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<title>linux/security/integrity, branch v4.5</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v4.5</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v4.5'/>
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<updated>2016-02-12T07:36:47Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons</title>
<updated>2016-02-12T07:36:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ryan Ware</name>
<email>ware@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-11T23:58:44Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:613317bd212c585c20796c10afe5daaa95d4b0a1</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085.  The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12.  This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().

Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo &lt;xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware &lt;ware@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wrappers for -&gt;i_mutex access</title>
<updated>2016-01-22T23:04:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-22T20:40:57Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5955102c9984fa081b2d570cfac75c97eecf8f3b</id>
<content type='text'>
parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested},
inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&amp;inode-&gt;i_mutex).

Please, use those for access to -&gt;i_mutex; over the coming cycle
-&gt;i_mutex will become rwsem, with -&gt;lookup() done with it held
only shared.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2016-01-18T03:13:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-18T03:13:15Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5807fcaa9bf7dd87241df739161c119cf78a6bc4</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:

 - EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
   (EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.

 - Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
   sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.

 - Misc enhancments for TPM &amp; TPM2.

 - Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
  selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
  KEYS: refcount bug fix
  ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
  IMA: policy can be updated zero times
  selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
  selinux: export validatetrans decisions
  gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
  selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
  security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
  selinux: Add accessor functions for inode-&gt;i_security
  security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
  security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
  selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
  keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
  keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
  keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
  tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
  tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
  tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
  tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fix the leak in integrity_read_file()</title>
<updated>2016-01-04T15:28:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-25T22:59:12Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:cc4e719e83cd4149bc96b7e1d1a73fe61797df6e</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking</title>
<updated>2016-01-03T18:22:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Petko Manolov</name>
<email>petkan@mip-labs.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-03T15:36:38Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6427e6c71c8b374761b661c4f355762794c171a1</id>
<content type='text'>
There is no need to hold the ima_write_mutex for so long.  We only need it
around ima_parse_add_rule().

Changelog:
- The return path now takes into account failed kmalloc() call.

Reported-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov &lt;petkan@mip-labs.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IMA: policy can be updated zero times</title>
<updated>2015-12-24T23:56:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sasha Levin</name>
<email>sasha.levin@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-22T13:51:23Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0112721df4edbdd07b800813300d76811572f080</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit "IMA: policy can now be updated multiple times" assumed that the
policy would be updated at least once.

If there are zero updates, the temporary list head object will get added
to the policy list, and later dereferenced as an IMA policy object, which
means that invalid memory will be accessed.

Changelog:
- Move list_empty() test to ima_release_policy(), before audit msg - Mimi

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security/integrity: make ima/ima_mok.c explicitly non-modular</title>
<updated>2015-12-15T15:01:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Gortmaker</name>
<email>paul.gortmaker@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-09T22:37:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:92cc916638a48f285736cd5541536e2e1b73ecf8</id>
<content type='text'>
The Kconfig currently controlling compilation of this code is:

ima/Kconfig:config IMA_MOK_KEYRING
ima/Kconfig: bool "Create IMA machine owner keys (MOK) and blacklist keyrings"

...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.

Lets remove the couple of traces of modularity so that when reading the
driver there is no doubt it really is builtin-only.

Since module_init translates to device_initcall in the non-modular
case, the init ordering remains unchanged with this commit.

Cc: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-ima-user@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: update appraise flags after policy update completes</title>
<updated>2015-12-15T15:01:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-07T19:35:47Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6ad6afa14610c1fed3303c719b1f8f86f19f1fd3</id>
<content type='text'>
While creating a temporary list of new rules, the ima_appraise flag is
updated, but not reverted on failure to append the new rules to the
existing policy.  This patch defines temp_ima_appraise flag.  Only when
the new rules are appended to the policy is the flag updated.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Petko Manolov &lt;petkan@mip-labs.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IMA: prevent keys on the .ima_blacklist from being removed</title>
<updated>2015-12-15T15:01:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-10T14:00:38Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:501f1bde66525f94403a5b78832a9218ef9b1c14</id>
<content type='text'>
Set the KEY_FLAGS_KEEP on the .ima_blacklist to prevent userspace
from removing keys from the keyring.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IMA: allow reading back the current IMA policy</title>
<updated>2015-12-15T15:01:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Petko Manolov</name>
<email>petkan@mip-labs.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-02T15:47:56Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:80eae209d63ac6361c7b445f7e7e41f39c044772</id>
<content type='text'>
It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy.  It is
even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY.
This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules.

Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski &lt;z.jasinski@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov &lt;petkan@mip-labs.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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