<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/net/core/rtnetlink.c, branch v5.7</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.7</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.7'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2020-03-28T21:24:41Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>xdp: Support specifying expected existing program when attaching XDP</title>
<updated>2020-03-28T21:24:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Toke Høiland-Jørgensen</name>
<email>toke@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-25T17:23:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=92234c8f15c8d96ad7e52afdc5994cba6be68eb9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:92234c8f15c8d96ad7e52afdc5994cba6be68eb9</id>
<content type='text'>
While it is currently possible for userspace to specify that an existing
XDP program should not be replaced when attaching to an interface, there is
no mechanism to safely replace a specific XDP program with another.

This patch adds a new netlink attribute, IFLA_XDP_EXPECTED_FD, which can be
set along with IFLA_XDP_FD. If set, the kernel will check that the program
currently loaded on the interface matches the expected one, and fail the
operation if it does not. This corresponds to a 'cmpxchg' memory operation.
Setting the new attribute with a negative value means that no program is
expected to be attached, which corresponds to setting the UPDATE_IF_NOEXIST
flag.

A new companion flag, XDP_FLAGS_REPLACE, is also added to explicitly
request checking of the EXPECTED_FD attribute. This is needed for userspace
to discover whether the kernel supports the new attribute.

Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen &lt;toke@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158515700640.92963.3551295145441017022.stgit@toke.dk
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net</title>
<updated>2020-02-21T21:39:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-21T21:39:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=e65ee2fb54d4745d7b7d9061d7fe33c5c5bf3b06'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e65ee2fb54d4745d7b7d9061d7fe33c5c5bf3b06</id>
<content type='text'>
Conflict resolution of ice_virtchnl_pf.c based upon work by
Stephen Rothwell.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: use netif_is_bridge_port() to check for IFF_BRIDGE_PORT</title>
<updated>2020-02-20T18:10:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Wiedmann</name>
<email>jwi@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-20T08:00:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=2e92a2d0e450740ebe7e7a816162327ad1fde94b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2e92a2d0e450740ebe7e7a816162327ad1fde94b</id>
<content type='text'>
Trivial cleanup, so that all bridge port-specific code can be found in
one go.

CC: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes@sipsolutions.net&gt;
CC: Roopa Prabhu &lt;roopa@cumulusnetworks.com&gt;
CC: Nikolay Aleksandrov &lt;nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann &lt;jwi@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov &lt;nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: bridge: teach ndo_dflt_bridge_getlink() more brport flags</title>
<updated>2020-02-17T22:36:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Wiedmann</name>
<email>jwi@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-17T13:45:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=583cb0b4121f73e9e093dc3a14e419de6dab341e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:583cb0b4121f73e9e093dc3a14e419de6dab341e</id>
<content type='text'>
This enables ndo_dflt_bridge_getlink() to report a bridge port's
offload settings for multicast and broadcast flooding.

CC: Roopa Prabhu &lt;roopa@cumulusnetworks.com&gt;
CC: Nikolay Aleksandrov &lt;nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann &lt;jwi@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: rtnetlink: fix bugs in rtnl_alt_ifname()</title>
<updated>2020-02-17T02:51:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-13T04:58:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=44bfa9c5e5f06c72540273813e4c66beb5a8c213'/>
<id>urn:sha1:44bfa9c5e5f06c72540273813e4c66beb5a8c213</id>
<content type='text'>
Since IFLA_ALT_IFNAME is an NLA_STRING, we have no
guarantee it is nul terminated.

We should use nla_strdup() instead of kstrdup(), since this
helper will make sure not accessing out-of-bounds data.

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x5e/0xa0 lib/string.c:535
CPU: 1 PID: 19157 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1c9/0x220 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 kmsan_report+0xf7/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:118
 __msan_warning+0x58/0xa0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:215
 strlen+0x5e/0xa0 lib/string.c:535
 kstrdup+0x7f/0x1a0 mm/util.c:59
 rtnl_alt_ifname net/core/rtnetlink.c:3495 [inline]
 rtnl_linkprop+0x85d/0xc00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3553
 rtnl_newlinkprop+0x9d/0xb0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3568
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1153/0x1570 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5424
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x451/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5442
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0xf9e/0x1100 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
 netlink_sendmsg+0x1248/0x14d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:639 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:659 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x12b6/0x1350 net/socket.c:2330
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2384 [inline]
 __sys_sendmsg+0x451/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2417
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2426 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg+0x97/0xb0 net/socket.c:2424
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2424
 do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x45b3b9
Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007ff1c7b1ac78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ff1c7b1b6d4 RCX: 000000000045b3b9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000075bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 00000000000009cb R14: 00000000004cb3dd R15: 000000000075bf2c

Uninit was created at:
 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:144 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x66/0xd0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:127
 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x8a/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:82
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2774 [inline]
 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb40/0x1200 mm/slub.c:4382
 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:141 [inline]
 __alloc_skb+0x2fd/0xac0 net/core/skbuff.c:209
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1049 [inline]
 netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1174 [inline]
 netlink_sendmsg+0x7d3/0x14d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:639 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:659 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x12b6/0x1350 net/socket.c:2330
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2384 [inline]
 __sys_sendmsg+0x451/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2417
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2426 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg+0x97/0xb0 net/socket.c:2424
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2424
 do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: 36fbf1e52bd3 ("net: rtnetlink: add linkprop commands to add and delete alternative ifnames")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@mellanox.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/core: Do not clear VF index for node/port GUIDs query</title>
<updated>2020-01-30T14:20:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Leon Romanovsky</name>
<email>leonro@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-30T12:59:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=9fbf082f569980ddd7cab348e0a118678db0e47e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9fbf082f569980ddd7cab348e0a118678db0e47e</id>
<content type='text'>
VF numbers were assigned to node_guid and port_guid, but cleared
right before such query calls were issued. It caused to return
node/port GUIDs of VF index 0 for all VFs.

Fixes: 30aad41721e0 ("net/core: Add support for getting VF GUIDs")
Reported-by: Adrian Chiris &lt;adrianc@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net</title>
<updated>2020-01-26T09:40:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-26T09:40:21Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=4d8773b68e83558025303f266070b31bc4101e73'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4d8773b68e83558025303f266070b31bc4101e73</id>
<content type='text'>
Minor conflict in mlx5 because changes happened to code that has
moved meanwhile.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: rtnetlink: validate IFLA_MTU attribute in rtnl_create_link()</title>
<updated>2020-01-23T10:14:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-22T06:47:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=d836f5c69d87473ff65c06a6123e5b2cf5e56f5b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d836f5c69d87473ff65c06a6123e5b2cf5e56f5b</id>
<content type='text'>
rtnl_create_link() needs to apply dev-&gt;min_mtu and dev-&gt;max_mtu
checks that we apply in do_setlink()

Otherwise malicious users can crash the kernel, for example after
an integer overflow :

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memset include/linux/string.h:365 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __alloc_skb+0x37b/0x5e0 net/core/skbuff.c:238
Write of size 32 at addr ffff88819f20b9c0 by task swapper/0/0

CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 &lt;IRQ&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x41 mm/kasan/report.c:506
 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline]
 check_memory_region+0x134/0x1a0 mm/kasan/generic.c:192
 memset+0x24/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:108
 memset include/linux/string.h:365 [inline]
 __alloc_skb+0x37b/0x5e0 net/core/skbuff.c:238
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1049 [inline]
 alloc_skb_with_frags+0x93/0x590 net/core/skbuff.c:5664
 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x7ad/0x920 net/core/sock.c:2242
 sock_alloc_send_skb+0x32/0x40 net/core/sock.c:2259
 mld_newpack+0x1d7/0x7f0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1609
 add_grhead.isra.0+0x299/0x370 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1713
 add_grec+0x7db/0x10b0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1844
 mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:1970 [inline]
 mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x3d3/0x950 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2477
 call_timer_fn+0x1ac/0x780 kernel/time/timer.c:1404
 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1449 [inline]
 __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1773 [inline]
 __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1740 [inline]
 run_timer_softirq+0x6c3/0x1790 kernel/time/timer.c:1786
 __do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292
 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:373 [inline]
 irq_exit+0x19b/0x1e0 kernel/softirq.c:413
 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline]
 smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a3/0x610 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1137
 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:829
 &lt;/IRQ&gt;
RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:61
Code: 98 6b ea f9 eb 8a cc cc cc cc cc cc e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 44 1c 60 00 f4 c3 66 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 34 1c 60 00 fb f4 &lt;c3&gt; cc 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 e8 4e 5d 9a f9 e8 79
RSP: 0018:ffffffff89807ce8 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: 1ffffffff13266ae RBX: ffffffff8987a1c0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: ffffffff8987aa54
RBP: ffffffff89807d18 R08: ffffffff8987a1c0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffffffff8a799980 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 arch_cpu_idle+0xa/0x10 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:690
 default_idle_call+0x84/0xb0 kernel/sched/idle.c:94
 cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline]
 do_idle+0x3c8/0x6e0 kernel/sched/idle.c:269
 cpu_startup_entry+0x1b/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:361
 rest_init+0x23b/0x371 init/main.c:451
 arch_call_rest_init+0xe/0x1b
 start_kernel+0x904/0x943 init/main.c:784
 x86_64_start_reservations+0x29/0x2b arch/x86/kernel/head64.c:490
 x86_64_start_kernel+0x77/0x7b arch/x86/kernel/head64.c:471
 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:242

The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00067c82c0 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
raw: 057ffe0000000000 ffffea00067c82c8 ffffea00067c82c8 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88819f20b880: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 ffff88819f20b900: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
&gt;ffff88819f20b980: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
                                           ^
 ffff88819f20ba00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 ffff88819f20ba80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff

Fixes: 61e84623ace3 ("net: centralize net_device min/max MTU checking")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rtnetlink: provide permanent hardware address in RTM_NEWLINK</title>
<updated>2019-12-13T01:07:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Michal Kubecek</name>
<email>mkubecek@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-11T09:58:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=f74877a5457d34d604dba6dbbb13c4c05bac8b93'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f74877a5457d34d604dba6dbbb13c4c05bac8b93</id>
<content type='text'>
Permanent hardware address of a network device was traditionally provided
via ethtool ioctl interface but as Jiri Pirko pointed out in a review of
ethtool netlink interface, rtnetlink is much more suitable for it so let's
add it to the RTM_NEWLINK message.

Add IFLA_PERM_ADDRESS attribute to RTM_NEWLINK messages unless the
permanent address is all zeros (i.e. device driver did not fill it). As
permanent address is not modifiable, reject userspace requests containing
IFLA_PERM_ADDRESS attribute.

Note: we already provide permanent hardware address for bond slaves;
unfortunately we cannot drop that attribute for backward compatibility
reasons.

v5 -&gt; v6: only add the attribute if permanent address is not zero

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@mellanox.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger &lt;stephen@networkplumber.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/core: Populate VF index in struct ifla_vf_guid</title>
<updated>2019-12-03T19:24:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Danit Goldberg</name>
<email>danitg@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-03T15:43:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=9aed6ae0647d8b23b5746223f376acd7de7b8868'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9aed6ae0647d8b23b5746223f376acd7de7b8868</id>
<content type='text'>
In addition to filling the node_guid and port_guid attributes,
there is a need to populate VF index too, otherwise users of netlink
interface will see same VF index for all VFs.

Fixes: 30aad41721e0 ("net/core: Add support for getting VF GUIDs")
Signed-off-by: Danit Goldberg &lt;danitg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
