linux/security/security.c, branch v5.11

Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

2020-12-16T19:01:04Z

Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: "While we have a small number of SELinux patches for v5.11, there are a few changes worth highlighting: - Change the LSM network hooks to pass flowi_common structs instead of the parent flowi struct as the LSMs do not currently need the full flowi struct and they do not have enough information to use it safely (missing information on the address family). This patch was discussed both with Herbert Xu (representing team netdev) and James Morris (representing team LSMs-other-than-SELinux). - Fix how we handle errors in inode_doinit_with_dentry() so that we attempt to properly label the inode on following lookups instead of continuing to treat it as unlabeled. - Tweak the kernel logic around allowx, auditallowx, and dontauditx SELinux policy statements such that the auditx/dontauditx are effective even without the allowx statement. Everything passes our test suite" * tag 'selinux-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks selinux: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang selinux: drop super_block backpointer from superblock_security_struct selinux: fix inode_doinit_with_dentry() LABEL_INVALID error handling selinux: allow dontauditx and auditallowx rules to take effect without allowx selinux: fix error initialization in inode_doinit_with_dentry()

Merge branch 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next

2020-12-12T20:28:42Z

Steffen Klassert says: ==================== pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2020-12-12 Just one patch this time: 1) Redact the SA keys with kernel lockdown confidentiality. If enabled, no secret keys are sent to uuserspace. From Antony Antony. * 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next: xfrm: redact SA secret with lockdown confidentiality ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201212085737.2101294-1-steffen.klassert@secunet.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

security: add const qualifier to struct sock in various places

2020-12-03T20:56:03Z

A followup change to tcp_request_sock_op would have to drop the 'const' qualifier from the 'route_req' function as the 'security_inet_conn_request' call is moved there - and that function expects a 'struct sock *'. However, it turns out its also possible to add a const qualifier to security_inet_conn_request instead. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Acked-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

xfrm: redact SA secret with lockdown confidentiality

2020-11-27T10:03:06Z

redact XFRM SA secret in the netlink response to xfrm_get_sa() or dumpall sa. Enable lockdown, confidentiality mode, at boot or at run time. e.g. when enabled: cat /sys/kernel/security/lockdown none integrity [confidentiality] ip xfrm state src 172.16.1.200 dst 172.16.1.100 proto esp spi 0x00000002 reqid 2 mode tunnel replay-window 0 aead rfc4106(gcm(aes)) 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 96 note: the aead secret is redacted. Redacting secret is also a FIPS 140-2 requirement. v1->v2 - add size checks before memset calls v2->v3 - replace spaces with tabs for consistency v3->v4 - use kernel lockdown instead of a /proc setting v4->v5 - remove kconfig option Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller Signed-off-by: Antony Antony Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert

lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks

2020-11-23T23:36:21Z

As pointed out by Herbert in a recent related patch, the LSM hooks do not have the necessary address family information to use the flowi struct safely. As none of the LSMs currently use any of the protocol specific flowi information, replace the flowi pointers with pointers to the address family independent flowi_common struct. Reported-by: Herbert Xu Acked-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook

2020-10-05T11:37:03Z

As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls. For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents, it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all existing LSMs to retain existing behavior. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-12-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook

2020-10-05T11:37:03Z

There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data(). Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in a subsequent patch.) Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false (which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook once the buffer is loaded. With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads (e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen in subsequent patches. Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: KP Singh Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate include file

2020-10-05T11:34:18Z

Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere and doesn't really need functions not related to the general fs interface. Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Scott Branden Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Acked-by: James Morris Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706232309.12010-2-scott.branden@broadcom.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-4-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

security: Fix hook iteration and default value for inode_copy_up_xattr

2020-06-23T23:39:23Z

inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 to indicate the acceptance of the xattr and 1 to reject it. If the LSM does not know about the xattr, it's expected to return -EOPNOTSUPP, which is the correct default value for this hook. BPF LSM, currently, uses 0 as the default value and thereby falsely allows all overlay fs xattributes to be copied up. The iteration logic is also updated from the "bail-on-fail" call_int_hook to continue on the non-decisive -EOPNOTSUPP and bail out on other values. Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks") Signed-off-by: KP Singh Signed-off-by: James Morris

Merge tag 'LSM-add-setgid-hook-5.8-author-fix' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux

2020-06-14T18:39:31Z

Pull SafeSetID update from Micah Morton: "Add additional LSM hooks for SafeSetID SafeSetID is capable of making allow/deny decisions for set*uid calls on a system, and we want to add similar functionality for set*gid calls. The work to do that is not yet complete, so probably won't make it in for v5.8, but we are looking to get this simple patch in for v5.8 since we have it ready. We are planning on the rest of the work for extending the SafeSetID LSM being merged during the v5.9 merge window" * tag 'LSM-add-setgid-hook-5.8-author-fix' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux: security: Add LSM hooks to set*gid syscalls