<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/security/keys, branch v6.2</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v6.2</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v6.2'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2022-12-13T22:22:50Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'integrity-v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity</title>
<updated>2022-12-13T22:22:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-13T22:22:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=717e6eb49bdd98357d14c90d60a3409196b33cfc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:717e6eb49bdd98357d14c90d60a3409196b33cfc</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "Aside from the one cleanup, the other changes are bug fixes:

  Cleanup:

   - Include missing iMac Pro 2017 in list of Macs with T2 security chip

  Bug fixes:

   - Improper instantiation of "encrypted" keys with user provided data

   - Not handling delay in updating LSM label based IMA policy rules
     (-ESTALE)

   - IMA and integrity memory leaks on error paths

   - CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3 hash algorithm renamed"

* tag 'integrity-v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: Fix hash dependency to correct algorithm
  ima: Fix misuse of dereference of pointer in template_desc_init_fields()
  integrity: Fix memory leakage in keyring allocation error path
  ima: Fix memory leak in __ima_inode_hash()
  ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()
  ima: Simplify ima_lsm_copy_rule
  ima: Fix a potential NULL pointer access in ima_restore_measurement_list
  efi: Add iMac Pro 2017 to uefi skip cert quirk
  KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with user-provided data
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'pull-iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2022-12-13T02:29:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-13T02:29:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=75f4d9af8b67d7415afe50afcb4e96fd0bbd3ae2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:75f4d9af8b67d7415afe50afcb4e96fd0bbd3ae2</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull iov_iter updates from Al Viro:
 "iov_iter work; most of that is about getting rid of direction
  misannotations and (hopefully) preventing more of the same for the
  future"

* tag 'pull-iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  use less confusing names for iov_iter direction initializers
  iov_iter: saner checks for attempt to copy to/from iterator
  [xen] fix "direction" argument of iov_iter_kvec()
  [vhost] fix 'direction' argument of iov_iter_{init,bvec}()
  [target] fix iov_iter_bvec() "direction" argument
  [s390] memcpy_real(): WRITE is "data source", not destination...
  [s390] zcore: WRITE is "data source", not destination...
  [infiniband] READ is "data destination", not source...
  [fsi] WRITE is "data source", not destination...
  [s390] copy_oldmem_kernel() - WRITE is "data source", not destination
  csum_and_copy_to_iter(): handle ITER_DISCARD
  get rid of unlikely() on page_copy_sane() calls
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: tee: Make registered shm dependency explicit</title>
<updated>2022-12-08T16:20:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sumit Garg</name>
<email>sumit.garg@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-10T11:11:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=1506fba28b53fd159c7028c4809a4a3143a38eb7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1506fba28b53fd159c7028c4809a4a3143a38eb7</id>
<content type='text'>
TEE trusted keys support depends on registered shared memory support
since the key buffers are needed to be registered with OP-TEE. So make
that dependency explicit to not register trusted keys support if
underlying implementation doesn't support registered shared memory.

Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg &lt;sumit.garg@linaro.org&gt;
Tested-by: Jerome Forissier &lt;jerome.forissier@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>use less confusing names for iov_iter direction initializers</title>
<updated>2022-11-25T18:01:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-16T00:25:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=de4eda9de2d957ef2d6a8365a01e26a435e958cb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:de4eda9de2d957ef2d6a8365a01e26a435e958cb</id>
<content type='text'>
READ/WRITE proved to be actively confusing - the meanings are
"data destination, as used with read(2)" and "data source, as
used with write(2)", but people keep interpreting those as
"we read data from it" and "we write data to it", i.e. exactly
the wrong way.

Call them ITER_DEST and ITER_SOURCE - at least that is harder
to misinterpret...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with user-provided data</title>
<updated>2022-10-19T17:01:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nikolaus Voss</name>
<email>nikolaus.voss@haag-streit.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-19T16:38:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=5adedd42245af0860ebda8fe0949f24f5204c1b1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5adedd42245af0860ebda8fe0949f24f5204c1b1</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with
user-provided decrypted data") added key instantiation with user
provided decrypted data.  The user data is hex-ascii-encoded but was
just memcpy'ed to the binary buffer. Fix this to use hex2bin instead.

Old keys created from user provided decrypted data saved with "keyctl
pipe" are still valid, however if the key is recreated from decrypted
data the old key must be converted to the correct format. This can be
done with a small shell script, e.g.:

BROKENKEY=abcdefABCDEF1234567890aaaaaaaaaa
NEWKEY=$(echo -ne $BROKENKEY | xxd -p -c32)
keyctl add user masterkey "$(cat masterkey.bin)" @u
keyctl add encrypted testkey "new user:masterkey 32 $NEWKEY" @u

However, NEWKEY is still broken: If for BROKENKEY 32 bytes were
specified, a brute force attacker knowing the key properties would only
need to try at most 2^(16*8) keys, as if the key was only 16 bytes long.

The security issue is a result of the combination of limiting the input
range to hex-ascii and using memcpy() instead of hex2bin(). It could
have been fixed either by allowing binary input or using hex2bin() (and
doubling the ascii input key length). This patch implements the latter.

The corresponding test for the Linux Test Project ltp has also been
fixed (see link below).

Fixes: cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/20221006081709.92303897@mail.steuer-voss.de/
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nikolaus Voss &lt;nikolaus.voss@haag-streit.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v6.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd</title>
<updated>2022-10-10T20:09:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-10T20:09:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=ada3bfb6492a6d0d3eca50f3b61315fe032efc72'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ada3bfb6492a6d0d3eca50f3b61315fe032efc72</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
 "Just a few bug fixes this time"

* tag 'tpmdd-next-v6.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
  selftest: tpm2: Add Client.__del__() to close /dev/tpm* handle
  security/keys: Remove inconsistent __user annotation
  char: move from strlcpy with unused retval to strscpy
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security/keys: Remove inconsistent __user annotation</title>
<updated>2022-10-04T21:25:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Vincenzo Frascino</name>
<email>vincenzo.frascino@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-07T12:12:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=72e9be6be9c08d882f94f80c7cf1b27f0896213d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:72e9be6be9c08d882f94f80c7cf1b27f0896213d</id>
<content type='text'>
The declaration of keyring_read does not match the definition
(security/keys/keyring.c). In this case the definition is correct
because it matches what defined in "struct key_type::read"
(linux/key-type.h).

Fix the declaration removing the inconsistent __user annotation.

Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino &lt;vincenzo.frascino@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Move KEY_LOOKUP_ to include/linux/key.h and define KEY_LOOKUP_ALL</title>
<updated>2022-09-22T00:32:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-20T07:59:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=90fd8f26edd47942203639bf3a5dde8fa1931a0e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:90fd8f26edd47942203639bf3a5dde8fa1931a0e</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for the patch that introduces the bpf_lookup_user_key() eBPF
kfunc, move KEY_LOOKUP_ definitions to include/linux/key.h, to be able to
validate the kfunc parameters. Add them to enum key_lookup_flag, so that
all the current ones and the ones defined in the future are automatically
exported through BTF and available to eBPF programs.

Also, add KEY_LOOKUP_ALL to the enum, with the logical OR of currently
defined flags as value, to facilitate checking whether a variable contains
only those flags.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220920075951.929132-7-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: tpm2: Fix migratable logic</title>
<updated>2022-06-08T11:12:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Safford</name>
<email>david.safford@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-07T18:07:57Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=dda5384313a40ecbaafd8a9a80f47483255e4c4d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dda5384313a40ecbaafd8a9a80f47483255e4c4d</id>
<content type='text'>
When creating (sealing) a new trusted key, migratable
trusted keys have the FIXED_TPM and FIXED_PARENT attributes
set, and non-migratable keys don't. This is backwards, and
also causes creation to fail when creating a migratable key
under a migratable parent. (The TPM thinks you are trying to
seal a non-migratable blob under a migratable parent.)

The following simple patch fixes the logic, and has been
tested for all four combinations of migratable and non-migratable
trusted keys and parent storage keys. With this logic, you will
get a proper failure if you try to create a non-migratable
trusted key under a migratable parent storage key, and all other
combinations work correctly.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Fixes: e5fb5d2c5a03 ("security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable")
Signed-off-by: David Safford &lt;david.safford@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ahmad Fatoum &lt;a.fatoum@pengutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd</title>
<updated>2022-05-24T20:16:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-24T20:16:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=7cf6a8a17f5b134b7e783c2d45c53298faef82a7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7cf6a8a17f5b134b7e783c2d45c53298faef82a7</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:

 - Tightened validation of key hashes for SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST. An
   invalid hash format causes a compilation error. Previously, they got
   included to the kernel binary but were silently ignored at run-time.

 - Allow root user to append new hashes to the blacklist keyring.

 - Trusted keys backed with Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance
   Module (CAAM), which part of some of the new NXP's SoC's. Now there
   is total three hardware backends for trusted keys: TPM, ARM TEE and
   CAAM.

 - A scattered set of fixes and small improvements for the TPM driver.

* tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
  MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-TRUSTED-CAAM
  doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source
  KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys
  crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator
  crypto: caam - determine whether CAAM supports blob encap/decap
  KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material
  KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support
  tpm: Add field upgrade mode support for Infineon TPM2 modules
  tpm: Fix buffer access in tpm2_get_tpm_pt()
  char: tpm: cr50_i2c: Suppress duplicated error message in .remove()
  tpm: cr50: Add new device/vendor ID 0x504a6666
  tpm: Remove read16/read32/write32 calls from tpm_tis_phy_ops
  tpm: ibmvtpm: Correct the return value in tpm_ibmvtpm_probe()
  tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee: Return true/false (not 1/0) from bool functions
  certs: Explain the rationale to call panic()
  certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
  certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
  certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
  certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
  tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
