linux/kernel/sysctl.c, branch v5.3

proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check

2019-07-19T00:08:07Z

In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Acked-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Stephen Rothwell Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

kernel: fix typos and some coding style in comments

2019-07-17T02:23:21Z

fix lenght to length Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190521050937.4370-1-houweitaoo@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Weitao Hou Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Colin Ian King Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

sched/uclamp: Add system default clamps

2019-06-24T17:23:45Z

Tasks without a user-defined clamp value are considered not clamped and by default their utilization can have any value in the [0..SCHED_CAPACITY_SCALE] range. Tasks with a user-defined clamp value are allowed to request any value in that range, and the required clamp is unconditionally enforced. However, a "System Management Software" could be interested in limiting the range of clamp values allowed for all tasks. Add a privileged interface to define a system default configuration via: /proc/sys/kernel/sched_uclamp_util_{min,max} which works as an unconditional clamp range restriction for all tasks. With the default configuration, the full SCHED_CAPACITY_SCALE range of values is allowed for each clamp index. Otherwise, the task-specific clamp is capped by the corresponding system default value. Do that by tracking, for each task, the "effective" clamp value and bucket the task has been refcounted in at enqueue time. This allows to lazy aggregate "requested" and "system default" values at enqueue time and simplifies refcounting updates at dequeue time. The cached bucket ids are used to avoid (relatively) more expensive integer divisions every time a task is enqueued. An active flag is used to report when the "effective" value is valid and thus the task is actually refcounted in the corresponding rq's bucket. Signed-off-by: Patrick Bellasi Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Alessio Balsini Cc: Dietmar Eggemann Cc: Joel Fernandes Cc: Juri Lelli Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Morten Rasmussen Cc: Paul Turner Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Quentin Perret Cc: Rafael J . Wysocki Cc: Steve Muckle Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan Cc: Tejun Heo Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Todd Kjos Cc: Vincent Guittot Cc: Viresh Kumar Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190621084217.8167-5-patrick.bellasi@arm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

sysctl: define proc_do_static_key()

2019-06-15T03:18:27Z

Convert proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_stats() into a more generic helper, since we are going to use jump labels more often. Note that sysctl_bpf_stats_enabled is removed, since it is no longer needed/used. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

treewide: Add SPDX license identifier for missed files

2019-05-21T08:50:45Z

Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which: - Have no license information of any form - Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the initial scan/conversion to ignore the file These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kernel/sysctl.c: fix proc_do_large_bitmap for large input buffers

2019-05-15T02:52:51Z

Today, proc_do_large_bitmap() truncates a large write input buffer to PAGE_SIZE - 1, which may result in misparsed numbers at the (truncated) end of the buffer. Further, it fails to notify the caller that the buffer was truncated, so it doesn't get called iteratively to finish the entire input buffer. Tell the caller if there's more work to do by adding the skipped amount back to left/*lenp before returning. To fix the misparsing, reset the position if we have completely consumed a truncated buffer (or if just one char is left, which may be a "-" in a range), and ask the caller to come back for more. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190320222831.8243-7-mcgrof@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Eric Sandeen Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

sysctl: return -EINVAL if val violates minmax

2019-05-15T02:52:51Z

Currently when userspace gives us a values that overflow e.g. file-max and other callers of __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax() we simply ignore the new value and leave the current value untouched. This can be problematic as it gives the illusion that the limit has indeed be bumped when in fact it failed. This commit makes sure to return EINVAL when an overflow is detected. Please note that this is a userspace facing change. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190210203943.8227-4-christian@brauner.io Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Al Viro Cc: Dominik Brodowski Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Joe Lawrence Cc: Waiman Long Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

kernel/sysctl.c: switch to bitmap_zalloc()

2019-05-15T02:52:51Z

Switch to bitmap_zalloc() to show clearly what we are allocating. Besides that it returns pointer of bitmap type instead of opaque void *. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190304094037.57756-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko Acked-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton Cc: Luis Chamberlain Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

userfaultfd/sysctl: add vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd

2019-05-14T16:47:45Z

Userfaultfd can be misued to make it easier to exploit existing use-after-free (and similar) bugs that might otherwise only make a short window or race condition available. By using userfaultfd to stall a kernel thread, a malicious program can keep some state that it wrote, stable for an extended period, which it can then access using an existing exploit. While it doesn't cause the exploit itself, and while it's not the only thing that can stall a kernel thread when accessing a memory location, it's one of the few that never needs privilege. We can add a flag, allowing userfaultfd to be restricted, so that in general it won't be useable by arbitrary user programs, but in environments that require userfaultfd it can be turned back on. Add a global sysctl knob "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd" to control whether userfaultfd is allowed by unprivileged users. When this is set to zero, only privileged users (root user, or users with the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability) will be able to use the userfaultfd syscalls. Andrea said: : The only difference between the bpf sysctl and the userfaultfd sysctl : this way is that the bpf sysctl adds the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability : requirement, while userfaultfd adds the CAP_SYS_PTRACE requirement, : because the userfaultfd monitor is more likely to need CAP_SYS_PTRACE : already if it's doing other kind of tracking on processes runtime, in : addition of userfaultfd. In other words both syscalls works only for : root, when the two sysctl are opt-in set to 1. [dgilbert@redhat.com: changelog additions] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: documentation tweak, per Mike] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190319030722.12441-2-peterx@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Peter Xu Suggested-by: Andrea Arcangeli Suggested-by: Mike Rapoport Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Hugh Dickins Cc: Luis Chamberlain Cc: Maxime Coquelin Cc: Maya Gokhale Cc: Jerome Glisse Cc: Pavel Emelyanov Cc: Johannes Weiner Cc: Martin Cracauer Cc: Denis Plotnikov Cc: Marty McFadden Cc: Mike Kravetz Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Mel Gorman Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" Cc: "Dr . David Alan Gilbert" Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

ipv6: Add rate limit mask for ICMPv6 messages

2019-04-18T23:58:37Z

To make ICMPv6 closer to ICMPv4, add ratemask parameter. Since the ICMP message types use larger numeric values, a simple bitmask doesn't fit. I use large bitmap. The input and output are the in form of list of ranges. Set the default to rate limit all error messages but Packet Too Big. For Packet Too Big, use ratemask instead of hard-coded. There are functions where icmpv6_xrlim_allow() and icmpv6_global_allow() aren't called. This patch only adds them to icmpv6_echo_reply(). Rate limiting error messages is mandated by RFC 4443 but RFC 4890 says that it is also acceptable to rate limit informational messages. Thus, I removed the current hard-coded behavior of icmpv6_mask_allow() that doesn't rate limit informational messages. v2: Add dummy function proc_do_large_bitmap() if CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL isn't defined, expand the description in ip-sysctl.txt and remove unnecessary conditional before kfree(). v3: Inline the bitmap instead of dynamically allocated. Still is a pointer to it is needed because of the way proc_do_large_bitmap work. Signed-off-by: Stephen Suryaputra Signed-off-by: David S. Miller