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<title>linux/security/loadpin, branch v5.2</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.2</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.2'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2019-06-05T15:36:37Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 282</title>
<updated>2019-06-05T15:36:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-29T14:17:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=9c92ab61914157664a2fbdf926df0eb937838e45'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9c92ab61914157664a2fbdf926df0eb937838e45</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this software is licensed under the terms of the gnu general public
  license version 2 as published by the free software foundation and
  may be copied distributed and modified under those terms this
  program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful but
  without any warranty without even the implied warranty of
  merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu
  general public license for more details

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 285 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras &lt;alexios.zavras@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190529141900.642774971@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/Kconfig</title>
<updated>2019-05-21T08:50:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-19T12:07:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=ec8f24b7faaf3d4799a7c3f4c1b87f6b02778ad1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ec8f24b7faaf3d4799a7c3f4c1b87f6b02778ad1</id>
<content type='text'>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:

 - Have no license information of any form

These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:

  GPL-2.0-only

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM</title>
<updated>2019-01-08T21:18:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-14T22:26:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=70b62c25665f636c9f6c700b26af7df296b0887e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:70b62c25665f636c9f6c700b26af7df296b0887e</id>
<content type='text'>
This converts LoadPin from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LoadPin: Rename boot param "enabled" to "enforce"</title>
<updated>2018-10-18T22:29:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-24T21:43:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=13523bef1e2154b6d02836cd0f6c0ffc89b2eae6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:13523bef1e2154b6d02836cd0f6c0ffc89b2eae6</id>
<content type='text'>
LoadPin's "enabled" setting is really about enforcement, not whether
or not the LSM is using LSM hooks. Instead, split this out so that LSM
enabling can be logically distinct from whether enforcement is happening
(for example, the pinning happens when the LSM is enabled, but the pin
is only checked when "enforce" is set). This allows LoadPin to continue
to operate sanely in test environments once LSM enable/disable is
centrally handled (i.e. we want LoadPin to be enabled separately from
its enforcement).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LoadPin: Report friendly block device name</title>
<updated>2018-10-18T22:29:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-04T00:38:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=f4b626d6de15149329332796e96709e0c4c84577'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f4b626d6de15149329332796e96709e0c4c84577</id>
<content type='text'>
Instead of only reporting major/minor, include the actual block device
name, at least as seen by the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module</title>
<updated>2018-07-16T19:31:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-13T18:06:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=c77b8cdf745d91eca138e7bfa430dc6640b604a0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c77b8cdf745d91eca138e7bfa430dc6640b604a0</id>
<content type='text'>
Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly
or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook.  This patch
replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new
security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes
in SELinux, LoadPin, and IMA.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep &lt;jeffv@google.com&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Jessica Yu &lt;jeyu@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>get rid of pointless includes of fs_struct.h</title>
<updated>2018-02-22T19:28:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-22T19:28:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=304ec482f562885b178b370cd50340447585d1c0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:304ec482f562885b178b370cd50340447585d1c0</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: mark LSM hooks as __ro_after_init</title>
<updated>2017-03-06T00:00:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>jmorris@namei.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-14T13:18:51Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=ca97d939db114c8d1619e10a3b82af8615372dae'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ca97d939db114c8d1619e10a3b82af8615372dae</id>
<content type='text'>
Mark all of the registration hooks as __ro_after_init (via the
__lsm_ro_after_init macro).

Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm</title>
<updated>2017-01-19T02:18:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-19T01:09:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=d69dece5f5b6bc7a5e39d2b6136ddc69469331fe'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d69dece5f5b6bc7a5e39d2b6136ddc69469331fe</id>
<content type='text'>
I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.

Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG</title>
<updated>2016-05-17T10:10:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-17T08:45:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=b937190c40de0f6f07f592042e3097b16c6b0130'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b937190c40de0f6f07f592042e3097b16c6b0130</id>
<content type='text'>
Instead of being enabled by default when SECURITY_LOADPIN is selected,
provide an additional (default off) config to determine the boot time
behavior. As before, the "loadpin.enabled=0/1" kernel parameter remains
available.

Suggested-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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