<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/net, branch v6.15</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v6.15</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v6.15'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2025-05-22T09:49:53Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'ipsec-2025-05-21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec</title>
<updated>2025-05-22T09:49:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Abeni</name>
<email>pabeni@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-22T09:49:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=bd2ec34d005013419f76196e76e8b8b55e436e31'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bd2ec34d005013419f76196e76e8b8b55e436e31</id>
<content type='text'>
Steffen Klassert says:

====================
pull request (net): ipsec 2025-05-21

1) Fix some missing kfree_skb in the error paths of espintcp.
   From Sabrina Dubroca.

2) Fix a reference leak in espintcp.
   From Sabrina Dubroca.

3) Fix UDP GRO handling for ESPINUDP.
   From Tobias Brunner.

4) Fix ipcomp truesize computation on the receive path.
   From Sabrina Dubroca.

5) Sanitize marks before policy/state insertation.
   From Paul Chaignon.

* tag 'ipsec-2025-05-21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec:
  xfrm: Sanitize marks before insert
  xfrm: ipcomp: fix truesize computation on receive
  xfrm: Fix UDP GRO handling for some corner cases
  espintcp: remove encap socket caching to avoid reference leak
  espintcp: fix skb leaks
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250521054348.4057269-1-steffen.klassert@secunet.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done</title>
<updated>2025-05-22T09:33:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Wang Liang</name>
<email>wangliang74@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-20T10:14:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=e279024617134c94fd3e37470156534d5f2b3472'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e279024617134c94fd3e37470156534d5f2b3472</id>
<content type='text'>
Syzbot reported a slab-use-after-free with the following call trace:

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_aead_encrypt_done+0x4bd/0x510 net/tipc/crypto.c:840
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807a733000 by task kworker/1:0/25

  Call Trace:
   kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601
   tipc_aead_encrypt_done+0x4bd/0x510 net/tipc/crypto.c:840
   crypto_request_complete include/crypto/algapi.h:266
   aead_request_complete include/crypto/internal/aead.h:85
   cryptd_aead_crypt+0x3b8/0x750 crypto/cryptd.c:772
   crypto_request_complete include/crypto/algapi.h:266
   cryptd_queue_worker+0x131/0x200 crypto/cryptd.c:181
   process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231

  Allocated by task 8355:
   kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:778
   tipc_crypto_start+0xcc/0x9e0 net/tipc/crypto.c:1466
   tipc_init_net+0x2dd/0x430 net/tipc/core.c:72
   ops_init+0xb9/0x650 net/core/net_namespace.c:139
   setup_net+0x435/0xb40 net/core/net_namespace.c:343
   copy_net_ns+0x2f0/0x670 net/core/net_namespace.c:508
   create_new_namespaces+0x3ea/0xb10 kernel/nsproxy.c:110
   unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc0/0x1f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:228
   ksys_unshare+0x419/0x970 kernel/fork.c:3323
   __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3394

  Freed by task 63:
   kfree+0x12a/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:4557
   tipc_crypto_stop+0x23c/0x500 net/tipc/crypto.c:1539
   tipc_exit_net+0x8c/0x110 net/tipc/core.c:119
   ops_exit_list+0xb0/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:173
   cleanup_net+0x5b7/0xbf0 net/core/net_namespace.c:640
   process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231

After freed the tipc_crypto tx by delete namespace, tipc_aead_encrypt_done
may still visit it in cryptd_queue_worker workqueue.

I reproduce this issue by:
  ip netns add ns1
  ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2
  ip link set veth1 netns ns1
  ip netns exec ns1 tipc bearer enable media eth dev veth1
  ip netns exec ns1 tipc node set key this_is_a_master_key master
  ip netns exec ns1 tipc bearer disable media eth dev veth1
  ip netns del ns1

The key of reproduction is that, simd_aead_encrypt is interrupted, leading
to crypto_simd_usable() return false. Thus, the cryptd_queue_worker is
triggered, and the tipc_crypto tx will be visited.

  tipc_disc_timeout
    tipc_bearer_xmit_skb
      tipc_crypto_xmit
        tipc_aead_encrypt
          crypto_aead_encrypt
            // encrypt()
            simd_aead_encrypt
              // crypto_simd_usable() is false
              child = &amp;ctx-&gt;cryptd_tfm-&gt;base;

  simd_aead_encrypt
    crypto_aead_encrypt
      // encrypt()
      cryptd_aead_encrypt_enqueue
        cryptd_aead_enqueue
          cryptd_enqueue_request
            // trigger cryptd_queue_worker
            queue_work_on(smp_processor_id(), cryptd_wq, &amp;cpu_queue-&gt;work)

Fix this by holding net reference count before encrypt.

Reported-by: syzbot+55c12726619ff85ce1f6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c12726619ff85ce1f6
Fixes: fc1b6d6de220 ("tipc: introduce TIPC encryption &amp; authentication")
Signed-off-by: Wang Liang &lt;wangliang74@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250520101404.1341730-1-wangliang74@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sch_hfsc: Fix qlen accounting bug when using peek in hfsc_enqueue()</title>
<updated>2025-05-22T09:16:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Cong Wang</name>
<email>xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-18T22:20:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=3f981138109f63232a5fb7165938d4c945cc1b9d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3f981138109f63232a5fb7165938d4c945cc1b9d</id>
<content type='text'>
When enqueuing the first packet to an HFSC class, hfsc_enqueue() calls the
child qdisc's peek() operation before incrementing sch-&gt;q.qlen and
sch-&gt;qstats.backlog. If the child qdisc uses qdisc_peek_dequeued(), this may
trigger an immediate dequeue and potential packet drop. In such cases,
qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() is called, but the HFSC qdisc's qlen and backlog
have not yet been updated, leading to inconsistent queue accounting. This
can leave an empty HFSC class in the active list, causing further
consequences like use-after-free.

This patch fixes the bug by moving the increment of sch-&gt;q.qlen and
sch-&gt;qstats.backlog before the call to the child qdisc's peek() operation.
This ensures that queue length and backlog are always accurate when packet
drops or dequeues are triggered during the peek.

Fixes: 12d0ad3be9c3 ("net/sched/sch_hfsc.c: handle corner cases where head may change invalidating calculated deadline")
Reported-by: Mingi Cho &lt;mincho@theori.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250518222038.58538-2-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim &lt;jhs@mojatatu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xsk: Bring back busy polling support in XDP_COPY</title>
<updated>2025-05-21T09:28:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Samiullah Khawaja</name>
<email>skhawaja@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-16T21:36:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=b95ed5517354a5f451fb9b3771776ca4c0b65ac3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b95ed5517354a5f451fb9b3771776ca4c0b65ac3</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 5ef44b3cb43b ("xsk: Bring back busy polling support") fixed the
busy polling support in xsk for XDP_ZEROCOPY after it was broken in
commit 86e25f40aa1e ("net: napi: Add napi_config"). The busy polling
support with XDP_COPY remained broken since the napi_id setup in
xsk_rcv_check was removed.

Bring back the setup of napi_id for XDP_COPY so socket level SO_BUSYPOLL
can be used to poll the underlying napi.

Do the setup of napi_id for XDP_COPY in xsk_bind, as it is done
currently for XDP_ZEROCOPY. The setup of napi_id for XDP_COPY in
xsk_bind is safe because xsk_rcv_check checks that the rx queue at which
the packet arrives is equal to the queue_id that was supplied in bind.
This is done for both XDP_COPY and XDP_ZEROCOPY mode.

Tested using AF_XDP support in virtio-net by running the xsk_rr AF_XDP
benchmarking tool shared here:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250320163523.3501305-1-skhawaja@google.com/T/

Enabled socket busy polling using following commands in qemu,

```
sudo ethtool -L eth0 combined 1
echo 400 | sudo tee /proc/sys/net/core/busy_read
echo 100 | sudo tee /sys/class/net/eth0/napi_defer_hard_irqs
echo 15000   | sudo tee /sys/class/net/eth0/gro_flush_timeout
```

Fixes: 5ef44b3cb43b ("xsk: Bring back busy polling support")
Signed-off-by: Samiullah Khawaja &lt;skhawaja@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@fomichev.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: bcm: add missing rcu read protection for procfs content</title>
<updated>2025-05-19T14:58:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Oliver Hartkopp</name>
<email>socketcan@hartkopp.net</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-19T12:50:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=dac5e6249159ac255dad9781793dbe5908ac9ddb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dac5e6249159ac255dad9781793dbe5908ac9ddb</id>
<content type='text'>
When the procfs content is generated for a bcm_op which is in the process
to be removed the procfs output might show unreliable data (UAF).

As the removal of bcm_op's is already implemented with rcu handling this
patch adds the missing rcu_read_lock() and makes sure the list entries
are properly removed under rcu protection.

Fixes: f1b4e32aca08 ("can: bcm: use call_rcu() instead of costly synchronize_rcu()")
Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Tested-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250519125027.11900-2-socketcan@hartkopp.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # &gt;= 5.4
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: bcm: add locking for bcm_op runtime updates</title>
<updated>2025-05-19T14:58:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Oliver Hartkopp</name>
<email>socketcan@hartkopp.net</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-19T12:50:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=c2aba69d0c36a496ab4f2e81e9c2b271f2693fd7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c2aba69d0c36a496ab4f2e81e9c2b271f2693fd7</id>
<content type='text'>
The CAN broadcast manager (CAN BCM) can send a sequence of CAN frames via
hrtimer. The content and also the length of the sequence can be changed
resp reduced at runtime where the 'currframe' counter is then set to zero.

Although this appeared to be a safe operation the updates of 'currframe'
can be triggered from user space and hrtimer context in bcm_can_tx().
Anderson Nascimento created a proof of concept that triggered a KASAN
slab-out-of-bounds read access which can be prevented with a spin_lock_bh.

At the rework of bcm_can_tx() the 'count' variable has been moved into
the protected section as this variable can be modified from both contexts
too.

Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Tested-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250519125027.11900-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>llc: fix data loss when reading from a socket in llc_ui_recvmsg()</title>
<updated>2025-05-19T11:12:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ilia Gavrilov</name>
<email>Ilia.Gavrilov@infotecs.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-15T12:20:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=239af1970bcb039a1551d2c438d113df0010c149'/>
<id>urn:sha1:239af1970bcb039a1551d2c438d113df0010c149</id>
<content type='text'>
For SOCK_STREAM sockets, if user buffer size (len) is less
than skb size (skb-&gt;len), the remaining data from skb
will be lost after calling kfree_skb().

To fix this, move the statement for partial reading
above skb deletion.

Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org)

Fixes: 30a584d944fb ("[LLX]: SOCK_DGRAM interface fixes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilia Gavrilov &lt;Ilia.Gavrilov@infotecs.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mr: consolidate the ipmr_can_free_table() checks.</title>
<updated>2025-05-17T00:53:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Abeni</name>
<email>pabeni@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-15T16:49:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=c46286fdd6aa1d0e33c245bcffe9ff2428a777bd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c46286fdd6aa1d0e33c245bcffe9ff2428a777bd</id>
<content type='text'>
Guoyu Yin reported a splat in the ipmr netns cleanup path:

WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 14564 at net/ipv4/ipmr.c:440 ipmr_free_table net/ipv4/ipmr.c:440 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 14564 at net/ipv4/ipmr.c:440 ipmr_rules_exit+0x135/0x1c0 net/ipv4/ipmr.c:361
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 14564 Comm: syz.4.838 Not tainted 6.14.0 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ipmr_free_table net/ipv4/ipmr.c:440 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ipmr_rules_exit+0x135/0x1c0 net/ipv4/ipmr.c:361
Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 75 7d 48 c7 83 60 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 71 67 7f 00 e8 4c 2d 8a fd 90 &lt;0f&gt; 0b 90 eb 93 e8 41 2d 8a fd 0f b6 2d 80 54 ea 01 31 ff 89 ee e8
RSP: 0018:ffff888109547c58 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888108c12dc0 RCX: ffffffff83e09868
RDX: ffff8881022b3300 RSI: ffffffff83e098d4 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: ffff888104288000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed10211825c9
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff88801816c4a0 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff888108c13320 R14: ffff888108c12dc0 R15: fffffbfff0b74058
FS:  00007f84f39316c0(0000) GS:ffff88811b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f84f3930f98 CR3: 0000000113b56000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 ipmr_net_exit_batch+0x50/0x90 net/ipv4/ipmr.c:3160
 ops_exit_list+0x10c/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:177
 setup_net+0x47d/0x8e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:394
 copy_net_ns+0x25d/0x410 net/core/net_namespace.c:516
 create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xaf0 kernel/nsproxy.c:110
 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc3/0x180 kernel/nsproxy.c:228
 ksys_unshare+0x78d/0x9a0 kernel/fork.c:3342
 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3413 [inline]
 __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3411 [inline]
 __x64_sys_unshare+0x31/0x40 kernel/fork.c:3411
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xa6/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f84f532cc29
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f84f3931038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000110
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f84f5615fa0 RCX: 00007f84f532cc29
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000040000400
RBP: 00007f84f53fba18 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f84f5615fa0 R15: 00007fff51c5f328
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

The running kernel has CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES disabled, and
the sanity check for such build is still too loose.

Address the issue consolidating the relevant sanity check in a single
helper regardless of the kernel configuration. Also share it between
the ipv4 and ipv6 code.

Reported-by: Guoyu Yin &lt;y04609127@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 50b94204446e ("ipmr: tune the ipmr_can_free_table() checks.")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/372dc261e1bf12742276e1b984fc5a071b7fc5a8.1747321903.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bridge: netfilter: Fix forwarding of fragmented packets</title>
<updated>2025-05-16T23:02:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ido Schimmel</name>
<email>idosch@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-15T08:48:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=91b6dbced0ef1d680afdd69b14fc83d50ebafaf3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:91b6dbced0ef1d680afdd69b14fc83d50ebafaf3</id>
<content type='text'>
When netfilter defrag hooks are loaded (due to the presence of conntrack
rules, for example), fragmented packets entering the bridge will be
defragged by the bridge's pre-routing hook (br_nf_pre_routing() -&gt;
ipv4_conntrack_defrag()).

Later on, in the bridge's post-routing hook, the defragged packet will
be fragmented again. If the size of the largest fragment is larger than
what the kernel has determined as the destination MTU (using
ip_skb_dst_mtu()), the defragged packet will be dropped.

Before commit ac6627a28dbf ("net: ipv4: Consolidate ipv4_mtu and
ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward"), ip_skb_dst_mtu() would return dst_mtu() as
the destination MTU. Assuming the dst entry attached to the packet is
the bridge's fake rtable one, this would simply be the bridge's MTU (see
fake_mtu()).

However, after above mentioned commit, ip_skb_dst_mtu() ends up
returning the route's MTU stored in the dst entry's metrics. Ideally, in
case the dst entry is the bridge's fake rtable one, this should be the
bridge's MTU as the bridge takes care of updating this metric when its
MTU changes (see br_change_mtu()).

Unfortunately, the last operation is a no-op given the metrics attached
to the fake rtable entry are marked as read-only. Therefore,
ip_skb_dst_mtu() ends up returning 1500 (the initial MTU value) and
defragged packets are dropped during fragmentation when dealing with
large fragments and high MTU (e.g., 9k).

Fix by moving the fake rtable entry's metrics to be per-bridge (in a
similar fashion to the fake rtable entry itself) and marking them as
writable, thereby allowing MTU changes to be reflected.

Fixes: 62fa8a846d7d ("net: Implement read-only protection and COW'ing of metrics.")
Fixes: 33eb9873a283 ("bridge: initialize fake_rtable metrics")
Reported-by: Venkat Venkatsubra &lt;venkat.x.venkatsubra@oracle.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/PH0PR10MB4504888284FF4CBA648197D0ACB82@PH0PR10MB4504.namprd10.prod.outlook.com/
Tested-by: Venkat Venkatsubra &lt;venkat.x.venkatsubra@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov &lt;razor@blackwall.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250515084848.727706-1-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: dsa: microchip: linearize skb for tail-tagging switches</title>
<updated>2025-05-16T23:00:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakob Unterwurzacher</name>
<email>jakobunt@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-15T07:29:19Z</published>
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The pointer arithmentic for accessing the tail tag only works
for linear skbs.

For nonlinear skbs, it reads uninitialized memory inside the
skb headroom, essentially randomizing the tag. I have observed
it gets set to 6 most of the time.

Example where ksz9477_rcv thinks that the packet from port 1 comes from port 6
(which does not exist for the ksz9896 that's in use), dropping the packet.
Debug prints added by me (not included in this patch):

	[  256.645337] ksz9477_rcv:323 tag0=6
	[  256.645349] skb len=47 headroom=78 headlen=0 tailroom=0
	               mac=(64,14) mac_len=14 net=(78,0) trans=78
	               shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=1 gso(size=0 type=0 segs=0))
	               csum(0x0 start=0 offset=0 ip_summed=0 complete_sw=0 valid=0 level=0)
	               hash(0x0 sw=0 l4=0) proto=0x00f8 pkttype=1 iif=3
	               priority=0x0 mark=0x0 alloc_cpu=0 vlan_all=0x0
	               encapsulation=0 inner(proto=0x0000, mac=0, net=0, trans=0)
	[  256.645377] dev name=end1 feat=0x0002e10200114bb3
	[  256.645386] skb headroom: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	[  256.645395] skb headroom: 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	[  256.645403] skb headroom: 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	[  256.645411] skb headroom: 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	[  256.645420] skb headroom: 00000040: ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 1c 19 f2 e2 db 08 06
	[  256.645428] skb frag:     00000000: 00 01 08 00 06 04 00 01 00 1c 19 f2 e2 db 0a 02
	[  256.645436] skb frag:     00000010: 00 83 00 00 00 00 00 00 0a 02 a0 2f 00 00 00 00
	[  256.645444] skb frag:     00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
	[  256.645452] ksz_common_rcv:92 dsa_conduit_find_user returned NULL

Call skb_linearize before trying to access the tag.

This patch fixes ksz9477_rcv which is used by the ksz9896 I have at
hand, and also applies the same fix to ksz8795_rcv which seems to have
the same problem.

Signed-off-by: Jakob Unterwurzacher &lt;jakob.unterwurzacher@cherry.de&gt;
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 016e43a26bab ("net: dsa: ksz: Add KSZ8795 tag code")
Fixes: 8b8010fb7876 ("dsa: add support for Microchip KSZ tail tagging")
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean &lt;olteanv@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250515072920.2313014-1-jakob.unterwurzacher@cherry.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
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