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<title>linux/security/security.c, branch v2.6.34</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v2.6.34</id>
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<updated>2010-02-28T22:36:31Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' into for-linus</title>
<updated>2010-02-28T22:36:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>jmorris@namei.org</email>
</author>
<published>2010-02-28T22:36:31Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b4ccebdd37ff70d349321a198f416ba737a5e833</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Security: add static to security_ops and default_security_ops variable</title>
<updated>2010-02-23T21:11:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>wzt.wzt@gmail.com</name>
<email>wzt.wzt@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-02-23T15:15:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:189b3b1c89761054fee3438f063d7f257306e2d8</id>
<content type='text'>
Enhance the security framework to support resetting the active security
module. This eliminates the need for direct use of the security_ops and
default_security_ops variables outside of security.c, so make security_ops
and default_security_ops static. Also remove the secondary_ops variable as
a cleanup since there is no use for that. secondary_ops was originally used by
SELinux to call the "secondary" security module (capability or dummy),
but that was replaced by direct calls to capability and the only
remaining use is to save and restore the original security ops pointer
value if SELinux is disabled by early userspace based on /etc/selinux/config.
Further, if we support this directly in the security framework, then we can
just use &amp;default_security_ops for this purpose since that is now available.

Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang &lt;zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com&gt;
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Take ima_file_free() to proper place.</title>
<updated>2010-02-07T08:07:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2010-02-07T08:07:29Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:89068c576bf324ef6fbd50dfc745148f7def202c</id>
<content type='text'>
Hooks: Just Say No.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>syslog: distinguish between /proc/kmsg and syscalls</title>
<updated>2010-02-04T03:20:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees.cook@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-02-03T23:36:43Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:002345925e6c45861f60db6f4fc6236713fd8847</id>
<content type='text'>
This allows the LSM to distinguish between syslog functions originating
from /proc/kmsg access and direct syscalls.  By default, the commoncaps
will now no longer require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read an opened /proc/kmsg
file descriptor.  For example the kernel syslog reader can now drop
privileges after opening /proc/kmsg, instead of staying privileged with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.  MAC systems that implement security_syslog have unchanged
behavior.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees.cook@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: correct error returns for get/set security with private inodes</title>
<updated>2010-01-14T21:23:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>jmorris@namei.org</email>
</author>
<published>2010-01-13T22:33:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8d9525048c74786205b99f3fcd05a839721edfb7</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently, the getsecurity and setsecurity operations return zero for
kernel private inodes, where xattrs are not available directly to
userspace.

This confuses some applications, and does not conform to the
man page for getxattr(2) etc., which state that these syscalls
should return ENOTSUP if xattrs are not supported or disabled.

Note that in the listsecurity case, we still need to return zero
as we don't know which other xattr handlers may be active.

For discussion of userland confusion, see:
http://www.mail-archive.com/bug-coreutils@gnu.org/msg17988.html

This patch corrects the error returns so that ENOTSUP is reported
to userspace as required.

Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Rename security_path_ functions argument names.</title>
<updated>2009-12-08T03:58:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2009-11-26T06:24:49Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5d0901a3a0c39c97ca504f73d24030f63cfc9fa2</id>
<content type='text'>
include/linux/security.h and security/capability.c are using "struct path *dir"
but security/security.c was using "struct path *path" by error.
This patch renames "struct path *path" to "struct path *dir".

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: report the module name to security_module_request</title>
<updated>2009-11-09T22:33:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-11-03T05:35:32Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:dd8dbf2e6880e30c00b18600c962d0cb5a03c555</id>
<content type='text'>
For SELinux to do better filtering in userspace we send the name of the
module along with the AVC denial when a program is denied module_request.

Example output:

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : arch=x86_64 syscall=write success=yes exit=2 a0=3 a1=7fc28c0d56c0 a2=2 a3=7fffca0d7440 items=0 ppid=1727 pid=1729 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=rpc.nfsd exe=/usr/sbin/rpc.nfsd subj=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : avc:  denied  { module_request } for  pid=1729 comm=rpc.nfsd kmod="net-pf-10" scontext=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tclass=system

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Config option to set a default LSM</title>
<updated>2009-11-08T21:40:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-11-06T01:03:20Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6e65f92ff0d6f18580737321718d09035085a3fb</id>
<content type='text'>
The LSM currently requires setting a kernel parameter at boot to select
a specific LSM.  This adds a config option that allows specifying a default
LSM that is used unless overridden with the security= kernel parameter.
If the the config option is not set the current behavior of first LSM
to register is used.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: imbed ima calls in the security hooks</title>
<updated>2009-10-25T04:22:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-10-22T21:30:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6c21a7fb492bf7e2c4985937082ce58ddeca84bd</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on discussions on LKML and LSM, where there are consecutive
security_ and ima_ calls in the vfs layer, move the ima_ calls to
the existing security_ hooks.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Add security_path_chroot().</title>
<updated>2009-10-11T23:56:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2009-10-04T12:49:48Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8b8efb44033c7e86b3dc76f825c693ec92ae30e9</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chroot() operations.

This hook is used by TOMOYO.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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