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<title>linux/security/security.c, branch v4.1</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v4.1</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v4.1'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2015-04-15T19:06:56Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations</title>
<updated>2015-04-15T19:06:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-17T22:26:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=c6f493d631c4d40cea5c36055f9148f547b200af'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c6f493d631c4d40cea5c36055f9148f547b200af</id>
<content type='text'>
most of the -&gt;d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would
go to, i.e. d_backing_inode()

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-davem' into for-next</title>
<updated>2015-04-12T02:27:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-12T02:27:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=39c853ebfe169f187a760b34f9cbf54751bfce00'/>
<id>urn:sha1:39c853ebfe169f187a760b34f9cbf54751bfce00</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>switch security_inode_getattr() to struct path *</title>
<updated>2015-04-12T02:24:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-08T23:28:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=3f7036a071b879da017eddaedb10fba173fdf1ff'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3f7036a071b879da017eddaedb10fba173fdf1ff</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "selinux: add a skb_owned_by() hook"</title>
<updated>2015-03-21T01:36:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-21T00:15:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d3593b5cef76db45c864de23c599b58198879e8c</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit ca10b9e9a8ca7342ee07065289cbe74ac128c169.

No longer needed after commit eb8895debe1baba41fcb62c78a16f0c63c21662a
("tcp: tcp_make_synack() should use sock_wmalloc")

When under SYNFLOOD, we build lot of SYNACK and hit false sharing
because of multiple modifications done on sk_listener-&gt;sk_wmem_alloc

Since tcp_make_synack() uses sock_wmalloc(), there is no need
to call skb_set_owner_w() again, as this adds two atomic operations.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'char-misc-3.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc</title>
<updated>2015-02-15T18:48:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-15T18:48:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=4ba63072b998cc31515cc6305c25f3b808b50c01'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4ba63072b998cc31515cc6305c25f3b808b50c01</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull char / misc patches from Greg KH:
 "Here's the big char/misc driver update for 3.20-rc1.

  Lots of little things in here, all described in the changelog.
  Nothing major or unusual, except maybe the binder selinux stuff, which
  was all acked by the proper selinux people and they thought it best to
  come through this tree.

  All of this has been in linux-next with no reported issues for a while"

* tag 'char-misc-3.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (90 commits)
  coresight: fix function etm_writel_cp14() parameter order
  coresight-etm: remove check for unknown Kconfig macro
  coresight: fixing CPU hwid lookup in device tree
  coresight: remove the unnecessary function coresight_is_bit_set()
  coresight: fix the debug AMBA bus name
  coresight: remove the extra spaces
  coresight: fix the link between orphan connection and newly added device
  coresight: remove the unnecessary replicator property
  coresight: fix the replicator subtype value
  pdfdocs: Fix 'make pdfdocs' failure for 'uio-howto.tmpl'
  mcb: Fix error path of mcb_pci_probe
  virtio/console: verify device has config space
  ti-st: clean up data types (fix harmless memory corruption)
  mei: me: release hw from reset only during the reset flow
  mei: mask interrupt set bit on clean reset bit
  extcon: max77693: Constify struct regmap_config
  extcon: adc-jack: Release IIO channel on driver remove
  extcon: Remove duplicated include from extcon-class.c
  Drivers: hv: vmbus: hv_process_timer_expiration() can be static
  Drivers: hv: vmbus: serialize Offer and Rescind offer
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.</title>
<updated>2015-01-25T17:17:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-21T15:54:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=79af73079d753b2d04e46f7445716d3b5f914dbd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:79af73079d753b2d04e46f7445716d3b5f914dbd</id>
<content type='text'>
Add security hooks to the binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.
The security hooks enable security modules such as SELinux to implement
controls over binder IPC.  The security hooks include support for
controlling what process can become the binder context manager
(binder_set_context_mgr), controlling the ability of a process
to invoke a binder transaction/IPC to another process (binder_transaction),
controlling the ability of a process to transfer a binder reference to
another process (binder_transfer_binder), and controlling the ability
of a process to transfer an open file to another process (binder_transfer_file).

These hooks have been included in the Android kernel trees since Android 4.3.

(Updated to reflect upstream relocation and changes to the binder driver,
changes to the LSM audit data structures, coding style cleanups, and
to add inline documentation for the hooks).

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich &lt;nnk@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jeffrey Vander Stoep &lt;jeffv@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: introduce f_op-&gt;mmap_capabilities for nommu mmap support</title>
<updated>2015-01-20T21:02:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-14T09:42:32Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b4caecd48005fbed3949dde6c1cb233142fd69e9</id>
<content type='text'>
Since "BDI: Provide backing device capability information [try #3]" the
backing_dev_info structure also provides flags for the kind of mmap
operation available in a nommu environment, which is entirely unrelated
to it's original purpose.

Introduce a new nommu-only file operation to provide this information to
the nommu mmap code instead.  Splitting this from the backing_dev_info
structure allows to remove lots of backing_dev_info instance that aren't
otherwise needed, and entirely gets rid of the concept of providing a
backing_dev_info for a character device.  It also removes the need for
the mtd_inodefs filesystem.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Brian Norris &lt;computersforpeace@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: make security_file_set_fowner, f_setown and __f_setown void return</title>
<updated>2014-09-09T20:01:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@primarydata.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-22T15:27:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=e0b93eddfe17dcb7d644eb5d6ad02a86fc41a977'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e0b93eddfe17dcb7d644eb5d6ad02a86fc41a977</id>
<content type='text'>
security_file_set_fowner always returns 0, so make it f_setown and
__f_setown void return functions and fix up the error handling in the
callers.

Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@primarydata.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware</title>
<updated>2014-07-25T18:47:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-22T14:39:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=5a9196d715607f76d6b7d96a0970d6065335e62b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5a9196d715607f76d6b7d96a0970d6065335e62b</id>
<content type='text'>
The "security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook" patch defined a
new security hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built
into the kernel.

This patch defines ima_fw_from_file(), which is called from the new
security hook, to measure and/or appraise the loaded firmware's
integrity.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook</title>
<updated>2014-07-25T18:47:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-02-25T18:28:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=13752fe2d7f2d41c2fd92a5d1b1c6e38c4de0c05'/>
<id>urn:sha1:13752fe2d7f2d41c2fd92a5d1b1c6e38c4de0c05</id>
<content type='text'>
In order to validate the contents of firmware being loaded, there must be
a hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built into the kernel
itself. Without this, there is a risk that a root user could load malicious
firmware designed to mount an attack against kernel memory (e.g. via DMA).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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