linux/security/smack, branch v3.19

Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

2014-12-15T04:36:37Z

Pull security layer updates from James Morris: "In terms of changes, there's general maintenance to the Smack, SELinux, and integrity code. The IMA code adds a new kconfig option, IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT, which allows IMA appraisal to require signatures. Support for reading keys from rootfs before init is call is also added" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits) selinux: Remove security_ops extern security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack() VFS: refactor vfs_read() ima: require signature based appraisal integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file() Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields() ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields() ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero ima: added error messages to template-related functions ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines ima: no need to allocate entry for comment ima: report policy load status ima: use path names cache ...

security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack()

2014-11-21T21:14:22Z

Setting smack label on file (e.g. 'attr -S -s SMACK64 -V "test" test') triggered following spew on the kernel with KASan applied: ================================================================== BUG: AddressSanitizer: out of bounds access in strncpy+0x28/0x60 at addr ffff8800059ad064 ============================================================================= BUG kmalloc-8 (Not tainted): kasan error ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint INFO: Slab 0xffffea0000166b40 objects=128 used=7 fp=0xffff8800059ad080 flags=0x4000000000000080 INFO: Object 0xffff8800059ad060 @offset=96 fp=0xffff8800059ad080 Bytes b4 ffff8800059ad050: a0 df 9a 05 00 88 ff ff 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ........ZZZZZZZZ Object ffff8800059ad060: 74 65 73 74 6b 6b 6b a5 testkkk. Redzone ffff8800059ad068: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........ Padding ffff8800059ad078: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ CPU: 0 PID: 528 Comm: attr Tainted: G B 3.18.0-rc1-mm1+ #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 0000000000000000 ffff8800059ad064 ffffffff81534cf2 ffff880005a5bc40 ffffffff8112fe1a 0000000100800006 0000000f059ad060 ffff880006000f90 0000000000000296 ffffea0000166b40 ffffffff8107ca97 ffff880005891060 Call Trace: ? dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52) ? kasan_report_error (mm/kasan/report.c:102 mm/kasan/report.c:178) ? preempt_count_sub (kernel/sched/core.c:2651) ? __asan_load1 (mm/kasan/kasan.h:50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:248 mm/kasan/kasan.c:358) ? strncpy (lib/string.c:121) ? strncpy (lib/string.c:121) ? smk_parse_smack (security/smack/smack_access.c:457) ? setxattr (fs/xattr.c:343) ? smk_import_entry (security/smack/smack_access.c:514) ? smack_inode_setxattr (security/smack/smack_lsm.c:1093 (discriminator 1)) ? security_inode_setxattr (security/security.c:602) ? vfs_setxattr (fs/xattr.c:134) ? setxattr (fs/xattr.c:343) ? setxattr (fs/xattr.c:360) ? get_parent_ip (kernel/sched/core.c:2606) ? preempt_count_sub (kernel/sched/core.c:2651) ? __percpu_counter_add (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:98 lib/percpu_counter.c:90) ? get_parent_ip (kernel/sched/core.c:2606) ? preempt_count_sub (kernel/sched/core.c:2651) ? __mnt_want_write (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:98 fs/namespace.c:359) ? path_setxattr (fs/xattr.c:380) ? SyS_lsetxattr (fs/xattr.c:397) ? system_call_fastpath (arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:423) Read of size 1 by task attr: Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8800059ace80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800059acf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800059acf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff8800059ad000: 00 fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 04 fc fc fc ^ ffff8800059ad080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8800059ad100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8800059ad180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== strncpy() copies one byte more than the source string has. Fix this by passing the correct length to strncpy(). Now we can remove initialization of the last byte in 'smack' string because kzalloc() already did this for us. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin

assorted conversions to %p[dD]

2014-11-19T18:01:20Z

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack

2014-10-31T21:29:32Z

The patch use kmem_cache to allocate/free inode_smack since they are alloced in high volumes making it a perfect case for kmem_cache. As per analysis, 24 bytes of memory is wasted per allocation due to internal fragmentation. With kmem_cache, this can be avoided. Accounting of memory allocation is below : total slack net count-alloc/free caller Before (with kzalloc) 1919872 719952 1919872 29998/0 new_inode_smack+0x14 After (with kmem_cache) 1201680 0 1201680 30042/0 new_inode_smack+0x18 >From above data, we found that 719952 bytes(~700 KB) of memory is saved on allocation of 29998 smack inodes. Signed-off-by: Rohit

Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels

2014-10-28T15:22:40Z

The lock access mode allows setting a read lock on a file for with the process has only read access. The floor label is defined to make it easy to have the basic system installed such that everyone can read it. Once there's a desire to read lock (rationally or otherwise) a floor file a rule needs to get set. This happens all the time, so make the floor label a little bit more special and allow everyone lock access, too. By implication, give processes with the hat label (hat can read everything) lock access as well. This reduces clutter in the Smack rule set. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler

Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

2014-10-12T14:13:55Z

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris. Mostly ima, selinux, smack and key handling updates. * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits) integrity: do zero padding of the key id KEYS: output last portion of fingerprint in /proc/keys KEYS: strip 'id:' from ca_keyid KEYS: use swapped SKID for performing partial matching KEYS: Restore partial ID matching functionality for asymmetric keys X.509: If available, use the raw subjKeyId to form the key description KEYS: handle error code encoded in pointer selinux: normalize audit log formatting selinux: cleanup error reporting in selinux_nlmsg_perm() KEYS: Check hex2bin()'s return when generating an asymmetric key ID ima: detect violations for mmaped files ima: fix race condition on ima_rdwr_violation_check and process_measurement ima: added ima_policy_flag variable ima: return an error code from ima_add_boot_aggregate() ima: provide 'ima_appraise=log' kernel option ima: move keyring initialization to ima_init() PKCS#7: Handle PKCS#7 messages that contain no X.509 certs PKCS#7: Better handling of unsupported crypto KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handling ...

security: make security_file_set_fowner, f_setown and __f_setown void return

2014-09-09T20:01:36Z

security_file_set_fowner always returns 0, so make it f_setown and __f_setown void return functions and fix up the error handling in the callers. Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig

Make Smack operate on smack_known struct where it still used char*

2014-08-29T17:10:55Z

Smack used to use a mix of smack_known struct and char* throughout its APIs and implementation. This patch unifies the behaviour and makes it store and operate exclusively on smack_known struct pointers when managing labels. Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk Conflicts: security/smack/smack_access.c security/smack/smack_lsm.c

Fix a bidirectional UDS connect check typo

2014-08-29T17:10:47Z

The 54e70ec5eb090193b03e69d551fa6771a5a217c4 commit introduced a bidirectional check that should have checked for mutual WRITE access between two labels. Due to a typo the second check was incorrect. Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk

Small fixes in comments describing function parameters

2014-08-29T17:10:36Z

Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk