<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/security/integrity, branch v3.17</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v3.17</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v3.17'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2014-07-25T18:47:46Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware</title>
<updated>2014-07-25T18:47:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-22T14:39:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=5a9196d715607f76d6b7d96a0970d6065335e62b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5a9196d715607f76d6b7d96a0970d6065335e62b</id>
<content type='text'>
The "security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook" patch defined a
new security hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built
into the kernel.

This patch defines ima_fw_from_file(), which is called from the new
security hook, to measure and/or appraise the loaded firmware's
integrity.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: define '.ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring</title>
<updated>2014-07-17T13:35:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-08-13T12:47:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=7d2ce2320e8efdc4a6dcbae7b329ed3f0d1cd778'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7d2ce2320e8efdc4a6dcbae7b329ed3f0d1cd778</id>
<content type='text'>
Require all keys added to the IMA keyring be signed by an
existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.

Changelog v6:
- remove ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING in C code - Dmitry
- update Kconfig dependency and help
- select KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS - Dmitry

Changelog v5:
- Move integrity_init_keyring() to init_ima() - Dmitry
- reset keyring[id] on failure - Dmitry

Changelog v1:
- don't link IMA trusted keyring to user keyring

Changelog:
- define stub integrity_init_keyring() function (reported-by Fengguang Wu)
- differentiate between regular and trusted keyring names.
- replace printk with pr_info (D. Kasatkin)
- only make the IMA keyring a trusted keyring (reported-by D. Kastatkin)
- define stub integrity_init_keyring() definition based on
  CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE, not CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS.
  (reported-by Jim Davis)

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: provide double buffering for hash calculation</title>
<updated>2014-07-17T13:35:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-06T11:54:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=32c2e6752ff0f48fe03b9e1c7c64bde580a840d2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:32c2e6752ff0f48fe03b9e1c7c64bde580a840d2</id>
<content type='text'>
The asynchronous hash API allows initiating a hash calculation and
then performing other tasks, while waiting for the hash calculation
to complete.

This patch introduces usage of double buffering for simultaneous
hashing and reading of the next chunk of data from storage.

Changes in v3:
- better comments

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: introduce multi-page collect buffers</title>
<updated>2014-07-17T13:35:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-06T11:47:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=6edf7a89260859c5e72861dc4e6e169495f076c8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6edf7a89260859c5e72861dc4e6e169495f076c8</id>
<content type='text'>
Use of multiple-page collect buffers reduces:
1) the number of block IO requests
2) the number of asynchronous hash update requests

Second is important for HW accelerated hashing, because significant
amount of time is spent for preparation of hash update operation,
which includes configuring acceleration HW, DMA engine, etc...
Thus, HW accelerators are more efficient when working on large
chunks of data.

This patch introduces usage of multi-page collect buffers. Buffer size
can be specified using 'ahash_bufsize' module parameter. Default buffer
size is 4096 bytes.

Changes in v3:
- kernel parameter replaced with module parameter

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: use ahash API for file hash calculation</title>
<updated>2014-07-17T13:35:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-02-26T15:05:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=3bcced39ea7d1b0da0a991e221f53de480c6b60b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3bcced39ea7d1b0da0a991e221f53de480c6b60b</id>
<content type='text'>
Async hash API allows the use of HW acceleration for hash calculation.
It may give significant performance gain and/or reduce power consumption,
which might be very beneficial for battery powered devices.

This patch introduces hash calculation using ahash API. ahash performance
depends on the data size and the particular HW. Depending on the specific
system, shash performance may be better.

This patch defines 'ahash_minsize' module parameter, which is used to
define the minimal file size to use with ahash.  If this minimum file size
is not set or the file is smaller than defined by the parameter, shash will
be used.

Changes in v3:
- kernel parameter replaced with module parameter
- pr_crit replaced with pr_crit_ratelimited
- more comment changes - Mimi

Changes in v2:
- ima_ahash_size became as ima_ahash
- ahash pre-allocation moved out from __init code to be able to use
  ahash crypto modules. Ahash allocated once on the first use.
- hash calculation falls back to shash if ahash allocation/calculation fails
- complex initialization separated from variable declaration
- improved comments

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: fix dangling keywords in integrity ima message output</title>
<updated>2014-07-17T13:35:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Guy Briggs</name>
<email>rgb@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-16T19:52:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=7e9001f663636116fdc2ea7978f0350849ced624'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7e9001f663636116fdc2ea7978f0350849ced624</id>
<content type='text'>
Replace spaces in op keyword labels in log output since userspace audit tools
can't parse orphaned keywords.

Reported-by: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: delay template descriptor lookup until use</title>
<updated>2014-07-17T13:35:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-13T15:55:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=209b43ca64a6f2b0c7ac66b457f530c52d608c3e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:209b43ca64a6f2b0c7ac66b457f530c52d608c3e</id>
<content type='text'>
process_measurement() always calls ima_template_desc_current(),
including when an IMA policy has not been defined.

This patch delays template descriptor lookup until action is
determined.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: remove unnecessary i_mutex locking from ima_rdwr_violation_check()</title>
<updated>2014-07-17T13:35:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-13T15:55:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=2c50b964823ebb7f0a098878c399ce859cd38e9e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2c50b964823ebb7f0a098878c399ce859cd38e9e</id>
<content type='text'>
Before 2.6.39 inode-&gt;i_readcount was maintained by IMA. It was not atomic
and protected using spinlock. For 2.6.39, i_readcount was converted to
atomic and maintaining was moved VFS layer. Spinlock for some unclear
reason was replaced by i_mutex.

After analyzing the code, we came to conclusion that i_mutex locking is
unnecessary, especially when an IMA policy has not been defined.

This patch removes i_mutex locking from ima_rdwr_violation_check().

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: introduce ima_kernel_read()</title>
<updated>2014-06-12T21:58:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-08T11:03:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=0430e49b6e7c6b5e076be8fefdee089958c9adad'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0430e49b6e7c6b5e076be8fefdee089958c9adad</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 8aac62706 "move exit_task_namespaces() outside of exit_notify"
introduced the kernel opps since the kernel v3.10, which happens when
Apparmor and IMA-appraisal are enabled at the same time.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
[  106.750167] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
0000000000000018
[  106.750221] IP: [&lt;ffffffff811ec7da&gt;] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[  106.750241] PGD 0
[  106.750254] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  106.750272] Modules linked in: cuse parport_pc ppdev bnep rfcomm
bluetooth rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl nfs lockd sunrpc
fscache dm_crypt intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp
kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi kvm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul
ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul
ablk_helper cryptd snd_hda_codec_realtek dcdbas snd_hda_intel
snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_page_alloc snd_seq_midi
snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi psmouse snd_seq microcode serio_raw
snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore video lpc_ich coretemp mac_hid lp
parport mei_me mei nbd hid_generic e1000e usbhid ahci ptp hid libahci
pps_core
[  106.750658] CPU: 6 PID: 1394 Comm: mysqld Not tainted 3.13.0-rc7-kds+ #15
[  106.750673] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9010/0M9KCM, BIOS A08
09/19/2012
[  106.750689] task: ffff8800de804920 ti: ffff880400fca000 task.ti:
ffff880400fca000
[  106.750704] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff811ec7da&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff811ec7da&gt;]
our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[  106.750725] RSP: 0018:ffff880400fcba60  EFLAGS: 00010286
[  106.750738] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000100 RCX:
ffff8800d51523e7
[  106.750764] RDX: ffffffffffffffea RSI: ffff880400fcba34 RDI:
ffff880402d20020
[  106.750791] RBP: ffff880400fcbae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
0000000000000001
[  106.750817] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12:
ffff8800d5152300
[  106.750844] R13: ffff8803eb8df510 R14: ffff880400fcbb28 R15:
ffff8800d51523e7
[  106.750871] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88040d200000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  106.750910] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  106.750935] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000001c0e000 CR4:
00000000001407e0
[  106.750962] Stack:
[  106.750981]  ffffffff813434eb ffff880400fcbb20 ffff880400fcbb18
0000000000000000
[  106.751037]  ffff8800de804920 ffffffff8101b9b9 0001800000000000
0000000000000100
[  106.751093]  0000010000000000 0000000000000002 000000000000000e
ffff8803eb8df500
[  106.751149] Call Trace:
[  106.751172]  [&lt;ffffffff813434eb&gt;] ? aa_path_name+0x2ab/0x430
[  106.751199]  [&lt;ffffffff8101b9b9&gt;] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
[  106.751225]  [&lt;ffffffff8134a68d&gt;] aa_path_perm+0x7d/0x170
[  106.751250]  [&lt;ffffffff8101b945&gt;] ? native_sched_clock+0x15/0x80
[  106.751276]  [&lt;ffffffff8134aa73&gt;] aa_file_perm+0x33/0x40
[  106.751301]  [&lt;ffffffff81348c5e&gt;] common_file_perm+0x8e/0xb0
[  106.751327]  [&lt;ffffffff81348d78&gt;] apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20
[  106.751355]  [&lt;ffffffff8130c853&gt;] security_file_permission+0x23/0xa0
[  106.751382]  [&lt;ffffffff811c77a2&gt;] rw_verify_area+0x52/0xe0
[  106.751407]  [&lt;ffffffff811c789d&gt;] vfs_read+0x6d/0x170
[  106.751432]  [&lt;ffffffff811cda31&gt;] kernel_read+0x41/0x60
[  106.751457]  [&lt;ffffffff8134fd45&gt;] ima_calc_file_hash+0x225/0x280
[  106.751483]  [&lt;ffffffff8134fb52&gt;] ? ima_calc_file_hash+0x32/0x280
[  106.751509]  [&lt;ffffffff8135022d&gt;] ima_collect_measurement+0x9d/0x160
[  106.751536]  [&lt;ffffffff810b552d&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[  106.751562]  [&lt;ffffffff8134f07c&gt;] ? ima_file_free+0x6c/0xd0
[  106.751587]  [&lt;ffffffff81352824&gt;] ima_update_xattr+0x34/0x60
[  106.751612]  [&lt;ffffffff8134f0d0&gt;] ima_file_free+0xc0/0xd0
[  106.751637]  [&lt;ffffffff811c9635&gt;] __fput+0xd5/0x300
[  106.751662]  [&lt;ffffffff811c98ae&gt;] ____fput+0xe/0x10
[  106.751687]  [&lt;ffffffff81086774&gt;] task_work_run+0xc4/0xe0
[  106.751712]  [&lt;ffffffff81066fad&gt;] do_exit+0x2bd/0xa90
[  106.751738]  [&lt;ffffffff8173c958&gt;] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b
[  106.751763]  [&lt;ffffffff8106780c&gt;] do_group_exit+0x4c/0xc0
[  106.751788]  [&lt;ffffffff81067894&gt;] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20
[  106.751814]  [&lt;ffffffff8174522d&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f
[  106.751839] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 e8 22 fe ff ff 5d c3
0f 1f 44 00 00 55 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 c9 00 00 48 8b 80 28 06 00 00 48 89
e5 5d &lt;48&gt; 8b 40 18 48 39 87 c0 00 00 00 0f 94 c0 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00
[  106.752185] RIP  [&lt;ffffffff811ec7da&gt;] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[  106.752214]  RSP &lt;ffff880400fcba60&gt;
[  106.752236] CR2: 0000000000000018
[  106.752258] ---[ end trace 3c520748b4732721 ]---
----------------------------------------------------------------------

The reason for the oops is that IMA-appraisal uses "kernel_read()" when
file is closed. kernel_read() honors LSM security hook which calls
Apparmor handler, which uses current-&gt;nsproxy-&gt;mnt_ns. The 'guilty'
commit changed the order of cleanup code so that nsproxy-&gt;mnt_ns was
not already available for Apparmor.

Discussion about the issue with Al Viro and Eric W. Biederman suggested
that kernel_read() is too high-level for IMA. Another issue, except
security checking, that was identified is mandatory locking. kernel_read
honors it as well and it might prevent IMA from calculating necessary hash.
It was suggested to use simplified version of the function without security
and locking checks.

This patch introduces special version ima_kernel_read(), which skips security
and mandatory locking checking. It prevents the kernel oops to happen.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: prohibit userspace writing 'security.evm' HMAC value</title>
<updated>2014-06-12T21:58:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-11T04:05:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=2fb1c9a4f2dbc2f0bd2431c7fa64d0b5483864e4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2fb1c9a4f2dbc2f0bd2431c7fa64d0b5483864e4</id>
<content type='text'>
Calculating the 'security.evm' HMAC value requires access to the
EVM encrypted key.  Only the kernel should have access to it.  This
patch prevents userspace tools(eg. setfattr, cp --preserve=xattr)
from setting/modifying the 'security.evm' HMAC value directly.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
