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Make the logic easier to follow:
- Remove the final return statement, which is never reached, and move the
actual walk-terminating return statement out of the do-while loop.
- Remove the else-clause to reduce indentation. If a non-lonely group is
encountered during the walk, the loop is immediately terminated with a
return statement anyway; no need for an else.
Signed-off-by: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250606124818.455560-1-ptesarik@suse.com
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When porting a cma related usage from x86_64 server to arm64 server,
the "cma=4G@4G" setup failed on arm64. The reason is arm64 and some
other architectures have specific physical address limit for reserved
cma area, like 4GB due to the device's need for 32 bit dma. Actually
lots of platforms of those architectures don't have this device dma
limit, but still have to obey it, and are not able to reserve a huge
cma pool.
This situation could be improved by honoring the user input cma
physical address than the arch limit. As when users specify it, they
already knows what the default is which probably can't suit them.
Suggested-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250612021417.44929-1-feng.tang@linux.alibaba.com
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Once the global hash is requested there is no way back to switch back to
the per-task private hash. This is checked at the begin of the function.
It is possible that two threads simultaneously request the global hash
and both pass the initial check and block later on the
mm::futex_hash_lock. In this case the first thread performs the switch
to the global hash. The second thread will also attempt to switch to the
global hash and while doing so, accessing the nonexisting slot 1 of the
struct futex_private_hash.
The same applies if the hash is made immutable: There is no reference
counting and the hash must not be replaced.
Verify under mm_struct::futex_phash that neither the global hash nor an
immutable hash in use.
Tested-by: "Lai, Yi" <yi1.lai@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: "Lai, Yi" <yi1.lai@linux.intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aDwDw9Aygqo6oAx+@ly-workstation/
Fixes: bd54df5ea7cad ("futex: Allow to resize the private local hash")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250610104400.1077266-5-bigeasy@linutronix.de/
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Both ARM and IBM CI reports RCU stall, which can be reproduced by the
below perf command.
perf record -a -e cpu-clock -- sleep 2
The issue is introduced by the generic throttle patch set, which
unconditionally invoke the event_stop() when throttle is triggered.
The cpu-clock and task-clock are two special SW events, which rely on
the hrtimer. The throttle is invoked in the hrtimer handler. The
event_stop()->hrtimer_cancel() waits for the handler to finish, which is
a deadlock. Instead of invoking the stop(), the HRTIMER_NORESTART should
be used to stop the timer.
There may be two ways to fix it:
- Introduce a PMU flag to track the case. Avoid the event_stop in
perf_event_throttle() if the flag is detected.
It has been implemented in the
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250528175832.2999139-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com/
The new flag was thought to be an overkill for the issue.
- Add a check in the event_stop. Return immediately if the throttle is
invoked in the hrtimer handler. Rely on the existing HRTIMER_NORESTART
method to stop the timer.
The latter is implemented here.
Move event->hw.interrupts = MAX_INTERRUPTS before the stop(). It makes
the order the same as perf_event_unthrottle(). Except the patch, no one
checks the hw.interrupts in the stop(). There is no impact from the
order change.
When stops in the throttle, the event should not be updated,
stop(event, 0). But the cpu_clock_event_stop() doesn't handle the flag.
In logic, it's wrong. But it didn't bring any problems with the old
code, because the stop() was not invoked when handling the throttle.
Checking the flag before updating the event.
Fixes: 9734e25fbf5a ("perf: Fix the throttle logic for a group")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250527161656.GJ2566836@e132581.arm.com/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/djxlh5fx326gcenwrr52ry3pk4wxmugu4jccdjysza7tlc5fef@ktp4rffawgcw/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/8e8f51d8-af64-4d9e-934b-c0ee9f131293@linux.ibm.com/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/4ce106d0-950c-aadc-0b6a-f0215cd39913@maine.edu/
Reported-by: Leo Yan <leo.yan@arm.com>
Reported-by: Aishwarya TCV <aishwarya.tcv@arm.com>
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250606192546.915765-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
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Correct "l" to "vl_i".
Signed-off-by: wang wei <a929244872@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250605152931.22804-1-a929244872@163.com
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Due to the weird Makefile setup of sched the various files do not
compile as stand alone units. The new generation of editors are trying
to do just this -- mostly to offer fancy things like completions but
also better syntax highlighting and code navigation.
Specifically, I've been playing around with neovim and clangd.
Setting up clangd on the kernel source is a giant pain in the arse
(this really should be improved), but once you do manage, you run into
dumb stuff like the above.
Fix up the scheduler files to at least pretend to work.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250523164348.GN39944@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
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The variable "head" is allocated and initialized as a list before
allocating the first "item" for the list. If the allocation of "item"
fails, it frees "head" and then jumps to the label "free_now" which will
process head and free it.
This will cause a UAF of "head", and it doesn't need to free it before
jumping to the "free_now" label as that code will free it.
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250610093348.33c5643a@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: a9d0aab5eb33 ("tracing: Fix regression of filter waiting a long time on RCU synchronization")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202506070424.lCiNreTI-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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This implements the core of the series and causes the verifier to fall
back to mitigating Spectre v1 using speculation barriers. The approach
was presented at LPC'24 [1] and RAID'24 [2].
If we find any forbidden behavior on a speculative path, we insert a
nospec (e.g., lfence speculation barrier on x86) before the instruction
and stop verifying the path. While verifying a speculative path, we can
furthermore stop verification of that path whenever we encounter a
nospec instruction.
A minimal example program would look as follows:
A = true
B = true
if A goto e
f()
if B goto e
unsafe()
e: exit
There are the following speculative and non-speculative paths
(`cur->speculative` and `speculative` referring to the value of the
push_stack() parameters):
- A = true
- B = true
- if A goto e
- A && !cur->speculative && !speculative
- exit
- !A && !cur->speculative && speculative
- f()
- if B goto e
- B && cur->speculative && !speculative
- exit
- !B && cur->speculative && speculative
- unsafe()
If f() contains any unsafe behavior under Spectre v1 and the unsafe
behavior matches `state->speculative &&
error_recoverable_with_nospec(err)`, do_check() will now add a nospec
before f() instead of rejecting the program:
A = true
B = true
if A goto e
nospec
f()
if B goto e
unsafe()
e: exit
Alternatively, the algorithm also takes advantage of nospec instructions
inserted for other reasons (e.g., Spectre v4). Taking the program above
as an example, speculative path exploration can stop before f() if a
nospec was inserted there because of Spectre v4 sanitization.
In this example, all instructions after the nospec are dead code (and
with the nospec they are also dead code speculatively).
For this, it relies on the fact that speculation barriers generally
prevent all later instructions from executing if the speculation was not
correct:
* On Intel x86_64, lfence acts as full speculation barrier, not only as
a load fence [3]:
An LFENCE instruction or a serializing instruction will ensure that
no later instructions execute, even speculatively, until all prior
instructions complete locally. [...] Inserting an LFENCE instruction
after a bounds check prevents later operations from executing before
the bound check completes.
This was experimentally confirmed in [4].
* On AMD x86_64, lfence is dispatch-serializing [5] (requires MSR
C001_1029[1] to be set if the MSR is supported, this happens in
init_amd()). AMD further specifies "A dispatch serializing instruction
forces the processor to retire the serializing instruction and all
previous instructions before the next instruction is executed" [8]. As
dispatch is not specific to memory loads or branches, lfence therefore
also affects all instructions there. Also, if retiring a branch means
it's PC change becomes architectural (should be), this means any
"wrong" speculation is aborted as required for this series.
* ARM's SB speculation barrier instruction also affects "any instruction
that appears later in the program order than the barrier" [6].
* PowerPC's barrier also affects all subsequent instructions [7]:
[...] executing an ori R31,R31,0 instruction ensures that all
instructions preceding the ori R31,R31,0 instruction have completed
before the ori R31,R31,0 instruction completes, and that no
subsequent instructions are initiated, even out-of-order, until
after the ori R31,R31,0 instruction completes. The ori R31,R31,0
instruction may complete before storage accesses associated with
instructions preceding the ori R31,R31,0 instruction have been
performed
Regarding the example, this implies that `if B goto e` will not execute
before `if A goto e` completes. Once `if A goto e` completes, the CPU
should find that the speculation was wrong and continue with `exit`.
If there is any other path that leads to `if B goto e` (and therefore
`unsafe()`) without going through `if A goto e`, then a nospec will
still be needed there. However, this patch assumes this other path will
be explored separately and therefore be discovered by the verifier even
if the exploration discussed here stops at the nospec.
This patch furthermore has the unfortunate consequence that Spectre v1
mitigations now only support architectures which implement BPF_NOSPEC.
Before this commit, Spectre v1 mitigations prevented exploits by
rejecting the programs on all architectures. Because some JITs do not
implement BPF_NOSPEC, this patch therefore may regress unpriv BPF's
security to a limited extent:
* The regression is limited to systems vulnerable to Spectre v1, have
unprivileged BPF enabled, and do NOT emit insns for BPF_NOSPEC. The
latter is not the case for x86 64- and 32-bit, arm64, and powerpc
64-bit and they are therefore not affected by the regression.
According to commit a6f6a95f2580 ("LoongArch, bpf: Fix jit to skip
speculation barrier opcode"), LoongArch is not vulnerable to Spectre
v1 and therefore also not affected by the regression.
* To the best of my knowledge this regression may therefore only affect
MIPS. This is deemed acceptable because unpriv BPF is still disabled
there by default. As stated in a previous commit, BPF_NOSPEC could be
implemented for MIPS based on GCC's speculation_barrier
implementation.
* It is unclear which other architectures (besides x86 64- and 32-bit,
ARM64, PowerPC 64-bit, LoongArch, and MIPS) supported by the kernel
are vulnerable to Spectre v1. Also, it is not clear if barriers are
available on these architectures. Implementing BPF_NOSPEC on these
architectures therefore is non-trivial. Searching GCC and the kernel
for speculation barrier implementations for these architectures
yielded no result.
* If any of those regressed systems is also vulnerable to Spectre v4,
the system was already vulnerable to Spectre v4 attacks based on
unpriv BPF before this patch and the impact is therefore further
limited.
As an alternative to regressing security, one could still reject
programs if the architecture does not emit BPF_NOSPEC (e.g., by removing
the empty BPF_NOSPEC-case from all JITs except for LoongArch where it
appears justified). However, this will cause rejections on these archs
that are likely unfounded in the vast majority of cases.
In the tests, some are now successful where we previously had a
false-positive (i.e., rejection). Change them to reflect where the
nospec should be inserted (using __xlated_unpriv) and modify the error
message if the nospec is able to mitigate a problem that previously
shadowed another problem (in that case __xlated_unpriv does not work,
therefore just add a comment).
Define SPEC_V1 to avoid duplicating this ifdef whenever we check for
nospec insns using __xlated_unpriv, define it here once. This also
improves readability. PowerPC can probably also be added here. However,
omit it for now because the BPF CI currently does not include a test.
Limit it to EPERM, EACCES, and EINVAL (and not everything except for
EFAULT and ENOMEM) as it already has the desired effect for most
real-world programs. Briefly went through all the occurrences of EPERM,
EINVAL, and EACCESS in verifier.c to validate that catching them like
this makes sense.
Thanks to Dustin for their help in checking the vendor documentation.
[1] https://lpc.events/event/18/contributions/1954/ ("Mitigating
Spectre-PHT using Speculation Barriers in Linux eBPF")
[2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.00078 ("VeriFence: Lightweight and
Precise Spectre Defenses for Untrusted Linux Kernel Extensions")
[3] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/runtime-speculative-side-channel-mitigations.html
("Managed Runtime Speculative Execution Side Channel Mitigations")
[4] https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3359789.3359837 ("Speculator: a
tool to analyze speculative execution attacks and mitigations" -
Section 4.6 "Stopping Speculative Execution")
[5] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/software-techniques-for-managing-speculation.pdf
("White Paper - SOFTWARE TECHNIQUES FOR MANAGING SPECULATION ON AMD
PROCESSORS - REVISION 5.09.23")
[6] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0597/2020-12/Base-Instructions/SB--Speculation-Barrier-
("SB - Speculation Barrier - Arm Armv8-A A32/T32 Instruction Set
Architecture (2020-12)")
[7] https://wiki.raptorcs.com/w/images/5/5f/OPF_PowerISA_v3.1C.pdf
("Power ISA™ - Version 3.1C - May 26, 2024 - Section 9.2.1 of Book
III")
[8] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/40332.pdf
("AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual Volumes 1–5 - Revision 4.08
- April 2024 - 7.6.4 Serializing Instructions")
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Dustin Nguyen <nguyen@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603212428.338473-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This is made to clarify that this flag will cause a nospec to be added
after this insn and can therefore be relied upon to reduce speculative
path analysis.
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Cc: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603212024.338154-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This changes the semantics of BPF_NOSPEC (previously a v4-only barrier)
to always emit a speculation barrier that works against both Spectre v1
AND v4. If mitigation is not needed on an architecture, the backend
should set bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v4/v1().
As of now, this commit only has the user-visible implication that unpriv
BPF's performance on PowerPC is reduced. This is the case because we
have to emit additional v1 barrier instructions for BPF_NOSPEC now.
This commit is required for a future commit to allow us to rely on
BPF_NOSPEC for Spectre v1 mitigation. As of this commit, the feature
that nospec acts as a v1 barrier is unused.
Commit f5e81d111750 ("bpf: Introduce BPF nospec instruction for
mitigating Spectre v4") noted that mitigation instructions for v1 and v4
might be different on some archs. While this would potentially offer
improved performance on PowerPC, it was dismissed after the following
considerations:
* Only having one barrier simplifies the verifier and allows us to
easily rely on v4-induced barriers for reducing the complexity of
v1-induced speculative path verification.
* For the architectures that implemented BPF_NOSPEC, only PowerPC has
distinct instructions for v1 and v4. Even there, some insns may be
shared between the barriers for v1 and v4 (e.g., 'ori 31,31,0' and
'sync'). If this is still found to impact performance in an
unacceptable way, BPF_NOSPEC can be split into BPF_NOSPEC_V1 and
BPF_NOSPEC_V4 later. As an optimization, we can already skip v1/v4
insns from being emitted for PowerPC with this setup if
bypass_spec_v1/v4 is set.
Vulnerability-status for BPF_NOSPEC-based Spectre mitigations (v4 as of
this commit, v1 in the future) is therefore:
* x86 (32-bit and 64-bit), ARM64, and PowerPC (64-bit): Mitigated - This
patch implements BPF_NOSPEC for these architectures. The previous
v4-only version was supported since commit f5e81d111750 ("bpf:
Introduce BPF nospec instruction for mitigating Spectre v4") and
commit b7540d625094 ("powerpc/bpf: Emit stf barrier instruction
sequences for BPF_NOSPEC").
* LoongArch: Not Vulnerable - Commit a6f6a95f2580 ("LoongArch, bpf: Fix
jit to skip speculation barrier opcode") is the only other past commit
related to BPF_NOSPEC and indicates that the insn is not required
there.
* MIPS: Vulnerable (if unprivileged BPF is enabled) -
Commit a6f6a95f2580 ("LoongArch, bpf: Fix jit to skip speculation
barrier opcode") indicates that it is not vulnerable, but this
contradicts the kernel and Debian documentation. Therefore, I assume
that there exist vulnerable MIPS CPUs (but maybe not from Loongson?).
In the future, BPF_NOSPEC could be implemented for MIPS based on the
GCC speculation_barrier [1]. For now, we rely on unprivileged BPF
being disabled by default.
* Other: Unknown - To the best of my knowledge there is no definitive
information available that indicates that any other arch is
vulnerable. They are therefore left untouched (BPF_NOSPEC is not
implemented, but bypass_spec_v1/v4 is also not set).
I did the following testing to ensure the insn encoding is correct:
* ARM64:
* 'dsb nsh; isb' was successfully tested with the BPF CI in [2]
* 'sb' locally using QEMU v7.2.15 -cpu max (emitted sb insn is
executed for example with './test_progs -t verifier_array_access')
* PowerPC: The following configs were tested locally with ppc64le QEMU
v8.2 '-machine pseries -cpu POWER9':
* STF_BARRIER_EIEIO + CONFIG_PPC_BOOK32_64
* STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI (forced on) + CONFIG_PPC_BOOK32_64
* STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK (forced on) + CONFIG_PPC_BOOK32_64
* CONFIG_PPC_E500 (forced on) + STF_BARRIER_EIEIO
* CONFIG_PPC_E500 (forced on) + STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI (forced on)
* CONFIG_PPC_E500 (forced on) + STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK (forced on)
* CONFIG_PPC_E500 (forced on) + STF_BARRIER_NONE (forced on)
Most of those cobinations should not occur in practice, but I was not
able to get an PPC e6500 rootfs (for testing PPC_E500 without forcing
it on). In any case, this should ensure that there are no unexpected
conflicts between the insns when combined like this. Individual v1/v4
barriers were already emitted elsewhere.
Hari's ack is for the PowerPC changes only.
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commit;h=29b74545531f6afbee9fc38c267524326dbfbedf
("MIPS: Add speculation_barrier support")
[2] https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/pull/8576
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603211703.337860-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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JITs can set bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() if they want the verifier to
skip analysis/patching for the respective vulnerability. For v4, this
will reduce the number of barriers the verifier inserts. For v1, it
allows more programs to be accepted.
The primary motivation for this is to not regress unpriv BPF's
performance on ARM64 in a future commit where BPF_NOSPEC is also used
against Spectre v1.
This has the user-visible change that v1-induced rejections on
non-vulnerable PowerPC CPUs are avoided.
For now, this does not change the semantics of BPF_NOSPEC. It is still a
v4-only barrier and must not be implemented if bypass_spec_v4 is always
true for the arch. Changing it to a v1 AND v4-barrier is done in a
future commit.
As an alternative to bypass_spec_v1/v4, one could introduce NOSPEC_V1
AND NOSPEC_V4 instructions and allow backends to skip their lowering as
suggested by commit f5e81d111750 ("bpf: Introduce BPF nospec instruction
for mitigating Spectre v4"). Adding bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() was
found to be preferable for the following reason:
* bypass_spec_v1/v4 benefits non-vulnerable CPUs: Always performing the
same analysis (not taking into account whether the current CPU is
vulnerable), needlessly restricts users of CPUs that are not
vulnerable. The only use case for this would be portability-testing,
but this can later be added easily when needed by allowing users to
force bypass_spec_v1/v4 to false.
* Portability is still acceptable: Directly disabling the analysis
instead of skipping the lowering of BPF_NOSPEC(_V1/V4) might allow
programs on non-vulnerable CPUs to be accepted while the program will
be rejected on vulnerable CPUs. With the fallback to speculation
barriers for Spectre v1 implemented in a future commit, this will only
affect programs that do variable stack-accesses or are very complex.
For PowerPC, the SEC_FTR checking in bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v4() is based
on the check that was previously located in the BPF_NOSPEC case.
For LoongArch, it would likely be safe to set both
bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1() and _v4() according to
commit a6f6a95f2580 ("LoongArch, bpf: Fix jit to skip speculation
barrier opcode"). This is omitted here as I am unable to do any testing
for LoongArch.
Hari's ack concerns the PowerPC part only.
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603211318.337474-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This prevents us from trying to recover from these on speculative paths
in the future.
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603205800.334980-4-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Mark these cases as non-recoverable to later prevent them from being
caught when they occur during speculative path verification.
Eduard writes [1]:
The only pace I'm aware of that might act upon specific error code
from verifier syscall is libbpf. Looking through libbpf code, it seems
that this change does not interfere with libbpf.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/785b4531ce3b44a84059a4feb4ba458c68fce719.camel@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603205800.334980-3-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This is required to catch the errors later and fall back to a nospec if
on a speculative path.
Eliminate the regs variable as it is only used once and insn_idx is not
modified in-between the definition and usage.
Do not pass insn but compute it in the function itself. As Eduard points
out [1], insn is assumed to correspond to env->insn_idx in many places
(e.g, __check_reg_arg()).
Move code into do_check_insn(), replace
* "continue" with "return 0" after modifying insn_idx
* "goto process_bpf_exit" with "return PROCESS_BPF_EXIT"
* "goto process_bpf_exit_full" with "return process_bpf_exit_full()"
* "do_print_state = " with "*do_print_state = "
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/293dbe3950a782b8eb3b87b71d7a967e120191fd.camel@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603205800.334980-2-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Add cookie in fdinfo for raw_tp, the info as follows:
link_type: raw_tracepoint
link_id: 31
prog_tag: 9dfdf8ef453843bf
prog_id: 32
tp_name: sys_enter
cookie: 23925373020405760
Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250606165818.3394397-5-chen.dylane@linux.dev
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Add cookie in fdinfo for tracing, the info as follows:
link_type: tracing
link_id: 6
prog_tag: 9dfdf8ef453843bf
prog_id: 35
attach_type: 25
target_obj_id: 1
target_btf_id: 60355
cookie: 9007199254740992
Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250606165818.3394397-4-chen.dylane@linux.dev
|
|
bpf_tramp_link includes cookie info, we can add it in bpf_link_info.
Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250606165818.3394397-1-chen.dylane@linux.dev
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|
When reg->type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, it can not be null. However the
verifier explores the branches under rX == 0 in check_cond_jmp_op()
even if reg->type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, because it was not checked for
in reg_not_null().
Fix this by adding CONST_PTR_TO_MAP to the set of types that are
considered non nullable in reg_not_null().
An old "unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero" selftest fails with this
change, because now early out correctly triggers in
check_cond_jmp_op(), making the verification to pass.
In practice verifier may allow pointer to null comparison in unpriv,
since in many cases the relevant branch and comparison op are removed
as dead code. So change the expected test result to __success_unpriv.
Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250609183024.359974-2-isolodrai@meta.com
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|
After commit 1b715e1b0ec5 ("bpf: Support ->fill_link_info for perf_event") add
perf_event info, we can also show the info with the method of cat /proc/[fd]/fdinfo.
kprobe fdinfo:
link_type: perf
link_id: 10
prog_tag: bcf7977d3b93787c
prog_id: 20
name: bpf_fentry_test1
offset: 0x0
missed: 0
addr: 0xffffffffa28a2904
event_type: kprobe
cookie: 3735928559
uprobe fdinfo:
link_type: perf
link_id: 13
prog_tag: bcf7977d3b93787c
prog_id: 21
name: /proc/self/exe
offset: 0x63dce4
ref_ctr_offset: 0x33eee2a
event_type: uprobe
cookie: 3735928559
tracepoint fdinfo:
link_type: perf
link_id: 11
prog_tag: bcf7977d3b93787c
prog_id: 22
tp_name: sched_switch
event_type: tracepoint
cookie: 3735928559
perf_event fdinfo:
link_type: perf
link_id: 12
prog_tag: bcf7977d3b93787c
prog_id: 23
type: 1
config: 2
event_type: event
cookie: 3735928559
Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250606150258.3385166-1-chen.dylane@linux.dev
|
|
Current cgroup prog ordering is appending at attachment time. This is not
ideal. In some cases, users want specific ordering at a particular cgroup
level. To address this, the existing mprog API seems an ideal solution with
supporting BPF_F_BEFORE and BPF_F_AFTER flags.
But there are a few obstacles to directly use kernel mprog interface.
Currently cgroup bpf progs already support prog attach/detach/replace
and link-based attach/detach/replace. For example, in struct
bpf_prog_array_item, the cgroup_storage field needs to be together
with bpf prog. But the mprog API struct bpf_mprog_fp only has bpf_prog
as the member, which makes it difficult to use kernel mprog interface.
In another case, the current cgroup prog detach tries to use the
same flag as in attach. This is different from mprog kernel interface
which uses flags passed from user space.
So to avoid modifying existing behavior, I made the following changes to
support mprog API for cgroup progs:
- The support is for prog list at cgroup level. Cross-level prog list
(a.k.a. effective prog list) is not supported.
- Previously, BPF_F_PREORDER is supported only for prog attach, now
BPF_F_PREORDER is also supported by link-based attach.
- For attach, BPF_F_BEFORE/BPF_F_AFTER/BPF_F_ID/BPF_F_LINK is supported
similar to kernel mprog but with different implementation.
- For detach and replace, use the existing implementation.
- For attach, detach and replace, the revision for a particular prog
list, associated with a particular attach type, will be updated
by increasing count by 1.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250606163141.2428937-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
|
|
One of key items in mprog API is revision for prog list. The revision
number will be increased if the prog list changed, e.g., attach, detach
or replace.
Add 'revisions' field to struct cgroup_bpf, representing revisions for
all cgroup related attachment types. The initial revision value is
set to 1, the same as kernel mprog implementations.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250606163136.2428732-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
|
|
The dedicated helper is more verbose and effective comparing to
cpumask_first() followed by cpumask_next().
Signed-off-by: Yury Norov [NVIDIA] <yury.norov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
|
|
scx_locked_rq() is used both from ext.c and ext_idle.c, move it to ext.h
as a static inline function.
No functional changes.
v2: Rename locked_rq to scx_locked_rq_state, expose it and make
scx_locked_rq() inline, as suggested by Tejun.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
|
|
scx_rq_bypassing() is used both from ext.c and ext_idle.c, move it to
ext.h as a static inline function.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
|
|
Functions that are only used within ext_idle.c can be marked as static
to limit their scope.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
|
|
There's no need to make scx_bpf_cpu_node() dependent on CONFIG_NUMA,
since cpu_to_node() can be used also in systems with CONFIG_NUMA
disabled.
This also allows to always validate the @cpu argument regardless of the
CONFIG_NUMA settings.
Fixes: 01059219b0cfd ("sched_ext: idle: Introduce node-aware idle cpu kfunc helpers")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
|
|
The kthreads for nbcon consoles are created by nbcon_alloc() at
the beginning of the console registration. But it currently works
only for the 2nd or later nbcon console because the code checks
@printk_kthreads_running.
The kthread for the 1st registered nbcon console is created at the very
end of register_console() by printk_kthreads_check_locked(). As a result,
the entire log is replayed synchronously when the "enabled" message
gets printed. It might block the boot for a long time with a slow serial
console.
Prevent the synchronous flush by creating the kthread even for the 1st
nbcon console when it is safe (kthreads ready and no boot consoles).
Also inform printk() to use the kthread by setting
@printk_kthreads_running. Note that the kthreads already must be
running when it is safe and this is not the 1st nbcon console.
Symmetrically, clear @printk_kthreads_running when the last nbcon
console was unregistered by nbcon_free(). This requires updating
@have_nbcon_console before nbcon_free() gets called.
Note that there is _no_ problem when the 1st nbcon console replaces boot
consoles. In this case, the kthread will be started at the end
of registration after the boot consoles are removed. But the console
does not reply the entire log buffer in this case. Note that
the flag CON_PRINTBUFFER is always cleared when the boot consoles are
removed and vice versa.
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250514173514.2117832-1-mcobb@thegoodpenguin.co.uk
Tested-by: Michael Cobb <mcobb@thegoodpenguin.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250604142045.253301-1-pmladek@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer cleanup from Thomas Gleixner:
"The delayed from_timer() API cleanup:
The renaming to the timer_*() namespace was delayed due massive
conflicts against Linux-next. Now that everything is upstream finish
the conversion"
* tag 'timers-cleanups-2025-06-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
treewide, timers: Rename from_timer() to timer_container_of()
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|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace
Pull more tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
- Fix regression of waiting a long time on updating trace event filters
When the faultable trace points were added, it needed task trace RCU
synchronization.
This was added to the tracepoint_synchronize_unregister() function.
The filter logic always called this function whenever it updated the
trace event filters before freeing the old filters. This increased
the time of "trace-cmd record" from taking 13 seconds to running over
2 minutes to complete.
Move the freeing of the filters to call_rcu*() logic, which brings
the time back down to 13 seconds.
- Fix ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set() error path lock protection
The error path of the ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set() released the
mutex too early and allowed subsequent accesses to setting the
subbuffer size to corrupt the data and cause a bug.
By moving the mutex locking to the end of the error path, it prevents
the reentrant access to the critical data and also allows the
function to convert the taking of the mutex over to the guard()
logic.
- Remove unused power management clock events
The clock events were added in 2010 for power management. In 2011 arm
used them. In 2013 the code they were used in was removed. These
events have been wasting memory since then.
- Fix sparse warnings
There was a few places that sparse warned about trace_events_filter.c
where file->filter was referenced directly, but it is annotated with
an __rcu tag. Use the helper functions and fix them up to use
rcu_dereference() properly.
* tag 'trace-v6.16-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace:
tracing: Add rcu annotation around file->filter accesses
tracing: PM: Remove unused clock events
ring-buffer: Fix buffer locking in ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set()
tracing: Fix regression of filter waiting a long time on RCU synchronization
|
|
Move this API to the canonical timer_*() namespace.
[ tglx: Redone against pre rc1 ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aB2X0jCKQO56WdMt@gmail.com
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild
Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada:
- Add support for the EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FOR_MODULES() macro, which
exports a symbol only to specified modules
- Improve ABI handling in gendwarfksyms
- Forcibly link lib-y objects to vmlinux even if CONFIG_MODULES=n
- Add checkers for redundant or missing <linux/export.h> inclusion
- Deprecate the extra-y syntax
- Fix a genksyms bug when including enum constants from *.symref files
* tag 'kbuild-v6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (28 commits)
genksyms: Fix enum consts from a reference affecting new values
arch: use always-$(KBUILD_BUILTIN) for vmlinux.lds
kbuild: set y instead of 1 to KBUILD_{BUILTIN,MODULES}
efi/libstub: use 'targets' instead of extra-y in Makefile
module: make __mod_device_table__* symbols static
scripts/misc-check: check unnecessary #include <linux/export.h> when W=1
scripts/misc-check: check missing #include <linux/export.h> when W=1
scripts/misc-check: add double-quotes to satisfy shellcheck
kbuild: move W=1 check for scripts/misc-check to top-level Makefile
scripts/tags.sh: allow to use alternative ctags implementation
kconfig: introduce menu type enum
docs: symbol-namespaces: fix reST warning with literal block
kbuild: link lib-y objects to vmlinux forcibly even when CONFIG_MODULES=n
tinyconfig: enable CONFIG_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION
docs/core-api/symbol-namespaces: drop table of contents and section numbering
modpost: check forbidden MODULE_IMPORT_NS("module:") at compile time
kbuild: move kbuild syntax processing to scripts/Makefile.build
Makefile: remove dependency on archscripts for header installation
Documentation/kbuild: Add new gendwarfksyms kABI rules
Documentation/kbuild: Drop section numbers
...
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Running sparse on trace_events_filter.c triggered several warnings about
file->filter being accessed directly even though it's annotated with __rcu.
Add rcu_dereference() around it and shuffle the logic slightly so that
it's always referenced via accessor functions.
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250607102821.6c7effbf@gandalf.local.home
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull misc fixes from Andrew Morton:
"13 hotfixes.
6 are cc:stable and the remainder address post-6.15 issues or aren't
considered necessary for -stable kernels. 11 are for MM"
* tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2025-06-06-16-02' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm:
kernel/rcu/tree_stall: add /sys/kernel/rcu_stall_count
MAINTAINERS: add mm swap section
kmsan: test: add module description
MAINTAINERS: add tlb trace events to MMU GATHER AND TLB INVALIDATION
mm/hugetlb: fix huge_pmd_unshare() vs GUP-fast race
mm/hugetlb: unshare page tables during VMA split, not before
MAINTAINERS: add Alistair as reviewer of mm memory policy
iov_iter: use iov_offset for length calculation in iov_iter_aligned_bvec
mm/mempolicy: fix incorrect freeing of wi_kobj
alloc_tag: handle module codetag load errors as module load failures
mm/madvise: handle madvise_lock() failure during race unwinding
mm: fix vmstat after removing NR_BOUNCE
KVM: s390: rename PROT_NONE to PROT_TYPE_DUMMY
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux
Pull RISC-V updates from Palmer Dabbelt:
- Support for the FWFT SBI extension, which is part of SBI 3.0 and a
dependency for many new SBI and ISA extensions
- Support for getrandom() in the VDSO
- Support for mseal
- Optimized routines for raid6 syndrome and recovery calculations
- kexec_file() supports loading Image-formatted kernel binaries
- Improvements to the instruction patching framework to allow for
atomic instruction patching, along with rules as to how systems need
to behave in order to function correctly
- Support for a handful of new ISA extensions: Svinval, Zicbop, Zabha,
some SiFive vendor extensions
- Various fixes and cleanups, including: misaligned access handling,
perf symbol mangling, module loading, PUD THPs, and improved uaccess
routines
* tag 'riscv-for-linus-6.16-mw1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux: (69 commits)
riscv: uaccess: Only restore the CSR_STATUS SUM bit
RISC-V: vDSO: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation
riscv: enable mseal sysmap for RV64
raid6: Add RISC-V SIMD syndrome and recovery calculations
riscv: mm: Add support for Svinval extension
RISC-V: Documentation: Add enough title underlines to CMODX
riscv: Improve Kconfig help for RISCV_ISA_V_PREEMPTIVE
MAINTAINERS: Update Atish's email address
riscv: uaccess: do not do misaligned accesses in get/put_user()
riscv: process: use unsigned int instead of unsigned long for put_user()
riscv: make unsafe user copy routines use existing assembly routines
riscv: hwprobe: export Zabha extension
riscv: Make regs_irqs_disabled() more clear
perf symbols: Ignore mapping symbols on riscv
RISC-V: Kconfig: Fix help text of CMDLINE_EXTEND
riscv: module: Optimize PLT/GOT entry counting
riscv: Add support for PUD THP
riscv: xchg: Prefetch the destination word for sc.w
riscv: Add ARCH_HAS_PREFETCH[W] support with Zicbop
riscv: Add support for Zicbop
...
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Enlarge the critical section in ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set() to
ensure that error handling takes place with per-buffer mutex held,
thus preventing list corruption and other concurrency-related issues.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Tzvetomir Stoyanov <tz.stoyanov@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250606112242.1510605-1-dmantipov@yandex.ru
Reported-by: syzbot+05d673e83ec640f0ced9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=05d673e83ec640f0ced9
Fixes: f9b94daa542a8 ("ring-buffer: Set new size of the ring buffer sub page")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
|
When faultable trace events were added, a trace event may no longer use
normal RCU to synchronize but instead used synchronize_rcu_tasks_trace().
This synchronization takes a much longer time to synchronize.
The filter logic would free the filters by calling
tracepoint_synchronize_unregister() after it unhooked the filter strings
and before freeing them. With this function now calling
synchronize_rcu_tasks_trace() this increased the time to free a filter
tremendously. On a PREEMPT_RT system, it was even more noticeable.
# time trace-cmd record -p function sleep 1
[..]
real 2m29.052s
user 0m0.244s
sys 0m20.136s
As trace-cmd would clear out all the filters before recording, it could
take up to 2 minutes to do a recording of "sleep 1".
To find out where the issues was:
~# trace-cmd sqlhist -e -n sched_stack select start.prev_state as state, end.next_comm as comm, TIMESTAMP_DELTA_USECS as delta, start.STACKTRACE as stack from sched_switch as start join sched_switch as end on start.prev_pid = end.next_pid
Which will produce the following commands (and -e will also execute them):
echo 's:sched_stack s64 state; char comm[16]; u64 delta; unsigned long stack[];' >> /sys/kernel/tracing/dynamic_events
echo 'hist:keys=prev_pid:__arg_18057_2=prev_state,__arg_18057_4=common_timestamp.usecs,__arg_18057_7=common_stacktrace' >> /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
echo 'hist:keys=next_pid:__state_18057_1=$__arg_18057_2,__comm_18057_3=next_comm,__delta_18057_5=common_timestamp.usecs-$__arg_18057_4,__stack_18057_6=$__arg_18057_7:onmatch(sched.sched_switch).trace(sched_stack,$__state_18057_1,$__comm_18057_3,$__delta_18057_5,$__stack_18057_6)' >> /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
The above creates a synthetic event that creates a stack trace when a task
schedules out and records it with the time it scheduled back in. Basically
the time a task is off the CPU. It also records the state of the task when
it left the CPU (running, blocked, sleeping, etc). It also saves the comm
of the task as "comm" (needed for the next command).
~# echo 'hist:keys=state,stack.stacktrace:vals=delta:sort=state,delta if comm == "trace-cmd" && state & 3' > /sys/kernel/tracing/events/synthetic/sched_stack/trigger
The above creates a histogram with buckets per state, per stack, and the
value of the total time it was off the CPU for that stack trace. It filters
on tasks with "comm == trace-cmd" and only the sleeping and blocked states
(1 - sleeping, 2 - blocked).
~# trace-cmd record -p function sleep 1
~# cat /sys/kernel/tracing/events/synthetic/sched_stack/hist | tail -18
{ state: 2, stack.stacktrace __schedule+0x1545/0x3700
schedule+0xe2/0x390
schedule_timeout+0x175/0x200
wait_for_completion_state+0x294/0x440
__wait_rcu_gp+0x247/0x4f0
synchronize_rcu_tasks_generic+0x151/0x230
apply_subsystem_event_filter+0xa2b/0x1300
subsystem_filter_write+0x67/0xc0
vfs_write+0x1e2/0xeb0
ksys_write+0xff/0x1d0
do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x420
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
} hitcount: 237 delta: 99756288 <<--------------- Delta is 99 seconds!
Totals:
Hits: 525
Entries: 21
Dropped: 0
This shows that this particular trace waited for 99 seconds on
synchronize_rcu_tasks() in apply_subsystem_event_filter().
In fact, there's a lot of places in the filter code that spends a lot of
time waiting for synchronize_rcu_tasks_trace() in order to free the
filters.
Add helper functions that will use call_rcu*() variants to asynchronously
free the filters. This brings the timings back to normal:
# time trace-cmd record -p function sleep 1
[..]
real 0m14.681s
user 0m0.335s
sys 0m28.616s
And the histogram also shows this:
~# cat /sys/kernel/tracing/events/synthetic/sched_stack/hist | tail -21
{ state: 2, stack.stacktrace __schedule+0x1545/0x3700
schedule+0xe2/0x390
schedule_timeout+0x175/0x200
wait_for_completion_state+0x294/0x440
__wait_rcu_gp+0x247/0x4f0
synchronize_rcu_normal+0x3db/0x5c0
tracing_reset_online_cpus+0x8f/0x1e0
tracing_open+0x335/0x440
do_dentry_open+0x4c6/0x17a0
vfs_open+0x82/0x360
path_openat+0x1a36/0x2990
do_filp_open+0x1c5/0x420
do_sys_openat2+0xed/0x180
__x64_sys_openat+0x108/0x1d0
do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x420
} hitcount: 2 delta: 77044
Totals:
Hits: 55
Entries: 28
Dropped: 0
Where the total waiting time of synchronize_rcu_tasks_trace() is 77
milliseconds.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Cc: Andreas Ziegler <ziegler.andreas@siemens.com>
Cc: Felix MOESSBAUER <felix.moessbauer@siemens.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250606201936.1e3d09a9@batman.local.home
Reported-by: "Flot, Julien" <julien.flot@siemens.com>
Tested-by: Julien Flot <julien.flot@siemens.com>
Fixes: a363d27cdbc2 ("tracing: Allow system call tracepoints to handle page faults")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/240017f656631c7dd4017aa93d91f41f653788ea.camel@siemens.com/
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Expose a simple counter to userspace for monitoring tools.
(akpm: 2536c5c7d6ae added the documentation but the code changes were lost)
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250504180831.4190860-3-max.kellermann@ionos.com
Fixes: 2536c5c7d6ae ("kernel/rcu/tree_stall: add /sys/kernel/rcu_stall_count")
Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
Cc: Core Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Cc: Doug Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Cc: Joel Granados <joel.granados@kernel.org>
Cc: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Failures inside codetag_load_module() are currently ignored. As a result
an error there would not cause a module load failure and freeing of the
associated resources. Correct this behavior by propagating the error code
to the caller and handling possible errors. With this change, error to
allocate percpu counters, which happens at this stage, will not be ignored
and will cause a module load failure and freeing of resources. With this
change we also do not need to disable memory allocation profiling when
this error happens, instead we fail to load the module.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250521160602.1940771-1-surenb@google.com
Fixes: 10075262888b ("alloc_tag: allocate percpu counters for module tags dynamically")
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reported-by: Casey Chen <cachen@purestorage.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250520231620.15259-1-cachen@purestorage.com/
Cc: Daniel Gomez <da.gomez@samsung.com>
Cc: David Wang <00107082@163.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: Luis Chamberalin <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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ssh://gitolite.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/alexghiti/linux into for-next
riscv patches for 6.16-rc1, part 2
* Performance improvements
- Add support for vdso getrandom
- Implement raid6 calculations using vectors
- Introduce svinval tlb invalidation
* Cleanup
- A bunch of deduplication of the macros we use for manipulating instructions
* Misc
- Introduce a kunit test for kprobes
- Add support for mseal as riscv fits the requirements (thanks to Lorenzo for making sure of that :))
[Palmer: There was a rebase between part 1 and part 2, so I've had to do
some more git surgery here... at least two rounds of surgery...]
* alex-pr-2: (866 commits)
RISC-V: vDSO: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation
riscv: enable mseal sysmap for RV64
raid6: Add RISC-V SIMD syndrome and recovery calculations
riscv: mm: Add support for Svinval extension
riscv: Add kprobes KUnit test
riscv: kprobes: Remove duplication of RV_EXTRACT_ITYPE_IMM
riscv: kprobes: Remove duplication of RV_EXTRACT_UTYPE_IMM
riscv: kprobes: Remove duplication of RV_EXTRACT_RD_REG
riscv: kprobes: Remove duplication of RVC_EXTRACT_BTYPE_IMM
riscv: kprobes: Remove duplication of RVC_EXTRACT_C2_RS1_REG
riscv: kproves: Remove duplication of RVC_EXTRACT_JTYPE_IMM
riscv: kprobes: Remove duplication of RV_EXTRACT_BTYPE_IMM
riscv: kprobes: Remove duplication of RV_EXTRACT_RS1_REG
riscv: kprobes: Remove duplication of RV_EXTRACT_JTYPE_IMM
riscv: kprobes: Move branch_funct3 to insn.h
riscv: kprobes: Move branch_rs2_idx to insn.h
Linux 6.15-rc6
Input: xpad - fix xpad_device sorting
Input: xpad - add support for several more controllers
Input: xpad - fix Share button on Xbox One controllers
...
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This CONFIG option, if supported by the architecture, helps reduce the
size of vmlinux.
For example, the size of vmlinux with ARCH=arm tinyconfig decreases as
follows:
text data bss dec hex filename
631684 104500 18176 754360 b82b8 vmlinux.before
455316 93404 15472 564192 89be0 vmlinux.after
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
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As is, it appears as if pointer arithmetic is allowed for everything
except PTR_TO_{STACK,MAP_VALUE} if one only looks at
sanitize_check_bounds(). However, this is misleading as the function
only works together with retrieve_ptr_limit() and the two must be kept
in sync. This patch documents the interdependency and adds a check to
ensure they stay in sync.
adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(): Because the preceding switch returns -EACCES
for every opcode except for ADD/SUB, the sanitize_needed() following the
sanitize_check_bounds() call is always true if reached. This means,
unless sanitize_check_bounds() detected that the pointer goes OOB
because of the ADD/SUB and returns -EACCES, sanitize_ptr_alu() always
executes after sanitize_check_bounds().
The following shows that this also implies that retrieve_ptr_limit()
runs in all relevant cases.
Note that there are two calls to sanitize_ptr_alu(), these are simply
needed to easily calculate the correct alu_limit as explained in
commit 7fedb63a8307 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic
mask"). The truncation-simulation is already performed on the first
call.
In the second sanitize_ptr_alu(commit_window = true), we always run
retrieve_ptr_limit(), unless:
* can_skip_alu_sanititation() is true, notably `BPF_SRC(insn->code) ==
BPF_K`. BPF_K is fine because it means that there is no scalar
register (which could be subject to speculative scalar confusion due
to Spectre v4) that goes into the ALU operation. The pointer register
can not be subject to v4-based value confusion due to the nospec
added. Thus, in this case it would have been fine to also skip
sanitize_check_bounds().
* If we are on a speculative path (`vstate->speculative`) and in the
second "commit" phase, sanitize_ptr_alu() always just returns 0. This
makes sense because there are no ALU sanitization limits to be learned
from speculative paths. Furthermore, because the sanitization will
ensure that pointer arithmetic stays in (architectural) bounds, the
sanitize_check_bounds() on the speculative path could also be skipped.
The second case needs more attention: Assume we have some ALU operation
that is used with scalars architecturally, but with a
non-PTR_TO_{STACK,MAP_VALUE} pointer (e.g., PTR_TO_PACKET)
speculatively. It might appear as if this would allow an unsanitized
pointer ALU operations, but this can not happen because one of the
following two always holds:
* The type mismatch stems from Spectre v4, then it is prevented by a
nospec after the possibly-bypassed store involving the pointer. There
is no speculative path simulated for this case thus it never happens.
* The type mismatch stems from a Spectre v1 gadget like the following:
r1 = slow(0)
r4 = fast(0)
r3 = SCALAR // Spectre v4 scalar confusion
if (r1) {
r2 = PTR_TO_PACKET
} else {
r2 = 42
}
if (r4) {
r2 += r3
*r2
}
If `r2 = PTR_TO_PACKET` is indeed dead code, it will be sanitized to
`goto -1` (as is the case for the r4-if block). If it is not (e.g., if
`r1 = r4 = 1` is possible), it will also be explored on an
architectural path and retrieve_ptr_limit() will reject it.
To summarize, the exception for `vstate->speculative` is safe.
Back to retrieve_ptr_limit(): It only allows the ALU operation if the
involved pointer register (can be either source or destination for ADD)
is PTR_TO_STACK or PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. Otherwise, it returns -EOPNOTSUPP.
Therefore, sanitize_check_bounds() returning 0 for
non-PTR_TO_{STACK,MAP_VALUE} is fine because retrieve_ptr_limit() also
runs for all relevant cases and prevents unsafe operations.
To summarize, we allow unsanitized pointer arithmetic with 64-bit
ADD/SUB for the following instructions if the requirements from
retrieve_ptr_limit() AND sanitize_check_bounds() hold:
* ptr -=/+= imm32 (i.e. `BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K`)
* PTR_TO_{STACK,MAP_VALUE} -= scalar
* PTR_TO_{STACK,MAP_VALUE} += scalar
* scalar += PTR_TO_{STACK,MAP_VALUE}
To document the interdependency between sanitize_check_bounds() and
retrieve_ptr_limit(), add a verifier_bug_if() to make sure they stay in
sync.
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Reported-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAP01T76HZ+s5h+_REqRFkRjjoKwnZZn9YswpSVinGicah1pGJw@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAP01T75oU0zfZCiymEcH3r-GQ5A6GOc6GmYzJEnMa3=53XuUQQ@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603204557.332447-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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After commit 68ca5d4eebb8 ("bpf: support BPF cookie in raw tracepoint
(raw_tp, tp_btf) programs"), we can show the cookie in bpf_link_info
like kprobe etc.
Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250603154309.3063644-1-chen.dylane@linux.dev
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The following ftrace patch for riscv uses a data store to update ftrace
function. Therefore, a romote fence is required to order it against
function_trace_op updates. The mechanism is similar to the fence between
function_trace_op and update_ftrace_func in the generic ftrace, so we
leverage the same ftrace_sync_ipi function.
[ alex: Fix build warning when !CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE ]
Signed-off-by: Andy Chiu <andybnac@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250407180838.42877-4-andybnac@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
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syzbot used a negative node number which was not rejected early and led
to invalid memory access in node_possible().
Reject negative node numbers except for FUTEX_NO_NODE.
[bigeasy: Keep the FUTEX_NO_NODE check]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/6835bfe3.a70a0220.253bc2.00b5.GAE@google.com/
Fixes: cec199c5e39bd ("futex: Implement FUTEX2_NUMA")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+9afaf6749e3a7aa1bdf3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250528085521.1938355-4-bigeasy@linutronix.de
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There may be concurrency between perf_cgroup_switch and
perf_cgroup_event_disable. Consider the following scenario: after a new
perf cgroup event is created on CPU0, the new event may not trigger
a reprogramming, causing ctx->is_active to be 0. In this case, when CPU1
disables this perf event, it executes __perf_remove_from_context->
list _del_event->perf_cgroup_event_disable on CPU1, which causes a race
with perf_cgroup_switch running on CPU0.
The following describes the details of this concurrency scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
perf_cgroup_switch:
...
# cpuctx->cgrp is not NULL here
if (READ_ONCE(cpuctx->cgrp) == NULL)
return;
perf_remove_from_context:
...
raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock);
...
# ctx->is_active == 0 because reprogramm is not
# tigger, so CPU1 can do __perf_remove_from_context
# for CPU0
__perf_remove_from_context:
perf_cgroup_event_disable:
...
if (--ctx->nr_cgroups)
...
# this warning will happened because CPU1 changed
# ctx.nr_cgroups to 0.
WARN_ON_ONCE(cpuctx->ctx.nr_cgroups == 0);
[peterz: use guard instead of goto unlock]
Fixes: db4a835601b7 ("perf/core: Set cgroup in CPU contexts for new cgroup events")
Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun@huaweicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250604033924.3914647-3-luogengkun@huaweicloud.com
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Commit a3c3c6667("perf/core: Fix child_total_time_enabled accounting
bug at task exit") moves the event->state update to before
list_del_event(). This makes the event->state test in list_del_event()
always false; never calling perf_cgroup_event_disable().
As a result, cpuctx->cgrp won't be cleared properly; causing havoc.
Fixes: a3c3c6667("perf/core: Fix child_total_time_enabled accounting bug at task exit")
Signed-off-by: Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: David Wang <00107082@163.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aD2TspKH%2F7yvfYoO@e129823.arm.com/
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While chasing down a missing perf_cgroup_event_disable() elsewhere,
Leo Yan found that both perf_put_aux_event() and
perf_remove_sibling_event() were also missing one.
Specifically, the rule is that events that switch to OFF,ERROR need to
call perf_cgroup_event_disable().
Unify the disable paths to ensure this.
Fixes: ab43762ef010 ("perf: Allow normal events to output AUX data")
Fixes: 9f0c4fa111dc ("perf/core: Add a new PERF_EV_CAP_SIBLING event capability")
Reported-by: Leo Yan <leo.yan@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250605123343.GD35970@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
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Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a
synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access
MMIO in bad ways.
The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in
exit_mmap()'s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address
space it is trying to access.
It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a
receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for
various reasons.
Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit().
Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER
to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes
sure to set current->mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual
teardown). Such that CPU wide events don't trip on this same problem.
Fixes: c5ebcedb566e ("perf: Add ability to attach user stack dump to sample")
Reported-by: Baisheng Gao <baisheng.gao@unisoc.com>
Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250605110815.GQ39944@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/sched_ext
Pull sched_ext fixes from Tejun Heo:
"Two fixes in the built-in idle selection helpers:
- Fix prev_cpu handling to guarantee that idle selection never
returns a CPU that's not allowed
- Skip cross-node search when !NUMA which could lead to infinite
looping due to a bug in NUMA iterator"
* tag 'sched_ext-for-6.16-rc1-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/sched_ext:
sched_ext: idle: Skip cross-node search with !CONFIG_NUMA
sched_ext: idle: Properly handle invalid prev_cpu during idle selection
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
- Fix UAF in module unload in ftrace when there's a bug in the module
If a module is buggy and triggers ftrace_disable which is set when an
anomaly is detected, when it gets unloaded it doesn't free the hooks
into kallsyms, and when a kallsyms lookup is performed it may access
the mod->modname field and crash via UAF.
Fix this by still freeing the mod_maps that are attached to kallsyms
on module unload regardless if ftrace_disable is set or not.
- Do not bother allocating mod_maps for kallsyms if ftrace_disable is
set
- Remove unused trace events
When a trace event or tracepoint is created but not used, it still
creates the code and data structures needed for that trace event.
This just wastes memory.
Remove the trace events that are created but not used. This does not
remove trace events that are created but are not used due configs not
being set. That will be handled later. This only removes events that
have no user under any config.
* tag 'trace-v6.16-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace:
fsdax: Remove unused trace events for dax insert mapping
genirq/matrix: Remove unused irq_matrix_alloc_reserved tracepoint
xdp: Remove unused mem_return_failed event
ftrace: Don't allocate ftrace module map if ftrace is disabled
ftrace: Fix UAF when lookup kallsym after ftrace disabled
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