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<title>linux/security/apparmor, branch v4.11</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v4.11</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v4.11'/>
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<updated>2017-03-02T07:42:38Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>sched/headers: Prepare to use &lt;linux/rcuupdate.h&gt; instead of &lt;linux/rculist.h&gt; in &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;</title>
<updated>2017-03-02T07:42:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-04T00:27:20Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b2d091031075ac9a1598e3cc3a29c28f02e64c0d</id>
<content type='text'>
We don't actually need the full rculist.h header in sched.h anymore,
we will be able to include the smaller rcupdate.h header instead.

But first update code that relied on the implicit header inclusion.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/headers: Prepare to remove &lt;linux/cred.h&gt; inclusion from &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;</title>
<updated>2017-03-02T07:42:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-02T16:54:15Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5b825c3af1d8a0af4deb4a5eb349d0d0050c62e5</id>
<content type='text'>
Add #include &lt;linux/cred.h&gt; dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h
doing that for them.

Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high,
it's still a net win, because &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; is included in over
2,200 files ...

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2017-02-24T04:33:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-24T04:33:51Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f1ef09fde17f9b77ca1435a5b53a28b203afb81c</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
 "There is a lot here. A lot of these changes result in subtle user
  visible differences in kernel behavior. I don't expect anything will
  care but I will revert/fix things immediately if any regressions show
  up.

  From Seth Forshee there is a continuation of the work to make the vfs
  ready for unpriviled mounts. We had thought the previous changes
  prevented the creation of files outside of s_user_ns of a filesystem,
  but it turns we missed the O_CREAT path. Ooops.

  Pavel Tikhomirov and Oleg Nesterov worked together to fix a long
  standing bug in the implemenation of PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER where only
  children that are forked after the prctl are considered and not
  children forked before the prctl. The only known user of this prctl
  systemd forks all children after the prctl. So no userspace
  regressions will occur. Holding earlier forked children to the same
  rules as later forked children creates a semantic that is sane enough
  to allow checkpoing of processes that use this feature.

  There is a long delayed change by Nikolay Borisov to limit inotify
  instances inside a user namespace.

  Michael Kerrisk extends the API for files used to maniuplate
  namespaces with two new trivial ioctls to allow discovery of the
  hierachy and properties of namespaces.

  Konstantin Khlebnikov with the help of Al Viro adds code that when a
  network namespace exits purges it's sysctl entries from the dcache. As
  in some circumstances this could use a lot of memory.

  Vivek Goyal fixed a bug with stacked filesystems where the permissions
  on the wrong inode were being checked.

  I continue previous work on ptracing across exec. Allowing a file to
  be setuid across exec while being ptraced if the tracer has enough
  credentials in the user namespace, and if the process has CAP_SETUID
  in it's own namespace. Proc files for setuid or otherwise undumpable
  executables are now owned by the root in the user namespace of their
  mm. Allowing debugging of setuid applications in containers to work
  better.

  A bug I introduced with permission checking and automount is now
  fixed. The big change is to mark the mounts that the kernel initiates
  as a result of an automount. This allows the permission checks in sget
  to be safely suppressed for this kind of mount. As the permission
  check happened when the original filesystem was mounted.

  Finally a special case in the mount namespace is removed preventing
  unbounded chains in the mount hash table, and making the semantics
  simpler which benefits CRIU.

  The vfs fix along with related work in ima and evm I believe makes us
  ready to finish developing and merge fully unprivileged mounts of the
  fuse filesystem. The cleanups of the mount namespace makes discussing
  how to fix the worst case complexity of umount. The stacked filesystem
  fixes pave the way for adding multiple mappings for the filesystem
  uids so that efficient and safer containers can be implemented"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock.
  vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid()
  proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering
  mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.
  prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant
  introduce the walk_process_tree() helper
  nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns
  fs: Better permission checking for submounts
  exit: fix the setns() &amp;&amp; PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER interaction
  vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids
  nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type
  proc: Better ownership of files for non-dumpable tasks in user namespaces
  exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
  exec: Test the ptracer's saved cred to see if the tracee can gain caps
  exec: Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID
  inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2017-02-21T20:49:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-21T20:49:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=c9341ee0af4df0af8b727873ef851227345defed'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c9341ee0af4df0af8b727873ef851227345defed</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - major AppArmor update: policy namespaces &amp; lots of fixes

   - add /sys/kernel/security/lsm node for easy detection of loaded LSMs

   - SELinux cgroupfs labeling support

   - SELinux context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts within user
     namespaces

   - improved TPM 2.0 support"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (117 commits)
  tpm: declare tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() as static
  tpm: Fix expected number of response bytes of TPM1.2 PCR Extend
  tpm xen: drop unneeded chip variable
  tpm: fix misspelled "facilitate" in module parameter description
  tpm_tis: fix the error handling of init_tis()
  KEYS: Use memzero_explicit() for secret data
  KEYS: Fix an error code in request_master_key()
  sign-file: fix build error in sign-file.c with libressl
  selinux: allow changing labels for cgroupfs
  selinux: fix off-by-one in setprocattr
  tpm: silence an array overflow warning
  tpm: fix the type of owned field in cap_t
  tpm: add securityfs support for TPM 2.0 firmware event log
  tpm: enhance read_log_of() to support Physical TPM event log
  tpm: enhance TPM 2.0 PCR extend to support multiple banks
  tpm: implement TPM 2.0 capability to get active PCR banks
  tpm: fix RC value check in tpm2_seal_trusted
  tpm_tis: fix iTPM probe via probe_itpm() function
  tpm: Begin the process to deprecate user_read_timer
  tpm: remove tpm_read_index and tpm_write_index from tpm.h
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'stable-4.11' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into next</title>
<updated>2017-02-09T23:28:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>james.l.morris@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-09T23:28:49Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a2a15479d617ebbab67c60b4eed02524536af780</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP</title>
<updated>2017-01-23T23:03:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-23T04:26:31Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=9227dd2a84a765fcfef1677ff17de0958b192eda'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9227dd2a84a765fcfef1677ff17de0958b192eda</id>
<content type='text'>
With previous changes every location that tests for
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP also tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE making the
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP redundant, so remove it.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm</title>
<updated>2017-01-19T02:18:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-19T01:09:05Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d69dece5f5b6bc7a5e39d2b6136ddc69469331fe</id>
<content type='text'>
I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.

Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix undefined reference to `aa_g_hash_policy'</title>
<updated>2017-01-16T21:21:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-16T21:21:27Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3ccb76c5dfe0d25c1d0168d5b726d0b43d19a485</id>
<content type='text'>
The kernel build bot turned up a bad config combination when
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR is y and CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH is n,
resulting in the build error
   security/built-in.o: In function `aa_unpack':
   (.text+0x841e2): undefined reference to `aa_g_hash_policy'

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: replace remaining BUG_ON() asserts with AA_BUG()</title>
<updated>2017-01-16T09:18:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-16T08:43:15Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e6bfa25deb5096c05a08f01e4d6a436dd331fa88</id>
<content type='text'>
AA_BUG() uses WARN and won't break the kernel like BUG_ON().

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix restricted endian type warnings for policy unpack</title>
<updated>2017-01-16T09:18:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-16T08:43:14Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2c17cd3681eab6d5d380dcfd073b5ee8c3440e7e</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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