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<title>linux/security/apparmor/include, branch v5.1</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.1</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.1'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2019-03-07T20:20:11Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit</title>
<updated>2019-03-07T20:20:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-07T20:20:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=be37f21a08ce65c7632c7f45e1755a4b07f278a0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:be37f21a08ce65c7632c7f45e1755a4b07f278a0</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
 "A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1.

  Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two
  bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another.

  Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups
  and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't
  all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file
  capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on
  filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems.

  All changes pass the audit-testsuite.  Please merge for v5.1"

* tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
  audit: mark expected switch fall-through
  audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes
  audit: join tty records to their syscall
  audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL
  audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match
  audit: ignore fcaps on umount
  audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs
  audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
  audit: add support for fcaps v3
  audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT
  audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records
  audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging
  audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match</title>
<updated>2019-02-01T04:00:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Guy Briggs</name>
<email>rgb@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-31T16:52:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=90462a5bd30c6ed91c6758e59537d047d7878ff9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:90462a5bd30c6ed91c6758e59537d047d7878ff9</id>
<content type='text'>
The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used
by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack).

The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be
accessed by audit accessor functions.

It was part of commit 03d37d25e0f9 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic
Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used.

Remove it.

Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
[PM: fixed the referenced commit title]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: Adjust offset when accessing task blob.</title>
<updated>2019-01-22T22:38:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-21T01:25:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=6c2976b06f6813768d3e61aeeb2b3fb04597a25f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6c2976b06f6813768d3e61aeeb2b3fb04597a25f</id>
<content type='text'>
AppArmor will no longer be the only user of task blob
after TOMOYO started using task blob.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Fixes: f4ad8f2c4076 ("LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security")
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable</title>
<updated>2019-01-10T22:16:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Micah Morton</name>
<email>mortonm@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-08T00:10:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c1a85a00ea66cb6f0bd0f14e47c28c2b0999799f</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the
security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is
used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for
the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag
passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether
security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by
the proposed SafeSetID LSM).

Signed-off-by: Micah Morton &lt;mortonm@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security</title>
<updated>2019-01-08T21:18:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-22T00:19:37Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f4ad8f2c40769b3cc9497ba0883bbaf823f7752f</id>
<content type='text'>
Move management of the task_struct-&gt;security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
The only user of this blob is AppArmor. The AppArmor use
is abstracted to avoid future conflict.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security</title>
<updated>2019-01-08T21:18:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-12T20:02:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=33bf60cabcc7687b194a689b068b65e9ecd556be'/>
<id>urn:sha1:33bf60cabcc7687b194a689b068b65e9ecd556be</id>
<content type='text'>
Move management of the file-&gt;f_security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the infrastructure.
The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead
they tell the infrastructure how much space they require.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Infrastructure management of the cred security blob</title>
<updated>2019-01-08T21:18:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-12T17:30:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=bbd3662a834813730912a58efb44dd6df6d952e6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bbd3662a834813730912a58efb44dd6df6d952e6</id>
<content type='text'>
Move management of the cred security blob out of the
security modules and into the security infrastructre.
Instead of allocating and freeing space the security
modules tell the infrastructure how much space they
require.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>AppArmor: Abstract use of cred security blob</title>
<updated>2019-01-08T21:18:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-22T00:17:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=69b5a44a95bb86f3ad8a50bf2e354057ec450082'/>
<id>urn:sha1:69b5a44a95bb86f3ad8a50bf2e354057ec450082</id>
<content type='text'>
Don't use the cred-&gt;security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: Parse secmark policy</title>
<updated>2018-10-03T13:18:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthew Garrett</name>
<email>mjg59@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-24T20:27:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=9caafbe2b4cf4c635826a2832e93cf648605de8b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9caafbe2b4cf4c635826a2832e93cf648605de8b</id>
<content type='text'>
Add support for parsing secmark policy provided by userspace, and
store that in the overall policy.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: Add a wildcard secid</title>
<updated>2018-10-03T13:18:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthew Garrett</name>
<email>mjg59@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-24T20:27:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=617a629c08bfffb05249131079d9a38322902e5b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:617a629c08bfffb05249131079d9a38322902e5b</id>
<content type='text'>
Reserve a secid value that we can use as a wildcard, allowing us to
define policy that's expected to match against all secids.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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