<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/security/keys, branch v4.2</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v4.2</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v4.2'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2015-07-28T03:08:23Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: ensure we free the assoc array edit if edit is valid</title>
<updated>2015-07-28T03:08:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Colin Ian King</name>
<email>colin.king@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-27T14:23:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=ca4da5dd1f99fe9c59f1709fb43e818b18ad20e0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ca4da5dd1f99fe9c59f1709fb43e818b18ad20e0</id>
<content type='text'>
__key_link_end is not freeing the associated array edit structure
and this leads to a 512 byte memory leak each time an identical
existing key is added with add_key().

The reason the add_key() system call returns okay is that
key_create_or_update() calls __key_link_begin() before checking to see
whether it can update a key directly rather than adding/replacing - which
it turns out it can.  Thus __key_link() is not called through
__key_instantiate_and_link() and __key_link_end() must cancel the edit.

CVE-2015-1333

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>switch keyctl_instantiate_key_common() to iov_iter</title>
<updated>2015-04-12T02:27:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-17T13:59:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=b353a1f7bbd6c015e8563e902f7c78710348e28f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b353a1f7bbd6c015e8563e902f7c78710348e28f</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Don't leak a key reference if request_key() tries to use a revoked keyring</title>
<updated>2015-02-16T02:45:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Jeffery</name>
<email>djeffery@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-12T16:45:31Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=d0709f1e66e8066c4ac6a54620ec116aa41937c0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d0709f1e66e8066c4ac6a54620ec116aa41937c0</id>
<content type='text'>
If a request_key() call to allocate and fill out a key attempts to insert the
key structure into a revoked keyring, the key will leak, using memory and part
of the user's key quota until the system reboots. This is from a failure of
construct_alloc_key() to decrement the key's reference count after the attempt
to insert into the requested keyring is rejected.

key_put() needs to be called in the link_prealloc_failed callpath to ensure
the unused key is released.

Signed-off-by: David Jeffery &lt;djeffery@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Make /proc/keys unconditional if CONFIG_KEYS=y</title>
<updated>2015-01-22T22:34:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-22T22:34:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=dabd39cc2fb1b0e97313ebbe7309ea8e05b7cfb5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dabd39cc2fb1b0e97313ebbe7309ea8e05b7cfb5</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that /proc/keys is used by libkeyutils to look up a key by type and
description, we should make it unconditional and remove
CONFIG_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS.

Reported-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: close race between key lookup and freeing</title>
<updated>2015-01-05T15:58:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sasha Levin</name>
<email>sasha.levin@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-29T14:39:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=a3a8784454692dd72e5d5d34dcdab17b4420e74c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a3a8784454692dd72e5d5d34dcdab17b4420e74c</id>
<content type='text'>
When a key is being garbage collected, it's key-&gt;user would get put before
the -&gt;destroy() callback is called, where the key is removed from it's
respective tracking structures.

This leaves a key hanging in a semi-invalid state which leaves a window open
for a different task to try an access key-&gt;user. An example is
find_keyring_by_name() which would dereference key-&gt;user for a key that is
in the process of being garbage collected (where key-&gt;user was freed but
-&gt;destroy() wasn't called yet - so it's still present in the linked list).

This would cause either a panic, or corrupt memory.

Fixes CVE-2014-9529.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: remove a bogus NULL check</title>
<updated>2014-12-16T07:05:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-11T19:59:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=5057975ae38452679b964f1382c5efcb9faee74e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5057975ae38452679b964f1382c5efcb9faee74e</id>
<content type='text'>
We already checked if "desc" was NULL at the beginning of the function
and we've dereferenced it so this causes a static checker warning.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into for-linus</title>
<updated>2014-12-16T01:49:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>james.l.morris@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-16T01:49:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=d0bffab0439fb7edaee09677b636eef5991e8b80'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d0bffab0439fb7edaee09677b636eef5991e8b80</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Fix stale key registration at error path</title>
<updated>2014-12-07T02:50:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-04T17:25:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=b26bdde5bb27f3f900e25a95e33a0c476c8c2c48'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b26bdde5bb27f3f900e25a95e33a0c476c8c2c48</id>
<content type='text'>
When loading encrypted-keys module, if the last check of
aes_get_sizes() in init_encrypted() fails, the driver just returns an
error without unregistering its key type.  This results in the stale
entry in the list.  In addition to memory leaks, this leads to a kernel
crash when registering a new key type later.

This patch fixes the problem by swapping the calls of aes_get_sizes()
and register_key_type(), and releasing resources properly at the error
paths.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=908163
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: request_key() should reget expired keys rather than give EKEYEXPIRED</title>
<updated>2014-12-01T22:52:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-01T22:52:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=0b0a84154eff56913e91df29de5c3a03a0029e38'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0b0a84154eff56913e91df29de5c3a03a0029e38</id>
<content type='text'>
Since the keyring facility can be viewed as a cache (at least in some
applications), the local expiration time on the key should probably be viewed
as a 'needs updating after this time' property rather than an absolute 'anyone
now wanting to use this object is out of luck' property.

Since request_key() is the main interface for the usage of keys, this should
update or replace an expired key rather than issuing EKEYEXPIRED if the local
expiration has been reached (ie. it should refresh the cache).

For absolute conditions where refreshing the cache probably doesn't help, the
key can be negatively instantiated using KEYCTL_REJECT_KEY with EKEYEXPIRED
given as the error to issue.  This will still cause request_key() to return
EKEYEXPIRED as that was explicitly set.

In the future, if the key type has an update op available, we might want to
upcall with the expired key and allow the upcall to update it.  We would pass
a different operation name (the first column in /etc/request-key.conf) to the
request-key program.

request_key() returning EKEYEXPIRED is causing an NFS problem which Chuck
Lever describes thusly:

	After about 10 minutes, my NFSv4 functional tests fail because the
	ownership of the test files goes to "-2". Looking at /proc/keys
	shows that the id_resolv keys that map to my test user ID have
	expired. The ownership problem persists until the expired keys are
	purged from the keyring, and fresh keys are obtained.

	I bisected the problem to 3.13 commit b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand
	the capacity of a keyring"). This commit inadvertantly changes the
	API contract of the internal function keyring_search_aux().

	The root cause appears to be that b2a4df200d57 made "no state check"
	the default behavior. "No state check" means the keyring search
	iterator function skips checking the key's expiry timeout, and
	returns expired keys.  request_key_and_link() depends on getting
	an -EAGAIN result code to know when to perform an upcall to refresh
	an expired key.

This patch can be tested directly by:

	keyctl request2 user debug:fred a @s
	keyctl timeout %user:debug:fred 3
	sleep 4
	keyctl request2 user debug:fred a @s

Without the patch, the last command gives error EKEYEXPIRED, but with the
command it gives a new key.

Reported-by: Carl Hetherington &lt;cth@carlh.net&gt;
Reported-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Simplify KEYRING_SEARCH_{NO,DO}_STATE_CHECK flags</title>
<updated>2014-12-01T22:52:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-01T22:52:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=054f6180d8b5602b431b5924976c956e760488b1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:054f6180d8b5602b431b5924976c956e760488b1</id>
<content type='text'>
Simplify KEYRING_SEARCH_{NO,DO}_STATE_CHECK flags to be two variations of the
same flag.  They are effectively mutually exclusive and one or the other
should be provided, but not both.

Keyring cycle detection and key possession determination are the only things
that set NO_STATE_CHECK, except that neither flag really does anything there
because neither purpose makes use of the keyring_search_iterator() function,
but rather provides their own.

For cycle detection we definitely want to check inside of expired keyrings,
just so that we don't create a cycle we can't get rid of.  Revoked keyrings
are cleared at revocation time and can't then be reused, so shouldn't be a
problem either way.

For possession determination, we *might* want to validate each keyring before
searching it: do you possess a key that's hidden behind an expired or just
plain inaccessible keyring?  Currently, the answer is yes.  Note that you
cannot, however, possess a key behind a revoked keyring because they are
cleared on revocation.

keyring_search() sets DO_STATE_CHECK, which is correct.

request_key_and_link() currently doesn't specify whether to check the key
state or not - but it should set DO_STATE_CHECK.

key_get_instantiation_authkey() also currently doesn't specify whether to
check the key state or not - but it probably should also set DO_STATE_CHECK.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
