov says:

====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2019-06-19

The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.

The main changes are:

1) new SO_REUSEPORT_DETACH_BPF setsocktopt, from Martin.

2) BTF based map definition, from Andrii.

3) support bpf_map_lookup_elem for xskmap, from Jonathan.

4) bounded loops and scalar precision logic in the verifier, from Alexei.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: precise scalar_value tracking</title>
<updated>2019-06-19T00:22:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-15T19:12:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=b5dc0163d8fd78e64a7e21f309cf932fda34353e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b5dc0163d8fd78e64a7e21f309cf932fda34353e</id>
<content type='text'>
Introduce precision tracking logic that
helps cilium programs the most:
                  old clang  old clang    new clang  new clang
                          with all patches         with all patches
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o      1838     2283         1923       1863
bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o      3218     2657         3077       2468
bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o    1064     545          1062       544
bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o  26935    23045        166729     22629
bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o   34439    35240        174607     28805
bpf_netdev.o         9721     8753         8407       6801
bpf_overlay.o        6184     7901         5420       4754
bpf_lxc_jit.o        39389    50925        39389      50925

Consider code:
654: (85) call bpf_get_hash_recalc#34
655: (bf) r7 = r0
656: (15) if r8 == 0x0 goto pc+29
657: (bf) r2 = r10
658: (07) r2 += -48
659: (18) r1 = 0xffff8881e41e1b00
661: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
662: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23
663: (69) r1 = *(u16 *)(r0 +0)
664: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+21
665: (bf) r8 = r7
666: (57) r8 &amp;= 65535
667: (bf) r2 = r8
668: (3f) r2 /= r1
669: (2f) r2 *= r1
670: (bf) r1 = r8
671: (1f) r1 -= r2
672: (57) r1 &amp;= 255
673: (25) if r1 &gt; 0x1e goto pc+12
 R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=20,vs=64,imm=0) R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=30,var_off=(0x0; 0x1f))
674: (67) r1 &lt;&lt;= 1
675: (0f) r0 += r1

At this point the verifier will notice that scalar R1 is used in map pointer adjustment.
R1 has to be precise for later operations on R0 to be validated properly.

The verifier will backtrack the above code in the following way:
last_idx 675 first_idx 664
regs=2 stack=0 before 675: (0f) r0 += r1         // started backtracking R1 regs=2 is a bitmask
regs=2 stack=0 before 674: (67) r1 &lt;&lt;= 1
regs=2 stack=0 before 673: (25) if r1 &gt; 0x1e goto pc+12
regs=2 stack=0 before 672: (57) r1 &amp;= 255
regs=2 stack=0 before 671: (1f) r1 -= r2         // now both R1 and R2 has to be precise -&gt; regs=6 mask
regs=6 stack=0 before 670: (bf) r1 = r8          // after this insn R8 and R2 has to be precise
regs=104 stack=0 before 669: (2f) r2 *= r1       // after this one R8, R2, and R1
regs=106 stack=0 before 668: (3f) r2 /= r1
regs=106 stack=0 before 667: (bf) r2 = r8
regs=102 stack=0 before 666: (57) r8 &amp;= 65535
regs=102 stack=0 before 665: (bf) r8 = r7
regs=82 stack=0 before 664: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+21
 // this is the end of verifier state. The following regs will be marked precised:
 R1_rw=invP(id=0,umax_value=65535,var_off=(0x0; 0xffff)) R7_rw=invP(id=0)
parent didn't have regs=82 stack=0 marks         // so backtracking continues into parent state
last_idx 663 first_idx 655
regs=82 stack=0 before 663: (69) r1 = *(u16 *)(r0 +0)   // R1 was assigned no need to track it further
regs=80 stack=0 before 662: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23    // keep tracking R7
regs=80 stack=0 before 661: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1  // keep tracking R7
regs=80 stack=0 before 659: (18) r1 = 0xffff8881e41e1b00
regs=80 stack=0 before 658: (07) r2 += -48
regs=80 stack=0 before 657: (bf) r2 = r10
regs=80 stack=0 before 656: (15) if r8 == 0x0 goto pc+29
regs=80 stack=0 before 655: (bf) r7 = r0                // here the assignment into R7
 // mark R0 to be precise:
 R0_rw=invP(id=0)
parent didn't have regs=1 stack=0 marks                 // regs=1 -&gt; tracking R0
last_idx 654 first_idx 644
regs=1 stack=0 before 654: (85) call bpf_get_hash_recalc#34 // and in the parent frame it was a return value
  // nothing further to backtrack

Two scalar registers not marked precise are equivalent from state pruning point of view.
More details in the patch comments.

It doesn't support bpf2bpf calls yet and enabled for root only.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andriin@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
