linux/kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c, branch v5.4

tracing: Add locked_down checks to the open calls of files created for tracefs

2019-10-13T00:48:06Z

Added various checks on open tracefs calls to see if tracefs is in lockdown mode, and if so, to return -EPERM. Note, the event format files (which are basically standard on all machines) as well as the enabled_functions file (which shows what is currently being traced) are not lockde down. Perhaps they should be, but it seems counter intuitive to lockdown information to help you know if the system has been modified. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wj7fGPKUspr579Cii-w_y60PtRaiDgKuxVtBAMK0VNNkA@mail.gmail.com Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware)

Merge branch 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

2019-09-28T15:14:15Z

Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris: "This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others. From the original description: This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature, intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel. When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted. Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand. The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer to not requiring external patches. There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline: - Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/ - Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven, rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism. The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be permitted. The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line: lockdown={integrity|confidentiality} Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract confidential information from the kernel are also disabled. This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and overriden by kernel configuration. New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in include/linux/security.h for details. The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way. Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing this under category (c) of the DCO" * 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits) kexec: Fix file verification on S390 security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down ...

tracing/probe: Fix same probe event argument matching

2019-09-25T10:34:06Z

Commit fe60b0ce8e73 ("tracing/probe: Reject exactly same probe event") tries to reject a event which matches an already existing probe. However it currently continues to match arguments and rejects adding a probe even when the arguments don't match. Fix this by only rejecting a probe if and only if all the arguments match. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190924114906.14038-1-srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Fixes: fe60b0ce8e73 ("tracing/probe: Reject exactly same probe event") Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Srikar Dronamraju Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware)

tracing/probe: Reject exactly same probe event

2019-09-19T15:09:16Z

Reject exactly same probe events as existing probes. Multiprobe allows user to define multiple probes on same event. If user appends a probe which exactly same definition (same probe address and same arguments) on existing event, the event will record same probe information twice. That can be confusing users, so reject it. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/156879694602.31056.5533024778165036763.stgit@devnote2 Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware)

tracing/probe: Fix to allow user to enable events on unloaded modules

2019-09-19T13:55:42Z

Fix to allow user to enable probe events on unloaded modules. This operations was allowed before commit 60d53e2c3b75 ("tracing/probe: Split trace_event related data from trace_probe"), because if users need to probe module init functions, they have to enable those probe events before loading module. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/156879693733.31056.9331322616994665167.stgit@devnote2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 60d53e2c3b75 ("tracing/probe: Split trace_event related data from trace_probe") Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware)

tracing/probe: Add immediate string parameter support

2019-08-31T16:19:39Z

Add immediate string parameter (\"string") support to probe events. This allows you to specify an immediate (or dummy) parameter instead of fetching a string from memory. This feature looks odd, but imagine that you put a probe on a code to trace some string data. If the code is compiled into 2 instructions and 1 instruction has a string on memory but other has no string since it is optimized out. In that case, you can not fold those into one event, even if ftrace supported multiple probes on one event. With this feature, you can set a dummy string like foo=\"(optimized)":string instead of something like foo=+0(+0(%bp)):string. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/156095691687.28024.13372712423865047991.stgit@devnote2 Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware)

tracing/kprobe: Add per-probe delete from event

2019-08-31T16:19:38Z

Allow user to delete a probe from event. This is done by head match. For example, if we have 2 probes on an event $ cat kprobe_events p:kprobes/testprobe _do_fork r1=%ax r2=%dx p:kprobes/testprobe idle_fork r1=%ax r2=%cx Then you can remove one of them by passing the head of definition which identify the probe. $ echo "-:kprobes/testprobe idle_fork" >> kprobe_events Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/156095688848.28024.15798690082378432435.stgit@devnote2 Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware)

tracing/kprobe: Add multi-probe per event support

2019-08-31T16:19:38Z

Add multi-probe per one event support to kprobe events. User can define several different probes on one trace event if those events have same "event signature", e.g. # echo p:testevent _do_fork > kprobe_events # echo p:testevent fork_idle >> kprobe_events # kprobe_events p:kprobes/testevent _do_fork p:kprobes/testevent fork_idle The event signature is defined by kprobe type (retprobe or not), the number of args, argument names, and argument types. Note that this only support appending method. Delete event operation will delete all probes on the event. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/156095686913.28024.9357292202316540742.stgit@devnote2 Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware)

tracing/dynevent: Pass extra arguments to match operation

2019-08-31T16:19:38Z

Pass extra arguments to match operation for checking exact match. If the event doesn't support exact match, it will be ignored. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/156095685930.28024.10405547027475590975.stgit@devnote2 Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware)

tracing/probe: Split trace_event related data from trace_probe

2019-08-31T16:19:38Z

Split the trace_event related data from trace_probe data structure and introduce trace_probe_event data structure for its folder. This trace_probe_event data structure can have multiple trace_probe. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/156095683995.28024.7552150340561557873.stgit@devnote2 Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware)