<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/kernel/signal.c, branch v5.14</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.14</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.14'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2021-07-08T18:43:24Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Fix UCOUNT_RLIMIT_SIGPENDING counter leak</title>
<updated>2021-07-08T18:43:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Gladkov</name>
<email>legion@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-08T10:33:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=f3791f4df569eadb3b1f5f2a247068d031fb91f5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f3791f4df569eadb3b1f5f2a247068d031fb91f5</id>
<content type='text'>
We must properly handle an errors when we increase the rlimit counter
and the ucounts reference counter. We have to this with RCU protection
to prevent possible use-after-free that could occur due to concurrent
put_cred_rcu().

The following reproducer triggers the problem:

  $ cat testcase.sh
  case "${STEP:-0}" in
  0)
	ulimit -Si 1
	ulimit -Hi 1
	STEP=1 unshare -rU "$0"
	killall sleep
	;;
  1)
	for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do unshare -rU sleep 5 &amp; done
	;;
  esac

with the KASAN report being along the lines of

  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in put_ucounts+0x17/0xa0
  Write of size 4 at addr ffff8880045f031c by task swapper/2/0

  CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 5.13.0+ #19
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-alt4 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   &lt;IRQ&gt;
   put_ucounts+0x17/0xa0
   put_cred_rcu+0xd5/0x190
   rcu_core+0x3bf/0xcb0
   __do_softirq+0xe3/0x341
   irq_exit_rcu+0xbe/0xe0
   sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6a/0x90
   &lt;/IRQ&gt;
   asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20
   default_idle_call+0x53/0x130
   do_idle+0x311/0x3c0
   cpu_startup_entry+0x14/0x20
   secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xc2/0xcb

  Allocated by task 127:
   kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
   __kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90
   alloc_ucounts+0x169/0x2b0
   set_cred_ucounts+0xbb/0x170
   ksys_unshare+0x24c/0x4e0
   __x64_sys_unshare+0x16/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x37/0x70
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

  Freed by task 0:
   kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
   kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
   kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
   __kasan_slab_free+0xeb/0x120
   kfree+0xaa/0x460
   put_cred_rcu+0xd5/0x190
   rcu_core+0x3bf/0xcb0
   __do_softirq+0xe3/0x341

  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880045f0300
   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
  The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of
   192-byte region [ffff8880045f0300, ffff8880045f03c0)
  The buggy address belongs to the page:
  page:000000008de0a388 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff8880045f0000 pfn:0x45f0
  flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1)
  raw: 0100000000000200 ffffea00000f4640 0000000a0000000a ffff888001042a00
  raw: ffff8880045f0000 000000008010000d 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

  Memory state around the buggy address:
   ffff8880045f0200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
   ffff8880045f0280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  &gt;ffff8880045f0300: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                              ^
   ffff8880045f0380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
   ffff8880045f0400: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  ==================================================================
  Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

Fixes: d64696905554 ("Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts")
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov &lt;legion@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)</title>
<updated>2021-07-02T19:08:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-02T19:08:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=71bd9341011f626d692aabe024f099820f02c497'/>
<id>urn:sha1:71bd9341011f626d692aabe024f099820f02c497</id>
<content type='text'>
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:
 "190 patches.

  Subsystems affected by this patch series: mm (hugetlb, userfaultfd,
  vmscan, kconfig, proc, z3fold, zbud, ras, mempolicy, memblock,
  migration, thp, nommu, kconfig, madvise, memory-hotplug, zswap,
  zsmalloc, zram, cleanups, kfence, and hmm), procfs, sysctl, misc,
  core-kernel, lib, lz4, checkpatch, init, kprobes, nilfs2, hfs,
  signals, exec, kcov, selftests, compress/decompress, and ipc"

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;: (190 commits)
  ipc/util.c: use binary search for max_idx
  ipc/sem.c: use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() for use_global_lock
  ipc: use kmalloc for msg_queue and shmid_kernel
  ipc sem: use kvmalloc for sem_undo allocation
  lib/decompressors: remove set but not used variabled 'level'
  selftests/vm/pkeys: exercise x86 XSAVE init state
  selftests/vm/pkeys: refill shadow register after implicit kernel write
  selftests/vm/pkeys: handle negative sys_pkey_alloc() return code
  selftests/vm/pkeys: fix alloc_random_pkey() to make it really, really random
  kcov: add __no_sanitize_coverage to fix noinstr for all architectures
  exec: remove checks in __register_bimfmt()
  x86: signal: don't do sas_ss_reset() until we are certain that sigframe won't be abandoned
  hfsplus: report create_date to kstat.btime
  hfsplus: remove unnecessary oom message
  nilfs2: remove redundant continue statement in a while-loop
  kprobes: remove duplicated strong free_insn_page in x86 and s390
  init: print out unknown kernel parameters
  checkpatch: do not complain about positive return values starting with EPOLL
  checkpatch: improve the indented label test
  checkpatch: scripts/spdxcheck.py now requires python3
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: signal: don't do sas_ss_reset() until we are certain that sigframe won't be abandoned</title>
<updated>2021-07-01T18:06:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-01T01:56:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=97c885d585c53d3f1ad4545b0ee10f0bdfaa1a4d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:97c885d585c53d3f1ad4545b0ee10f0bdfaa1a4d</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently we handle SS_AUTODISARM as soon as we have stored the altstack
settings into sigframe - that's the point when we have set the things up
for eventual sigreturn to restore the old settings.  And if we manage to
set the sigframe up (we are not done with that yet), everything's fine.
However, in case of failure we end up with sigframe-to-be abandoned and
SIGSEGV force-delivered.  And in that case we end up with inconsistent
rules - late failures have altstack reset, early ones do not.

It's trivial to get consistent behaviour - just handle SS_AUTODISARM once
we have set the sigframe up and are committed to entering the handler,
i.e.  in signal_delivered().

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200404170604.GN23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk/
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/876
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210422230846.1756380-1-ndesaulniers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;natechancellor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2021-06-29T03:39:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-29T03:39:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=c54b245d011855ea91c5beff07f1db74143ce614'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c54b245d011855ea91c5beff07f1db74143ce614</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull user namespace rlimit handling update from Eric Biederman:
 "This is the work mainly by Alexey Gladkov to limit rlimits to the
  rlimits of the user that created a user namespace, and to allow users
  to have stricter limits on the resources created within a user
  namespace."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  cred: add missing return error code when set_cred_ucounts() failed
  ucounts: Silence warning in dec_rlimit_ucounts
  ucounts: Set ucount_max to the largest positive value the type can hold
  kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces
  Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
  Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts
  Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts
  Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
  Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
  Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
  Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'sched-core-2021-06-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2021-06-28T19:14:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-28T19:14:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=54a728dc5e4feb0a9278ad62b19f34ad21ed0ee4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:54a728dc5e4feb0a9278ad62b19f34ad21ed0ee4</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull scheduler udpates from Ingo Molnar:

 - Changes to core scheduling facilities:

    - Add "Core Scheduling" via CONFIG_SCHED_CORE=y, which enables
      coordinated scheduling across SMT siblings. This is a much
      requested feature for cloud computing platforms, to allow the
      flexible utilization of SMT siblings, without exposing untrusted
      domains to information leaks &amp; side channels, plus to ensure more
      deterministic computing performance on SMT systems used by
      heterogenous workloads.

      There are new prctls to set core scheduling groups, which allows
      more flexible management of workloads that can share siblings.

    - Fix task-&gt;state access anti-patterns that may result in missed
      wakeups and rename it to -&gt;__state in the process to catch new
      abuses.

 - Load-balancing changes:

    - Tweak newidle_balance for fair-sched, to improve 'memcache'-like
      workloads.

    - "Age" (decay) average idle time, to better track &amp; improve
      workloads such as 'tbench'.

    - Fix &amp; improve energy-aware (EAS) balancing logic &amp; metrics.

    - Fix &amp; improve the uclamp metrics.

    - Fix task migration (taskset) corner case on !CONFIG_CPUSET.

    - Fix RT and deadline utilization tracking across policy changes

    - Introduce a "burstable" CFS controller via cgroups, which allows
      bursty CPU-bound workloads to borrow a bit against their future
      quota to improve overall latencies &amp; batching. Can be tweaked via
      /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/&lt;X&gt;/cpu.cfs_burst_us.

    - Rework assymetric topology/capacity detection &amp; handling.

 - Scheduler statistics &amp; tooling:

    - Disable delayacct by default, but add a sysctl to enable it at
      runtime if tooling needs it. Use static keys and other
      optimizations to make it more palatable.

    - Use sched_clock() in delayacct, instead of ktime_get_ns().

 - Misc cleanups and fixes.

* tag 'sched-core-2021-06-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (72 commits)
  sched/doc: Update the CPU capacity asymmetry bits
  sched/topology: Rework CPU capacity asymmetry detection
  sched/core: Introduce SD_ASYM_CPUCAPACITY_FULL sched_domain flag
  psi: Fix race between psi_trigger_create/destroy
  sched/fair: Introduce the burstable CFS controller
  sched/uclamp: Fix uclamp_tg_restrict()
  sched/rt: Fix Deadline utilization tracking during policy change
  sched/rt: Fix RT utilization tracking during policy change
  sched: Change task_struct::state
  sched,arch: Remove unused TASK_STATE offsets
  sched,timer: Use __set_current_state()
  sched: Add get_current_state()
  sched,perf,kvm: Fix preemption condition
  sched: Introduce task_is_running()
  sched: Unbreak wakeups
  sched/fair: Age the average idle time
  sched/cpufreq: Consider reduced CPU capacity in energy calculation
  sched/fair: Take thermal pressure into account while estimating energy
  thermal/cpufreq_cooling: Update offline CPUs per-cpu thermal_pressure
  sched/fair: Return early from update_tg_cfs_load() if delta == 0
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "signal: Allow tasks to cache one sigqueue struct"</title>
<updated>2021-06-27T20:32:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-27T20:32:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=b4b27b9eed8ebdbf9f3046197d29d733c8c944f3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b4b27b9eed8ebdbf9f3046197d29d733c8c944f3</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commits 4bad58ebc8bc4f20d89cff95417c9b4674769709 (and
399f8dd9a866e107639eabd3c1979cd526ca3a98, which tried to fix it).

I do not believe these are correct, and I'm about to release 5.13, so am
reverting them out of an abundance of caution.

The locking is odd, and appears broken.

On the allocation side (in __sigqueue_alloc()), the locking is somewhat
straightforward: it depends on sighand-&gt;siglock.  Since one caller
doesn't hold that lock, it further then tests 'sigqueue_flags' to avoid
the case with no locks held.

On the freeing side (in sigqueue_cache_or_free()), there is no locking
at all, and the logic instead depends on 'current' being a single
thread, and not able to race with itself.

To make things more exciting, there's also the data race between freeing
a signal and allocating one, which is handled by using WRITE_ONCE() and
READ_ONCE(), and being mutually exclusive wrt the initial state (ie
freeing will only free if the old state was NULL, while allocating will
obviously only use the value if it was non-NULL, so only one or the
other will actually act on the value).

However, while the free-&gt;alloc paths do seem mutually exclusive thanks
to just the data value dependency, it's not clear what the memory
ordering constraints are on it.  Could writes from the previous
allocation possibly be delayed and seen by the new allocation later,
causing logical inconsistencies?

So it's all very exciting and unusual.

And in particular, it seems that the freeing side is incorrect in
depending on "current" being single-threaded.  Yes, 'current' is a
single thread, but in the presense of asynchronous events even a single
thread can have data races.

And such asynchronous events can and do happen, with interrupts causing
signals to be flushed and thus free'd (for example - sending a
SIGCONT/SIGSTOP can happen from interrupt context, and can flush
previously queued process control signals).

So regardless of all the other questions about the memory ordering and
locking for this new cached allocation, the sigqueue_cache_or_free()
assumptions seem to be fundamentally incorrect.

It may be that people will show me the errors of my ways, and tell me
why this is all safe after all.  We can reinstate it if so.  But my
current belief is that the WRITE_ONCE() that sets the cached entry needs
to be a smp_store_release(), and the READ_ONCE() that finds a cached
entry needs to be a smp_load_acquire() to handle memory ordering
correctly.

And the sequence in sigqueue_cache_or_free() would need to either use a
lock or at least be interrupt-safe some way (perhaps by using something
like the percpu 'cmpxchg': it doesn't need to be SMP-safe, but like the
percpu operations it needs to be interrupt-safe).

Fixes: 399f8dd9a866 ("signal: Prevent sigqueue caching after task got released")
Fixes: 4bad58ebc8bc ("signal: Allow tasks to cache one sigqueue struct")
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>signal: Prevent sigqueue caching after task got released</title>
<updated>2021-06-22T13:55:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-21T23:08:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=399f8dd9a866e107639eabd3c1979cd526ca3a98'/>
<id>urn:sha1:399f8dd9a866e107639eabd3c1979cd526ca3a98</id>
<content type='text'>
syzbot reported a memory leak related to sigqueue caching.

The assumption that a task cannot cache a sigqueue after the signal handler
has been dropped and exit_task_sigqueue_cache() has been invoked turns out
to be wrong.

Such a task can still invoke release_task(other_task), which cleans up the
signals of 'other_task' and ends up in sigqueue_cache_or_free(), which in
turn will cache the signal because task-&gt;sigqueue_cache is NULL. That's
obviously bogus because nothing will free the cached signal of that task
anymore, so the cached item is leaked.

This happens when e.g. the last non-leader thread exits and reaps the
zombie leader.

Prevent this by setting tsk::sigqueue_cache to an error pointer value in
exit_task_sigqueue_cache() which forces any subsequent invocation of
sigqueue_cache_or_free() from that task to hand the sigqueue back to the
kmemcache.

Add comments to all relevant places.

Fixes: 4bad58ebc8bc ("signal: Allow tasks to cache one sigqueue struct")
Reported-by: syzbot+0bac5fec63d4f399ba98@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/878s32g6j5.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.de

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched: Introduce task_is_running()</title>
<updated>2021-06-18T09:43:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-11T08:28:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=b03fbd4ff24c5f075e58eb19261d5f8b3e40d7c6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b03fbd4ff24c5f075e58eb19261d5f8b3e40d7c6</id>
<content type='text'>
Replace a bunch of 'p-&gt;state == TASK_RUNNING' with a new helper:
task_is_running(p).

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210611082838.222401495@infradead.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-v5.13-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2021-05-21T16:12:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-21T16:12:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=a0e31f3a38e77612ed8967aaad28db6d3ee674b5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a0e31f3a38e77612ed8967aaad28db6d3ee674b5</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull siginfo fix from Eric Biederman:
 "During the merge window an issue with si_perf and the siginfo ABI came
  up. The alpha and sparc siginfo structure layout had changed with the
  addition of SIGTRAP TRAP_PERF and the new field si_perf.

  The reason only alpha and sparc were affected is that they are the
  only architectures that use si_trapno.

  Looking deeper it was discovered that si_trapno is used for only a few
  select signals on alpha and sparc, and that none of the other
  _sigfault fields past si_addr are used at all. Which means technically
  no regression on alpha and sparc.

  While the alignment concerns might be dismissed the abuse of si_errno
  by SIGTRAP TRAP_PERF does have the potential to cause regressions in
  existing userspace.

  While we still have time before userspace starts using and depending
  on the new definition siginfo for SIGTRAP TRAP_PERF this set of
  changes cleans up siginfo_t.

   - The si_trapno field is demoted from magic alpha and sparc status
     and made an ordinary union member of the _sigfault member of
     siginfo_t. Without moving it of course.

   - si_perf is replaced with si_perf_data and si_perf_type ending the
     abuse of si_errno.

   - Unnecessary additions to signalfd_siginfo are removed"

* 'for-v5.13-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  signalfd: Remove SIL_PERF_EVENT fields from signalfd_siginfo
  signal: Deliver all of the siginfo perf data in _perf
  signal: Factor force_sig_perf out of perf_sigtrap
  signal: Implement SIL_FAULT_TRAPNO
  siginfo: Move si_trapno inside the union inside _si_fault
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>signal: Deliver all of the siginfo perf data in _perf</title>
<updated>2021-05-18T21:20:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-02T22:28:31Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=0683b53197b55343a166f1507086823030809a19'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0683b53197b55343a166f1507086823030809a19</id>
<content type='text'>
Don't abuse si_errno and deliver all of the perf data in _perf member
of siginfo_t.

Note: The data field in the perf data structures in a u64 to allow a
pointer to be encoded without needed to implement a 32bit and 64bit
version of the same structure.  There already exists a 32bit and 64bit
versions siginfo_t, and the 32bit version can not include a 64bit
member as it only has 32bit alignment.  So unsigned long is used in
siginfo_t instead of a u64 as unsigned long can encode a pointer on
all architectures linux supports.

v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/m11rarqqx2.fsf_-_@fess.ebiederm.org
v2: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210503203814.25487-10-ebiederm@xmission.com
v3: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210505141101.11519-11-ebiederm@xmission.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210517195748.8880-4-ebiederm@xmission.com
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
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