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<title>linux/security/apparmor, branch v5.14</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.14</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.14'/>
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<updated>2021-05-17T11:30:29Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: use get_unaligned() only for multi-byte words</title>
<updated>2021-05-17T11:30:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-07T22:07:54Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:dd979d7a08adb473744f2e9d4bbaddb039dc39dc</id>
<content type='text'>
Using get_unaligned() on a u8 pointer is pointless, and will
result in a compiler warning after a planned cleanup:

In file included from arch/x86/include/generated/asm/unaligned.h:1,
                 from security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:16:
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c: In function 'unpack_u8':
include/asm-generic/unaligned.h:13:15: error: 'packed' attribute ignored for field of type 'u8' {aka 'unsigned char'} [-Werror=attributes]
   13 |  const struct { type x __packed; } *__pptr = (typeof(__pptr))(ptr); \
      |               ^

Simply dereference this pointer directly.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2021-05-02T16:14:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-02T16:14:01Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:27787ba3fa4904422b3928b898d1bd3d74d98bea</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Assorted stuff all over the place"

* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  useful constants: struct qstr for ".."
  hostfs_open(): don't open-code file_dentry()
  whack-a-mole: kill strlen_user() (again)
  autofs: should_expire() argument is guaranteed to be positive
  apparmor:match_mn() - constify devpath argument
  buffer: a small optimization in grow_buffers
  get rid of autofs_getpath()
  constify dentry argument of dentry_path()/dentry_path_raw()
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor:match_mn() - constify devpath argument</title>
<updated>2021-03-24T18:11:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-24T18:11:29Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:64b2f34f38cb999597570e09e04aa6e4c3fed07e</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants</title>
<updated>2021-03-22T19:23:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-19T19:26:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4ebd7651bfc8992ba05b355a8036cb7fd0e8d7de</id>
<content type='text'>
Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM
hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security
credentials.  This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's
callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although
a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective
credentials.

This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits
the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one
for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds.

  void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
				   u32 *secid);
  void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
				  u32 *secid);

While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct
variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to
ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for
both hooks.  The net effect is that this patch should not change
the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter
LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook
implementations and return the correct credentials.

Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt; (IMA)
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: handle idmapped mounts</title>
<updated>2021-01-24T13:27:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>christian.brauner@ubuntu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-21T13:19:44Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3cee6079f62f4d3a37d9dda2e0851677e08028ff</id>
<content type='text'>
The i_uid and i_gid are mostly used when logging for AppArmor. This is
broken in a bunch of places where the global root id is reported instead
of the i_uid or i_gid of the file. Nonetheless, be kind and log the
mapped inode if we're coming from an idmapped mount. If the initial user
namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see
identical behavior as before.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-26-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: make helpers idmap mount aware</title>
<updated>2021-01-24T13:27:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>christian.brauner@ubuntu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-21T13:19:43Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:549c7297717c32ee53f156cd949e055e601f67bb</id>
<content type='text'>
Extend some inode methods with an additional user namespace argument. A
filesystem that is aware of idmapped mounts will receive the user
namespace the mount has been marked with. This can be used for
additional permission checking and also to enable filesystems to
translate between uids and gids if they need to. We have implemented all
relevant helpers in earlier patches.

As requested we simply extend the exisiting inode method instead of
introducing new ones. This is a little more code churn but it's mostly
mechanical and doesnt't leave us with additional inode methods.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-25-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xattr: handle idmapped mounts</title>
<updated>2021-01-24T13:27:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tycho Andersen</name>
<email>tycho@tycho.pizza</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-21T13:19:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c7c7a1a18af4c3bb7749d33e3df3acdf0a95bbb5</id>
<content type='text'>
When interacting with extended attributes the vfs verifies that the
caller is privileged over the inode with which the extended attribute is
associated. For posix access and posix default extended attributes a uid
or gid can be stored on-disk. Let the functions handle posix extended
attributes on idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an
idmapped mount we need to map it according to the mount's user
namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts.
This has no effect for e.g. security xattrs since they don't store uids
or gids and don't perform permission checks on them like posix acls do.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-10-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;jamorris@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen &lt;tycho@tycho.pizza&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: remove duplicate macro list_entry_is_head()</title>
<updated>2020-12-16T06:46:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Shevchenko</name>
<email>andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-16T04:47:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9801ca279ad37f72f71234fa81722afd95a3f997</id>
<content type='text'>
Strangely I hadn't had noticed the existence of the list_entry_is_head()
in apparmor code when added the same one in the list.h.  Luckily it's
fully identical and didn't break builds.  In any case we don't need a
duplicate anymore, thus remove it from apparmor code.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201208100639.88182-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Fixes: e130816164e244 ("include/linux/list.h: add a macro to test if entry is pointing to the head")
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: "Serge E . Hallyn " &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: add const qualifier to struct sock in various places</title>
<updated>2020-12-03T20:56:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-30T15:36:29Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:41dd9596d6b239a125c3d19f9d0ca90bdbfbf876</id>
<content type='text'>
A followup change to tcp_request_sock_op would have to drop the 'const'
qualifier from the 'route_req' function as the
'security_inet_conn_request' call is moved there - and that function
expects a 'struct sock *'.

However, it turns out its also possible to add a const qualifier to
security_inet_conn_request instead.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;jamorris@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Use fallthrough pseudo-keyword</title>
<updated>2020-08-23T22:36:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavoars@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-23T22:36:59Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:df561f6688fef775baa341a0f5d960becd248b11</id>
<content type='text'>
Replace the existing /* fall through */ comments and its variants with
the new pseudo-keyword macro fallthrough[1]. Also, remove unnecessary
fall-through markings when it is the case.

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.7/process/deprecated.html?highlight=fallthrough#implicit-switch-case-fall-through

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavoars@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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