<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp, branch v4.14</title>
<subtitle>Mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v4.14</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/atom?h=v4.14'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/'/>
<updated>2017-11-02T10:10:55Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license</title>
<updated>2017-11-02T10:10:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-01T14:07:57Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=b24413180f5600bcb3bb70fbed5cf186b60864bd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b24413180f5600bcb3bb70fbed5cf186b60864bd</id>
<content type='text'>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode &amp; Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained &gt;5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if &lt;5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne &lt;pombredanne@nexb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'linux-kselftest-4.14-rc3-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest</title>
<updated>2017-09-27T17:51:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-27T17:51:08Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=225d3b67482930ff5a9f49ad307deffd97ce04c1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:225d3b67482930ff5a9f49ad307deffd97ce04c1</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull kselftest fixes from Shuah Khan:
 "This update consists of:

   - fixes to several existing tests

   - a test for regression introduced by b9470c27607b ("inet: kill
     smallest_size and smallest_port")

   - seccomp support for glibc 2.26 siginfo_t.h

   - fixes to kselftest framework and tests to run make O=dir use-case

   - fixes to silence unnecessary test output to de-clutter test results"

* tag 'linux-kselftest-4.14-rc3-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest: (28 commits)
  selftests: timers: set-timer-lat: Fix hang when testing unsupported alarms
  selftests: timers: set-timer-lat: fix hang when std out/err are redirected
  selftests/memfd: correct run_tests.sh permission
  selftests/seccomp: Support glibc 2.26 siginfo_t.h
  selftests: futex: Makefile: fix for loops in targets to run silently
  selftests: Makefile: fix for loops in targets to run silently
  selftests: mqueue: Use full path to run tests from Makefile
  selftests: futex: copy sub-dir test scripts for make O=dir run
  selftests: lib.mk: copy test scripts and test files for make O=dir run
  selftests: sync: kselftest and kselftest-clean fail for make O=dir case
  selftests: sync: use TEST_CUSTOM_PROGS instead of TEST_PROGS
  selftests: lib.mk: add TEST_CUSTOM_PROGS to allow custom test run/install
  selftests: watchdog: fix to use TEST_GEN_PROGS and remove clean
  selftests: lib.mk: fix test executable status check to use full path
  selftests: Makefile: clear LDFLAGS for make O=dir use-case
  selftests: lib.mk: kselftest and kselftest-clean fail for make O=dir case
  Makefile: kselftest and kselftest-clean fail for make O=dir case
  selftests/net: msg_zerocopy enable build with older kernel headers
  selftests: actually run the various net selftests
  selftest: add a reuseaddr test
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selftests/seccomp: Support glibc 2.26 siginfo_t.h</title>
<updated>2017-09-25T16:09:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-07T23:32:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=10859f3855db4c6f10dc7974ff4b3a292f3de8e0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:10859f3855db4c6f10dc7974ff4b3a292f3de8e0</id>
<content type='text'>
The 2.26 release of glibc changed how siginfo_t is defined, and the earlier
work-around to using the kernel definition are no longer needed. The old
way needs to stay around for a while, though.

Reported-by: Seth Forshee &lt;seth.forshee@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Will Drewry &lt;wad@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuah@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Tested-by: Seth Forshee &lt;seth.forshee@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan &lt;shuahkh@osg.samsung.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'seccomp-v4.14-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux</title>
<updated>2017-09-23T02:16:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-23T02:16:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=c0a3a64e723324ae6dda53214061a71de63808c3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c0a3a64e723324ae6dda53214061a71de63808c3</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull seccomp updates from Kees Cook:
 "Major additions:

   - sysctl and seccomp operation to discover available actions
     (tyhicks)

   - new per-filter configurable logging infrastructure and sysctl
     (tyhicks)

   - SECCOMP_RET_LOG to log allowed syscalls (tyhicks)

   - SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS as the new strictest possible action

   - self-tests for new behaviors"

[ This is the seccomp part of the security pull request during the merge
  window that was nixed due to unrelated problems   - Linus ]

* tag 'seccomp-v4.14-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  samples: Unrename SECCOMP_RET_KILL
  selftests/seccomp: Test thread vs process killing
  seccomp: Implement SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS action
  seccomp: Introduce SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS
  seccomp: Rename SECCOMP_RET_KILL to SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD
  seccomp: Action to log before allowing
  seccomp: Filter flag to log all actions except SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
  seccomp: Selftest for detection of filter flag support
  seccomp: Sysctl to configure actions that are allowed to be logged
  seccomp: Operation for checking if an action is available
  seccomp: Sysctl to display available actions
  seccomp: Provide matching filter for introspection
  selftests/seccomp: Refactor RET_ERRNO tests
  selftests/seccomp: Add simple seccomp overhead benchmark
  selftests/seccomp: Add tests for basic ptrace actions
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selftests: Enhance kselftest_harness.h to print which assert failed</title>
<updated>2017-09-06T01:21:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
<email>mic@digikod.net</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-06T23:23:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=369130b63178e0e2f863a2da2a5ad0238ded6d9d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:369130b63178e0e2f863a2da2a5ad0238ded6d9d</id>
<content type='text'>
When a test process is not able to write to TH_LOG_STREAM, this step
mechanism enable to print the assert number which triggered the failure.
This can be enabled by setting _metadata-&gt;no_print to true at the
beginning of the test sequence.

Update the seccomp-bpf test to return 0 if a test succeeded.

This feature is needed for the Landlock tests.

Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuah@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Will Drewry &lt;wad@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAGXu5j+D-FP8Kt9unNOqKrQJP4DYTpmgkJxWykZyrYiVPz3Y3Q@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan &lt;shuahkh@osg.samsung.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selftests/seccomp: Test thread vs process killing</title>
<updated>2017-08-14T20:46:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-11T20:20:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=f3e1821d9e1cc3fb434d7763001791dcd6720c90'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f3e1821d9e1cc3fb434d7763001791dcd6720c90</id>
<content type='text'>
This verifies that SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS is higher priority than
SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD. (This also moves a bunch of defines up earlier
in the file to use them earlier.)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seccomp: Rename SECCOMP_RET_KILL to SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD</title>
<updated>2017-08-14T20:46:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-11T19:53:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=fd76875ca289a3d4722f266fd2d5532a27083903'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fd76875ca289a3d4722f266fd2d5532a27083903</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for adding SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS, rename SECCOMP_RET_KILL
to the more accurate SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD.

The existing selftest values are intentionally left as SECCOMP_RET_KILL
just to be sure we're exercising the alias.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seccomp: Action to log before allowing</title>
<updated>2017-08-14T20:46:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-11T04:33:57Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=59f5cf44a38284eb9e76270c786fb6cc62ef8ac4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:59f5cf44a38284eb9e76270c786fb6cc62ef8ac4</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a new action, SECCOMP_RET_LOG, that logs a syscall before allowing
the syscall. At the implementation level, this action is identical to
the existing SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW action. However, it can be very useful when
initially developing a seccomp filter for an application. The developer
can set the default action to be SECCOMP_RET_LOG, maybe mark any
obviously needed syscalls with SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, and then put the
application through its paces. A list of syscalls that triggered the
default action (SECCOMP_RET_LOG) can be easily gleaned from the logs and
that list can be used to build the syscall whitelist. Finally, the
developer can change the default action to the desired value.

This provides a more friendly experience than seeing the application get
killed, then updating the filter and rebuilding the app, seeing the
application get killed due to a different syscall, then updating the
filter and rebuilding the app, etc.

The functionality is similar to what's supported by the various LSMs.
SELinux has permissive mode, AppArmor has complain mode, SMACK has
bring-up mode, etc.

SECCOMP_RET_LOG is given a lower value than SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW as allow
while logging is slightly more restrictive than quietly allowing.

Unfortunately, the tests added for SECCOMP_RET_LOG are not capable of
inspecting the audit log to verify that the syscall was logged.

With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is:

if action == RET_ALLOW:
  do not log
else if action == RET_KILL &amp;&amp; RET_KILL in actions_logged:
  log
else if action == RET_LOG &amp;&amp; RET_LOG in actions_logged:
  log
else if filter-requests-logging &amp;&amp; action in actions_logged:
  log
else if audit_enabled &amp;&amp; process-is-being-audited:
  log
else:
  do not log

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seccomp: Filter flag to log all actions except SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW</title>
<updated>2017-08-14T20:46:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-11T04:33:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=e66a39977985b1e69e17c4042cb290768eca9b02'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e66a39977985b1e69e17c4042cb290768eca9b02</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a new filter flag, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG, that enables logging for
all actions except for SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW for the given filter.

SECCOMP_RET_KILL actions are always logged, when "kill" is in the
actions_logged sysctl, and SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW actions are never logged,
regardless of this flag.

This flag can be used to create noisy filters that result in all
non-allowed actions to be logged. A process may have one noisy filter,
which is loaded with this flag, as well as a quiet filter that's not
loaded with this flag. This allows for the actions in a set of filters
to be selectively conveyed to the admin.

Since a system could have a large number of allocated seccomp_filter
structs, struct packing was taken in consideration. On 64 bit x86, the
new log member takes up one byte of an existing four byte hole in the
struct. On 32 bit x86, the new log member creates a new four byte hole
(unavoidable) and consumes one of those bytes.

Unfortunately, the tests added for SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG are not
capable of inspecting the audit log to verify that the actions taken in
the filter were logged.

With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is:

if action == RET_ALLOW:
  do not log
else if action == RET_KILL &amp;&amp; RET_KILL in actions_logged:
  log
else if filter-requests-logging &amp;&amp; action in actions_logged:
  log
else if audit_enabled &amp;&amp; process-is-being-audited:
  log
else:
  do not log

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seccomp: Selftest for detection of filter flag support</title>
<updated>2017-08-14T20:46:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-11T04:33:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.shady.money/linux/commit/?id=2b7ea5b5b5799f2878ed454bb48032bed6d101d3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2b7ea5b5b5799f2878ed454bb48032bed6d101d3</id>
<content type='text'>
Userspace needs to be able to reliably detect the support of a filter
flag. A good way of doing that is by attempting to enter filter mode,
with the flag bit(s) in question set, and a NULL pointer for the args
parameter of seccomp(2). EFAULT indicates that the flag is valid and
EINVAL indicates that the flag is invalid.

This patch adds a selftest that can be used to test this method of
detection in userspace.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
