<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/net/core/stream.c, branch v6.3</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v6.3</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v6.3'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2023-02-11T03:53:42Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>net: Remove WARN_ON_ONCE(sk-&gt;sk_forward_alloc) from sk_stream_kill_queues().</title>
<updated>2023-02-11T03:53:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuniyuki Iwashima</name>
<email>kuniyu@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-10T00:22:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=62ec33b44e0f7168ff2886520fec6fb62d03b5a3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:62ec33b44e0f7168ff2886520fec6fb62d03b5a3</id>
<content type='text'>
Christoph Paasch reported that commit b5fc29233d28 ("inet6: Remove
inet6_destroy_sock() in sk-&gt;sk_prot-&gt;destroy().") started triggering
WARN_ON_ONCE(sk-&gt;sk_forward_alloc) in sk_stream_kill_queues().  [0 - 2]
Also, we can reproduce it by a program in [3].

In the commit, we delay freeing ipv6_pinfo.pktoptions from sk-&gt;destroy()
to sk-&gt;sk_destruct(), so sk-&gt;sk_forward_alloc is no longer zero in
inet_csk_destroy_sock().

The same check has been in inet_sock_destruct() from at least v2.6,
we can just remove the WARN_ON_ONCE().  However, among the users of
sk_stream_kill_queues(), only CAIF is not calling inet_sock_destruct().
Thus, we add the same WARN_ON_ONCE() to caif_sock_destructor().

[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/39725AB4-88F1-41B3-B07F-949C5CAEFF4F@icloud.com/
[1]: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/341
[2]:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3232 at net/core/stream.c:212 sk_stream_kill_queues+0x2f9/0x3e0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3232 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5ab24eb4698afbe147b424149c529e2a43ec24eb5 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:sk_stream_kill_queues+0x2f9/0x3e0
Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e ec 00 00 00 8b ab 08 01 00 00 e9 60 ff ff ff e8 d0 5f b6 fe 0f 0b eb 97 e8 c7 5f b6 fe &lt;0f&gt; 0b eb a0 e8 be 5f b6 fe 0f 0b e9 6a fe ff ff e8 02 07 e3 fe e9
RSP: 0018:ffff88810570fc68 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888101f38f40 RSI: ffffffff8285e529 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000ce0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000ce0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8881009e9488
R13: ffffffff84af2cc0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881009e9458
FS:  00007f7fdfbd5800(0000) GS:ffff88811b600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32923000 CR3: 00000001062fc006 CR4: 0000000000170ef0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x1a1/0x320
 __tcp_close+0xab6/0xe90
 tcp_close+0x30/0xc0
 inet_release+0xe9/0x1f0
 inet6_release+0x4c/0x70
 __sock_release+0xd2/0x280
 sock_close+0x15/0x20
 __fput+0x252/0xa20
 task_work_run+0x169/0x250
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
 do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
RIP: 0033:0x7f7fdf7ae28d
Code: c1 20 00 00 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ee fb ff ff 48 89 04 24 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 8b 3c 24 48 89 c2 e8 37 fc ff ff 48 89 d0 48 83 c4 08 48 3d 01
RSP: 002b:00000000007dfbb0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f7fdf7ae28d
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000007f338e0f R09: 0000000000000e0f
R10: 000000007f338e13 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f7fdefff000
R13: 00007f7fdefffcd8 R14: 00007f7fdefffce0 R15: 00007f7fdefffcd8
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230208004245.83497-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/

Fixes: b5fc29233d28 ("inet6: Remove inet6_destroy_sock() in sk-&gt;sk_prot-&gt;destroy().")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch &lt;christophpaasch@icloud.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: stream: purge sk_error_queue in sk_stream_kill_queues()</title>
<updated>2022-12-19T12:33:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-16T16:29:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=e0c8bccd40fc1c19e1d246c39bcf79e357e1ada3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e0c8bccd40fc1c19e1d246c39bcf79e357e1ada3</id>
<content type='text'>
Changheon Lee reported TCP socket leaks, with a nice repro.

It seems we leak TCP sockets with the following sequence:

1) SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_ACK is enabled on the socket.

   Each ACK will cook an skb put in error queue, from __skb_tstamp_tx().
   __skb_tstamp_tx() is using skb_clone(), unless
   SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_TSONLY was also requested.

2) If the application is also using MSG_ZEROCOPY, then we put in the
   error queue cloned skbs that had a struct ubuf_info attached to them.

   Whenever an struct ubuf_info is allocated, sock_zerocopy_alloc()
   does a sock_hold().

   As long as the cloned skbs are still in sk_error_queue,
   socket refcount is kept elevated.

3) Application closes the socket, while error queue is not empty.

Since tcp_close() no longer purges the socket error queue,
we might end up with a TCP socket with at least one skb in
error queue keeping the socket alive forever.

This bug can be (ab)used to consume all kernel memory
and freeze the host.

We need to purge the error queue, with proper synchronization
against concurrent writers.

Fixes: 24bcbe1cc69f ("net: stream: don't purge sk_error_queue in sk_stream_kill_queues()")
Reported-by: Changheon Lee &lt;darklight2357@icloud.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: use get_random_u32_below() instead of deprecated function</title>
<updated>2022-11-18T01:15:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-10T02:44:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=8032bf1233a74627ce69b803608e650f3f35971c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8032bf1233a74627ce69b803608e650f3f35971c</id>
<content type='text'>
This is a simple mechanical transformation done by:

@@
expression E;
@@
- prandom_u32_max
+ get_random_u32_below
  (E)

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt; # for xfs
Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park &lt;sj@kernel.org&gt; # for damon
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt; # for infiniband
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt; # for arm
Acked-by: Ulf Hansson &lt;ulf.hansson@linaro.org&gt; # for mmc
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: use prandom_u32_max() when possible, part 1</title>
<updated>2022-10-11T23:42:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-05T14:43:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=81895a65ec63ee1daec3255dc1a06675d2fbe915'/>
<id>urn:sha1:81895a65ec63ee1daec3255dc1a06675d2fbe915</id>
<content type='text'>
Rather than incurring a division or requesting too many random bytes for
the given range, use the prandom_u32_max() function, which only takes
the minimum required bytes from the RNG and avoids divisions. This was
done mechanically with this coccinelle script:

@basic@
expression E;
type T;
identifier get_random_u32 =~ "get_random_int|prandom_u32|get_random_u32";
typedef u64;
@@
(
- ((T)get_random_u32() % (E))
+ prandom_u32_max(E)
|
- ((T)get_random_u32() &amp; ((E) - 1))
+ prandom_u32_max(E * XXX_MAKE_SURE_E_IS_POW2)
|
- ((u64)(E) * get_random_u32() &gt;&gt; 32)
+ prandom_u32_max(E)
|
- ((T)get_random_u32() &amp; ~PAGE_MASK)
+ prandom_u32_max(PAGE_SIZE)
)

@multi_line@
identifier get_random_u32 =~ "get_random_int|prandom_u32|get_random_u32";
identifier RAND;
expression E;
@@

-       RAND = get_random_u32();
        ... when != RAND
-       RAND %= (E);
+       RAND = prandom_u32_max(E);

// Find a potential literal
@literal_mask@
expression LITERAL;
type T;
identifier get_random_u32 =~ "get_random_int|prandom_u32|get_random_u32";
position p;
@@

        ((T)get_random_u32()@p &amp; (LITERAL))

// Add one to the literal.
@script:python add_one@
literal &lt;&lt; literal_mask.LITERAL;
RESULT;
@@

value = None
if literal.startswith('0x'):
        value = int(literal, 16)
elif literal[0] in '123456789':
        value = int(literal, 10)
if value is None:
        print("I don't know how to handle %s" % (literal))
        cocci.include_match(False)
elif value == 2**32 - 1 or value == 2**31 - 1 or value == 2**24 - 1 or value == 2**16 - 1 or value == 2**8 - 1:
        print("Skipping 0x%x for cleanup elsewhere" % (value))
        cocci.include_match(False)
elif value &amp; (value + 1) != 0:
        print("Skipping 0x%x because it's not a power of two minus one" % (value))
        cocci.include_match(False)
elif literal.startswith('0x'):
        coccinelle.RESULT = cocci.make_expr("0x%x" % (value + 1))
else:
        coccinelle.RESULT = cocci.make_expr("%d" % (value + 1))

// Replace the literal mask with the calculated result.
@plus_one@
expression literal_mask.LITERAL;
position literal_mask.p;
expression add_one.RESULT;
identifier FUNC;
@@

-       (FUNC()@p &amp; (LITERAL))
+       prandom_u32_max(RESULT)

@collapse_ret@
type T;
identifier VAR;
expression E;
@@

 {
-       T VAR;
-       VAR = (E);
-       return VAR;
+       return E;
 }

@drop_var@
type T;
identifier VAR;
@@

 {
-       T VAR;
        ... when != VAR
 }

Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Yury Norov &lt;yury.norov@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt; # for ext4 and sbitmap
Reviewed-by: Christoph Böhmwalder &lt;christoph.boehmwalder@linbit.com&gt; # for drbd
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt; # for s390
Acked-by: Ulf Hansson &lt;ulf.hansson@linaro.org&gt; # for mmc
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt; # for xfs
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: If sock is dead don't access sock's sk_wq in sk_stream_wait_memory</title>
<updated>2022-09-26T15:43:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Liu Jian</name>
<email>liujian56@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-08-23T13:37:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=3f8ef65af927db247418d4e1db49164d7a158fc5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3f8ef65af927db247418d4e1db49164d7a158fc5</id>
<content type='text'>
Fixes the below NULL pointer dereference:

  [...]
  [   14.471200] Call Trace:
  [   14.471562]  &lt;TASK&gt;
  [   14.471882]  lock_acquire+0x245/0x2e0
  [   14.472416]  ? remove_wait_queue+0x12/0x50
  [   14.473014]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x17/0x50
  [   14.473681]  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3d/0x50
  [   14.474318]  ? remove_wait_queue+0x12/0x50
  [   14.474907]  remove_wait_queue+0x12/0x50
  [   14.475480]  sk_stream_wait_memory+0x20d/0x340
  [   14.476127]  ? do_wait_intr_irq+0x80/0x80
  [   14.476704]  do_tcp_sendpages+0x287/0x600
  [   14.477283]  tcp_bpf_push+0xab/0x260
  [   14.477817]  tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir+0x297/0x500
  [   14.478461]  ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x77/0xe0
  [   14.479096]  tcp_bpf_send_verdict+0x105/0x470
  [   14.479729]  tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0x318/0x4f0
  [   14.480311]  sock_sendmsg+0x2d/0x40
  [   14.480822]  ____sys_sendmsg+0x1b4/0x1c0
  [   14.481390]  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x62/0x80
  [   14.482048]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0
  [   14.482580]  ? vmf_insert_pfn_prot+0x91/0x150
  [   14.483215]  ? __do_fault+0x2a/0x1a0
  [   14.483738]  ? do_fault+0x15e/0x5d0
  [   14.484246]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x56b/0x1040
  [   14.484874]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xdf/0x130
  [   14.485474]  ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90
  [   14.486046]  ? __sys_sendmsg+0x41/0x70
  [   14.486587]  __sys_sendmsg+0x41/0x70
  [   14.487105]  ? intel_pmu_drain_pebs_core+0x350/0x350
  [   14.487822]  do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80
  [   14.488345]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
  [...]

The test scenario has the following flow:

thread1                               thread2
-----------                           ---------------
 tcp_bpf_sendmsg
  tcp_bpf_send_verdict
   tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir              sock_close
    tcp_bpf_push_locked                 __sock_release
     tcp_bpf_push                         //inet_release
      do_tcp_sendpages                    sock-&gt;ops-&gt;release
       sk_stream_wait_memory          	   // tcp_close
          sk_wait_event                      sk-&gt;sk_prot-&gt;close
           release_sock(__sk);
            ***
                                                lock_sock(sk);
                                                  __tcp_close
                                                    sock_orphan(sk)
                                                      sk-&gt;sk_wq  = NULL
                                                release_sock
            ****
           lock_sock(__sk);
          remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &amp;wait);
             sk_sleep(sk)
             //NULL pointer dereference
             &amp;rcu_dereference_raw(sk-&gt;sk_wq)-&gt;wait

While waiting for memory in thread1, the socket is released with its wait
queue because thread2 has closed it. This caused by tcp_bpf_send_verdict
didn't increase the f_count of psock-&gt;sk_redir-&gt;sk_socket-&gt;file in thread1.

We should check if SOCK_DEAD flag is set on wakeup in sk_stream_wait_memory
before accessing the wait queue.

Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki &lt;jakub@cloudflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Liu Jian &lt;liujian56@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220823133755.314697-2-liujian56@huawei.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: use WARN_ON_ONCE() in sk_stream_kill_queues()</title>
<updated>2022-06-10T04:53:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-08T16:04:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=c59f02f848672f92bcea90306240822239d68049'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c59f02f848672f92bcea90306240822239d68049</id>
<content type='text'>
sk_stream_kill_queues() has three checks which have been
useful to detect kernel bugs in the past.

However they are potentially a problem because they
could flood the syslog.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: stream: don't purge sk_error_queue in sk_stream_kill_queues()</title>
<updated>2021-10-16T08:06:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
<email>kuba@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-15T13:37:39Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=24bcbe1cc69fa52dc4f7b5b2456678ed464724d8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:24bcbe1cc69fa52dc4f7b5b2456678ed464724d8</id>
<content type='text'>
sk_stream_kill_queues() can be called on close when there are
still outstanding skbs to transmit. Those skbs may try to queue
notifications to the error queue (e.g. timestamps).
If sk_stream_kill_queues() purges the queue without taking
its lock the queue may get corrupted, and skbs leaked.

This shows up as a warning about an rmem leak:

WARNING: CPU: 24 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:154 inet_sock_destruct+0x...

The leak is always a multiple of 0x300 bytes (the value is in
%rax on my builds, so RAX: 0000000000000300). 0x300 is truesize of
an empty sk_buff. Indeed if we dump the socket state at the time
of the warning the sk_error_queue is often (but not always)
corrupted. The -&gt;next pointer points back at the list head,
but not the -&gt;prev pointer. Indeed we can find the leaked skb
by scanning the kernel memory for something that looks like
an skb with -&gt;sk = socket in question, and -&gt;truesize = 0x300.
The contents of -&gt;cb[] of the skb confirms the suspicion that
it is indeed a timestamp notification (as generated in
__skb_complete_tx_timestamp()).

Removing purging of sk_error_queue should be okay, since
inet_sock_destruct() does it again once all socket refs
are gone. Eric suggests this may cause sockets that go
thru disconnect() to maintain notifications from the
previous incarnations of the socket, but that should be
okay since the race was there anyway, and disconnect()
is not exactly dependable.

Thanks to Jonathan Lemon and Omar Sandoval for help at various
stages of tracing the issue.

Fixes: cb9eff097831 ("net: new user space API for time stamping of incoming and outgoing packets")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: add new socket option SO_RESERVE_MEM</title>
<updated>2021-09-30T12:36:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Wei Wang</name>
<email>weiwan@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-29T17:25:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=2bb2f5fb21b0486ff69b7b4a1fe03a760527d133'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2bb2f5fb21b0486ff69b7b4a1fe03a760527d133</id>
<content type='text'>
This socket option provides a mechanism for users to reserve a certain
amount of memory for the socket to use. When this option is set, kernel
charges the user specified amount of memory to memcg, as well as
sk_forward_alloc. This amount of memory is not reclaimable and is
available in sk_forward_alloc for this socket.
With this socket option set, the networking stack spends less cycles
doing forward alloc and reclaim, which should lead to better system
performance, with the cost of an amount of pre-allocated and
unreclaimable memory, even under memory pressure.

Note:
This socket option is only available when memory cgroup is enabled and we
require this reserved memory to be charged to the user's memcg. We hope
this could avoid mis-behaving users to abused this feature to reserve a
large amount on certain sockets and cause unfairness for others.

Signed-off-by: Wei Wang &lt;weiwan@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: make sure EPOLLOUT wont be missed</title>
<updated>2019-08-19T20:07:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-17T04:26:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=ef8d8ccdc216f797e66cb4a1372f5c4c285ce1e4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ef8d8ccdc216f797e66cb4a1372f5c4c285ce1e4</id>
<content type='text'>
As Jason Baron explained in commit 790ba4566c1a ("tcp: set SOCK_NOSPACE
under memory pressure"), it is crucial we properly set SOCK_NOSPACE
when needed.

However, Jason patch had a bug, because the 'nonblocking' status
as far as sk_stream_wait_memory() is concerned is governed
by MSG_DONTWAIT flag passed at sendmsg() time :

    long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags &amp; MSG_DONTWAIT);

So it is very possible that tcp sendmsg() calls sk_stream_wait_memory(),
and that sk_stream_wait_memory() returns -EAGAIN with SOCK_NOSPACE
cleared, if sk-&gt;sk_sndtimeo has been set to a small (but not zero)
value.

This patch removes the 'noblock' variable since we must always
set SOCK_NOSPACE if -EAGAIN is returned.

It also renames the do_nonblock label since we might reach this
code path even if we were in blocking mode.

Fixes: 790ba4566c1a ("tcp: set SOCK_NOSPACE under memory pressure")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jason Baron &lt;jbaron@akamai.com&gt;
Reported-by: Vladimir Rutsky  &lt;rutsky@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh &lt;soheil@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jason Baron &lt;jbaron@akamai.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: reduce POLLOUT events caused by TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT</title>
<updated>2018-12-05T05:21:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-04T15:58:17Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT socket option or sysctl was added in linux-3.12
as a step to enable bigger tcp sndbuf limits.

It works reasonably well, but the following happens :

Once the limit is reached, TCP stack generates
an [E]POLLOUT event for every incoming ACK packet.

This causes a high number of context switches.

This patch implements the strategy David Miller added
in sock_def_write_space() :

 - If TCP socket has a notsent_lowat constraint of X bytes,
   allow sendmsg() to fill up to X bytes, but send [E]POLLOUT
   only if number of notsent bytes is below X/2

This considerably reduces TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT overhead,
while allowing to keep the pipe full.

Tested:
 100 ms RTT netem testbed between A and B, 100 concurrent TCP_STREAM

A:/# cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_wmem
4096	262144	64000000
A:/# super_netperf 100 -H B -l 1000 -- -K bbr &amp;

A:/# grep TCP /proc/net/sockstat
TCP: inuse 203 orphan 0 tw 19 alloc 414 mem 1364904 # This is about 54 MB of memory per flow :/

A:/# vmstat 5 5
procs -----------memory---------- ---swap-- -----io---- -system-- ------cpu-----
 r  b   swpd   free   buff  cache   si   so    bi    bo   in   cs us sy id wa st
 0  0      0 256220672  13532 694976    0    0    10     0   28   14  0  1 99  0  0
 2  0      0 256320016  13532 698480    0    0   512     0 715901 5927  0 10 90  0  0
 0  0      0 256197232  13532 700992    0    0   735    13 771161 5849  0 11 89  0  0
 1  0      0 256233824  13532 703320    0    0   512    23 719650 6635  0 11 89  0  0
 2  0      0 256226880  13532 705780    0    0   642     4 775650 6009  0 12 88  0  0

A:/# echo 2097152 &gt;/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_notsent_lowat

A:/# grep TCP /proc/net/sockstat
TCP: inuse 203 orphan 0 tw 19 alloc 414 mem 86411 # 3.5 MB per flow

A:/# vmstat 5 5  # check that context switches have not inflated too much.
procs -----------memory---------- ---swap-- -----io---- -system-- ------cpu-----
 r  b   swpd   free   buff  cache   si   so    bi    bo   in   cs us sy id wa st
 2  0      0 260386512  13592 662148    0    0    10     0   17   14  0  1 99  0  0
 0  0      0 260519680  13592 604184    0    0   512    13 726843 12424  0 10 90  0  0
 1  1      0 260435424  13592 598360    0    0   512    25 764645 12925  0 10 90  0  0
 1  0      0 260855392  13592 578380    0    0   512     7 722943 13624  0 11 88  0  0
 1  0      0 260445008  13592 601176    0    0   614    34 772288 14317  0 10 90  0  0

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh &lt;soheil@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
