<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/kernel/kmod.c, branch v2.6.30</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v2.6.30</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v2.6.30'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2009-05-26T19:11:19Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>kmod: Release sub_info on cred allocation failure.</title>
<updated>2009-05-26T19:11:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2009-05-26T08:11:03Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=ab2b7ebaad16226c9a5e85c5f384d19fa58a7459'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ab2b7ebaad16226c9a5e85c5f384d19fa58a7459</id>
<content type='text'>
call_usermodehelper_setup() forgot to kfree(sub_info)
when prepare_usermodehelper_creds() failed.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>module: create a request_module_nowait()</title>
<updated>2009-03-31T02:35:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Arjan van de Ven</name>
<email>arjan@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-02-08T18:42:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=acae05156551fd7528fbb616271e672789388e3c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:acae05156551fd7528fbb616271e672789388e3c</id>
<content type='text'>
There seems to be a common pattern in the kernel where drivers want to
call request_module() from inside a module_init() function. Currently
this would deadlock.

As a result, several drivers go through hoops like scheduling things via
kevent, or creating custom work queues (because kevent can deadlock on them).

This patch changes this to use a request_module_nowait() function macro instead,
which just fires the modprobe off but doesn't wait for it, and thus avoids the
original deadlock entirely.

On my laptop this already results in one less kernel thread running..

(Includes Jiri's patch to use enum umh_wait)

Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt; (bool-ified)
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jirislaby@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpumask: remove dangerous CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR, &amp;CPU_MASK_ALL</title>
<updated>2009-03-30T11:35:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Rusty Russell</name>
<email>rusty@rustcorp.com.au</email>
</author>
<published>2009-03-31T04:05:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=1a2142afa5646ad5af44bbe1febaa5e0b7e71156'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1a2142afa5646ad5af44bbe1febaa5e0b7e71156</id>
<content type='text'>
Impact: cleanup

(Thanks to Al Viro for reminding me of this, via Ingo)

CPU_MASK_ALL is the (deprecated) "all bits set" cpumask, defined as so:

	#define CPU_MASK_ALL (cpumask_t) { { ... } }

Taking the address of such a temporary is questionable at best,
unfortunately 321a8e9d (cpumask: add CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR macro) added
CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR:

	#define CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR (&amp;CPU_MASK_ALL)

Which formalizes this practice.  One day gcc could bite us over this
usage (though we seem to have gotten away with it so far).

So replace everywhere which used &amp;CPU_MASK_ALL or CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR
with the modern "cpu_all_mask" (a real const struct cpumask *).

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Reported-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Mike Travis &lt;travis@sgi.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kmod: fix varargs kernel-doc</title>
<updated>2009-01-06T23:59:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Randy Dunlap</name>
<email>randy.dunlap@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-01-06T22:42:39Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=bd4207c9016749f0a212faf7f7f49e5317d96d9b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bd4207c9016749f0a212faf7f7f49e5317d96d9b</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix varargs kernel-doc format in kmod.c:
Use @... instead of @varargs.

Warning(kernel/kmod.c:67): Excess function parameter or struct member 'varargs' description in 'request_module'

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;randy.dunlap@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials</title>
<updated>2008-11-13T23:39:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-11-13T23:39:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=d84f4f992cbd76e8f39c488cf0c5d123843923b1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d84f4f992cbd76e8f39c488cf0c5d123843923b1</id>
<content type='text'>
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management.  This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.

A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().

With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:

	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
	int ret = blah(new);
	if (ret &lt; 0) {
		abort_creds(new);
		return ret;
	}
	return commit_creds(new);

There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.

To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const.  The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers.  Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:

  (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.

  (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.

The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
     security code rather than altering the current creds directly.

 (2) Temporary credential overrides.

     do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
     temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
     preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
     on the thread being dumped.

     This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
     credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
     the task's objective credentials.

 (3) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_capset_check(), -&gt;capset_check()
     (*) security_capset_set(), -&gt;capset_set()

     	 Removed in favour of security_capset().

     (*) security_capset(), -&gt;capset()

     	 New.  This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
     	 creds and the proposed capability sets.  It should fill in the new
     	 creds or return an error.  All pointers, barring the pointer to the
     	 new creds, are now const.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), -&gt;bprm_apply_creds()

     	 Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
     	 killed if it's an error.

     (*) security_task_alloc(), -&gt;task_alloc_security()

     	 Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().

     (*) security_cred_free(), -&gt;cred_free()

     	 New.  Free security data attached to cred-&gt;security.

     (*) security_prepare_creds(), -&gt;cred_prepare()

     	 New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred-&gt;security.

     (*) security_commit_creds(), -&gt;cred_commit()

     	 New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
     	 security by commit_creds().

     (*) security_task_post_setuid(), -&gt;task_post_setuid()

     	 Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().

     (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), -&gt;task_fix_setuid()

     	 Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid().  This is used by
     	 cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
     	 setuid() changes.  Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
     	 than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().

     (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), -&gt;task_reparent_to_init()

     	 Removed.  Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
     	 directly to init's credentials.

	 NOTE!  This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
	 longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.

     (*) security_key_alloc(), -&gt;key_alloc()
     (*) security_key_permission(), -&gt;key_permission()

     	 Changed.  These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
     	 refer to the security context.

 (4) sys_capset().

     This has been simplified and uses less locking.  The LSM functions it
     calls have been merged.

 (5) reparent_to_kthreadd().

     This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
     commit_thread() to point that way.

 (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()

     __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
     beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
     user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
     successful.

     switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
     folded into that.  commit_creds() should take care of protecting
     __sigqueue_alloc().

 (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.

     The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
     abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
     it.

     security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section.  This
     guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.

     The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().

     Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
     commit_creds().

     The get functions all simply access the data directly.

 (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().

     security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
     want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
     rather than through an argument.

     Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
     if it doesn't end up using it.

 (9) Keyrings.

     A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:

     (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
     	 all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
     	 They may want separating out again later.

     (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
     	 rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.

     (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
     	 thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
     	 keyring.

     (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
     	 the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.

     (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
     	 credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
     	 process or session keyrings (they're shared).

(10) Usermode helper.

     The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
     subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer.  This set
     of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
     after it has been cloned.

     call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
     call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used.  A
     special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
     specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.

     call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
     supplied keyring as the new session keyring.

(11) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
     	 current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
     	 that covers getting the ptracer's SID.  Whilst this lock ensures that
     	 the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
     	 until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
     	 lock.

(12) is_single_threaded().

     This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
     a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
     wants to use it too.

     The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
     with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough.  We really want
     to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).

(13) nfsd.

     The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
     credentials it is going to use.  It really needs to pass the credentials
     down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
     in this series have been applied.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument</title>
<updated>2008-11-13T23:39:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-11-13T23:39:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=8bbf4976b59fc9fc2861e79cab7beb3f6d647640'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8bbf4976b59fc9fc2861e79cab7beb3f6d647640</id>
<content type='text'>
Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring
arguments.  Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link
the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist.  This, however, can be
a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating
process can alter the credentials of the requesting process.

This patch alters the behaviour such that:

 (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific
     keyring by ID (ringid &gt;= 0), then that keyring will be used.

 (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the
     special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings
     (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all &lt;= 0), then:

     (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the
     	 key will be attached to that keyring.

     (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being
     	 instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by
     	 keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring().

 (3) No extra link will be made.

Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators
who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so
as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings.

Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that
get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the
instantiator to request that the key is retained.  This is mainly useful for
situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which
should be retained by the initial requestor:

	+-----------+        +--------------+        +--------------+
	|           |        |              |        |              |
	| Requestor |-------&gt;| Instantiator |-------&gt;| Instantiator |
	|           |        |              |        |              |
	+-----------+        +--------------+        +--------------+
	           request_key()           request_key()

This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a
ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else
then has to go and fetch.  The TGT, however, should be retained in the
keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator.  To make this explict
an extra special keyring constant is also added.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux-2.6-for-linus</title>
<updated>2008-10-16T19:38:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2008-10-16T19:38:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=c8d8a2321f9c4ee18fbcc399fdc2a77e580a03b9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c8d8a2321f9c4ee18fbcc399fdc2a77e580a03b9</id>
<content type='text'>
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux-2.6-for-linus:
  module: remove CONFIG_KMOD in comment after #endif
  remove CONFIG_KMOD from fs
  remove CONFIG_KMOD from drivers

Manually fix conflict due to include cleanups in drivers/md/md.c
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pm: rework disabling of user mode helpers during suspend/hibernation</title>
<updated>2008-10-16T18:21:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Rafael J. Wysocki</name>
<email>rjw@sisk.pl</email>
</author>
<published>2008-10-16T05:01:21Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=1bfcf1304ea79c46efc3724e548b13b4b442b418'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1bfcf1304ea79c46efc3724e548b13b4b442b418</id>
<content type='text'>
We currently use a PM notifier to disable user mode helpers before suspend
and hibernation and to re-enable them during resume.  However, this is not
an ideal solution, because if any drivers want to upload firmware into
memory before suspend, they have to use a PM notifier for this purpose and
there is no guarantee that the ordering of PM notifiers will be as
expected (ie.  the notifier that disables user mode helpers has to be run
after the driver's notifier used for uploading the firmware).

For this reason, it seems better to move the disabling and enabling of
user mode helpers to separate functions that will be called by the PM core
as necessary.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded ifdefs]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rjw@sisk.pl&gt;
Cc: Alan Stern &lt;stern@rowland.harvard.edu&gt;
Acked-by: Pavel Machek &lt;pavel@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>module: remove CONFIG_KMOD in comment after #endif</title>
<updated>2008-10-16T15:38:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Rusty Russell</name>
<email>rusty@rustcorp.com.au</email>
</author>
<published>2008-10-17T07:38:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=118a9069f06ff591d51a3133e242f0c256ba2db7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:118a9069f06ff591d51a3133e242f0c256ba2db7</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>call_usermodehelper(): increase reliability</title>
<updated>2008-07-25T17:53:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>KOSAKI Motohiro</name>
<email>kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-07-25T08:45:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=ac331d158e198d2a91a5b0a3ec4ca9991fdb57af'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ac331d158e198d2a91a5b0a3ec4ca9991fdb57af</id>
<content type='text'>
Presently call_usermodehelper_setup() uses GFP_ATOMIC.  but it can return
NULL _very_ easily.

GFP_ATOMIC is needed only when we can't sleep.  and, GFP_KERNEL is robust
and better.

thus, I add gfp_mask argument to call_usermodehelper_setup().

So, its callers pass the gfp_t as below:

call_usermodehelper() and call_usermodehelper_keys():
	depend on 'wait' argument.
call_usermodehelper_pipe():
	always GFP_KERNEL because always run under process context.
orderly_poweroff():
	pass to GFP_ATOMIC because may run under interrupt context.

Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro &lt;kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: "Paul Menage" &lt;menage@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Li Zefan &lt;lizf@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge &lt;jeremy@xensource.com&gt;
Cc: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;andi@firstfloor.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
