<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/kernel/bpf, branch v6.0</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v6.0</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v6.0'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2022-08-26T11:19:09Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf</title>
<updated>2022-08-26T11:19:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2022-08-26T11:19:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=2e085ec0e2d7afa14bcfbcd4c41240f5d3372bfe'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2e085ec0e2d7afa14bcfbcd4c41240f5d3372bfe</id>
<content type='text'>
Daniel borkmann says:

====================
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.

We've added 11 non-merge commits during the last 14 day(s) which contain
a total of 13 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-).

The main changes are:

1) Fix BPF verifier's precision tracking around BPF ring buffer, from Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi.

2) Fix regression in tunnel key infra when passing FLOWI_FLAG_ANYSRC, from Eyal Birger.

3) Fix insufficient permissions for bpf_sys_bpf() helper, from YiFei Zhu.

4) Fix splat from hitting BUG when purging effective cgroup programs, from Pu Lehui.

5) Fix range tracking for array poke descriptors, from Daniel Borkmann.

6) Fix corrupted packets for XDP_SHARED_UMEM in aligned mode, from Magnus Karlsson.

7) Fix NULL pointer splat in BPF sockmap sk_msg_recvmsg(), from Liu Jian.

8) Add READ_ONCE() to bpf_jit_limit when reading from sysctl, from Kuniyuki Iwashima.

9) Add BPF selftest lru_bug check to s390x deny list, from Daniel Müller.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Don't use tnum_range on array range checking for poke descriptors</title>
<updated>2022-08-25T21:58:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2022-08-25T21:26:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=a657182a5c5150cdfacb6640aad1d2712571a409'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a657182a5c5150cdfacb6640aad1d2712571a409</id>
<content type='text'>
Hsin-Wei reported a KASAN splat triggered by their BPF runtime fuzzer which
is based on a customized syzkaller:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff888004e90b58 by task syz-executor.0/1489
  CPU: 1 PID: 1489 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.19.0 #1
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
  1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xc9
   print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x1f0
   ? bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0
   kasan_report.cold+0xeb/0x197
   ? kvmalloc_node+0x170/0x200
   ? bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0
   bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0
   ? arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher+0xd0/0xd0
   ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x43/0x70
   bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x3e8/0x640
   ? bpf_obj_name_cpy+0x149/0x1b0
   bpf_prog_load+0x102f/0x2220
   ? __bpf_prog_put.constprop.0+0x220/0x220
   ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110
   ? __might_fault+0xd6/0x180
   ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
   ? lock_is_held_type+0xa6/0x120
   ? __might_fault+0x147/0x180
   __sys_bpf+0x137b/0x6070
   ? bpf_perf_link_attach+0x530/0x530
   ? new_sync_read+0x600/0x600
   ? __fget_files+0x255/0x450
   ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
   ? fput+0x30/0x1a0
   ? ksys_write+0x1a8/0x260
   __x64_sys_bpf+0x7a/0xc0
   ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x21/0x70
   do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
  RIP: 0033:0x7f917c4e2c2d

The problem here is that a range of tnum_range(0, map-&gt;max_entries - 1) has
limited ability to represent the concrete tight range with the tnum as the
set of resulting states from value + mask can result in a superset of the
actual intended range, and as such a tnum_in(range, reg-&gt;var_off) check may
yield true when it shouldn't, for example tnum_range(0, 2) would result in
00XX -&gt; v = 0000, m = 0011 such that the intended set of {0, 1, 2} is here
represented by a less precise superset of {0, 1, 2, 3}. As the register is
known const scalar, really just use the concrete reg-&gt;var_off.value for the
upper index check.

Fixes: d2e4c1e6c294 ("bpf: Constant map key tracking for prog array pokes")
Reported-by: Hsin-Wei Hung &lt;hsinweih@uci.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Shung-Hsi Yu &lt;shung-hsi.yu@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/984b37f9fdf7ac36831d2137415a4a915744c1b6.1661462653.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Do mark_chain_precision for ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO</title>
<updated>2022-08-25T19:07:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi</name>
<email>memxor@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-08-23T18:52:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=2fc31465c5373b5ca4edf2e5238558cb62902311'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2fc31465c5373b5ca4edf2e5238558cb62902311</id>
<content type='text'>
Precision markers need to be propagated whenever we have an ARG_CONST_*
style argument, as the verifier cannot consider imprecise scalars to be
equivalent for the purposes of states_equal check when such arguments
refine the return value (in this case, set mem_size for PTR_TO_MEM). The
resultant mem_size for the R0 is derived from the constant value, and if
the verifier incorrectly prunes states considering them equivalent where
such arguments exist (by seeing that both registers have reg-&gt;precise as
false in regsafe), we can end up with invalid programs passing the
verifier which can do access beyond what should have been the correct
mem_size in that explored state.

To show a concrete example of the problem:

0000000000000000 &lt;prog&gt;:
       0:       r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80)
       1:       r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 76)
       2:       r3 = r1
       3:       r3 += 4
       4:       if r3 &gt; r2 goto +18 &lt;LBB5_5&gt;
       5:       w2 = 0
       6:       *(u32 *)(r1 + 0) = r2
       7:       r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 0)
       8:       r2 = 1
       9:       if w1 == 0 goto +1 &lt;LBB5_3&gt;
      10:       r2 = -1

0000000000000058 &lt;LBB5_3&gt;:
      11:       r1 = 0 ll
      13:       r3 = 0
      14:       call bpf_ringbuf_reserve
      15:       if r0 == 0 goto +7 &lt;LBB5_5&gt;
      16:       r1 = r0
      17:       r1 += 16777215
      18:       w2 = 0
      19:       *(u8 *)(r1 + 0) = r2
      20:       r1 = r0
      21:       r2 = 0
      22:       call bpf_ringbuf_submit

00000000000000b8 &lt;LBB5_5&gt;:
      23:       w0 = 0
      24:       exit

For the first case, the single line execution's exploration will prune
the search at insn 14 for the branch insn 9's second leg as it will be
verified first using r2 = -1 (UINT_MAX), while as w1 at insn 9 will
always be 0 so at runtime we don't get error for being greater than
UINT_MAX/4 from bpf_ringbuf_reserve. The verifier during regsafe just
sees reg-&gt;precise as false for both r2 registers in both states, hence
considers them equal for purposes of states_equal.

If we propagated precise markers using the backtracking support, we
would use the precise marking to then ensure that old r2 (UINT_MAX) was
within the new r2 (1) and this would never be true, so the verification
would rightfully fail.

The end result is that the out of bounds access at instruction 19 would
be permitted without this fix.

Note that reg-&gt;precise is always set to true when user does not have
CAP_BPF (or when subprog count is greater than 1 (i.e. use of any static
or global functions)), hence this is only a problem when precision marks
need to be explicitly propagated (i.e. privileged users with CAP_BPF).

A simplified test case has been included in the next patch to prevent
future regressions.

Fixes: 457f44363a88 ("bpf: Implement BPF ring buffer and verifier support for it")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220823185300.406-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix a data-race around bpf_jit_limit.</title>
<updated>2022-08-23T22:27:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuniyuki Iwashima</name>
<email>kuniyu@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-08-23T21:58:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=0947ae1121083d363d522ff7518ee72b55bd8d29'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0947ae1121083d363d522ff7518ee72b55bd8d29</id>
<content type='text'>
While reading bpf_jit_limit, it can be changed concurrently via sysctl,
WRITE_ONCE() in __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(). The size of bpf_jit_limit
is long, so we need to add a paired READ_ONCE() to avoid load-tearing.

Fixes: ede95a63b5e8 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220823215804.2177-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf, cgroup: Fix kernel BUG in purge_effective_progs</title>
<updated>2022-08-18T21:27:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pu Lehui</name>
<email>pulehui@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-08-13T13:40:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=7d6620f107bae6ed687ff07668e8e8f855487aa9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7d6620f107bae6ed687ff07668e8e8f855487aa9</id>
<content type='text'>
Syzkaller reported a triggered kernel BUG as follows:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:925!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 1 PID: 194 Comm: detach Not tainted 5.19.0-14184-g69dac8e431af #8
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
  rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:__cgroup_bpf_detach+0x1f2/0x2a0
  Code: 00 e8 92 60 30 00 84 c0 75 d8 4c 89 e0 31 f6 85 f6 74 19 42 f6 84
  28 48 05 00 00 02 75 0e 48 8b 80 c0 00 00 00 48 85 c0 75 e5 &lt;0f&gt; 0b 48
  8b 0c5
  RSP: 0018:ffffc9000055bdb0 EFLAGS: 00000246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888100ec0800 RCX: ffffc900000f1000
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff888100ec4578
  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff888100ec0800 R09: 0000000000000040
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888100ec4000
  R13: 000000000000000d R14: ffffc90000199000 R15: ffff888100effb00
  FS:  00007f68213d2b80(0000) GS:ffff88813bc80000(0000)
  knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 000055f74a0e5850 CR3: 0000000102836000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   cgroup_bpf_prog_detach+0xcc/0x100
   __sys_bpf+0x2273/0x2a00
   __x64_sys_bpf+0x17/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
  RIP: 0033:0x7f68214dbcb9
  Code: 08 44 89 e0 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89
  f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01
  f0 ff8
  RSP: 002b:00007ffeb487db68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000b RCX: 00007f68214dbcb9
  RDX: 0000000000000090 RSI: 00007ffeb487db70 RDI: 0000000000000009
  RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000012 R09: 0000000b00000003
  R10: 00007ffeb487db70 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffeb487dc20
  R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 000055f74a1011b0
   &lt;/TASK&gt;
  Modules linked in:
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Repetition steps:

For the following cgroup tree,

  root
   |
  cg1
   |
  cg2

  1. attach prog2 to cg2, and then attach prog1 to cg1, both bpf progs
     attach type is NONE or OVERRIDE.
  2. write 1 to /proc/thread-self/fail-nth for failslab.
  3. detach prog1 for cg1, and then kernel BUG occur.

Failslab injection will cause kmalloc fail and fall back to
purge_effective_progs. The problem is that cg2 have attached another prog,
so when go through cg2 layer, iteration will add pos to 1, and subsequent
operations will be skipped by the following condition, and cg will meet
NULL in the end.

  `if (pos &amp;&amp; !(cg-&gt;bpf.flags[atype] &amp; BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI))`

The NULL cg means no link or prog match, this is as expected, and it's not
a bug. So here just skip the no match situation.

Fixes: 4c46091ee985 ("bpf: Fix KASAN use-after-free Read in compute_effective_progs")
Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui &lt;pulehui@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220813134030.1972696-1-pulehui@huawei.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: Fix suspicious RCU usage in bpf_sk_reuseport_detach()</title>
<updated>2022-08-17T23:42:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-08-16T09:34:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=fc4aaf9fb3c99bcb326d52f9d320ed5680bd1cee'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fc4aaf9fb3c99bcb326d52f9d320ed5680bd1cee</id>
<content type='text'>
bpf_sk_reuseport_detach() calls __rcu_dereference_sk_user_data_with_flags()
to obtain the value of sk-&gt;sk_user_data, but that function is only usable
if the RCU read lock is held, and neither that function nor any of its
callers hold it.

Fix this by adding a new helper, __locked_read_sk_user_data_with_flags()
that checks to see if sk-&gt;sk_callback_lock() is held and use that here
instead.

Alternatively, making __rcu_dereference_sk_user_data_with_flags() use
rcu_dereference_checked() might suffice.

Without this, the following warning can be occasionally observed:

=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.0.0-rc1-build2+ #563 Not tainted
-----------------------------
include/net/sock.h:592 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
5 locks held by locktest/29873:
 #0: ffff88812734b550 (&amp;sb-&gt;s_type-&gt;i_mutex_key#9){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __sock_release+0x77/0x121
 #1: ffff88812f5621b0 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: tcp_close+0x1c/0x70
 #2: ffff88810312f5c8 (&amp;h-&gt;lhash2[i].lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: inet_unhash+0x76/0x1c0
 #3: ffffffff83768bb8 (reuseport_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: reuseport_detach_sock+0x18/0xdd
 #4: ffff88812f562438 (clock-AF_INET){++..}-{2:2}, at: bpf_sk_reuseport_detach+0x24/0xa4

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 29873 Comm: locktest Not tainted 6.0.0-rc1-build2+ #563
Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x5f
 bpf_sk_reuseport_detach+0x6d/0xa4
 reuseport_detach_sock+0x75/0xdd
 inet_unhash+0xa5/0x1c0
 tcp_set_state+0x169/0x20f
 ? lockdep_sock_is_held+0x3a/0x3a
 ? __lock_release.isra.0+0x13e/0x220
 ? reacquire_held_locks+0x1bb/0x1bb
 ? hlock_class+0x31/0x96
 ? mark_lock+0x9e/0x1af
 __tcp_close+0x50/0x4b6
 tcp_close+0x28/0x70
 inet_release+0x8e/0xa7
 __sock_release+0x95/0x121
 sock_close+0x14/0x17
 __fput+0x20f/0x36a
 task_work_run+0xa3/0xcc
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x9c/0x14d
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x44
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Fixes: cf8c1e967224 ("net: refactor bpf_sk_reuseport_detach()")
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Hawkins Jiawei &lt;yin31149@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166064248071.3502205.10036394558814861778.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Restrict bpf_sys_bpf to CAP_PERFMON</title>
<updated>2022-08-17T22:27:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>YiFei Zhu</name>
<email>zhuyifei@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-08-16T20:55:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=14b20b784f59bdd95f6f1cfb112c9818bcec4d84'/>
<id>urn:sha1:14b20b784f59bdd95f6f1cfb112c9818bcec4d84</id>
<content type='text'>
The verifier cannot perform sufficient validation of any pointers passed
into bpf_attr and treats them as integers rather than pointers. The helper
will then read from arbitrary pointers passed into it. Restrict the helper
to CAP_PERFMON since the security model in BPF of arbitrary kernel read is
CAP_BPF + CAP_PERFMON.

Fixes: af2ac3e13e45 ("bpf: Prepare bpf syscall to be used from kernel and user space.")
Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu &lt;zhuyifei@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220816205517.682470-1-zhuyifei@google.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Shut up kern_sys_bpf warning.</title>
<updated>2022-08-11T06:58:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-08-11T06:52:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=4e4588f1c4d2e67c993208f0550ef3fae33abce4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4e4588f1c4d2e67c993208f0550ef3fae33abce4</id>
<content type='text'>
Shut up this warning:
kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5089:5: warning: no previous prototype for function 'kern_sys_bpf' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
int kern_sys_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)

Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf</title>
<updated>2022-08-11T04:48:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
<email>kuba@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-08-11T04:48:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=fbe8870f72e8e71bb57b883d29c600aaaca6cd20'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fbe8870f72e8e71bb57b883d29c600aaaca6cd20</id>
<content type='text'>
Daniel Borkmann says:

====================
bpf 2022-08-10

We've added 23 non-merge commits during the last 7 day(s) which contain
a total of 19 files changed, 424 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-).

The main changes are:

1) Several fixes for BPF map iterator such as UAFs along with selftests, from Hou Tao.

2) Fix BPF syscall program's {copy,strncpy}_from_bpfptr() to not fault, from Jinghao Jia.

3) Reject BPF syscall programs calling BPF_PROG_RUN, from Alexei Starovoitov and YiFei Zhu.

4) Fix attach_btf_obj_id info to pick proper target BTF, from Stanislav Fomichev.

5) BPF design Q/A doc update to clarify what is not stable ABI, from Paul E. McKenney.

6) Fix BPF map's prealloc_lru_pop to not reinitialize, from Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi.

7) Fix bpf_trampoline_put to avoid leaking ftrace hash, from Jiri Olsa.

8) Fix arm64 JIT to address sparse errors around BPF trampoline, from Xu Kuohai.

9) Fix arm64 JIT to use kvcalloc instead of kcalloc for internal program address
   offset buffer, from Aijun Sun.

* https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf: (23 commits)
  selftests/bpf: Ensure sleepable program is rejected by hash map iter
  selftests/bpf: Add write tests for sk local storage map iterator
  selftests/bpf: Add tests for reading a dangling map iter fd
  bpf: Only allow sleepable program for resched-able iterator
  bpf: Check the validity of max_rdwr_access for sock local storage map iterator
  bpf: Acquire map uref in .init_seq_private for sock{map,hash} iterator
  bpf: Acquire map uref in .init_seq_private for sock local storage map iterator
  bpf: Acquire map uref in .init_seq_private for hash map iterator
  bpf: Acquire map uref in .init_seq_private for array map iterator
  bpf: Disallow bpf programs call prog_run command.
  bpf, arm64: Fix bpf trampoline instruction endianness
  selftests/bpf: Add test for prealloc_lru_pop bug
  bpf: Don't reinit map value in prealloc_lru_pop
  bpf: Allow calling bpf_prog_test kfuncs in tracing programs
  bpf, arm64: Allocate program buffer using kvcalloc instead of kcalloc
  selftests/bpf: Excercise bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd for bpf2bpf
  bpf: Use proper target btf when exporting attach_btf_obj_id
  mptcp, btf: Add struct mptcp_sock definition when CONFIG_MPTCP is disabled
  bpf: Cleanup ftrace hash in bpf_trampoline_put
  BPF: Fix potential bad pointer dereference in bpf_sys_bpf()
  ...
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220810190624.10748-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: refactor bpf_sk_reuseport_detach()</title>
<updated>2022-08-11T04:48:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hawkins Jiawei</name>
<email>yin31149@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-08-05T07:48:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=cf8c1e967224c931119d3447f2213d1f645a1a2a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cf8c1e967224c931119d3447f2213d1f645a1a2a</id>
<content type='text'>
Refactor sk_user_data dereference using more generic function
__rcu_dereference_sk_user_data_with_flags(), which improve its
maintainability

Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hawkins Jiawei &lt;yin31149@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki &lt;jakub@cloudflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
