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<title>linux/security/smack, branch v6.2</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v6.2</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v6.2'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2022-12-13T17:47:48Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20221212' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm</title>
<updated>2022-12-13T17:47:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-13T17:47:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=c76ff350bd57682ae12bea6383dd8baf4824ac96'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c76ff350bd57682ae12bea6383dd8baf4824ac96</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:

 - Improve the error handling in the device cgroup such that memory
   allocation failures when updating the access policy do not
   potentially alter the policy.

 - Some minor fixes to reiserfs to ensure that it properly releases
   LSM-related xattr values.

 - Update the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook to take
   sockptr_t values.

   Previously the net/BPF folks updated the getsockopt code in the
   network stack to leverage the sockptr_t type to make it easier to
   pass both kernel and __user pointers, but unfortunately when they did
   so they didn't convert the LSM hook.

   While there was/is no immediate risk by not converting the LSM hook,
   it seems like this is a mistake waiting to happen so this patch
   proactively does the LSM hook conversion.

 - Convert vfs_getxattr_alloc() to return an int instead of a ssize_t
   and cleanup the callers. Internally the function was never going to
   return anything larger than an int and the callers were doing some
   very odd things casting the return value; this patch fixes all that
   and helps bring a bit of sanity to vfs_getxattr_alloc() and its
   callers.

 - More verbose, and helpful, LSM debug output when the system is booted
   with "lsm.debug" on the command line. There are examples in the
   commit description, but the quick summary is that this patch provides
   better information about which LSMs are enabled and the ordering in
   which they are processed.

 - General comment and kernel-doc fixes and cleanups.

* tag 'lsm-pr-20221212' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
  lsm: Fix description of fs_context_parse_param
  lsm: Add/fix return values in lsm_hooks.h and fix formatting
  lsm: Clarify documentation of vm_enough_memory hook
  reiserfs: Add missing calls to reiserfs_security_free()
  lsm,fs: fix vfs_getxattr_alloc() return type and caller error paths
  device_cgroup: Roll back to original exceptions after copy failure
  LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot
  lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safe
  audit: Fix some kernel-doc warnings
  lsm: remove obsoleted comments for security hooks
  fs: edit a comment made in bad taste
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safe</title>
<updated>2022-11-05T03:25:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-10T16:31:21Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=b10b9c342f7571f287fd422be5d5c0beb26ba974'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b10b9c342f7571f287fd422be5d5c0beb26ba974</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 4ff09db1b79b ("bpf: net: Change sk_getsockopt() to take the
sockptr_t argument") made it possible to call sk_getsockopt()
with both user and kernel address space buffers through the use of
the sockptr_t type.  Unfortunately at the time of conversion the
security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook was written to only
accept userspace buffers, and in a desire to avoid having to change
the LSM hook the commit author simply passed the sockptr_t's
userspace buffer pointer.  Since the only sk_getsockopt() callers
at the time of conversion which used kernel sockptr_t buffers did
not allow SO_PEERSEC, and hence the
security_socket_getpeersec_stream() hook, this was acceptable but
also very fragile as future changes presented the possibility of
silently passing kernel space pointers to the LSM hook.

There are several ways to protect against this, including careful
code review of future commits, but since relying on code review to
catch bugs is a recipe for disaster and the upstream eBPF maintainer
is "strongly against defensive programming", this patch updates the
LSM hook, and all of the implementations to support sockptr_t and
safely handle both user and kernel space buffers.

Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>smack: implement get, set and remove acl hook</title>
<updated>2022-10-20T08:13:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-22T15:17:09Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:44faac01cd0afbf6d3f1e41918fb85daecfcb8a6</id>
<content type='text'>
The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic
xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to
interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to
userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to
understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of
making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are
building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode
operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths
easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1].

So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and
integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the
void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl
representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is
obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the
vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper
security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in
their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void
pointer stored in the uapi format.

I spent considerate time in the security module infrastructure and
audited all codepaths. Smack has no restrictions based on the posix
acl values passed through it. The capability hook doesn't need to be
called either because it only has restrictions on security.* xattrs. So
these all becomes very simple hooks for smack.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1]
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'pull-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2022-10-07T00:31:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-07T00:31:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=4c0ed7d8d6e3dc013c4599a837de84794baa5b62'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4c0ed7d8d6e3dc013c4599a837de84794baa5b62</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull vfs constification updates from Al Viro:
 "whack-a-mole: constifying struct path *"

* tag 'pull-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  ecryptfs: constify path
  spufs: constify path
  nd_jump_link(): constify path
  audit_init_parent(): constify path
  __io_setxattr(): constify path
  do_proc_readlink(): constify path
  overlayfs: constify path
  fs/notify: constify path
  may_linkat(): constify path
  do_sys_name_to_handle(): constify path
  -&gt;getprocattr(): attribute name is const char *, TYVM...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'Smack-for-6.1' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next</title>
<updated>2022-10-04T00:38:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-04T00:38:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=74a0f84590eefaf0b55941e8bd8c476b35cdd40b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:74a0f84590eefaf0b55941e8bd8c476b35cdd40b</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
 "Two minor code clean-ups: one removes constants left over from the old
  mount API, while the other gets rid of an unneeded variable.

  The other change fixes a flaw in handling IPv6 labeling"

* tag 'Smack-for-6.1' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
  smack: cleanup obsolete mount option flags
  smack: lsm: remove the unneeded result variable
  SMACK: Add sk_clone_security LSM hook
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>smack: cleanup obsolete mount option flags</title>
<updated>2022-09-27T17:33:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiu Jianfeng</name>
<email>xiujianfeng@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-08T10:35:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=cc71271f5b793d619f8a7d2ef905374102533c75'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cc71271f5b793d619f8a7d2ef905374102533c75</id>
<content type='text'>
These mount option flags are obsolete since commit 12085b14a444 ("smack:
switch to private smack_mnt_opts"), remove them.

Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng &lt;xiujianfeng@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>smack: lsm: remove the unneeded result variable</title>
<updated>2022-09-27T17:33:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Xu Panda</name>
<email>xu.panda@zte.com.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-12T10:05:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=d3f84f5c9627576b555976c7584514a2ca3ed02e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d3f84f5c9627576b555976c7584514a2ca3ed02e</id>
<content type='text'>
Return the value smk_ptrace_rule_check() directly instead of storing it
in another redundant variable.

Reported-by: Zeal Robot &lt;zealci@zte.com.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xu Panda &lt;xu.panda@zte.com.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SMACK: Add sk_clone_security LSM hook</title>
<updated>2022-09-27T17:33:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Lontke Michael</name>
<email>michael.lontke@elektrobit.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-08-31T12:03:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=4ca165fc6c49c3b0100f61524ffbca4743d46e8d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4ca165fc6c49c3b0100f61524ffbca4743d46e8d</id>
<content type='text'>
Using smk_of_current() during sk_alloc_security hook leads in
rare cases to a faulty initialization of the security context
of the created socket.

By adding the LSM hook sk_clone_security to SMACK this initialization
fault is corrected by copying the security context of the old socket
pointer to the newly cloned one.

Co-authored-by: Martin Ostertag: &lt;martin.ostertag@elektrobit.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Lontke Michael &lt;michael.lontke@elektrobit.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>-&gt;getprocattr(): attribute name is const char *, TYVM...</title>
<updated>2022-09-01T21:34:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-31T00:57:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=c8e477c649b40c1a073b7a843d89e51dc0037db7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c8e477c649b40c1a073b7a843d89e51dc0037db7</id>
<content type='text'>
cast of -&gt;d_name.name to char * is completely wrong - nothing is
allowed to modify its contents.

Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Smack: Provide read control for io_uring_cmd</title>
<updated>2022-08-26T18:56:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-08-23T23:46:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=dd9373402280cf4715fdc8fd5070f7d039e43511'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dd9373402280cf4715fdc8fd5070f7d039e43511</id>
<content type='text'>
Limit io_uring "cmd" options to files for which the caller has
Smack read access. There may be cases where the cmd option may
be closer to a write access than a read, but there is no way
to make that determination.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd")
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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