<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/tools/testing/selftests/proc, branch v5.10</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.10</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v5.10'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2020-11-05T17:08:14Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>selftests: proc: fix warning: _GNU_SOURCE redefined</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T17:08:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tommi Rantala</name>
<email>tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-08T12:26:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=f3ae6c6e8a3ea49076d826c64e63ea78fbf9db43'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f3ae6c6e8a3ea49076d826c64e63ea78fbf9db43</id>
<content type='text'>
Makefile already contains -D_GNU_SOURCE, so we can remove it from the
*.c files.

Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala &lt;tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: use human-readable values for hidepid</title>
<updated>2020-04-22T15:51:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Gladkov</name>
<email>gladkov.alexey@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-19T14:10:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=1c6c4d112e81a919d4ea83ec6cbc2f55203217fd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1c6c4d112e81a919d4ea83ec6cbc2f55203217fd</id>
<content type='text'>
The hidepid parameter values are becoming more and more and it becomes
difficult to remember what each new magic number means.

Backward compatibility is preserved since it is possible to specify
numerical value for the hidepid parameter. This does not break the
fsconfig since it is not possible to specify a numerical value through
it. All numeric values are converted to a string. The type
FSCONFIG_SET_BINARY cannot be used to indicate a numerical value.

Selftest has been added to verify this behavior.

Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov &lt;gladkov.alexey@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace</title>
<updated>2020-04-22T15:51:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Gladkov</name>
<email>gladkov.alexey@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-19T14:10:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=fa10fed30f2550313a8284365b3e2398526eb42c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fa10fed30f2550313a8284365b3e2398526eb42c</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch allows to have multiple procfs instances inside the
same pid namespace. The aim here is lightweight sandboxes, and to allow
that we have to modernize procfs internals.

1) The main aim of this work is to have on embedded systems one
supervisor for apps. Right now we have some lightweight sandbox support,
however if we create pid namespacess we have to manages all the
processes inside too, where our goal is to be able to run a bunch of
apps each one inside its own mount namespace without being able to
notice each other. We only want to use mount namespaces, and we want
procfs to behave more like a real mount point.

2) Linux Security Modules have multiple ptrace paths inside some
subsystems, however inside procfs, the implementation does not guarantee
that the ptrace() check which triggers the security_ptrace_check() hook
will always run. We have the 'hidepid' mount option that can be used to
force the ptrace_may_access() check inside has_pid_permissions() to run.
The problem is that 'hidepid' is per pid namespace and not attached to
the mount point, any remount or modification of 'hidepid' will propagate
to all other procfs mounts.

This also does not allow to support Yama LSM easily in desktop and user
sessions. Yama ptrace scope which restricts ptrace and some other
syscalls to be allowed only on inferiors, can be updated to have a
per-task context, where the context will be inherited during fork(),
clone() and preserved across execve(). If we support multiple private
procfs instances, then we may force the ptrace_may_access() on
/proc/&lt;pids&gt;/ to always run inside that new procfs instances. This will
allow to specifiy on user sessions if we should populate procfs with
pids that the user can ptrace or not.

By using Yama ptrace scope, some restricted users will only be able to see
inferiors inside /proc, they won't even be able to see their other
processes. Some software like Chromium, Firefox's crash handler, Wine
and others are already using Yama to restrict which processes can be
ptracable. With this change this will give the possibility to restrict
/proc/&lt;pids&gt;/ but more importantly this will give desktop users a
generic and usuable way to specifiy which users should see all processes
and which users can not.

Side notes:
* This covers the lack of seccomp where it is not able to parse
arguments, it is easy to install a seccomp filter on direct syscalls
that operate on pids, however /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/ is a Linux ABI using
filesystem syscalls. With this change LSMs should be able to analyze
open/read/write/close...

In the new patch set version I removed the 'newinstance' option
as suggested by Eric W. Biederman.

Selftest has been added to verify new behavior.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov &lt;gladkov.alexey@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>.gitignore: add SPDX License Identifier</title>
<updated>2020-03-25T10:50:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>masahiroy@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-03T13:35:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=d198b34f3855eee2571dda03eea75a09c7c31480'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d198b34f3855eee2571dda03eea75a09c7c31480</id>
<content type='text'>
Add SPDX License Identifier to all .gitignore files.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;masahiroy@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selftests: proc: Make va_max 1MB</title>
<updated>2019-11-07T21:52:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masami Hiramatsu</name>
<email>mhiramat@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-23T04:57:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=2f3571ea71311bbb2cbb9c3bbefc9c1969a3e889'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2f3571ea71311bbb2cbb9c3bbefc9c1969a3e889</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently proc-self-map-files-002.c sets va_max (max test address
of user virtual address) to 4GB, but it is too big for 32bit
arch and 1UL &lt;&lt; 32 is overflow on 32bit long.
Also since this value should be enough bigger than vm.mmap_min_addr
(64KB or 32KB by default), 1MB should be enough.

Make va_max 1MB unconditionally.

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: test /proc/sysvipc vs setns(CLONE_NEWIPC)</title>
<updated>2019-07-17T02:23:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-16T23:26:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=7dbbade1f285e881119049563ab2a036c96dd9f3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7dbbade1f285e881119049563ab2a036c96dd9f3</id>
<content type='text'>
I thought that /proc/sysvipc has the same bug as /proc/net

	commit 1fde6f21d90f8ba5da3cb9c54ca991ed72696c43
	proc: fix /proc/net/* after setns(2)

However, it doesn't! /proc/sysvipc files do

	get_ipc_ns(current-&gt;nsproxy-&gt;ipc_ns);

in their open() hook and avoid the problem.

Keep the test, maybe /proc/sysvipc will become broken someday :-\

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190706180146.GA21015@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-pid-vm.c: hide "segfault at ffffffffff600000" dmesg spam</title>
<updated>2019-07-17T02:23:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-16T23:26:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=bca1eac55a940025065645158c1a3429ac697df6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bca1eac55a940025065645158c1a3429ac697df6</id>
<content type='text'>
Test tries to access vsyscall page and if it doesn't exist gets SIGSEGV
which can spam into dmesg.  However the segfault happens by design.
Handle it and carry information via exit code to parent.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190524181256.GA2260@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/Kconfig</title>
<updated>2019-05-21T08:50:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-19T12:07:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=ec8f24b7faaf3d4799a7c3f4c1b87f6b02778ad1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ec8f24b7faaf3d4799a7c3f4c1b87f6b02778ad1</id>
<content type='text'>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:

 - Have no license information of any form

These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:

  GPL-2.0-only

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: fixup proc-pid-vm test</title>
<updated>2019-04-19T16:46:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-19T00:50:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=68545aa1cda847c4fdda7e49331807f99f799838'/>
<id>urn:sha1:68545aa1cda847c4fdda7e49331807f99f799838</id>
<content type='text'>
Silly sizeof(pointer) vs sizeof(uint8_t[]) bug.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414123009.GA12971@avx2
Fixes: e483b0208784 ("proc: test /proc/*/maps, smaps, smaps_rollup, statm")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: fix map_files test on F29</title>
<updated>2019-04-19T16:46:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-19T00:50:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=8cd40d1d41ffc305d9aed77937896e1712b2490c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8cd40d1d41ffc305d9aed77937896e1712b2490c</id>
<content type='text'>
F29 bans mapping first 64KB even for root making test fail.  Iterate
from address 0 until mmap() works.

Gentoo (root):

	openat(AT_FDCWD, "/dev/zero", O_RDONLY) = 3
	mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = 0

Gentoo (non-root):

	openat(AT_FDCWD, "/dev/zero", O_RDONLY) = 3
	mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
	mmap(0x1000, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = 0x1000

F29 (root):

	openat(AT_FDCWD, "/dev/zero", O_RDONLY) = 3
	mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
	mmap(0x1000, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
	mmap(0x2000, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
	mmap(0x3000, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
	mmap(0x4000, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
	mmap(0x5000, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
	mmap(0x6000, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
	mmap(0x7000, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
	mmap(0x8000, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
	mmap(0x9000, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
	mmap(0xa000, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
	mmap(0xb000, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
	mmap(0xc000, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
	mmap(0xd000, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
	mmap(0xe000, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
	mmap(0xf000, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
	mmap(0x10000, 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = 0x10000

Now all proc tests succeed on F29 if run as root, at last!

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414123612.GB12971@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
