<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/net/ipv4, branch v6.0</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v6.0</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v6.0'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2022-09-22T13:42:57Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>udp: Use WARN_ON_ONCE() in udp_read_skb()</title>
<updated>2022-09-22T13:42:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peilin Ye</name>
<email>peilin.ye@bytedance.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-21T00:59:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=db39dfdc1c3bd9da273902da12f01973792ff911'/>
<id>urn:sha1:db39dfdc1c3bd9da273902da12f01973792ff911</id>
<content type='text'>
Prevent udp_read_skb() from flooding the syslog.

Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki &lt;jakub@cloudflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye &lt;peilin.ye@bytedance.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220921005915.2697-1-yepeilin.cs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipmr: Always call ip{,6}_mr_forward() from RCU read-side critical section</title>
<updated>2022-09-20T15:22:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ido Schimmel</name>
<email>idosch@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-14T07:53:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=b07a9b26e2b1aa3711fd6935eccb08a463b1fb11'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b07a9b26e2b1aa3711fd6935eccb08a463b1fb11</id>
<content type='text'>
These functions expect to be called from RCU read-side critical section,
but this only happens when invoked from the data path via
ip{,6}_mr_input(). They can also be invoked from process context in
response to user space adding a multicast route which resolves a cache
entry with queued packets [1][2].

Fix by adding missing rcu_read_lock() / rcu_read_unlock() in these call
paths.

[1]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.0.0-rc3-custom-15969-g049d233c8bcc-dirty #1387 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/ipv4/ipmr.c:84 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by smcrouted/246:
 #0: ffffffff862389b0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ip_mroute_setsockopt+0x11c/0x1420

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 246 Comm: smcrouted Not tainted 6.0.0-rc3-custom-15969-g049d233c8bcc-dirty #1387
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-1.fc36 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xb9
 vif_dev_read+0xbf/0xd0
 ipmr_queue_xmit+0x135/0x1ab0
 ip_mr_forward+0xe7b/0x13d0
 ipmr_mfc_add+0x1a06/0x2ad0
 ip_mroute_setsockopt+0x5c1/0x1420
 do_ip_setsockopt+0x23d/0x37f0
 ip_setsockopt+0x56/0x80
 raw_setsockopt+0x219/0x290
 __sys_setsockopt+0x236/0x4d0
 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbe/0x160
 do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

[2]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.0.0-rc3-custom-15969-g049d233c8bcc-dirty #1387 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:69 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by smcrouted/246:
 #0: ffffffff862389b0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ip6_mroute_setsockopt+0x6b9/0x2630

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 246 Comm: smcrouted Not tainted 6.0.0-rc3-custom-15969-g049d233c8bcc-dirty #1387
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-1.fc36 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xb9
 vif_dev_read+0xbf/0xd0
 ip6mr_forward2.isra.0+0xc9/0x1160
 ip6_mr_forward+0xef0/0x13f0
 ip6mr_mfc_add+0x1ff2/0x31f0
 ip6_mroute_setsockopt+0x1825/0x2630
 do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x462/0x4440
 ipv6_setsockopt+0x105/0x140
 rawv6_setsockopt+0xd8/0x690
 __sys_setsockopt+0x236/0x4d0
 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbe/0x160
 do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Fixes: ebc3197963fc ("ipmr: add rcu protection over (struct vif_device)-&gt;dev")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: read multiple skbs in tcp_read_skb()</title>
<updated>2022-09-20T12:47:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Cong Wang</name>
<email>cong.wang@bytedance.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-12T17:35:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=db4192a754ebd52300a28abe1a50dd18eae0eb12'/>
<id>urn:sha1:db4192a754ebd52300a28abe1a50dd18eae0eb12</id>
<content type='text'>
Before we switched to -&gt;read_skb(), -&gt;read_sock() was passed with
desc.count=1, which technically indicates we only read one skb per
-&gt;sk_data_ready() call. However, for TCP, this is not true.

TCP at least has sk_rcvlowat which intentionally holds skb's in
receive queue until this watermark is reached. This means when
-&gt;sk_data_ready() is invoked there could be multiple skb's in the
queue, therefore we have to read multiple skbs in tcp_read_skb()
instead of one.

Fixes: 965b57b469a5 ("net: Introduce a new proto_ops -&gt;read_skb()")
Reported-by: Peilin Ye &lt;peilin.ye@bytedance.com&gt;
Cc: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jakub Sitnicki &lt;jakub@cloudflare.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;cong.wang@bytedance.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220912173553.235838-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: Use WARN_ON_ONCE() in tcp_read_skb()</title>
<updated>2022-09-16T14:29:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peilin Ye</name>
<email>peilin.ye@bytedance.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-08T23:15:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=96628951869c0dedf0377adca01c8675172d8639'/>
<id>urn:sha1:96628951869c0dedf0377adca01c8675172d8639</id>
<content type='text'>
Prevent tcp_read_skb() from flooding the syslog.

Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki &lt;jakub@cloudflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye &lt;peilin.ye@bytedance.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: fix early ETIMEDOUT after spurious non-SACK RTO</title>
<updated>2022-09-06T09:06:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Neal Cardwell</name>
<email>ncardwell@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-03T12:10:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=686dc2db2a0fdc1d34b424ec2c0a735becd8d62b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:686dc2db2a0fdc1d34b424ec2c0a735becd8d62b</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix a bug reported and analyzed by Nagaraj Arankal, where the handling
of a spurious non-SACK RTO could cause a connection to fail to clear
retrans_stamp, causing a later RTO to very prematurely time out the
connection with ETIMEDOUT.

Here is the buggy scenario, expanding upon Nagaraj Arankal's excellent
report:

(*1) Send one data packet on a non-SACK connection

(*2) Because no ACK packet is received, the packet is retransmitted
     and we enter CA_Loss; but this retransmission is spurious.

(*3) The ACK for the original data is received. The transmitted packet
     is acknowledged.  The TCP timestamp is before the retrans_stamp,
     so tcp_may_undo() returns true, and tcp_try_undo_loss() returns
     true without changing state to Open (because tcp_is_sack() is
     false), and tcp_process_loss() returns without calling
     tcp_try_undo_recovery().  Normally after undoing a CA_Loss
     episode, tcp_fastretrans_alert() would see that the connection
     has returned to CA_Open and fall through and call
     tcp_try_to_open(), which would set retrans_stamp to 0.  However,
     for non-SACK connections we hold the connection in CA_Loss, so do
     not fall through to call tcp_try_to_open() and do not set
     retrans_stamp to 0. So retrans_stamp is (erroneously) still
     non-zero.

     At this point the first "retransmission event" has passed and
     been recovered from. Any future retransmission is a completely
     new "event". However, retrans_stamp is erroneously still
     set. (And we are still in CA_Loss, which is correct.)

(*4) After 16 minutes (to correspond with tcp_retries2=15), a new data
     packet is sent. Note: No data is transmitted between (*3) and
     (*4) and we disabled keep alives.

     The socket's timeout SHOULD be calculated from this point in
     time, but instead it's calculated from the prior "event" 16
     minutes ago (step (*2)).

(*5) Because no ACK packet is received, the packet is retransmitted.

(*6) At the time of the 2nd retransmission, the socket returns
     ETIMEDOUT, prematurely, because retrans_stamp is (erroneously)
     too far in the past (set at the time of (*2)).

This commit fixes this bug by ensuring that we reuse in
tcp_try_undo_loss() the same careful logic for non-SACK connections
that we have in tcp_try_undo_recovery(). To avoid duplicating logic,
we factor out that logic into a new
tcp_is_non_sack_preventing_reopen() helper and call that helper from
both undo functions.

Fixes: da34ac7626b5 ("tcp: only undo on partial ACKs in CA_Loss")
Reported-by: Nagaraj Arankal &lt;nagaraj.p.arankal@hpe.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/SJ0PR84MB1847BE6C24D274C46A1B9B0EB27A9@SJ0PR84MB1847.NAMPRD84.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM/
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220903121023.866900-1-ncardwell.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'rxrpc-fixes-20220901' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs</title>
<updated>2022-09-02T11:45:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-02T11:45:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=e7506d344bf180096a86ec393515861fb5245915'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e7506d344bf180096a86ec393515861fb5245915</id>
<content type='text'>
David Howells says:

====================
rxrpc fixes
Here are some fixes for AF_RXRPC:

 (1) Fix the handling of ICMP/ICMP6 packets.  This is a problem due to
     rxrpc being switched to acting as a UDP tunnel, thereby allowing it to
     steal the packets before they go through the UDP Rx queue.  UDP
     tunnels can't get ICMP/ICMP6 packets, however.  This patch adds an
     additional encap hook so that they can.

 (2) Fix the encryption routines in rxkad to handle packets that have more
     than three parts correctly.  The problem is that -&gt;nr_frags doesn't
     count the initial fragment, so the sglist ends up too short.

 (3) Fix a problem with destruction of the local endpoint potentially
     getting repeated.

 (4) Fix the calculation of the time at which to resend.
     jiffies_to_usecs() gives microseconds, not nanoseconds.

 (5) Fix AFS to work out when callback promises and locks expire based on
     the time an op was issued rather than the time the first reply packet
     arrives.  We don't know how long the server took between calculating
     the expiry interval and transmitting the reply.

 (6) Given (5), rxrpc_get_reply_time() is no longer used, so remove it.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: TX zerocopy should not sense pfmemalloc status</title>
<updated>2022-09-02T11:29:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-08-31T23:38:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=3261400639463a853ba2b3be8bd009c2a8089775'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3261400639463a853ba2b3be8bd009c2a8089775</id>
<content type='text'>
We got a recent syzbot report [1] showing a possible misuse
of pfmemalloc page status in TCP zerocopy paths.

Indeed, for pages coming from user space or other layers,
using page_is_pfmemalloc() is moot, and possibly could give
false positives.

There has been attempts to make page_is_pfmemalloc() more robust,
but not using it in the first place in this context is probably better,
removing cpu cycles.

Note to stable teams :

You need to backport 84ce071e38a6 ("net: introduce
__skb_fill_page_desc_noacc") as a prereq.

Race is more probable after commit c07aea3ef4d4
("mm: add a signature in struct page") because page_is_pfmemalloc()
is now using low order bit from page-&gt;lru.next, which can change
more often than page-&gt;index.

Low order bit should never be set for lru.next (when used as an anchor
in LRU list), so KCSAN report is mostly a false positive.

Backporting to older kernel versions seems not necessary.

[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in lru_add_fn / tcp_build_frag

write to 0xffffea0004a1d2c8 of 8 bytes by task 18600 on cpu 0:
__list_add include/linux/list.h:73 [inline]
list_add include/linux/list.h:88 [inline]
lruvec_add_folio include/linux/mm_inline.h:105 [inline]
lru_add_fn+0x440/0x520 mm/swap.c:228
folio_batch_move_lru+0x1e1/0x2a0 mm/swap.c:246
folio_batch_add_and_move mm/swap.c:263 [inline]
folio_add_lru+0xf1/0x140 mm/swap.c:490
filemap_add_folio+0xf8/0x150 mm/filemap.c:948
__filemap_get_folio+0x510/0x6d0 mm/filemap.c:1981
pagecache_get_page+0x26/0x190 mm/folio-compat.c:104
grab_cache_page_write_begin+0x2a/0x30 mm/folio-compat.c:116
ext4_da_write_begin+0x2dd/0x5f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:2988
generic_perform_write+0x1d4/0x3f0 mm/filemap.c:3738
ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x235/0x3e0 fs/ext4/file.c:270
ext4_file_write_iter+0x2e3/0x1210
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2187 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
vfs_write+0x468/0x760 fs/read_write.c:578
ksys_write+0xe8/0x1a0 fs/read_write.c:631
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:643 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:640 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x3e/0x50 fs/read_write.c:640
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

read to 0xffffea0004a1d2c8 of 8 bytes by task 18611 on cpu 1:
page_is_pfmemalloc include/linux/mm.h:1740 [inline]
__skb_fill_page_desc include/linux/skbuff.h:2422 [inline]
skb_fill_page_desc include/linux/skbuff.h:2443 [inline]
tcp_build_frag+0x613/0xb20 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1018
do_tcp_sendpages+0x3e8/0xaf0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1075
tcp_sendpage_locked net/ipv4/tcp.c:1140 [inline]
tcp_sendpage+0x89/0xb0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1150
inet_sendpage+0x7f/0xc0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:833
kernel_sendpage+0x184/0x300 net/socket.c:3561
sock_sendpage+0x5a/0x70 net/socket.c:1054
pipe_to_sendpage+0x128/0x160 fs/splice.c:361
splice_from_pipe_feed fs/splice.c:415 [inline]
__splice_from_pipe+0x222/0x4d0 fs/splice.c:559
splice_from_pipe fs/splice.c:594 [inline]
generic_splice_sendpage+0x89/0xc0 fs/splice.c:743
do_splice_from fs/splice.c:764 [inline]
direct_splice_actor+0x80/0xa0 fs/splice.c:931
splice_direct_to_actor+0x305/0x620 fs/splice.c:886
do_splice_direct+0xfb/0x180 fs/splice.c:974
do_sendfile+0x3bf/0x910 fs/read_write.c:1249
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1317 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1303 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendfile64+0x10c/0x150 fs/read_write.c:1303
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -&gt; 0xffffea0004a1d288

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 18611 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc2-syzkaller-00248-ge022620b5d05-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/22/2022

Fixes: c07aea3ef4d4 ("mm: add a signature in struct page")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Shakeel Butt &lt;shakeelb@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt &lt;shakeelb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Fix ICMP/ICMP6 error handling</title>
<updated>2022-09-01T10:42:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-08-26T14:39:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=ac56a0b48da86fd1b4389632fb7c4c8a5d86eefa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ac56a0b48da86fd1b4389632fb7c4c8a5d86eefa</id>
<content type='text'>
Because rxrpc pretends to be a tunnel on top of a UDP/UDP6 socket, allowing
it to siphon off UDP packets early in the handling of received UDP packets
thereby avoiding the packet going through the UDP receive queue, it doesn't
get ICMP packets through the UDP -&gt;sk_error_report() callback.  In fact, it
doesn't appear that there's any usable option for getting hold of ICMP
packets.

Fix this by adding a new UDP encap hook to distribute error messages for
UDP tunnels.  If the hook is set, then the tunnel driver will be able to
see ICMP packets.  The hook provides the offset into the packet of the UDP
header of the original packet that caused the notification.

An alternative would be to call the -&gt;error_handler() hook - but that
requires that the skbuff be cloned (as ip_icmp_error() or ipv6_cmp_error()
do, though isn't really necessary or desirable in rxrpc's case is we want
to parse them there and then, not queue them).

Changes
=======
ver #3)
 - Fixed an uninitialised variable.

ver #2)
 - Fixed some missing CONFIG_AF_RXRPC_IPV6 conditionals.

Fixes: 5271953cad31 ("rxrpc: Use the UDP encap_rcv hook")
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: make global challenge ack rate limitation per net-ns and default disabled</title>
<updated>2022-09-01T02:56:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-08-30T18:56:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=79e3602caa6f9d59c4f66a268407080496dae408'/>
<id>urn:sha1:79e3602caa6f9d59c4f66a268407080496dae408</id>
<content type='text'>
Because per host rate limiting has been proven problematic (side channel
attacks can be based on it), per host rate limiting of challenge acks ideally
should be per netns and turned off by default.

This is a long due followup of following commits:

083ae308280d ("tcp: enable per-socket rate limiting of all 'challenge acks'")
f2b2c582e824 ("tcp: mitigate ACK loops for connections as tcp_sock")
75ff39ccc1bd ("tcp: make challenge acks less predictable")

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jason Baron &lt;jbaron@akamai.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: annotate data-race around challenge_timestamp</title>
<updated>2022-09-01T02:56:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-08-30T18:56:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=8c70521238b7863c2af607e20bcba20f974c969b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8c70521238b7863c2af607e20bcba20f974c969b</id>
<content type='text'>
challenge_timestamp can be read an written by concurrent threads.

This was expected, but we need to annotate the race to avoid potential issues.

Following patch moves challenge_timestamp and challenge_count
to per-netns storage to provide better isolation.

Fixes: 354e4aa391ed ("tcp: RFC 5961 5.2 Blind Data Injection Attack Mitigation")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
