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<title>linux/security/integrity, branch v4.20</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v4.20</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v4.20'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2018-12-18T00:31:28Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ima: cleanup the match_token policy code</title>
<updated>2018-12-18T00:31:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-18T00:14:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=1a9430db2835c0c00acc87d915b573496998c1bf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1a9430db2835c0c00acc87d915b573496998c1bf</id>
<content type='text'>
Start the policy_tokens and the associated enumeration from zero,
simplifying the pt macro.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding field</title>
<updated>2018-11-13T21:09:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-09T05:53:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:fd35f192e42cf7c0df1e2480bfd5965e35b2f4ca</id>
<content type='text'>
On systems with IMA-appraisal enabled with a policy requiring file
signatures, the "good" signature values are stored on the filesystem as
extended attributes (security.ima).  Signature verification failure
would normally be limited to just a particular file (eg. executable),
but during boot signature verification failure could result in a system
hang.

Defining and requiring a new public_key_signature field requires all
callers of asymmetric signature verification to be updated to reflect
the change.  This patch updates the integrity asymmetric_verify()
caller.

Fixes: 82f94f24475c ("KEYS: Provide software public key query function [ver #2]")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Denis Kenzior &lt;denkenz@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2018-10-25T20:22:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-25T20:22:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=57ce66d39f10fb01efabd72b14eb033deddb226b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:57ce66d39f10fb01efabd72b14eb033deddb226b</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
 "From Mimi: This contains a couple of bug fixes, including one for a
  recent problem with calculating file hashes on overlayfs, and some
  code cleanup"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  MAINTAINERS: add Jarkko as maintainer for trusted keys
  ima: open a new file instance if no read permissions
  ima: fix showing large 'violations' or 'runtime_measurements_count'
  security/integrity: remove unnecessary 'init_keyring' variable
  security/integrity: constify some read-only data
  vfs: require i_size &lt;= SIZE_MAX in kernel_read_file()
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info</title>
<updated>2018-10-11T03:40:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-11T00:18:24Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:07aed2f2af5a5892ced035dbcf3993f630825fc3</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for making LSM selections outside of the LSMs, include
the name of LSMs in struct lsm_info.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM()</title>
<updated>2018-10-11T03:40:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-11T00:18:23Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3d6e5f6dcf6561e57b6466e43e14029fb196028d</id>
<content type='text'>
Instead of using argument-based initializers, switch to defining the
contents of struct lsm_info on a per-LSM basis. This also drops
the final use of the now inaccurate "initcall" naming.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info</title>
<updated>2018-10-11T03:40:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-11T00:18:21Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=5b89c1bd4c7e5c5ca8c5374fde35ecee6e16496c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5b89c1bd4c7e5c5ca8c5374fde35ecee6e16496c</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for doing more interesting LSM init probing, this converts
the existing initcall system into an explicit call into a function pointer
from a section-collected struct lsm_info array.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: open a new file instance if no read permissions</title>
<updated>2018-10-10T19:18:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Goldwyn Rodrigues</name>
<email>rgoldwyn@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-09T15:12:33Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a408e4a86b36bf98ad15b9ada531cf0e5118ac67</id>
<content type='text'>
Open a new file instance as opposed to changing file-&gt;f_mode when
the file is not readable.  This is done to accomodate overlayfs
stacked file operations change.  The real struct file is hidden
behind the overlays struct file.  So, any file-&gt;f_mode manipulations are
not reflected on the real struct file.  Open the file again in read mode
if original file cannot be read, read and calculate the hash.

Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues &lt;rgoldwyn@suse.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (linux-4.19)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: fix showing large 'violations' or 'runtime_measurements_count'</title>
<updated>2018-10-10T16:56:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-07T21:33:24Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1e4c8dafbb6bf72fb5eca035b861e39c5896c2b7</id>
<content type='text'>
The 12 character temporary buffer is not necessarily long enough to hold
a 'long' value.  Increase it.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security/integrity: remove unnecessary 'init_keyring' variable</title>
<updated>2018-10-10T16:56:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-04T00:15:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=2ab5daf867d1f7898327962d59d3039206294d3a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2ab5daf867d1f7898327962d59d3039206294d3a</id>
<content type='text'>
The 'init_keyring' variable actually just gave the value of
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING.  We should check the config option
directly instead.  No change in behavior; this just simplifies the code.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security/integrity: constify some read-only data</title>
<updated>2018-10-10T16:56:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-07T20:22:23Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b2724d5802a77b7fb47e84d9b88b80370eccbc64</id>
<content type='text'>
Constify some static data that is never modified,
so that it is placed in .rodata.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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