linux/security/security.c, branch v6.15

Merge tag 'bpf-next-6.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next

2025-03-30T19:43:03Z

Pull bpf updates from Alexei Starovoitov: "For this merge window we're splitting BPF pull request into three for higher visibility: main changes, res_spin_lock, try_alloc_pages. These are the main BPF changes: - Add DFA-based live registers analysis to improve verification of programs with loops (Eduard Zingerman) - Introduce load_acquire and store_release BPF instructions and add x86, arm64 JIT support (Peilin Ye) - Fix loop detection logic in the verifier (Eduard Zingerman) - Drop unnecesary lock in bpf_map_inc_not_zero() (Eric Dumazet) - Add kfunc for populating cpumask bits (Emil Tsalapatis) - Convert various shell based tests to selftests/bpf/test_progs format (Bastien Curutchet) - Allow passing referenced kptrs into struct_ops callbacks (Amery Hung) - Add a flag to LSM bpf hook to facilitate bpf program signing (Blaise Boscaccy) - Track arena arguments in kfuncs (Ihor Solodrai) - Add copy_remote_vm_str() helper for reading strings from remote VM and bpf_copy_from_user_task_str() kfunc (Jordan Rome) - Add support for timed may_goto instruction (Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi) - Allow bpf_get_netns_cookie() int cgroup_skb programs (Mahe Tardy) - Reduce bpf_cgrp_storage_busy false positives when accessing cgroup local storage (Martin KaFai Lau) - Introduce bpf_dynptr_copy() kfunc (Mykyta Yatsenko) - Allow retrieving BTF data with BTF token (Mykyta Yatsenko) - Add BPF kfuncs to set and get xattrs with 'security.bpf.' prefix (Song Liu) - Reject attaching programs to noreturn functions (Yafang Shao) - Introduce pre-order traversal of cgroup bpf programs (Yonghong Song)" * tag 'bpf-next-6.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (186 commits) selftests/bpf: Add selftests for load-acquire/store-release when register number is invalid bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read in check_atomic_load/store() libbpf: Add namespace for errstr making it libbpf_errstr bpf: Add struct_ops context information to struct bpf_prog_aux selftests/bpf: Sanitize pointer prior fclose() selftests/bpf: Migrate test_xdp_vlan.sh into test_progs selftests/bpf: test_xdp_vlan: Rename BPF sections bpf: clarify a misleading verifier error message selftests/bpf: Add selftest for attaching fexit to __noreturn functions bpf: Reject attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn functions bpf: Only fails the busy counter check in bpf_cgrp_storage_get if it creates storage bpf: Make perf_event_read_output accessible in all program types. bpftool: Using the right format specifiers bpftool: Add -Wformat-signedness flag to detect format errors selftests/bpf: Test freplace from user namespace libbpf: Pass BPF token from find_prog_btf_id to BPF_BTF_GET_FD_BY_ID bpf: Return prog btf_id without capable check bpf: BPF token support for BPF_BTF_GET_FD_BY_ID bpf, x86: Fix objtool warning for timed may_goto bpf: Check map->record at the beginning of check_and_free_fields() ...

security: Propagate caller information in bpf hooks

2025-03-15T18:48:58Z

Certain bpf syscall subcommands are available for usage from both userspace and the kernel. LSM modules or eBPF gatekeeper programs may need to take a different course of action depending on whether or not a BPF syscall originated from the kernel or userspace. Additionally, some of the bpf_attr struct fields contain pointers to arbitrary memory. Currently the functionality to determine whether or not a pointer refers to kernel memory or userspace memory is exposed to the bpf verifier, but that information is missing from various LSM hooks. Here we augment the LSM hooks to provide this data, by simply passing a boolean flag indicating whether or not the call originated in the kernel, in any hook that contains a bpf_attr struct that corresponds to a subcommand that may be called from the kernel. Signed-off-by: Blaise Boscaccy Acked-by: Song Liu Acked-by: Paul Moore Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250310221737.821889-2-bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov

perf: Remove unnecessary parameter of security check

2025-02-26T19:13:58Z

It seems that the attr parameter was never been used in security checks since it was first introduced by: commit da97e18458fb ("perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks") so remove it. Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

io_uring,lsm,selinux: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup()

2025-02-07T22:17:49Z

It is desirable to allow LSM to configure accessibility to io_uring because it is a coarse yet very simple way to restrict access to it. So, add an LSM for io_uring_allowed() to guard access to io_uring. Cc: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Hamza Mahfooz Acked-by: Jens Axboe [PM: merge fuzz due to changes in preceding patches, subj tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

Merge tag 'AT_EXECVE_CHECK-v6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

2025-01-23T04:34:42Z

Pull AT_EXECVE_CHECK from Kees Cook: - Implement AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2) (Mickaël Salaün) - Implement EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits (Mickaël Salaün) - Add selftests and samples for AT_EXECVE_CHECK (Mickaël Salaün) * tag 'AT_EXECVE_CHECK-v6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: ima: instantiate the bprm_creds_for_exec() hook samples/check-exec: Add an enlighten "inc" interpreter and 28 tests selftests: ktap_helpers: Fix uninitialized variable samples/check-exec: Add set-exec selftests/landlock: Add tests for execveat + AT_EXECVE_CHECK selftests/exec: Add 32 tests for AT_EXECVE_CHECK and exec securebits security: Add EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits exec: Add a new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2)

security: remove redundant assignment to return variable

2025-01-05T02:52:13Z

In the case where rc is equal to EOPNOTSUPP it is being reassigned a new value of zero that is never read. The following continue statement loops back to the next iteration of the lsm_for_each_hook loop and rc is being re-assigned a new value from the call to getselfattr. The assignment is redundant and can be removed. Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn [PM: subj tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

exec: Add a new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2)

2024-12-19T01:00:29Z

Add a new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2) to check if a file would be allowed for execution. The main use case is for script interpreters and dynamic linkers to check execution permission according to the kernel's security policy. Another use case is to add context to access logs e.g., which script (instead of interpreter) accessed a file. As any executable code, scripts could also use this check [1]. This is different from faccessat(2) + X_OK which only checks a subset of access rights (i.e. inode permission and mount options for regular files), but not the full context (e.g. all LSM access checks). The main use case for access(2) is for SUID processes to (partially) check access on behalf of their caller. The main use case for execveat(2) + AT_EXECVE_CHECK is to check if a script execution would be allowed, according to all the different restrictions in place. Because the use of AT_EXECVE_CHECK follows the exact kernel semantic as for a real execution, user space gets the same error codes. An interesting point of using execveat(2) instead of openat2(2) is that it decouples the check from the enforcement. Indeed, the security check can be logged (e.g. with audit) without blocking an execution environment not yet ready to enforce a strict security policy. LSMs can control or log execution requests with security_bprm_creds_for_exec(). However, to enforce a consistent and complete access control (e.g. on binary's dependencies) LSMs should restrict file executability, or measure executed files, with security_file_open() by checking file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC. Because AT_EXECVE_CHECK is dedicated to user space interpreters, it doesn't make sense for the kernel to parse the checked files, look for interpreters known to the kernel (e.g. ELF, shebang), and return ENOEXEC if the format is unknown. Because of that, security_bprm_check() is never called when AT_EXECVE_CHECK is used. It should be noted that script interpreters cannot directly use execveat(2) (without this new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag) because this could lead to unexpected behaviors e.g., `python script.sh` could lead to Bash being executed to interpret the script. Unlike the kernel, script interpreters may just interpret the shebang as a simple comment, which should not change for backward compatibility reasons. Because scripts or libraries files might not currently have the executable permission set, or because we might want specific users to be allowed to run arbitrary scripts, the following patch provides a dynamic configuration mechanism with the SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits. This is a redesign of the CLIP OS 4's O_MAYEXEC: https://github.com/clipos-archive/src_platform_clip-patches/blob/f5cb330d6b684752e403b4e41b39f7004d88e561/1901_open_mayexec.patch This patch has been used for more than a decade with customized script interpreters. Some examples can be found here: https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/search?q=O_MAYEXEC Cc: Al Viro Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: Kees Cook Acked-by: Paul Moore Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn Reviewed-by: Jeff Xu Tested-by: Jeff Xu Link: https://docs.python.org/3/library/io.html#io.open_code [1] Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212174223.389435-2-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Kees Cook

lsm: lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security

2024-12-04T19:58:51Z

lsm: use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx

2024-12-04T19:58:09Z

Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill a lsm_context structure instead of data and length pointers. This provides the information about which LSM created the context so that security_release_secctx() can use the correct hook. Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler [PM: subject tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

lsm: replace context+len with lsm_context

2024-12-04T19:42:31Z

Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single lsm_context pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier along with the context and context length. This allows security_release_secctx() to know how to release the context. Callers have been modified to use or save the returned data from the new structure. security_secid_to_secctx() and security_lsmproc_to_secctx() will now return the length value on success instead of 0. Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Todd Kjos Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler [PM: subject tweak, kdoc fix, signedness fix from Dan Carpenter] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore