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<title>linux/security/commoncap.c, branch v2.6.37</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v2.6.37</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v2.6.37'/>
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<updated>2010-11-15T23:40:01Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>capabilities/syslog: open code cap_syslog logic to fix build failure</title>
<updated>2010-11-15T23:40:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-15T23:36:29Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:12b3052c3ee8f508b2c7ee4ddd63ed03423409d8</id>
<content type='text'>
The addition of CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT resulted in a build
failure when CONFIG_PRINTK=n.  This is because the capabilities code
which used the new option was built even though the variable in question
didn't exist.

The patch here fixes this by moving the capabilities checks out of the
LSM and into the caller.  All (known) LSMs should have been calling the
capabilities hook already so it actually makes the code organization
better to eliminate the hook altogether.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Restrict unprivileged access to kernel syslog</title>
<updated>2010-11-12T15:55:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Rosenberg</name>
<email>drosenberg@vsecurity.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-11T22:05:18Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:eaf06b241b091357e72b76863ba16e89610d31bd</id>
<content type='text'>
The kernel syslog contains debugging information that is often useful
during exploitation of other vulnerabilities, such as kernel heap
addresses.  Rather than futilely attempt to sanitize hundreds (or
thousands) of printk statements and simultaneously cripple useful
debugging functionality, it is far simpler to create an option that
prevents unprivileged users from reading the syslog.

This patch, loosely based on grsecurity's GRKERNSEC_DMESG, creates the
dmesg_restrict sysctl.  When set to "0", the default, no restrictions are
enforced.  When set to "1", only users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can read the
kernel syslog via dmesg(8) or other mechanisms.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: explain the config option in kernel.txt]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Acked-by: Eugene Teo &lt;eugeneteo@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees.cook@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: remove unused parameter from security_task_setscheduler()</title>
<updated>2010-10-20T23:12:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>KOSAKI Motohiro</name>
<email>kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-10-14T19:21:18Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b0ae19811375031ae3b3fecc65b702a9c6e5cc28</id>
<content type='text'>
All security modules shouldn't change sched_param parameter of
security_task_setscheduler().  This is not only meaningless, but also
make a harmful result if caller pass a static variable.

This patch remove policy and sched_param parameter from
security_task_setscheduler() becuase none of security module is
using it.

Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro &lt;kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Make do_execve() take a const filename pointer</title>
<updated>2010-08-18T01:07:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-08-17T22:52:56Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d7627467b7a8dd6944885290a03a07ceb28c10eb</id>
<content type='text'>
Make do_execve() take a const filename pointer so that kernel_execve() compiles
correctly on ARM:

arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c:88: warning: passing argument 1 of 'do_execve' discards qualifiers from pointer target type

This also requires the argv and envp arguments to be consted twice, once for
the pointer array and once for the strings the array points to.  This is
because do_execve() passes a pointer to the filename (now const) to
copy_strings_kernel().  A simpler alternative would be to cast the filename
pointer in do_execve() when it's passed to copy_strings_kernel().

do_execve() may not change any of the strings it is passed as part of the argv
or envp lists as they are some of them in .rodata, so marking these strings as
const should be fine.

Further kernel_execve() and sys_execve() need to be changed to match.

This has been test built on x86_64, frv, arm and mips.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Acked-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: whitespace coding style fixes</title>
<updated>2010-04-23T00:10:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Justin P. Mattock</name>
<email>justinmattock@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-04-21T07:02:11Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c5b60b5e67af8be4c58d3ffcc36894f69c4fbdc1</id>
<content type='text'>
Whitespace coding style fixes.

Signed-off-by: Justin P. Mattock &lt;justinmattock@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Security: Fix the comment of cap_file_mmap()</title>
<updated>2010-04-19T22:47:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>wzt.wzt@gmail.com</name>
<email>wzt.wzt@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-04-19T01:16:17Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6f262d8e1acb7b1605b811700326163fa707d355</id>
<content type='text'>
In the comment of cap_file_mmap(), replace mmap_min_addr to be dac_mmap_min_addr.

Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang &lt;zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>syslog: clean up needless comment</title>
<updated>2010-02-05T06:48:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees.cook@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-02-04T22:28:06Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f40a70861ace69001524644473cc389543b06c3c</id>
<content type='text'>
Drop my typoed comment as it is both unhelpful and redundant.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees.cook@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>syslog: use defined constants instead of raw numbers</title>
<updated>2010-02-04T03:20:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees.cook@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-02-03T23:37:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d78ca3cd733d8a2c3dcd88471beb1a15d973eed8</id>
<content type='text'>
Right now the syslog "type" action are just raw numbers which makes
the source difficult to follow.  This patch replaces the raw numbers
with defined constants for some level of sanity.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees.cook@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>syslog: distinguish between /proc/kmsg and syscalls</title>
<updated>2010-02-04T03:20:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees.cook@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-02-03T23:36:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=002345925e6c45861f60db6f4fc6236713fd8847'/>
<id>urn:sha1:002345925e6c45861f60db6f4fc6236713fd8847</id>
<content type='text'>
This allows the LSM to distinguish between syslog functions originating
from /proc/kmsg access and direct syscalls.  By default, the commoncaps
will now no longer require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read an opened /proc/kmsg
file descriptor.  For example the kernel syslog reader can now drop
privileges after opening /proc/kmsg, instead of staying privileged with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.  MAC systems that implement security_syslog have unchanged
behavior.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees.cook@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>remove CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile option</title>
<updated>2009-11-24T04:06:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Serge E. Hallyn</name>
<email>serue@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-11-23T22:21:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=b3a222e52e4d4be77cc4520a57af1a4a0d8222d1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b3a222e52e4d4be77cc4520a57af1a4a0d8222d1</id>
<content type='text'>
As far as I know, all distros currently ship kernels with default
CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y.  Since having the option on
leaves a 'no_file_caps' option to boot without file capabilities,
the main reason to keep the option is that turning it off saves
you (on my s390x partition) 5k.  In particular, vmlinux sizes
came to:

without patch fscaps=n:		 	53598392
without patch fscaps=y:		 	53603406
with this patch applied:		53603342

with the security-next tree.

Against this we must weigh the fact that there is no simple way for
userspace to figure out whether file capabilities are supported,
while things like per-process securebits, capability bounding
sets, and adding bits to pI if CAP_SETPCAP is in pE are not supported
with SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n, leaving a bit of a problem for
applications wanting to know whether they can use them and/or why
something failed.

It also adds another subtly different set of semantics which we must
maintain at the risk of severe security regressions.

So this patch removes the SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile
option.  It drops the kernel size by about 50k over the stock
SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y kernel, by removing the
cap_limit_ptraced_target() function.

Changelog:
	Nov 20: remove cap_limit_ptraced_target() as it's logic
		was ifndef'ed.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan" &lt;morgan@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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